Patna High Court
Trustees Of The Provident Fund Of The ... vs Muktilall Agarwala And Ors. on 12 May, 1950
Equivalent citations: AIR1951PAT488, AIR 1951 PATNA 488, ILR 29 PAT 713
JUDGMENT Sarjoo Prasad, J.
1. This is a batch of misc. appeals arising out of an order of Mr. S. Ahmad, Dist. J. of Purulia, dated 26-6-1948. All these appeals have been heard together as they are directed against the same judgment & involve common questions for adjudication.
2. The cases arise out of applns. filed by the resp.-creditor under Section 4, Provincial Insolvency Act (Act V [5] of 1920). In those applns., the creditor alleged that certain sums of money lying in deposit in the provident fund account of the Tinplate Co. of India Ltd. under the management & control of the trustees of the Tinplate Co. provident fund were the property of the inslvts. within the meaning of Section 2 (d), Provincial Insolvency Act, & that the said property accordingly vested in the receiver appointed in the inslvcy. proceedings & was available for distribution & division amongst the creditors under Section 28 (2) of the aforesaid Act.
3. The applns. were opposed by the inslvts. as also by the Tinplate Co. Ltd. & the trustees of the fund aforesaid. Their contention was that the Tinplate Co. had created a fund by an indenture dated 15-7-1930, for the benefit of their employees & their families & had made a declaration of trust according to law transferring & vesting the said funds in the trustees who had admittedly the control, custody & management thereof. The fund being trust property & subject to rules & regulations framed under the instrument of trust, the inslvts. had no present interest in them. They, therefore, urged that the said deposits in the provident fund accounts could not be regarded as property of the inslvts. within the meaning of the Insolvency Act; nor were they available for distribution amongst the creditors of the inslvts.
4. The learned Dist. J. who dealt with these applns. held by his order under appeal that the members of the provident fund, namely, the inslvts had got disposing power over their provident fund monies standing to their credit in two of the accounts, & that, therefore, the provident fund was the property of the inslvts. which vested in the Insolvency Ct. & was available for distribution to the creditors under the provisions of the Insolvency Act. He also found that the property in the funds in question had not vested in the trustees who had simply the power of control & management over the funds in question. Against this order of the learned Dist. J the trustees of the provident fund of the Tinplate Co. of India Ltd. as also the Company have preferred the above appeals.
5. On behalf of the applts. Mr. Bhabanand Mukherji contended that the decision of the learned Dist. J. is erroneous on both the points. His contention is that the inslvts. who were the employees of the Tinplate Co. had no present right of disposition over the funds in question except under the rules of the trust, & that the property in the funds was, as it appears from the terms constituting the fund, vested in certain trustees, & therefore, the trustees could not be divested of the funds in question so as to make them available to the Insolvency Ct. for distribution amongst the creditors of the inslvts. It appears to me that both these contentions of Mr. Mukherji are correct & must prevail.
6. Section 28 (2), Provincial Insolvency Act, requires that "on the making of an order of adjudication, the whole of the property of the inslvt. shall vest in the Ct. or in a receiver as hereinafter provided, & shall become divisible among the creditors."
Therefore, if the funds in question are the "property of the inslvt," it cannot be doubted that they would vest in the Ct. or a receiver for purposes of distribution among the creditors. Now, the word "property" has been defined in Section 2 (d) of the Act. It includes any property over which or the profits of which any person has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit. There is no doubt that this definition of the word "property" is not exhaustive because the language itself shows that it includes any property having the characteristics mentioned in the definition, namely, property over which or the profits of which any person has a disposing power which power he can exercise to his advantage. It follows, therefore, that whatever the nature of the property may be, the inslvt. should have an interest in present to dispose of the same, & not such an interest which may depend upon the fulfilment of certain conditions or contingencies. In that case, the power of disposition cannot be exercised without let or hindrance by the person concerned. Therefore, the definition of the term "property" as used in the Act contemplates that the power of disposition must be an unconditional power. It is only such a property that is divisible amongst the creditors of the inslvt. This view of the law is also supported by reference to Section 56 (3) of the Act which lays down:
"Where the Ct. appoints a receiver, it may remove the person in whose possession or custody any such property as aforesaid is from the possession or custody thereof :
Provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise the Ct. to remove from the possession or custody of property any person whom the inslvt. has not a present right so to remove."
The Ct. or for the matter of that the receiver appointed in the inslvcy. proceedings is in no better position in the exercise of this power of disposition than the inslvt. himself. If the inslvt. has no present right to remove a person from the custody & control of a certain property, then the receiver or the Insolvency Ct. cannot do so, because the latter only steps into the shoes of the inslvt. with respect to the inslvt.'s property.
6(A). In Sat Narain v. Behari Lal, A. I. R. (12) 1925 P. C. 18 : (6 Lah. 1) the Judicial Committee when dealing with the definition of the term "property" in Section 2 (e), Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, which is exactly in the same terms as Section 2 (d), Provincial Act, observed as follows: "Section 2 seems to contemplate an absolute & unconditional power of disposal". There can be no doubt that where this power of disposal is hedged in & surrounded with conditions, it cannot constitute the property so as to vest in the receiver or the Ct. As the ease in question has given rise to some controversy, it would be useful to refer briefly to the facts in which the decision was given. The pltfs. in the case had sued to enforce a right of pre-emption. The defts. contested the pltf.'s right on the ground that the father of the pltfs. & the head manager of their family had been adjudicated an inslvt. & from the said date the whole of the family estate & effects including the property through which the right of pre-emption was claimed had vested in the Official Assignee. The contention, in other words, was that when a Hindu governed by the Mitakshara school is adjudged an inslvt. under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909, not only his own rights but all the rights & interests of his sons who are the coparceners in the joint family property vest in the Official Assignee by virtue of the adjudication alone. The learned Dist. J. did not accept the contention & decided in favour of the pltfs. On appeal to the H. C. there was a reference to a F. B. & the point formulated for decision was :
"Does an order of adjudication passed against a father vest in the Official Receiver his son's interest in the joint family property ?"
Sir Shadi Lal who delivered the judgment of the F. B. answered the point in the affirmative, but in doing so, he observed :
"I must say that if the matter were res integra, I should find considerable difficulty in subscribing to the doctrine that the son's interest in the joint family property should in the event of the father's inslvcy. be regarded as the latter's property which vests in the Official Receiver."
The learned Judge also held that upon general principles of Hindu law governing the rights of the father & his son in the coparcenary property, an order of adjudication against the father has only the effect of replacing the father by the Official Receiver, & that the order does not by itself vest in the latter the interest of the son in the property. The Judicial Committee did not agree that the point should have been answered in the affirmative, & set aside the decree of the H. C. restoring that of the learned Dist. J. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, however, pointed out that it may be that under the provisions of Section 52 or in some other way that property may in a proper case be made available for payment of the father's just debts, but it is quite a different thing to say that by virtue of his inslvcy. alone the interest of the sons also vests in the assignee, & no such provision should be read into the Act. It would be seen that the Judicial Committee quite clearly made a distinction between the vesting of the property itself & the power which a Mitakshara father exercises in making his son's share in the joint family liable for payment of his debts. This power, their Lordships held, might within the terms of Section 52 vest in the Official Receiver but not the interest of the son in the joint family property itself. Indeed Sir Shadi Lal himself in delivering the opinion of the F. B. was conscious of this distinction & felt difficulty in subscribing to the contrary view. It is important to note that there is no corresponding section to Section 52, Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, in the Provincial Insolvency Act, & therefore, whatever may have been observed in regard to the scope of Section 52 is of little assistance to us in the construction of the present enactment.
7. On behalf of the resps., Mr. B. N. Mitter has drawn our attention to a F. B. decision of this Ct. in Bishwanath v. Official Receiver, 16 Pat. 60 : (A. I. R. (24) 1937 Pat. 185 F. B.). Mr. Mitter contends on the authority of this decision that the definition of the term "property" as used in the present Act must be deemed to include property over which an inslvt. has a conditional & qualified right of disposition. It is difficult to see how the decision of the P. B. is really of any assistance to him on the point. In the E. B. in question their Lordships held that the power or the right which the father has under the Hindu law to sell his son's interest for the payment of his proper debts is property within the meaning of Sections 28 (2) & 59, Provincial Insolvency Act. This decision appears to be based upon certain other decisions of various other Cts.; for instance, T. S. Balavenkata Seetharama v. Official Receiver, Tanjore, 49 Mad. 849 : (A. I. R. (13) 1926 Mad. 994 F. B.), Anand Prakash v. Narain Das, 53 ALL. 239 : (A. I. R. (18) 1931 ALL. 162 F. B.), Haridas v. Lallubhai, 55 Bom. 110 : (A. I. R. (18) 1931 Bom. 50) as also on a decision of the P. C. in Sat Narain v. Sri Kishen Das, 17 Lah. 644: (A. I. R. (23) 1936 P. C. 277). The power of a Hindu father to dispose of the interest of his sons in the joint family property is a power which he can. always exercise to his benefit. If he does exercise such a power, the sale would be a good sale unless the sons choose to get it set aside on the ground that the father's debt was illegal or immoral; otherwise the power of disposition may be unconditionally exercised by the father. To this limited extent the power in question may be regarded as property within the meaning of the Act so as to vest in the-receiver, on the father being adjudged an insolvent, but beyond that the receiver cannot displace the interest of the sons in the joint family property, and the said property remains-the property of the sons. It is true that some of the observations made in the decision of the Judicial Committee, if pushed to their logical sequence, may be found not to be in complete accord with the view taken by this Court in the F. B. decision in Bishwanath Sao's case, (16 Pat. 60 : A. I. R. (24) 1937 Pat. 185 F. B.) but there is no doubt in my mind that the view taken by the Judicial Committee in regard to the meaning of the term "property" as used in Section 2 (e), Presidency Towns Insolvency Act applies with equal force to the definition of "property" in Section 2 (e) (sic) of the present Act. Therefore, whatever may be said of the power or the right which the father has under the Hindu law to sell his sons' interest for the payment of his debts, I am of opinion that the property mentioned in the Insolvency Act must be such that the insolvent has "an absolute and unconditional power of disposal" thereof. Applying these principles, I shall now see whether in the present case the insolvents can be said to have such power of disposal over the trust funds in question.
8. It is admitted that the insolvents are the employees of the Tinplate Co. The Tinplate Co. of India Ltd. have created a fund for the benefit of their employees and the insolvents are members of the said fund. In the provident fund there are three kinds of accounts, namely, A, B & C accounts. The 'A' account relates to the contribution made by a member of the provident fund out of his earnings. At the end of each year a sum equal to the amount contributed by the employee-member of the provident fund from his earning during that year is contributed by the Company in the name of the member, and this is called the 'B' account, while the 'o' account is a further contribution made by the Company in proportion to the dividends paid by the Company on its ordinary share capital during any financial year. This 'o' account is really a contribution by way of bonus. The claim of the creditors in particular relates to the funds lying in deposit in the 'A' and 'o' accounts. As to whether these funds are vested in the trustees or not, I shall deal with the point later. The rules of the funds which have been exhibited in the case show that the management and control of the fund is vested in the trustees. All the employees of the Company except certain covenanted employees on higher grades are eligible for membership of the fund on completion of one year's service if they apply for such membership with certain declaration relating to the disposition of the money available in the event of death of the member which declaration is of course open to be cancelled and revised by the member if he so desires. The monies of the fund, as Rule 8 shows, are to be invested by the trustees in accordance with the provisions from time to time in force under the Provident Fund Belief Act, 1929. On retirement of any member with the consent of the General Manager of the Company before completion of fifteen years of service the member is entitled to be paid the entire ' amount standing to his credit in 'A' and 'c' accounts together with one-fifteeth of the monies standing to his credit in 'B' account for each completed year of service. In case of dismissal for misconduct or resignation without the consent of the General Manager before completion of 15 years' service, he is to be paid only the amount then standing to his credit in 'A' & 'o' accounts, the fund in 'B' account in that case being forfeited. On termination by any means of a member's service after completion of 15 years' service, the member shall be paid the entire amount then standing to his credit in 'A', 'B' & 'c' accounts. Therefore, the funds become payable under certain conditions of retirement or dismissal or termination of service according to rules governing the fund. It is important to notice that under Rule 17 of the rules no member of the fund shall have any claim on the monies standing to his or her credit otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the rules. Rule 17 further provides that any assignment by a member of the monies which would otherwise be payable to him shall be void, and in the event of any member being assignee or being adjudicated insolvent, the monies shall be liable 'to be forfeited provided the trustees in their absolute discretion do pay and apply the same for the benefit of the member or his dependents. Rule 18 is another important rule which shows that withdrawals by members of the money standing to their credit in the fund shall not be allowed by the trustees except on special grounds. These rules, to my mind, quite clearly show that the members have no disposing power over the funds in question. They are bound by the provident fund rules specified above, and it is only on the conditions mentioned in the rules that the funds under certain circumstances become payable to the members concerned. That being so, it is difficult to hold that the said funds are the property of the insolvents within the meaning of Section 2 (d), Insolvency Act, or that they can be divisible amongst the creditors as contemplated by Section 28 (2) of the Act. By the mere act of insolvency these insolvents cannot compel the trustees to make payment of the funds standing in the various accounts, and if the insolvents cannot do so, the receiver or the Court cannot remove the trustees from the custody of the same as enjoined by the proviso to Sub-Sectiion (3) of Section 56 of the Act,
9. In an unreported decision of this Court in civil Revns. Nos. 620 & 746 of 1948 decided on 20-12-1948, in which the present decree-holder-resp. was the petnr., Meredith J. (as he then was) had occasion to construe the rules in question. In that case, in pursuance of an attachment order a notice was issued upon the Tinplate Co. Ltd. to show cause why the sums in question standing to the credit of the debtors in the provident fund managed by the Company should not be paid in Court. The Company objected to the payment on the ground that under the provident fund rules the sums laying to the credit of any employee could not be paid to him until he retired from service or his service was otherwise terminated as contemplated by the rules. The decree holder, on the contrary, asserted that the judg-ment-debtors had full disposing power over their provident fund deposits and so the Company could be compelled to pay. The learned Munsif held that the decree-holder had no better rights than the judgment-debtors. The judgment-debtors having no disposing power over these sums during the continuance of their service, the Company could not be compelled to pay the amounts in Ct. for payment to the decree-holder. Meredith J. upheld the decision of the learned Munsif. In construing the rules, Meredith J. observed as follows :
"These conditions are contractual, & there is nothing illegal about them or to prevent their enforcement either against the employee or in his favour. It would be absurd to assert that when a member joins the Fund & makes contributions he is entering upon a colourable transaction designed to defeat possible creditors. The object of the Fund is specified in Rule 2 as to accumulate for the benefit of the Company's employees who have joined the Fund, certain sums as a future provision for them & for their families.' It is perfectly legal arrangement, & indeed a laudable one, & I can see no reason why the Cts. should regard it 'with disfavour. under the Provident Funds Act Govt. & Railway Provident Funds, substantially similar in nature, have been completely protected from the hands of creditors--a sufficient indication of the view taken by the Legislature with regard to Provident Funds. Such Funds are established not as a devise to enable workers to defeat their creditors, but to protect them against themselves --against extravagance against running into debt, & so to ensure some provision for their old age & their dependants. A money-lender who lends money to a member of a Provident Fund as against 'his assets in that Fund surely does so with his eyes open, & can have, in my view, no legitimate grievance if he subsequently finds difficulties in his way."
I entirely agree with these observations. I must, however, make it clear that I am not in agreement with his Lordship in regard to his views as to whether the ownership of the fund had vested in the trustees.
10. In this context reference may be made to a decision In re Earnest Clarence O'brien, 60 Cal. 926 : (A. I. R. (20) 1933 Cal. 701) on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the resps. In that case there was an adjudication order against an inslvt. on 23-5-1932. The inslvt. had entered the service of the Company on 1-1-1914, & he was discharged on account of his inslvcy. on 31-5-1932. Before he filed his appln. for inslvcy. certain sums of money stood to his credit in the books of the provident fund which were under three heads (1) London's contribution, (2) his contribution & (3) bank's contribution. I should observe that the provident fund in question was created under certain rules, as in the present case, by the Company for the benefit of its employees who were entitled to become members of the fund. The Official Assignee contended that the property in the funds had vested in him, & he asked for an order compelling the trustees to pay the fund forthwith. It was found that under the rules of the fund the member was entitled to claim payment from the fund only under certain circumstances as specified in the rules. The learned Judge who decided the case, therefore, held that the inslvt. on discharge could not claim any payment in respect of that part of the fund which was contributed by the Company because he had not served the requisite period. The learned Judge, therefore, held in regard to the amounts under the first & third heads that the Official Assignee could not get the same. In regard to the second head, that is, the personal contribution of the member, the learned Judge found that on the date of the inslvcy. the inslvt. had no property in the funds because he was still in the service of the Company, & that any claim he might have could only arise upon his discharge when he would cease to be a member. He, however, held that inasmuch as the inslvt. had been already discharged from service on account of his inslvcy., his claim to the amount under the second head had become vested in him when his service terminated & must be paid to the Official Assignee. This decision, therefore, does not in any manner support the contention of the resps. On the other hand, if at all, it shows that so long as the conditions mentioned in the rules are not fulfilled, the funds are not payable to the inslvt. &, as such, they cannot vest in the receiver appointed to take charge of the estate of the inslvt. This decision has been also relied upon by Mr. Mitter, counsel for the resps. in support of the argument that under Section 12, T. P. Act, Rule 17 of the present rules which provides for forfeiture of the funds in case of assignment or inslvcy. is void. His argument is that if the provision as to forfeiture in the rules is void under Section 12, T. P. Act, the funds would become payable to the Official Assignee forming the assets of the inslvt. In my opinion, it is doubtful if Section 12 of the Act can apply to such a case. Section 12 invalidates only those conditions which are in derogation of the rights of the transferee & not those which are in derogation of the rights of the transferor. Be that as it may, it is really not necessary to decide the matter for our present purposes. I have already held that under the provident fund rules discussed above, the inslvts. have no right of disposition over the funds in question, &, as such, the amounts standing in those accounts cannot vest in the receiver.
11. It has been further argued by the learned counsel for the resps, that the words of Section 28 (2) of the Act, viz., that "the whole of the property of the inslvt. shall vest in the Ct. or in a receiver" are wide enough to cover a property of this nature. It seems to me, however, that the language of Section 28 (2) by itself cannot solve the problem. One has again to look back to the meaning of the term "property" as contained in the definition in Section 2 (d) of the Act which means & includes any property over which the inslvt. can exercise his disposing power. It was held in Damodar Chaube & Co. v. Madan Makund, A. I. R. (34) 1947 Pat. 7: (223 I. C. 330) that "the definition of the word 'property' in the Provincial Insolvency Act is not exhaustive." It is, however, difficult to understand how the expression "property" in the Provincial Insolvency Act can mean property over which or the profits of which the inslvt. has not got disposing power. As has been observed by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Sat Narain v. Behari Lal, 52 I. A. 22 : (A. I. R. (12) 1925 P. C. 18) 'the property of an insvlt. which by Section 17, Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, (which corresponds to Section 28, Provincial Insolvency Act) vests in the Official Assignee must mean only the property which is divisible amongst his creditors."
In Damodar Chaube's case, (A. I. R. (34) 1947 Pat. 7: 223 I. C. 330) there was an argument advanced that the interest of the inslvt. in certain Govt. promissory notes vested in the receiver. This was claimed on the basis of a certain agreement under which after the demise of a lady, Mt. Rajwanti kuer, the inslvts. would be entitled to take the Govt. promissory notes from the Imperial Bank of India. The Ct. below held that the interest of the inslvts. in the Govt. promissory notes was not a mere chance of succession, & in view of the terms of the agreement they could not be assigned to the receiver or to any other person so as to be available for distribution amongst the creditors so long as Mt. Rajwanti Kuer was alive. The decision was affirmed by this Ct; & the contention that the word "property" in Section 2 (d), Provincial Insolvency Act, would include a property of this character did not find favour with their Lordships. Their Lordships held that during the lifetime of Mt. Rajwanti kuer the inslvts. had no disposing power in respect of the Govt. promissory notes, & had, therefore, no such property as would vest in the Ct. or the receiver under Section 28 (2) of the Act.
12. Counsel for the resps. has in this connection relied upon a decision of this Ct. in D. Palaiya v. T. P. Sen, 16 P. L. T. 167: (A. I. R. (22) 1985 Pat. 211) in which it was held that under Section 28 (2), Provincial Insolvency Act on the making of the order of inslvcy. the provident fund money vested in the receiver, but the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable. In that case on the terms of the contract between the parties as embodied in the provident fund rules, it was found that at all times during the years of service the amount contributed by the employee was within his disposal. The receiver was, therefore, held entitled to attach the provident fund money of the employee. That being so, I cannot agree with the learned Dist. J. in his conclusion that the provident fund money vested in the receiver & was capable of distribution amongst the creditors of the inslvts.
13. Mr. Mukherji has next argued that the property in the funds actually vested in the trustees & was not the property of the inslvts. under Section 5 & 6, Trusts Act. A trust in respect of moveable property is created by declaration of the intention creating such a trust, the purpose of the trust, "the beneficiary, & the trust property & by transfer of the trust property to the trustee. The learned counsel for the resp. has contended that there is really no transfer of the trust property in favour of the trustees, & he contends on a reference to the rules that all that has been transferred is the control & management of the funds of the trust. He refers to Rule 1 of the Rules & regulations which says that "the management of the fund & the control of its funds shall be vested in the trustees who will undertake such management . . . ." There would be much force in the contention if Rule 1 stood alone, but I have shown from the other rules that the investment of the funds, the control of the funds & the distribution of the funds have all vested in the trustees. If after the creation of the trust the author of the trust has no interest in the trust property except under the rules thereof & the entire dominion over the trust property is to all intents & purposes vested in the trustees, which is so in the present case, I cannot see how it can be argued that there has been no-transfer of interest in favour of the trustees After all, the various emblems of ownership as evidenced by the rules are all vested in the trustees, & the members of the trust or the company for the matter of that have no control over it. In such a case, the only inference-possible is that the trust fund was for all purposes vested in the trustees. I am conscious of the fact that a contrary view was taken by a single Judge of this Ct. in Gopal Das v. Abdul Jabber, A. I. R. (33) 1946 Pat. 430: (228 I. C. 478) & that the said decision was followed by another learned Judge of this Ct. sitting single in Muktilal v. Tinplate Co. of India Ltd-, A. I. R (36) 1949 Pat. 337. With all respect to the learned Judges, I am afraid, I cannot agree with their view in regard to the construction of the rules. In this connection Mr. Mitter has relied upon a decision of the Judicial Committee in The King v. Paulson, A. I. R. (7) 1920 P. C. 190. In that case, it was quite obvious from the terms creating the alleged trust that there was. no intention on the part of the author to divest himself of the interest in the property, & the P, C. therefore, held that it was in substance a scheme for the management of the property during the absence of the creater of the trust; as such the ownership in the property had not vested in the trustees. The case is quite different here. But even then it is contended by Mr. Mitter that the interest of a beneficiary under a trust can also vest in the inslvt. That again brings us to a consideration of the point whether it is such an interest as can be regarded as property within the meaning of the Insolvency Act. The beneficiary's interest may be assignable or may be in the nature of an actionable claim but that itself does not take us very far unless we also find that it is an interest capable of distribution amongst the creditors of the inslvts. as contemplated by Section 28 (2) of the Act. It has been held in Secy. Burma Oil Subsidiary Provident Fund India Ltd. v. Dadibhar Singh, A. I. R. (28) 1941 Bang. 256 that even though in a provident fund account an amount stands to the credit of a member, he obtains no interest in it until the payment. This shows that the mere fact that a certain amount is credited to a member's account does not indicate that he holds an interest in such amount. The member's right to have the money paid to him will arise only in the event of his dismissal or retirement as provided in the rules of the fund which may or may not happen before his death, or his becoming insane. And this applies both to contribution or subscription made by the member out of his salary & contribution made by the company. It was held in that case that such monies even though credited to the member's account could not be attached in execution of a decree against him. It was further held in that case that the word "debt" used in Section 60 & Order 21, Rule 46, C. P. C, means an actually existing debt that is, a perfected & absolute debt, not merely a sum of money which may or may not become payable at some future time or the payment of which depends upon contingencies which may or may not happen. To a similar effect is a decision in Gajraj Sheokarandas v. Hukamchand Sarupchand, A. I. R. (26) 1939 Bom. 90: (I. L. R. (1939) Bom. 109). I find myself in complete agreement with the view taken in these decisions notwithstanding some of the observations made by the learned Judges of this Ct. sitting single in the two, decisions referred to above, viz., Gopal Das v. Abdul Jabber, A. I. R. (33) 1946 Pat. 430: (228 I. C. 478) & Muktilal v. Tinplate Co. of India Ltd., A. I. R. (36) 1949 Pat. 337.
14. For the above reasons, the appeals must fee allowed & the order of the learned Dist. J. set aside with costs. As the above appeals have been heard together, I consider that there should be only one hearing fee payable to the applts.
Ramaswami, J.
15. I agree.