Bangalore District Court
Sundresh B M vs The Enforcement Officer, Epfo on 7 February, 2026
1 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT
KABC010273092024
IN THE COURT OF LXIX ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL
AND SESSIONS JUDGE (CCH 70)
Present:
Smt. Shirin Javeed Ansari, B.A.,LL.B (Hon`s) LL.M.,
LXIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru. (CCH70)
Dated this the 7th day of February, 2026
Crl.A.No.1740/2024
Appellant: Sri Sundresh B.M.
Aged about 41 years
#246, Bileshivale,
Doddaguddi Post
Off Hennur Baralur Main Road
Bengaluru-562 149
(Sri Satish G.A., Advocate for appellant)
Vs.
Respondents: 1. The Enforcement Officer
Employees Provident Fund Organisation,
Regional Office,
Koramangala
Bhavishyanidhi Bhavan,
Annapurneshwari Complex,
Survey No. 37/1,
6th Main, Singasandra,
Bengaluru- 560068.
(Sri Harsha.V., Advocate for respondent
2 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT
No.1)
2. M/s. Design Apparels Pvt. Ltd,
#180/4, 1st Floor,
Govindappa Complex,
Whitefield Road,
B Narayanapura,
Bengaluru- 560 016.
(Accused No.1)
3. Sri. Prabhakara V Shetty
S/o Vittal Shetty,
Director,
R/at. #156, Ramamurthy Nagar,
Ambedkar Nagar,
1st Main Road, 5th Cross,
Bengaluru East,
Bengaluru -560016.
(AccusedNo.2)
4. Sri Anand Kotreshwar Sithale
s/o Kotreshwar Sithale
DirectorsPlot No.25, K.H.Sithale
Biddapur Colony
Afzalpur Road
Gulbarga-585 102
(Accused No.3)
5. Smt. Rekha Prabhakar Shetty
Wife of Prabhakar Shetty,
Additional Director,
#156, Ramamurthy Nagar,
Ambedkar Nagar,
1st Main Road,
5th Cross, Bengaluru East,
Bengaluru -560016
(Accused No.5)
3 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 26.09.2024 passed by the Special Court for Economic Offences, Bengaluru, in C.C. No.99/2024, wherein the accused No.4, along with other accused persons, was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 14(1A) read with Section 14A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as "The EPF & MP Act").
2. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment and conviction, the accused No.4 has preferred the present appeal under Section 374(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking to set aside the same.
3. The accused No.4 in CC No.99/2024 before the trial court has preferred the instant appeal against the complainant- respondent No.1, by arraigning the accused No.1 to 3 and 5 as respondents No.2 to 4. The appellant and respondents are hereby assigned with their original ranks before the trial court i.e., the appellant as accused No.4 and respondent No.1 as complainant and respondent 4 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT No.2 to 4 as accused No.1 to 3 and 5 in CC No.99/2024 in the instant discussion for the purpose of brevity and convenience to avoid the confusion and perplexity.
4. The facts leading to the filing of the present appeal, as borne out from the record, may be briefly but comprehensively stated. The respondent-complainant initiated prosecution against the accused establishment and its Directors alleging willful and deliberate default in remittance of employees' and employers' provident fund contributions together with administrative charges for the period September 2013 to November 2013, amounting to Rs.5,29,615/-, despite statutory mandate under the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952. It is not in dispute that the accused establishment was covered under the EPF & MP Act, 1952, was allotted a code number, and that proceedings under Section 7A of the Act culminated in an assessment order dated 31.10.2017, which remained unchallenged.
5. Upon obtaining sanction for prosecution from the competent authority, the complaint was filed. The trial 5 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT court, after recording evidence, considering documentary exhibits, hearing all accused and evaluating rival submissions, convicted the accused including the present appellant.
6. Being aggrieved by the findings of guilt, the conviction and the sentence, Accused No.4 has preferred the instant appeal against the respondent No.1 who was the complainant and respondent No.2 to 4 who are the accused No.1 to 3 and 5 before the trial court on the following:
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
a) It is submitted that, the impugned Judgment passed by the trial court is untenable in law being oppressive and as the same is without authority of law, facts, materials and evidence on record. Hence, the same is liable to be set aside in so far as Accused No.4 is concerned as not maintainable under law.
b) It is submitted that the Complaint was filed under Section 14(1A) read with Section 14-
A of the EPF Act. Section 14-A of EPF Act 6 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT deals with offences by companies
c) It is an admitted fact on record that the Company had filed the Return of Ownership in Form SA. Column No.8 of Return of Ownership refers to Particulars of Owners, wherein the list of Directors is mentioned. Column No. 11 refers to particulars of persons mentioned, who are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of establishment. In Column No.11, it is specifically stated that, Mr. Prabhakar V Shetty is In-charge and responsible for conduct of business establishment and accordingly there is no reference to any other directors. This document has been produced by the Complainant himself.
d) It is submitted that, in spite of clearly stipulating in Form 5A, i.e., Mr.Prabhakar V Shetty was responsible and in-charge for the conduct of the business of establishment and in spite of clear statutory provisions under Section 14A of the EPF Act, it is only the Accused-2 who can be proceeded against for any violation of the Act and the Rules. However, in the 7 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT instant case, the Trial Court has erroneously proceeded against the Appellant, who is Accused-4 in the complaint and also imposed punishment without any authority of law. Hence for the above said reason, the impugned order is liable to be set aside in so far as Accused No.4 is concerned, as not maintainable under law.
e) It is submitted that, though the Respondent along with the Complaint had produced Form 5A, Return of Ownership which clearly discloses that only Sri.Prabhakar V Shetty is incharge and responsible, the Trial Court has failed to appreciate the admitted fact and has erroneously taken cognizance of offence against the Appellant and has proceeded without any sanction of law in so for as Appellant is concerned. Hence for the above said reason the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
f) It is submitted that, the Complaint was filed in pursuant to order dated 31.10.2017 passed under Section 7-A of the EPF Act, in respect of arrears of contribution for the period 9/2012 to 8/2014. In the sald 8 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT order, it is specifically stated that, "Any failure to comply with the above directions will render the employer liable for prosecution under section 14/14A of the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions 1952, in violation of EPF Act. It is respectfully submitted that as on 31.10.2017, the Appellant was no more a Director in the Accused No.1 Company and he had resigned from the post of Director of the Company vide resignation letter dated 14.08.2013 and the same has been Intimated to the Registrar of Companies Affairs in the prescribed Form-32. Therefore, since the Appellant was no more Director or owner of the Company as on 31.10.2017, there is no question of any failure to comply with the directions issued in the order dated 31.10.2017 and accordingly the prosecution initiated against the Appellant is not tenable in law. Hence for the above said reason the Impugned order is liable to be set aside in so far as Accused No.4 is concerned as not maintainable under law.
g) It is submitted that, show cause notice 9 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT dated 18.01.2024 is alleged to have been issued to the Appellant as to why legal action should not be Initiated. However, the Appellant had not received any show cause notice as alleged in the tracking report submitted by the Respondent and the said tracking report itself clearly shows that show cause notice has not been served to the Appellant. Hence the impugned order is liable to be set aside in so far as Accused No.4 is concerned as not maintainable under law.
h) Without prejudice to the above submissions, it is submitted that, in show cause notice issued, it is stated that it is issued to the establishment as well as to the employers. However, as per Section 14A for any offence under EPF Act, in respect of Company every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company is liable to be prosecuted. Therefore, the show cause notice dated 18.01.2024 alleged to have been issued to the Appellant is not maintainable in law and therefore no 10 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT opportunity has been given to the Appellant before passing the Sanction Order dated 14.02.2024. Hence, the impugned order is liable to be set aside in so far as Accused No.4 is concerned as not maintainable under law.
i) It is submitted that, on perusal of the sanction order dated 14.02.2024, sanction has been accorded to all the Directors of the Company as per Form 5A. However, for any offence under EPF Act In respect of a Company, as per Section 14-A, prosecution could be sanctioned only against the Director who is in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company. Therefore, sanction order against the Appellant is in violation of Section 14-A of the EPF Act.
j) It is submitted that, the Trial Court has erroneously applied the ratio of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of Srikantadatta Narasimharaja Wodiyar vs Endorcement Officer, Mysuru, reported in 1993 (3) SCC 217 and the facts clearly reveal as follows:-
11 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT
"8. Form 5-A envisages to give particulars in Columns 1 to 7 thereof, 1.e. particulars of owner, etc., The Appellant's establishment stated the name of the establishment as Ideal Jawa (India) Ltd., Code No. of the establishment, its address, nature of business, period of its commencement and manufacturing status, have been given. In Column 8 the establishment is to furnish the names of the owner-company, Directors. It was mentioned therein as Mr. Ν.Κ. Irani as Managing Director; the appellant as one of the Directors and others. In Column 10 the names of occupier and Manager as registered under the Factories Act were given. In Column 11 which specifies particulars thus: 'Particulars of the persons mentioned above, who are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the establishment'. Therein it was stated that "as per the details mentioned in Item 8". As stated earlier in Column 8 the names of the Managing Director, the Joint Managing Director and two Directors including the appellant have been mentioned."12 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT
k) It is submitted that, in the instant case, Form 5A clearly states in Column 11 that Mr. Prabhakar V Shetty, the Accused No.2 herein is in charge and responsible for conduct of the business of the establishment. Therefore, the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of Srikantadatta Narasimharaja Wodiyar referred to in the impugned order is not applicable to the facts of this case. Hence, the impugned order is liable to be set aside in so far as Accused No.4 is concerned as not maintainable under law.
l) It is submitted that, it is admitted by the Complainant himself in the evidence that, except the list of Directors appended to Annexure P3, no documents have been submitted in the Trial Court to show that Accused No.4 is responsible for the day to day affairs and conduct of establishment.
Without considering the same the impugned order dated 26.09.2024 is
passed by the Trial Court. Hence, on this count also the impugned order is liable to be set aside in so far as Accused No.4 is concerned as not maintainable under law. 13 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT
m) It is submitted that, in furtherance to passing of order under Section 7-A of the EPF Act, the liability of the Company is crystallized and any failure to comply with the order passed under Section 7-A would only attract the penalty provisions of Section 14-B damages and prosecution. Hence the finding of the Trial Court alleging offence as continuance offence set out under Section 468 of CrPC is not tenable in law. Hence, for the above said reason the impugned order is liable to be set aside in so far as Accused No.4 is concerned as not maintainable under law.
n) It is submitted that, the finding of the Trial Court that the contention of Appellant that the complaint is barred by limitation as contemplated under Section 468 of CrPC will not survive pursuant to the show cause notice dated 18.01.2024 issued to Appellant is erroneous since no show cause notice has been served on the Appellant.
o) It is further submitted that, the finding of the Trial Court that the establishment being the juristic person managed by the 14 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT Accused Nos.2 to 4, designated as Directors of the establishment and Accused No.5 who is designated as Additional Director are responsible for the day to day affairs of Accused No.1 establishment and having failed to comply the provisions of EPF Act are guilty of having committed offences punishable under Section 14(1A) read with Section 14A of the EPF Act is erroneous and not maintainable.
p) It is submitted that, the Trial Court erred in holding that the Complainant has discharged the burden of demonstrating the guilt of the Accused Nos. 1 to 5 beyond all reasonable doubts, in spite of the fact that the Appellant is not at all in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the establishment at the relevant period.
q) It is submitted that, no prosecution could have been lodged against the Appellant and the impugned judgment is not maintainable against the Appellant and the sanction order dated 14.02.2024 ordered against the Appellant is also liable 15 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT to be quashed.
r) It is submitted that, several criminal complaints have been filed for different periods of time and in every case the Appellant is found guilty. It is further submitted that, the criminal complaint arose out of non-compliance of the order passed under Section 7-A of the EPF Act and order under Section 7A refers to the period 09/2012 to 08/2014. In other words, there is only one order passed under Section 7-A for the period between 9/2012 to 08/2014 and only one show cause notice has been issued for the entire period and one sanction is being Ordered. Therefore, the different complaints filed for different periods and consequent orders being passed thereon are not maintainable in law.
s) It is submitted that, it was brought to the notice of the below court that, the Show Cause Notice dated 18.01.2024 was issued by Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II and the Sanction Order dated 14.02.2024 was granted by Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-I, the same 16 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT reveals that it is by two different authorities and further reveals that the Sanctioning authority has not issued any notice and also has not followed the procedure as required under section 14(AC) of the EPFO Act, before granting Sanction Order dated 14.02.2024 for prosecution. Without considering the above contention of the Accused No.4, the Court has passed the Judgment dated 26.09.2024.
t) It is submitted that, the Judgment is otherwise bad in law and hence the same is liable to be set aside. Hence for the above said reason the impugned order dated 26.09.2024 passed by the Special Court for Economic Offences at Bengaluru, is liable to be set aside in so far as Accused No.4 is concerned as not maintainable under law and thereby acquit the accused/ Appellant.
Hence, under the said facts and circumstances, the appellant/accused No.4 pray before this court to call for records from the trial court, set aside the impugned judgment conviction and sentence passed by Trial Court in 17 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT CC No.99/2024 dated 26.09.2024 and dismiss the complaint filed by the complainant/ respondent No.1, in so far as Accused No.4 is concerned in the interest of justice.
7. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. The entire original records of the Trial Court have been summoned and examined.
8. On the basis of the rival submissions and the record, the following points arise for consideration of this appellate Court:
(1) Whether the trial court erred in holding that the appellant was liable under Section 14(1A) read with Section 14A of the EPF & MP Act, 1952?
(2) Whether the prosecution against the appellant suffers from illegality due to absence of responsibility for day-to-day affairs?
(3) Whether the sanction order,
limitation, and procedural
compliance vitiate the conviction? (4) Whether the impugned judgment warrants interference by this appellate court?18 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT
(5) What Order?
9. My findings to the above points are as under:
Point No.1 to 4: In the Negative Point No.5 : As per final order for the following:
REASONS
10. Point No.1 to 4:- The appellant has raised extensive grounds, which substantially revolve around the contentions that as per Form 5A, only Accused No.2 was shown as the person "in-charge and responsible" for the conduct of business and hence prosecution of Accused No.4 is illegal. That the appellant had resigned as Director and was not responsible during the relevant period. That no notice or show cause was served upon the appellant. That sanction order is invalid for non-application of mind. That the complaint is barred by limitation and the offence is not a continuing offence. That reliance placed on Srikantadatta Narasimharaja Wodiyar v. Enforcement Officer, Mysuru, (1993) 3 SCC 217, is erroneous.
11. That multiple prosecutions based on one Section 7A order are impermissible. Each of the above 19 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT grounds is meticulously examined herein below.
12. This appellate court has bestowed its anxious and meticulous consideration to the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, the impugned judgment of conviction, the exhaustive grounds urged in the memorandum of appeal, and the rival submissions addressed at the Bar. At the outset, it must be observed that the scope of an appeal against conviction is not to re- try the case afresh, but to examine whether the findings recorded by the trial court suffer from perversity, illegality, misapplication of law, or non-consideration of material evidence.
13. The gravamen of the prosecution case is not in serious dispute. It stands admitted that Accused No.1 establishment was covered under the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, and that statutory contributions for the period between September 2013 and November 2013 were not remitted within the prescribed time. The assessment order passed under Section 7A of the Act dated 31.10.2017 has attained 20 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT finality, having not been challenged by any of the accused.
14. The core controversy raised by the appellant/Accused No.4 revolves around his alleged non- responsibility for the day-to-day affairs of the establishment. The argument is founded primarily on Column No.11 of Form No.5A, wherein Accused No.2 alone is shown as the person "in-charge and responsible" for the conduct of the business.
15. This court finds no merit in the said contention. Form No.5A is a statutory declaration intended to facilitate administrative convenience. It neither curtails nor overrides the statutory definition of "employer" under Section 2(e) of the EPF & MP Act, nor does it whittle down the scope of Section 14A, which fastens criminal liability on persons having ultimate control over the affairs of the establishment.
16. The trial court has correctly appreciated that Column No.8 of Form 5A categorically reflects the appellant as one of the Directors of Accused No.1 establishment during the relevant period. Once the status of Director is 21 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT admitted, the statutory presumption under Section 14A(1) comes into operation, shifting the burden upon the Director to prove lack of knowledge or exercise of due diligence.
17. The appellant has failed to discharge this statutory burden. No material is placed on record to demonstrate that he had no knowledge of the defaults or that he took any steps whatsoever to ensure statutory compliance. Mere assertion of non-involvement, without substantive proof, is legally insufficient.
18. The reliance placed by the appellant on a selective reading of Form 5A is wholly misconceived. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Srikantadatta Narasimharaja Wodiyar v. Enforcement Officer, Mysuru, (1993) 3 SCC 217, has unequivocally held that in establishments other than factories, every person having ultimate control over the affairs of the company, including Directors, answers the description of "employer".
19. The trial court has rightly applied the above ratio. In the cited decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court 22 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT rejected the very argument advanced herein, holding that limiting liability only to a named person in Form 5A would defeat the object of the welfare legislation.
20. The EPF Act is a piece of social welfare legislation, enacted to secure the economic future of employees. Its provisions must therefore receive a purposive and beneficial interpretation, rather than a narrow or pedantic construction, as repeatedly held by constitutional courts.
21. The appellant's plea of resignation also does not advance his case. Even assuming that the appellant had tendered resignation during the relevant period, such resignation by itself does not absolve statutory liability under the EPF Act.
22. Paragraph 36A of the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952, casts a mandatory obligation upon the employer to intimate the Provident Fund authorities regarding any change in ownership or management within fifteen days. Admittedly, no such intimation was ever given by the appellant.
23 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT
23. Filing of Form-32 before the Registrar of Companies is an internal corporate compliance and cannot substitute statutory intimation mandated under the EPF Scheme. The trial court has rightly drawn an adverse inference from the appellant's failure to comply with Para 36A.
24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Srikantadatta Narasimharaja Wodiyar has categorically held that resignation not intimated to EPF authorities does not shield a Director from prosecution. The appellant's attempt to distinguish the said judgment is artificial and unsustainable.
25. The contention that the appellant was not a Director as on the date of the Section 7A order is equally misconceived. Criminal liability under Section 14(1A) attaches to the period of default, not to the date of assessment or sanction.
26. The default in the present case occurred during September to November 2013, when the appellant admittedly continued as Director. Subsequent resignation, 24 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT even if proved, does not efface liability already incurred.
27. The argument regarding non-service of show cause notice has been rightly repelled by the trial court. Documentary evidence including email communications, tracking reports and certification under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act clearly establish issuance of notice.
28. The appellant has not entered the witness box nor adduced rebuttal evidence to disprove service. Mere denial in arguments cannot dislodge documentary proof produced by a public authority in discharge of official duties.
29. The challenge to the sanction order dated 14.02.2024 is equally devoid of substance. A perusal of the sanction order reveals due consideration of relevant materials, application of mind, and conscious approval for prosecution.
30. The decision in Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1979) 4 SCC 172, relied upon by the appellant, pertains to a case where sanction was 25 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT demonstrably mechanical. The factual matrix herein is entirely different and the ratio is inapplicable.
31. The plea of limitation under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. is also unsustainable. Offences under the EPF Act are continuing offences, as long as statutory dues remain unpaid.
32. Section 472 of Cr.P.C. expressly provides that a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of continuance of the offence. The trial court has rightly applied this provision.
33. The law on continuing offences is well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi, (1972) 2 SCC 890, which squarely governs the present case.
34. The appellant's contention that multiple prosecutions arising out of one Section 7A order are impermissible is legally untenable. Each month's failure to remit contributions constitutes a distinct and separate offence. The EPF Act contemplates monthly compliance. 26 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT Therefore, prosecution for defaults covering different periods does not amount to double jeopardy or abuse of process.
35. The argument that sanctioning authority and issuing authority are different officers also does not vitiate the proceedings. The statute does not mandate that the very same officer must issue show cause notice and grant sanction.
36. What is material is that the sanctioning authority is competent and has independently applied its mind, which requirement stands fully satisfied in the present case.
37.
38. The trial court has elaborately discussed the oral testimony of PW-1 and documentary exhibits Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-9. No material contradiction or infirmity is shown in appreciation of evidence.
39. This appellate court finds that the findings recorded by the trial court are neither conjectural nor 27 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT speculative, but are based on sound reasoning and settled principles of law.
40. The contention that Accused No.4 has been roped in merely because of his designation is factually incorrect. His role flows from statutory presumption coupled with failure to rebut the same.
41. The EPF Act deliberately casts a wide net of responsibility to prevent Directors from escaping liability by delegating functions while retaining control.
42. Granting immunity to Directors on the basis of internal arrangements would defeat the very purpose of the Act and erode employees' statutory rights. The sentence imposed by the trial court is proportionate, statutory and in consonance with the gravity of the socio-economic offence committed.
43. The trial court has also assigned cogent reasons for denying the benefit of probation, which cannot be faulted in light of the nature of the offence.
44. This court does not find any perversity, illegality 28 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT or miscarriage of justice warranting appellate interference under Section 374 of Cr.P.C.
45. Consequently, this appellate court holds that the conviction of the appellant/Accused No.4 under Section 14(1A) read with Section 14A of the EPF & MP Act, 1952, is legal, justified and calls for affirmation. Accordingly, Point No.1 to 4 are answered in the Negative.
46. Point No.5: In view of the reasons mentioned above and the findings arrived at on Point No.1 to 4, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER The Criminal Appeal filed by the appellant/accused No.4 under Section 374(3) Cr.P.C. is hereby dismissed.
The judgment of conviction and order on sentence dated 26.09.2024 passed by the Presiding Officer, Special Court for Economic Offences, Bengaluru, in C.C. No.99/2024, is hereby confirmed in toto.
The appellant/ accused No.4 shall comply with the sentence imposed by the trial court forthwith.29 Crl.Apl.No.1740/2024 JUDGMENT
Office is hereby directed to send back the records to the trial court along with a copy of this judgment. (Dictated to Stenographer Grade-I directly on computer, typed by him, revised and corrected by me and then pronounced in open court on this the 7th day of February, 2026) Digitally signed by SHIRIN JAVEED SHIRIN JAVEED ANSARI ANSARI Date: 2026.02.07 17:44:02 +0530 (Shirin Javeed Ansari) LXIX Addl.C.C. & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru.