Chattisgarh High Court
Krishna Bhagat vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 30 April, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:20083-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 554 of 2025
Krishna Bhagat S/o Parmeshwar Bhagat Aged About 28 Years R/o
Village- Jharan, P.S. And Tahsil- Lailunga, Distt. Raigarh (CG)
... Appellant(s)
versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station - Lailunga, Distt. Raigarh
(C.G.)
...Respondent(s)
(Cause-titles taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Ashutosh Mishra, Advocate.
For Respondent/State : Dr. Saurabh Kumar Pande, Deputy Advocate General.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 30.04.2026 Digitally
1. Heard Mr. Ashutosh Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the signed by BRIJMOHAN BRIJMOHAN MORLE MORLE appellant. Also heard Dr. Saurabh Kumar Pande, learned Deputy Date:
2026.05.12 11:00:16 +0530 Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondent.2
2. The present criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant/accused under Section 415(2) of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, "BNSS"), assailing the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.01.2025 passed by the learned Additional Session Judge, Gharghoda, District Raigarh (C.G.) (hereinafter referred to as "the learned trial Court") in Sessions Case No. 40 of 2019, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under:
Conviction under Section Sentence
Section 302 of the Indian :Rigorous imprisonment (for short,
Penal Code (for short, 'IPC') 'R.I.') for life and fine of
Rs.1000/-, to default of payment
of fine, 01 month R.I. more.
3. Brief facts of the case are that, on 15.01.2019 at about 08:30 a.m., the complainant, Sukhdas Panika (PW-1), reported that he was the Kotwar (village watchman) of Village Jharan and that on the same day at around 06:00 a.m., information spread in the village that a dead body was lying beside the road at Jharan Chowk. Upon reaching the spot, he found a large crowd gathered there and saw a dead body lying face down near the roadside. There were injuries on the right side of the forehead and on the left hand of the deceased, and blood stains were found on his shirt and on the surrounding area. A blood-stained shirt was also lying at a short distance from the body. The villagers identified the deceased as Rameshwar Painkra. It appeared that someone had murdered him and thrown the body there. On the basis of the said 3 information, Assistant Sub-Inspector Vijay Kumar Ekka (PW-7) registered a merg intimation vide Ex.P/1 under Merg No. 0/2019 and informed the S.D.M., Lailunga. Notices under Section 175 of the Cr.P.C. were issued to witnesses to remain present during the inquest proceedings vide Ex.P/5, and the inquest report (Naksha Panchayatnama) was prepared vide Ex.P/6. As the death appeared to be homicidal in nature, an application for postmortem examination of the deceased was prepared vide Ex.P/7 in accordance with the opinion of the panch witnesses, and the dead body was sent to C.H.C., Lailunga through Constable No. 1132, Ramesh Yadav, to whom a duty certificate vide Ex.P/25 was issued.
4. On 15.01.2019, Assistant Sub-Inspector Vijay Kumar Ekka (PW-7) prepared the spot map vide Ex.P/2 and seized from the place of occurrence one blood-stained half shirt of red, white and blue colour, blood-stained soil and plain soil, and from the house of the appellant, blood-stained soil and plain soil, in the presence of witnesses Divya Lochan Chauhan (PW-2) and Ratan Yadav (PW-3), vide seizure memo Ex.P/3. Thereafter, upon returning to the police station, the merg enquiry officer registered numbered Merg Intimation No. 6/2019 vide Ex.P/4.
5. Dr. Gulshan Sidar (PW-8) conducted the postmortem examination on the dead body of deceased Rameshwar Painkra and found injuries at various places on his body, including internal hemorrhage in the posterior part of the head. The postmortem report was prepared vide 4 Ex.P/8, wherein it was opined that the death was caused due to severe internal head injury and internal bleeding, and that the nature of death was homicidal. During the postmortem examination, a white cloth stained with blood and a maroon-coloured full pant were sealed and handed over to Constable Ramesh Yadav, who, upon returning to the police station, produced the said articles, which were seized by Inspector B. Ekka (PW-9) vide seizure memo Ex.P/14.
6. After completion of the merg enquiry, Inspector B. Ekka (PW-9) registered First Information Report (FIR) vide Ex.P/26 on 16.01.2019 against an unknown person for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, bearing Crime No. 8/2019. On the same day at about 05:30 p.m., the Investigating Officer recorded the memorandum statement of the appellant in the presence of witnesses Divya Lochan Chauhan (PW-2) and Asharam Painkra (PW-6) vide Ex.P/9, pursuant to which one iron "Parsul" and one wooden stick alleged to have been used in the commission of the offence were seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/10. On the same date, an old undergarment produced by the appellant was seized vide Ex.P/11. The appellant was arrested vide arrest memo Ex.P/12, and intimation of his arrest was given to his relative Parmeshwar vide Ex.P/13. The seized Parsul and wooden stick were sent for medical query through requisition Ex.P/15 to the Medical Officer, Community Health Centre, Lailunga, where Dr. Gulshan Sidar (PW-8), after examination, submitted query report Ex.P/16 opining that the injuries sustained by the deceased could have been caused by the said seized weapons and further recommended chemical examination 5 thereof. Statements of witnesses were recorded during investigation. The seized articles were sent to the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Bilaspur through forwarding memo Ex.P/17 issued by the Superintendent of Police, Raigarh, and receipt thereof is Ex.P/18. After examination, the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Bilaspur forwarded its report Ex.P/20 along with forwarding memo Ex.P/19 to the Superintendent of Police, Raigarh. As per the report, blood was detected on the seized half shirt, blood-stained soil seized from the place of occurrence and from the house of the appellant, the Parsul seized from the appellant, and the shirt and full pant seized during postmortem examination. Human blood was detected on the half shirt seized from the spot, on the Parsul seized from the appellant and on the shirt seized during the postmortem examination. Further, blood group "A" was detected on the half shirt seized from the spot and on the Parsul seized from the appellant.
7. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC was filed against the appellant before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gharghoda, District Raigarh (C.G.). The case being exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, it was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial and was thereafter made over to the Court of learned Additional Session Judge, Gharghoda, District Raigarh (C.G.) for trial, hearing and disposal in accordance with law.
8. The learned trial Court framed charge against the appellant under 6 Section 302 of the IPC. The charge was read over and explained to the appellant, who denied the same and pleaded innocence and claimed to be tried.
9. Statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. was recorded, wherein he denied the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence, pleaded innocence and alleged false implication. However, the appellant did not examine any witness in his defence.
10. In order to bring home the charge against the appellant, the prosecution examined as many as 09 witnesses and exhibited 26 documents. No oral or documentary evidence was adduced on behalf of the defence.
11. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned trial Court, by judgment dated 29.01.2025, convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him accordingly, as mentioned in paragraph 03 of this judgment. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the present criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant.
12. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court are contrary to the facts and law and, therefore, liable to be set aside. It is contended that the entire case of the prosecution rests upon circumstantial evidence and there is no eyewitness to the incident. 7 It is further submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances pointing only towards the guilt of the appellant. He further submits that the conviction of the appellant has mainly been based upon the memorandum statement of the appellant vide Ex.P/9 and the alleged recovery of one iron "Parsul" and a wooden stick vide Ex.P/10. However, the independent witnesses to the memorandum and seizure proceedings have not fully supported the prosecution case and, therefore, the alleged recovery becomes doubtful. It is further contended that though blood stains were allegedly found on the seized articles, the prosecution has failed to conclusively establish that the same belonged to the deceased. The prosecution has also failed to prove any motive for commission of the offence. It is argued that mere recovery of articles allegedly used in the offence, in absence of any cogent and reliable evidence connecting the appellant with the crime, is not sufficient to sustain conviction under Section 302 of the IPC. Accordingly, it is prayed that the appellant is entitled to benefit of doubt and the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside.
13. Per contra, learned State counsel supports the impugned judgment and submits that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence available on record and has not committed any illegality in convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. It is submitted that the memorandum statement of the appellant vide Ex.P/9 led to the recovery of one iron "Parsul" and a wooden stick vide Ex.P/10, which were found stained with blood. The query report Ex.P/16 clearly establishes that the 8 injuries sustained by the deceased could have been caused by the said seized weapons. It is further submitted that the FSL report (Ex.P/20) confirms presence of human blood on the seized articles, including the Parsul recovered at the instance of the appellant, thereby constituting a strong incriminating circumstance against him.
14. Learned State counsel further submits that the prosecution has successfully established the chain of circumstances, which unerringly points towards the guilt of the appellant and rules out every hypothesis of innocence. It is contended that minor discrepancies or lapses in investigation do not affect the core of the prosecution case. Therefore, the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court is well-founded and does not call for any interference by this Court.
15. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and carefully perused the entire record of the case.
16. The conviction of the appellant is primarily based upon circumstantial evidence, particularly the memorandum statement of the appellant vide Ex.P/9 and the consequent recovery of one iron "Parsul" and a wooden stick vide seizure memo Ex.P/10. The prosecution has also relied upon the medical evidence, query report Ex.P/16 and the FSL report Ex.P/20 in support of its case.
17. The first question that arises for consideration before this Court is whether the death of deceased Rameshwar Painkra was homicidal in nature.
9
18. In this regard, the learned trial Court, after appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, particularly the testimony of Dr. Gulshan Sidar (PW-8), who conducted the postmortem examination on the dead body of deceased Rameshwar Painkra and proved the postmortem report Ex.P/8, recorded a finding that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. Dr. Gulshan Sidar (PW-8) has stated that during postmortem examination, he found multiple injuries on the body of the deceased, including internal hemorrhage in the posterior part of the head. According to the postmortem report Ex.P/8, the cause of death was severe internal head injury and internal bleeding, and the nature of death was opined to be homicidal. The testimony of this witness has remained substantially unshaken during cross-examination and nothing material could be elicited to discredit his evidence.
19. In view of the medical evidence of Dr. Gulshan Sidar (PW-8) and the postmortem report Ex.P/8, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the death of deceased was homicidal in nature.
20. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and upon due consideration of the material available on record, we are of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the learned trial Court regarding the homicidal nature of death of deceased is a pure finding of fact based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record. The said finding is neither perverse nor contrary to the evidence on record. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding.
10
21. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the recovery of incriminating articles pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant vide Ex.P/9 is admissible in evidence and whether the same can be relied upon against the appellant.
22. In order to examine the admissibility and evidentiary value of the said memorandum and the consequent recovery, it is necessary to scrutinize the testimony of the witnesses to the memorandum and seizure proceedings, as well as the surrounding circumstances in which such recovery is alleged to have been effected.
23. In the present case, Investigating Officer B. Ekka (PW-9) has stated that on the basis of the memorandum statement of the appellant vide Ex.P/9, the aforesaid Parsul and wooden stick were seized from the appellant vide seizure memo Ex.P/10. It is a well-settled principle of law that only that portion of a memorandum statement which distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered is admissible in evidence. From memorandum Ex.P/9 and seizure memo Ex.P/10, it appears that the said proceedings were conducted in the presence of independent witnesses Divya Lochan and Asharam. Though Divya Lochan (PW-2) and Asharam (PW-6) have admitted their respective signatures on memorandum Ex.P/9 and seizure memo Ex.P/10, they have denied that the appellant was interrogated in their presence or that any article was seized before them. Even after being cross-examined by the prosecution, both these witnesses did not support the prosecution case with regard to the said proceedings. Therefore, in the present case, 11 since Divya Lochan (PW-2) and Asharam (PW-6) have not supported the memorandum proceedings vide Ex.P/9 and seizure proceedings vide Ex.P/10, the memorandum and seizure proceedings become doubtful and unsafe to rely upon without independent corroboration.
24. Divya Lochan (PW-2) and Ratan Yadav (PW-3) have denied that any articles were seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/3. However, upon being cross-examined by the prosecution, Divya Lochan (PW-2) admitted that he had stated before the police in his statement Ex.P/22 that the shirt of deceased Rameshwar was soaked with blood. However, this witness denied the suggestion that blood had spilled and spread around the dead body, that dragging marks were present near the place where the dead body of Rameshwar was lying, that the said dragging marks extended towards the house of the appellant, and that blood stains were also found at the house of Krishna Bhagat. On the contrary, Ratan Yadav (PW-3), upon being cross-examined by the prosecution, admitted that blood had spilled and spread around the dead body and that dragging marks were present near the place where the dead body of Rameshwar was lying. He further admitted that the said dragging marks extended towards the house of the appellant and that the police had found blood stains in the house of the appellant.
25. Asharam (PW-6) has not supported the memorandum proceedings vide Ex.P/9 and seizure proceedings vide Ex.P/10. However, upon being cross-examined by the prosecution, this witness also admitted that dragging marks were present outside the house of 12 the appellant.
26. Thus, from the aforesaid evidence available on record, it appears that blood stains were found near the place of occurrence and dragging marks were seen extending towards the house of the appellant. However, the material witnesses to the seizure and memorandum proceedings have not supported the prosecution case in material particulars. The evidence of Divya Lochan (PW-2), Ratan Yadav (PW-
3), and Asharam (PW-6) suffers from inconsistencies and omissions, thereby rendering the prosecution version doubtful.
27. Further, the FSL report Ex.P/20 reveals that blood was detected on the half shirt seized from the place of occurrence, the blood-stained soil seized from the place of occurrence, the blood-stained soil seized from the house of the appellant, the Parsul, and the shirt and full pant of the deceased sealed by the Doctor during postmortem examination. Out of these articles, human blood was detected on the half shirt seized from the place of occurrence, on the Parsul, and on the shirt of the deceased sealed during postmortem examination. However, with regard to the blood-stained soil seized from the place of occurrence and from the house of the appellant, as well as the stains found on the full pant of the deceased sealed during postmortem examination, the result regarding human origin was found negative due to disintegration of the stains. The FSL report further reveals that blood group "A" was detected on the shirt seized from the place of occurrence and on the seized Parsul. However, no evidence has been brought on record to establish 13 that the blood group of the deceased was also "A". In absence of such evidence, the FSL report by itself is insufficient to conclusively connect the appellant with the crime.
28. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which states as under: -
"27. How much of information received from accused may be proved.--Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved."
29. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is applicable only if the confessional statement relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered.
30. The Honb'le Supreme Court in the matter of Asar Mohammad and others v. State of U.P.1 with reference to the word "fact" employed in Section 27 of the Evidence Act has held that the facts need not be self-probatory and the word "fact" as contemplated in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not limited to "actual physical material object". It has been further held that the discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its existence at a particular place and it includes a discovery of an object, the place from which it is 1 AIR 2018 SC 5264 14 produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence. Their Lordships relying upon the decision of the Privy Council in the matter of Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor2 observed as under: -
"13. It is a settled legal position that the facts need not be self-probatory and the word "fact" as contemplated in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not limited to "actual physical material object". The discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its existence at a particular place. It includes a discovery of an object, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence. It will be useful to advert to the exposition in the case of Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2015) 1 SCC 253, in particular, paragraph 23 thereof. The same read thus:
"23. While accepting or rejecting the factors of discovery, certain principles are to be kept in mind. The Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor (supra) has held thus: (IA p. 77) "... it is fallacious to treat the 'fact discovered' within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must
2 AIR 1947 PC 67 15 relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that 'I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house' does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added 'with which I stabbed A', these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx"
31. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Asar Mohammad (supra), only the discovery of the object, the place from which it was produced and the knowledge of the accused regarding its existence would be admissible in evidence. Except to that limited extent, the remaining incriminating part of the statement would be inadmissible 16 under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
32. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar3 has clearly held that confession to police whether in course of investigation or otherwise and confession made while in police custody would be hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act and observed as under:-
"9. Section 25 of the Evidence Act is one of the provisions of law dealing with confessions made by an accused. The law relating to confessions is to be found generally in Ss. 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and Ss. 162 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Sections 17 to 31 of the Evidence Act are to be found under the heading "Admissions". Confession is a species of admission, and is dealt with in Ss. 24 to 30. A confession or an admission is evidence against the maker of it, unless its admissibility is excluded by some provision of law. Section 24 excludes confessions caused by certain inducements, threats and promises. Section 25 provides : "No confession made to a police officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of an offence." The terms of S. 25 are imperative. A confession made to a police officer under any circumstances is not admissible in evidence against the accused. It covers a confession made when he was free and not in police custody, as also a confession made before any investigation has begun. The expression "accused of any 3 AIR 1966 SC 119 17 offence" covers a person accused of an offence at the trial whether or not he was accused of the offence when he made the confession. Section 26 prohibits proof against any person of a confession made by him in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. The partial ban imposed by S. 26 relates to a confession made to a person other than a police officer. Section 26 does not qualify the absolute ban imposed by S. 25 on a confession made to a police officer. Section 27 is in the form of a proviso, and partially lifts the ban imposed by Ss. 24, 25 and 26. It provides that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure forbids the use of any statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation for any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of the offence under investigation, save as mentioned in the proviso and in cases falling under sub-section (2), and it specifically provides that nothing in it shall be deemed to affect the provisions of S. 27 of the Evidence Act. The words of S. 162 are wide enough to include a confession made to a police officer in the course of an investigation. A statement or confession made in the course of an investigation may be recorded by a Magistrate 18 under S. 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure subject to the safeguards imposed by the section. Thus, except as provided by S. 27 of the Evidence Act, a confession by an accused to a police officer is absolutely protected under S.25 of the Evidence Act, and if it is made in the course of an investigation, it is also protected by S. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and a confession to any other person made by him while in the custody of a police officer is protected by S. 26, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. These provisions seem to proceed upon the view that confessions made by an accused to a police officer or made by him while he is in the custody of a police officer are not to be trusted, and should not be used in evidence against him. They are based upon grounds of public policy, and the fullest effect should be given to them."
Their Lordships further held as under:-
"18. If the first information report is given by the accused to a police officer and amounts to a confessional statement, proof of the confession is prohibited by S. 25. The confession includes not only the admission of the offence but all other admissions of incriminating facts related to the offence contained in the confessional statement. No part of the confessional statement is receivable in evidence except to the extent that the ban of S. 25 is lifted by S.27"
33. In the present case, the memorandum statement Ex.P/9 allegedly made by the appellant before the police officer is hit by Section 25 of 19 the Evidence Act except to the limited extent permissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. As such, only that portion of the statement which distinctly relates to the discovery of the fact would be admissible in evidence. However, since the memorandum and seizure proceedings themselves have not been satisfactorily proved by reliable independent evidence, the alleged recovery pursuant thereto loses much of its evidentiary value. As held by the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya (supra) and followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Asar Mohammad (supra), only the fact discovered, namely, the place from which the object is recovered and the knowledge of the accused regarding its existence, would be admissible, whereas the incriminating or confessional part of the statement would remain inadmissible in evidence.
34. It is well settled that where the seizure witnesses turn hostile and do not support the prosecution case regarding recovery, the Court is required to seek strong corroboration before placing reliance upon such recovery proceedings. In the present case, except the testimony of the Investigating Officer, there is no convincing independent evidence available on record to establish that the Parsul and wooden stick were actually recovered at the instance of the appellant in the manner alleged by the prosecution.
35. At this stage, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Balwan Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh and another 4 deserves to be noticed, wherein relying upon the Constitution Bench 4 (2019) 7 SCC 781 20 judgment in Raghav Prapanna Tripathi v. State of U.P.5, it has been held that where the prosecution seeks to rely upon bloodstained articles recovered from the accused, it is necessary for the prosecution to establish that the blood found on such articles was of human origin and had nexus with the deceased. Their Lordships in Balwan Singh (supra) observed as under:-
"23. From the aforementioned discussion, we can summarise that if the recovery of bloodstained articles is proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, and if the investigation was not found to be tainted, then it may be sufficient if the prosecution shows that the blood found on the articles is of human origin though, even though the blood group is not proved because of disintegration of blood. The court will have to come to the conclusion based on the facts and circumstances of each case, and there cannot be any fixed formula that the prosecution has to prove, or need not prove, that the blood groups match."
36. Their Lordships further held in Balwan Singh (supra) as under:-
"24. In the instant case, then, we could have placed some reliance on the recovery, had the prosecution at least proved that the blood was of human origin. As observed supra, while discussing the evidence of PWs 9 and 16, the prosecution has tried to concoct the case from stage to stage. Hence, in the absence of positive material indicating that the stained blood was of 5 AIR 1963 SC 74 21 human origin and of the same blood group as that of the accused, it would be difficult for the Court to rely upon the aspect of recovery of the weapons and tabbal, and such recovery does not help the case of the prosecution."
37. Reverting to the facts of the present case, though blood stains were found on the seized Parsul, the prosecution has failed to establish any nexus between the said blood stains and the deceased. Though the FSL report Ex.P/20 indicates that blood group "A" was found on the seized Parsul and shirt recovered from the spot, no evidence has been adduced by the prosecution to establish that the blood group of the deceased was also "A". Further, with respect to several seized articles, the origin of the blood could not be determined due to disintegration of the stains. In absence of such conclusive scientific evidence, the recovery of the weapon by itself cannot be treated as an incriminating circumstance sufficient to sustain conviction.
38. The medical evidence only indicates that the injuries sustained by the deceased could have been caused by the seized weapon. However, mere possibility cannot take the place of proof. The prosecution was required to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the weapon allegedly recovered was in fact used by the appellant in commission of the offence, which it has failed to do.
39. It is also pertinent to note that there is no eyewitness account of the incident and the entire prosecution case rests upon circumstantial evidence. It is trite law that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, 22 each incriminating circumstance must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and all the circumstances so proved must form a complete chain pointing only towards the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with any hypothesis of innocence.
40. In the present case, the chain of circumstances sought to be established by the prosecution is not complete. Material witnesses have not supported the prosecution case, the memorandum and seizure proceedings are doubtful, and the forensic evidence does not conclusively connect the appellant with the crime. Furthermore, the prosecution has also failed to establish any cogent motive for commission of the offence by the appellant. Except vague allegations and suspicion, no material has been brought on record to demonstrate any prior enmity, dispute, or compelling reason which could have prompted the appellant to commit the murder of the deceased. Absence of motive assumes significance particularly in a case resting solely upon circumstantial evidence.
41. Having considered the entire evidence available on record in its proper perspective, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court was not justified in convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC.
42. Consequently, the appellant is entitled to benefit of doubt.
43. Accordingly, the appeal deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court are set aside.
23
44. The appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section 302 of the IPC. The appellant is reported to be in jail. He be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.
45. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of Cr.P.C. (now Section 481 of BNSS), appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs. 25,000/- with two reliable sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
46. The learned trial Court record alongwith the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Brijmohan