Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal - Delhi
Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Cce on 1 January, 1990
Equivalent citations: 1990(29)ECR31(TRI.-DELHI)
ORDER D.C. Mandal, Member (T)
1. By the impugned order the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) upheld the demand confirmation order passed by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Moradabad. By his order-in-original No. 140-CE/77 dated 12.7.1979, the Assistant Collector confirmed the demand for duty of Rs. 1,921.72 on bagasse produced in the appellants' sugar factory.
2. We have heard Shri J.S. Sharma, Sales Manager of the Appellant-Company and Smt. V. Zutsi, learned SDR for the Revenue. Shri Sharma has argued that the duty was demanded for the period from 1.3.1975 to 29.4.1975 and the show cause notice demanding duty was issued on 29.3.1978, i.e., long after expiry of the statutory time limit of six months. He has argued that there was no suppression of facts of production of bagasse by the appellants in their sugar factory and hence the longer time limit for raising demand was not applicable. He has prayed that on this ground itself the impugned order may be set aside and the appeal may be allowed. Besides arguing on limitation, Shri Sharma has also argued on merits and has stated that no duty was payable on the bagasse. Smt. Zulsi contested the argument of Shri Sharma on merits, as well as on limitation. So far as limitation is concerned, she has stated that the appellants did not take Central Excise licence for manufacturing bagasse and also did not file classification list in respect of the said product.
3. We have considered the records of the case and arguments advanced before us. Bagasse is produced by sugar mill in course of manufacture of sugar. This is a well known fact. It cannot, therefore, be said that Departmental officers were not aware of the fact that bagasse was being produced by the appellants.
4. There was no allegation of suppression of facts or wilful mis-statement in the show cause notice dated 20.3.1978, The demand show cause notice was issued long after expiry of six months' limitation. The demand for duty was, therefore, clearly time-barred. On this ground alone we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order. Since the appeal is allowed on grounds of limitation, it is not necessary for us to go into the merit of the case.