Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
A.V.Reddy vs The Apsrtc, Rep.By Its Managing ... on 20 November, 2013
Author: Dama Seshadri Naidu
Bench: Dama Seshadri Naidu
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU WRIT PETITON No.32961 of 2010 20-11-2013 A.V.Reddy.Petitioner The APSRTC, rep.by its Managing Director, Musheerabad, Hyderabad and 2 others..Respondents Counsel for the Petitioner:Sri S.M.SUBHAN Counsel for the respondents: Sri KALLAKURI SRINIVASA RAO <Gist : >Head Note: ? Cases Referred: 1.2001(1) alt 371 (D.B) 2.W.P.No.27139 of 2005 dt.06.06.2006 3.(2006) 5 SCC 386 4.(2009) 6 SCC 469 5.(1996) 10 SCC 291 6.AIR 1959 SC 395 at 410 7.1995(2) An.W.R 324 8.AIR 1996 SC 764 9.1998(3) SCALE 529 THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU WRIT PETITION No.32961 of 2010 The Court made the following: ORAL ORDER :
The present writ petition is filed questioning the action of the respondents in not considering the case of the petitioner for promotion to the post of ADC/Controller as per the seniority by counting his service from the date of regularisation.
The facts in brief, as pleaded by the petitioner, are that the petitioner was appointed a conductor and his services were regularised w.e.f 24.03.1984 when he was working at Razole Depot of East Godavari region. He has completed 26 years of service and is eligible to be promoted as ADC/Controller. It is the case of the petitioner that in the year 1990 he was transferred from Razole to Machilipatnam and later in the year 2000 he was transferred from Machilipatnam to Bhadrachalam. In 2009 a Selection Committee was constituted for selections to the post of ADC/Controllers in Khammam region from among the eligible candidates of conductors and drivers, the only qualification for promotion being seniority. Despite his seniority, the petitioner has not been promoted to the post of ADC/Controller.
It is contended by the petitioner that Regulation 3 of APSRTC Employees (Service) Regulations, 1964 (for brevity the Regulations) governs the issue of promotions. As per the said regulation, the petitioner avers, he is entitled to promotion, but was not considered; as such, aggrieved thereby, the petitioner approached this Court by filing the present writ petition.
The Respondent Corporation filed its counter and stated that only on the request of the petitioner and on the condition of his foregoing seniority, while he was working at Machilipatnam Depot of Viziawada region, the petitioner was transferred to Bhadrachalam Depot of Khamma region in terms of the office proceedings dated 03.06.2000. In the order of the said transfer, it was categorically mentioned that seniority in the category of Conductor Gr.II will be reckoned from the date of his reporting at Khammam region as per undertaking given by the petitioner for foregoing seniority in his parent region in terms of Regulations 9 and 3 of the Regulations. Since his seniority in the post of Conductor Gr.II in Khammam region is to be reckoned w.e.f 19.06.2000, rightly the Corporation has not considered his case for promotion. It is finally pleaded by the respondent Corporation that the previous service is to be reckoned only for the purpose of providing special grade but not for the purpose of promotion to the post of ADC/Controller. Accordingly, the Corporation has urged that the writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed.
Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned standing counsel for the Corporation, apart from perusing the record.
To begin with, the issue to be considered is whether the seniority of an employee transferred on his own request to another unit inter-regionally should be reckoned from the date of his initial appointment to the post, or from the date on which he was transferred to the new region.
It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the issue has been agitated quite a few times earlier and this Court has settled the controversy through numerous judgments pronouncing definitively that the entire service should be reckoned despite inter-regional transfer.
It is further submitted by the learned counsel that the subject matter of this writ petition is squarely covered by a judgment of a learned Division Bench of this Court in Managing Director, APSRTC v. M.Venkat Rao , which is said to have subsequently been followed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in V.D. Prasad v. A.P. State Road Transport Corporation, rep. by its Managing Director .
Interestingly, even the learned counsel who represented the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Corporation too has submitted affirmatively that the matter is squarely covered. In terms thereof, both the learned counsel have agreed for the disposal of the writ petition by and in terms of the said judgments.
Accordingly, this Court has informed both the counsel that the matter is being disposed of in terms of M.Venkat Rao (1 supra) and V.D.Prasad (2 supra), essentially on the concession made by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, and kept the matter aside for dictating the order, essentially a consented one. However, some time later when the Court was hearing other matters listed for the day, the learned Standing Counsel rushed into Court, profusely apologised, and sought the leave of the Court to mention the matter. When permission was granted, the learned Standing Counsel has apologetically submitted that his colleague earlier gave his consent due to lack of proper instructions, that, in fact, the matter stood covered by definitive decisions of the Honble Supreme Court, and that, in the light of those decisions, the two judgments rendered, one by a learned Division Bench and the other by a learned Single Judge, must be declared to be per incuriam.
The citations relied on by the learned Standing Counsel are: (1) K.P. Sudhakaran and Anr. v. State of Kerala and Ors. ; (2) Surendra Singh Beniwal v. Hukam Singh and Ors. ; (3) Joyachan M. Sebastian v. Director General and Ors.
Firstly, in K.P. Sudhakaran (3 supra), the Honble Supreme Court has examined the statutory scheme with regard to seniority in the face of request transfer. The rule governing the same issue, to the extent relevant, as has been extracted in the said judgment, is as follows:
(1) A person transferred to a new unit will take rank below the junior most in the category in the new unit or department. He will not be allowed to count his previous service towards seniority. Such transfers should not be prejudicial to the legitimate interest of anyone in the department to which he is transferred. But he may be allowed to count his previous service towards increment, leave, pension, gratuity, etc. He will not be required to undergo fresh probation, if he has already completed probation.
x x x x x (4) Persons transferred from one department to another or from one unit to another in the same department due to proved administrative reasons will retain all their rights in the old unit or department, as their case may be.
Interpreting the above provisions, their Lordships have held as follows:
11. In service jurisprudence, the general rule is that if a Government servant holding a particular post is transferred to the same post in the same cadre, the transfer will not wipe out his length of service in the post till the date of transfer and the period of service in the post before his transfer has to be taken into consideration in computing the seniority in the transferred post. But where a Government servant is so transferred on his own request, the transferred employee will have to forego his seniority till the date of transfer, and will be placed at the bottom below the junior-most employee in the category in the new cadre or department. This is because a government servant getting transferred to another unit or department for his personal considerations, cannot be permitted to disturb the seniority of the employees in the department to which he is transferred, by claiming that his service in the department from which he has been transferred, should be taken into account. This is also because a person appointed to a particular post in a cadre, should know the strength of the cadre and prospects of promotion on the basis of the seniority list prepared for the cadre and any addition from outside would disturb such prospects. The matter is, however, governed by the relevant service Rules.
Referring to the second decision of the Supreme Court relied on by the learned Standing Counsel, it may be stated that in Surendra Singh Beniwal (4 supra), their Lordships have referred to the same issue adverted to above and have extracted the governing Rule 61(2) of the Regulations framed under U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 which reads as under:
61(2): A teacher on being transferred in pursuance of this Chapter-
a) shall become the teacher of the institution to which he has been transferred and his pay and service condition shall remain the same unless legally varied.
(b) shall be placed at the bottom of the seniority list of the teachers serving on the same cadre and category in the institution.
(c) in compliance to the provisions of Sub-clause (b) the service rendered prior to the transfer in the institution from which the teacher has been transferred shall be treated as service rendered to the institution to which he has been transferred.
Interpreting the above Rule, it is held:
9. A perusal of Clause (b) of the aforesaid Rule shows that if a teacher goes on voluntary transfer from one institution to another, then the transferee teacher shall be placed at the bottom of the seniority list of the teachers serving on the same cadre and category in the transferee institution.
As regards Clause (c), in our opinion, it has to be read harmoniously with Clause (b) and so reading it, we are of the opinion that Clause (c) deals with matters other than seniority e.g. pensionary benefits etc. However, as regards seniority, the clear rule has been laid down in Clause (b) i.e. that if a teacher seeks voluntary transfer from college/institution to another college/institution, the transferee teacher shall be placed at the bottom of the seniority list. The reason for making Rule 61(2)(b) is obvious. When a teacher applies for voluntary transfer from one college to another, then if his seniority in the old college is maintained in the new college, there would be great heart burning in the teachers in the transferee college. Hence, the rule was made that if a teacher applies for voluntary transfer from one college to another, such a transfer can only be done by placing the transferee teacher at the bottom of the seniority list of the teachers serving on the same cadre and category in the transferee institution.
Finally turning to the decision of the Supreme Court in Joyachan M. Sebastian (5 supra), it is to be observed that the post which the petitioner was holding came to be abolished on account of administrative exigencies. Thereupon, he was transferred and posted at his option to some other place. When the seniority list was prepared as per the order of appointment, his seniority was shown not from the date of his initial appointment. Therefore, he raised a dispute, which eventually reached the Supreme Court. In that context, their Lordships have held as follows:
7. It is now settled legal posited that no abolition of the post, the holder of the post has no right to continue on the post. Instead of retrenching him as surplus, the Government have accommodated him in the available vacancy and, therefore, it must be deemed to be a fresh appointment for the purposes of seniority. After joining in Salem in Tamil Nadu, he made a request for transfer to Trivandrum and it is at his request that he was transferred.
Consequently, on his undertaking in the application that he would not claim his seniority at Salem Station, the transfer was effected at his request. It is settled legal position that he would take his seniority as junior-most among the confirmed employees in the transferee-region.
The last decision relied on by the learned Standing Counsel may not have much in conformity with the facts of the case on hand, though the proposition of law does seem to follow the same line of reasoning, as is the case with the previous decisions cited.
Axiomatically, it is to be stated that in service jurisprudence absolute propositions of law, and ex hypothesi, absolute precedents applying on all fours, are hard to come by. The service regulations are essentially delegated legislation in terms of Art.309 of the Constitution, being statutory in character, though. Thus, before applying any proposition of law borne out by a precedent at that, it is inevitable to look for the comparable contours of the respective statutes or regulations, based on which the decisions were rendered.
Now, we may examine whether service regulation that has fallen for consideration in the present writ petition on one hand, and those in the above referred pronouncements of the Supreme Court, on the other hand, are analogous, if not pari materia.
The learned Single Judge, while disposing of V.D.Prasad case (2 supra), placed reliance on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in M.Venkat Rao (1 supra), and has, under identical circumstances, held as follows:
When the matter is taken up for hearing, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner and admitted to by the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent- Corporation that the subject matter of this writ petition is squarely covered by a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Managing Director, APSRTC v. M. Venkat Rao, and they both agreed for disposal of the writ petition by and in terms of the said judgment.
The Division Bench of this Court in Managing Director, APSRTC v. M. Venkat Rao, held that eligibility for promotion cannot be confused with seniority, for they are two different and distinct factors. The Division Bench further held that even though seniority of an employee is reckoned as a junior-most employee at his transferred place on transfer made at his request, yet his service at the earlier place cannot be excluded from consideration for determining his eligibility for promotion.
The facts of the present case are similar to the one, which the Division Bench of this Court in Managing Director, APSRTC v. M. Venkat Rao, was faced with, and having regard to the agreed stand taken by both the counsel that the subject-matter of this writ petition is squarely covered by the above-said judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, I deem it appropriate to dispose of the writ petition by and in terms of the above referred Judgment.
Being conscious of the fact that a decision of a co- equal Bench does bind, it is, with respect, stated that, since that was a judgment rendered consequent upon the concession made by the learned counsel qua their respective parties, it may not stricto sensu amount to a precedent, as has been held by a Constitutional Bench of the Honble Supreme Court in M.S.M.Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha . The initial concession, however, was made by both the learned counsel in view of the earlier judgment of a learned Division Bench of this Court in M.Venkat Rao (1 supra). As such, it is imperative to examine the said decision of the Division Bench.
But before examining the said decision, we may have to first observe that there is a Circular letter issued on 8.9.1977, presumably a supplementary regulation, para 5.3 of which reads thus:
Request transfers ordered outside the seniority area should result [in] the employee becoming junior most in that cadre in the seniority area to which he is to be transferred.
In fact, at the earliest point of time, a learned Single Judge in WP No.172 of 1978 has considered the above circular and declared it as being contrary to Regulation 3.1 and thus ultra vires. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge has held that the seniority of the transferred employee should be reckoned from the date of his initial joining.
Another interesting facet is that the self-same Circular letter fell for consideration in A.P.S. Road Transport Corp. v. B. Sreenivasulu , decided by a learned Division Bench on 24.08.1995. In fact, the Division Bench has extracted Regulation 3 in its entirety. It is pertinent to observe that the extracted regulation was prior to 29.5.1999, when an amendment actually brought by the Corporation on 3.2.1990 was approved by the Government.
Thus, the pre-amended regulation 3 is as follows:
Regulation 3 of the Regulations is as follows :-
"3. Seniority' (a) The 'seniority' of a person in a service, class, category or grade shall, unless he has been reduced to a lower rank as a punishment, be determined by the date of his first appointment to such service, class, category or grade. If any portion of the service of such person does not count towards probation, his seniority shall be determined by the date of commencement of his service which counts towards probation.
(b) The appointing authority may, at the time of passing an order appointing two or more persons simultaneously to a service fix the order of preference among them; and where such order has been fixed, seniority shall be determined in accordance with it.
(c) The transfer of a person from one category or grade of a service to another category or grade carrying the same pay or scale of pay shall not be treated as a first appointment to the later for purposes of seniority; and the seniority of a person so transferred shall be determined with reference to the date of his first appointment to the category or grade from which he was transferred. Where any difficulty or doubt arises in applying this regulation, seniority shall be determined by the appointing authority.
(d) Where a member of any service, class, category or grade, is reduced to a lower service, class, category or grade, he shall be placed at the top of the latter unless the authority ordering such reduction directs that he shall take rank in such lower service, class, category or grade, next below any specified member thereof.
(emphasis added) In fact, as adverted to above, the amendment was effected to Reg.3 through Resolution No.8/1990, dt.3.2.1990, approved by Govt. Lr. No.1242/Tr.III-2/96-6, dt.18-12- 1998, vide notification No.18/1999, dt.29.5.1999. The portion added by way of amendment is as follows:
"If any employee is willing to relinquish the right of his seniority in the past held by him in the seniority Unit in which he is working and is willing to join on transfer in another seniority unit at his request, it shall be treated as a first appointment for transferred employee for the purpose of seniority and he will become junior most in the seniority unit to which transferred on request. His seniority shall be reckoned from the date of his joining on transfer in the later seniority unit."
Since in B.Srinivasulu (7 supra) only the question of seniority, rather than the issue of promotion, fell for consideration, referring to the unamended Reg.3, the Division Bench has held:
"(6) On the plain reading of Regulation 3, it is apparent that it only speaks of the principles for determination of seniority when that is to be made in all ordinary cases as between persons belonging to any service, class, category or grade. The rule is only reiteration of the general principle of fixation of seniority that if there are no other rules to the contrary or distinctive feature on which a different rule of seniority may be based, seniority has to be reckoned with reference to the initial date of appointment only. The rule of seniority laid down in the circular of 8-9-
1977, while not determining a rule of seniority inconsistent with that of Regulation 3, yet seeks to evolve a principle of determination of seniority where a situation, other than that prevails, where the transfer is obtained by the employee on his own request to suit his own convenience. The universal rule of seniority is, of course, when persons are appointed to the same service or grade at successive times, to fix it in accordance with the sequence of time in which the incumbents come in. Such principle is obviously founded on the principle of natural justice and fair-play as a person coming in later must find his place below the one who is already there. But when a person, for his own convenience, seeks to have his services placed in a different service, cadre or grade, it is inequitable that he must not only get the benefit of having himself posted in the new service or grade but also march over the heads of all others who are already there."
It has further been observed:
So far as transfer by the employer at his own instance for exigencies of service is concerned, an employee transferred to a different cadre is not to be adversely affected with regard to his seniority and is ordinarily to retain the same in the new cadre. Where the employee himself seeks a transfer for some reason of his own he cannot be permitted to take his own seniority to the new cadre, to the detriment of others already in the cadre and hence must find his seniority below everybody else in the cadre on the date of the transfer.
Accordingly the Division Bench in B.Sreenivasulu case (7 supra) has concluded that para 5.3 of the Circular is in no way inconsistent with the rule of seniority in Reg.3, but is to be read along with it, governing specific cases as distinguished from the general rule of seniority.
Now we may examine M. Venkat Raos case (1 supra), which has specifically dealt with the issue of promotion based on seniority. In M. Venkat Rao case (1 supra) the basic facts would indicate that the petitioner therein was appointed temporary Driver Grade-II with effect from 6.11.1977 in one Depot., that later he filed an application for his transfer to another Depot in another Division in the year 1986, and that basing on his representation that he would not claim his original seniority, he was permitted to join in the new Depot. It was contended by the Corporation that the writ petitioner himself opted for transfer to the new Division; as such, he could not claim his seniority in relation to services rendered earlier.
The only question that fell for consideration in M.Venkat Raos case (1 supra) was whether the writ petitioner therein was entitled to be considered for promotion irrespective of the fact that he was placed as a junior-most employee at his transferred place. Having considered Union of India v. C. N. Poonnappan , and Scientific Advisor to Raksha Mantri v. V. M. Joseph , the learned Division Bench has felt that the issue was no longer res integra. Thus, it has held:
10. There cannot be any doubt, having regard to the aforementioned decision of the Apex Court, that although by reason of the said Circular dated 8-9-1977 the rule of seniority had been laid down but thereby the transferred employee does not lose his chance of promotion. The Apex Court has clearly laid down that the eligibility for promotion cannot be confused with seniority as they are two different and distinct factors. The point at issue, thus, is squarely covered by the aforementioned decisions of the Apex Court in Scientific Advisor to Raksha Mantri (supra).
Now we may examine Ponnappan (8 supra). In the said case, the Honble Supreme Court has considered whether an employee who is transferred from one unit to another on compassionate grounds, and, as a result, is placed at the bottom of the seniority list, can have his service in the earlier unit, from where he has been transferred, counted for the purpose of promotion in the unit where he is transferred to. It is observed in para 4:
4. The service rendered by an employee at the place from where he was transferred on compassionate grounds is regular service. It is no different from the service rendered at the place where he is transferred. Both the periods are taken into account for the purpose of leave and retiral benefits. The fact that as a result of transfer he is placed at the bottom of the seniority list at the place of transfer does not wipe out his service at the place from where he was transferred. The said service, being regular service in the grade, has to be taken into account as part of his experience for the purpose of eligibility for promotion and it cannot be ignored only on the ground that it was not rendered at the place where he has been transferred. In our opinion, the Tribunal has rightly held that the service held at the place from where the employee has been transferred has to be counted as experience for the purpose of eligibility for promotion at the place where he has been transferred.
What assumes importance is the observation of the Honble Supreme Court in the next paragraph:
5. It has been pointed out that subsequent to the judgment of the Tribunal in Ponnappan case [(1987) 5 ATC 766 (Mad)], the relevant rules governing promotion from Lower Division Clerk to Upper Division Clerk have been amended by notification dated 30-6-1986 and now the requirement is with eight years' regular service in the grade in the unit/ office/ establishment/ laboratory/ centre/unit, etc. in which they are considered for promotion.
Thus, since the amendment was subsequent in point of time with prospective application, their Lordships have maintained the ratio as found in paragraph 4. Evidently, all the cases subsequent to the amendment are required to be considered in the light of the said amendment only, unless a challenge is laid and sustained against the very amendment. In the present case, the later limb of Reg. 3 cannot be ignored. Ipso facto, the ratio laid down in Ponnappan by the Honble Supreme Court could have application only in consideration of the un-amended Reg.3
(c).
In V. M. Joseph (9 supra), it is observed by the Honble Supreme Court in para 6 of the Judgment:
6. From the facts set out above, it will be seen that promotion was denied to the respondent on the post of Senior Store Keeper on the ground that he had completed 3 years of regular service as Store keeper on 7th June, 1980 and therefore, he could not be promoted earlier than 1980. In coming to this conclusion, the appellants excluded the period of service rendered by the respondent in the Central Ordnance Depot, Pune, as a Store Keeper for the period from 27th April, 1971 to 6th June, 1977. The appellants contended that, since the respondent had been transferred on compassionate ground, on his own request to the post of Store Keeper at Cochin and was placed at the bottom of the Seniority list, the period of 3 years of regular service can be treated to commence only from the date on which he was transferred to Cochin. This is obviously fallacious inasmuch as the respondent had already acquired the status of a permanent employee at Pune where he had rendered more than 3 years of service as a Store Keeper. Even if an employee is transferred at his own request, from one place to another, on the same post, the period of service rendered by him at the earlier place where he held a permanent post and had acquired permanent status, cannot be excluded from consideration for determining his eligibility for promotion, though he may have been placed at the bottom of the seniority list at the transferred place. Eligibility for promotion cannot be confused with seniority as they are two different and distinct factors.
It is interesting to note that in the above judgment what exactly is the regulatory regime that governs the promotions has not been spelt out. On the other hand, the matter was considered based on the ratio in Ponnappan (8 supra) case, as is evident from the succeeding paragraphs:
7. This Court in Union of India & Ors. v. C.N. Ponnappan, AIR1996SC764 , has held that, where an employee is transferred from one unit to another on compassionate ground and is placed at the bottom of the seniority list, the service rendered by him at the earlier place from where he has been transferred, being regular service, has to be counted towards experience and eligibility for promotion.
8. In view of this decision, with which we respectfully agree, the direction of the Tribunal that the respondent may be promoted to the post of Senior Store Keeper from an earlier date and the further direction concerning respondent's promotion to the post of Senior Store Keeper, Grade-I, do not suffer from any infirmity. That being so, the appeal has no merits and is accordingly dismissed without, however, any order as to costs.
Eventually, it may have to be said that in M. Venkat Rao (1 supra), the initial appointment was on 6.11.1977, and his transfer on his own request was on 4.8.1996. The original Writ Petition was filed in 1993, though the Writ Appeal was decided on 19-12-2000. Reg. 3 suffered amendment on 3.2.1990, it was approved by the Government on 18-12-1998, but was notified on 29.5.1999. Thus the amendment was not considered by the Division Bench in M. Venkat Rao (1 supra), as the cause of action arose prior to the amendment.
It is too well established to cavil about that precedentially a judgement can be declared ultra vires on the following grounds: (1) That the correct statutory provision was not brought to the notice of the said learned Bench, or in other words, the said judgments were rendered per ignoratium or not being aware of the prevailing statutory law, and (2) that those judgments were rendered in ignorance of the binding precedent of a larger bench or in terms of Art.141 of the Constitution; in other words, the binding precedent has not been brought to the notice of the said learned Bench.
Judicial pronouncements are legion in laying down the proposition that a Bench cannot declare the decision of a co-equal Bench, much less that of a larger Bench, per incuriam. The principle of stare decisis is too well settled to brook such inconsistency, to say the least. Now, we may examine whether M. Venkat Rao (1 supra) and V. D. Prasad (2 supra) are the binding precedents for deciding the issue in the present writ petition.
Reg. 3 of the Regulations, 1964 was amended through Resolution No.8/1990, dt.3.2.1990, and was approved by Govt. Lr. No.1242/Tr.III-2/96-6, dt.18-12-1998, vide notification No.18/1999, dt.29.5.1999. That means the amended regulations came into effect from 29.05.1999. Whereas the lis in M. Venkat Rao commenced prior to 1978, when WP No.172 of 1978, out of which the Writ Appeal decided by the learned Division Bench, was filed before this Court. Thus, the issue in the present writ petition has not at all fallen for consideration before the Division Bench in M. Venkat Rao (1 supra).
As has been held by a Constitutional Bench of the Honble Supreme Court in M.S.M.Sharma (6 supra), a judgement rendered on the concessions of the parties or their counsel is not the opinion of the Court. Accordingly, the decision in V.D.Prasad (2 supra) is not the conscious legal opinion or dictum of the Court. It may bear repetition to recall his Lordships observations in V.D.Prasad (2 supra): The learned counsel for the petitioner and admitted to by the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-Corporation that the subject matter of this writ petition is squarely covered by a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in M.Venkat Rao (1 supra), and they both agreed for disposal of the writ petition by and in terms of the said judgment.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court is constrained to observe that the petitioner cannot compel the respondent Corporation to reckon his seniority for the purpose of promotion from the date of his initial appointment. In terms of Reg.13, it shall be reckoned from the date of his joining the duty at the transferred place.
The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in consequence.
_______________________ DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU,J Date: 20.11.2013