Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Adapa Goverdhana Rao vs Deputy Registrar Of Co-Operative ... on 28 December, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1996(1)ALT319, (1996)IILLJ314AP
ORDER S.R. Nayak, J.
1. The petitioner claims to be the elected President of Sri Gopalaswamy Primary Agricultural Co-operative Society, Adapavaripalem village. The first respondent under Section 34(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, for short 'the Act' has issued notice to the petitioner and other members of the Committee of Management proposing to supersede the Committee of Management and calling upon the petitioner and other Members of the Committee of Management to submit their written explanation on or before December 29, 1995. This notice dt. December 21, 1995 issued by the first respondent under Section 34(1) of the Act is called in question in this writ petition. Sri. M.V. Durga Prasad, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner firstly contended that the impugned notice is one without jurisdiction and competence and the first respondent has no jurisdiction to supersede the office of the elected President. In support of his submission Sri Durga Prasad would draw the attention of the Court to Sub-section (5) of Section 31 of the Act. Secondly the learned counsel would contend that the action is otherwise tainted by malafide and the first respondent has taken the impugned action at the behest of the third respondent-Minister.
2. I do not find any force in the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Admittedly notice is issued under Sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the Act reads as under:
34. Supersession of the committee:
(1) If in the opinion of the Registrar, the committee is not functioning properly or wilfully disobeys or fails to comply wilfully with any lawful order or direction issued by the Registrar under this Act or the rules, he may, after giving the committee an opportunity of making its representation by order supersede the Committee and appoint either a person(hereinafter referred to as the special officer) or a committee of two or more persons (hereinafter referred to as the managing committee) to manage the affairs of the society for a period not exceeding two years, specified in the order which period, may, at the discretion of the Registrar, be extended from time to time, so however that the aggregate period shall not exceed three years".
At this stage it is relevant to note that, as held by the Apex Court in Geep Flash Light Industries Ltd., v. Union of India and Ors. , a show cause notice is not an order affecting anybody's right. The Court can interfere with show cause notice only where a show cause notice is issued by an incompetent authority. That is the precise argument of Sri Durga Prasad and he contends that the first respondent has no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice. The language of Section 34(1) is quite precise, unambiguous and does not admit more than one meaning. It provides that if in the opinion of the Registrar the Committee is not functioning properly of wilfully disobeys with any lawful order or direction issued by the Registrar, he may, after giving the Committee an opportunity of making its representation by order supersede the Committee of management of a co- operative society. The impugned notice makes it very clear that as many as 8 members of the committee of management have tendered their resignation under Rule 23 AAA of the Andhra Pradesh Co- operative Societies Rules, 1964. The first respondent has also pointed out that the committee of management is not functioning properly and there is a deadlock in the management of the Society due to existence of rival groups. Therefore it cannot be said that the conditions precedent to initiate proceedings under Section 34(1) of the Act do not exist. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is not a part of the Committee of management of Co-operative Society is not at all acceptable to the Court. Sub-section (5) of Section 31 of the Act only provides that the elected President shall be an ex-officio member of the committee. There is no difficulty in holding that even an ex-officio member of the committee is a member of the Committee and he, as a member of the Committee, cannot have any separate existence of membership beyond or outside the Committee. In other words, such ex-officio member should stand or sink with the committee, and if the Committee of management can be superseded under Section 34(1) of the Act and it is accordingly superseded, it is not open to such ex-officio member to contend that despite supersession, he is entitled to continue as a member of the Committee. When the Committee itself comes to an end the components of the Committee also cease to be components of the Committee. If the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted the Court would be violating both logic and reason.
3. It is not the argument of Sri M.V. Durga Prasad, the learned counsel for the petitioner that the first respondent lacks power under section 34 (1) of the Act to supersede a Committee of management of a Co-operative Society. As held by me supra, the elected President is also a constituent of the Committee of the management. When Section 34(1) of the Act contemplates an action against the whole body of Committee of management, the elected President, being ex-officio member of the Committee of management, cannot legally contend that the action now initiated by the first respondent against the Committee of management of the Co- operative Society is one without jurisdiction and competence. Therefore, I hold that the impugned notice issued by the first respondent is well within the competence and power of the first respondent.
4. The petitioner has also alleged that the impugned action was taken by the first respondent at the behest of the third respondent Minister for collateral and extraneous considerations and therefore the action is tainted by malafide, I do not find any necessity to go into those allegations at this stage inasmuch as the petitioner has approached this court against the show cause notice issued by the first respondent under Section 34(1) of the Act. The petitioner has an opportunity to show cause against the impugned notice and if the first respondent is satisfied that the objections that may be put forth by the petitioner, are valid and well founded, the first respondent may drop further proceedings in pursuance of the impugned notice. In that view of the matter I think that the consideration of plea of malafide at this stage is premature. The said plea is kept open to be agitated and considered if an occasion arises in future.
5. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, the writ petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs.