Custom, Excise & Service Tax Tribunal
Atr Warehousing Pvt Ltd vs Visakhapatnam-I on 21 February, 2025
(1)
ST/1566/2012
CUSTOMS, EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
REGIONAL BENCH AT HYDERABAD
Division Bench - Court No. - I
Service Tax Appeal No. 1566 of 2012
(Arising out of Order-in-Original No. VIZ-STX-001-COM-064-12 dt.30.03.2012 passed by
Commissioner of Central Excise, Service Tax & Customs, Visakhapatnam-I)
ATR Warehousing Pvt Ltd
D.No.11-8-34, Daspalla Hills, Visakhapatnam, ......Appellant
Andhra Pradesh - 530 002
VERSUS
Commissioner of Central Tax
Visakhapatnam - I
Port Area, Visakhapatnam,
......Respondent
Andhra Pradesh - 530 035 Appearance Shri Suresh Dorbala, Advocate for the Appellant.
Shri Sandeep Payal, AR for the Respondent.
Coram: HON'BLE MR. A.K. JYOTISHI, MEMBER (TECHNICAL) HON'BLE MR. ANGAD PRASAD, MEMBER (JUDICIAL) FINAL ORDER No. A/30052/2025 Date of Hearing: 19.11.2024 Date of Decision: 21.02.2025 [Order per: A.K. JYOTISHI] M/s ATR Warehousing Pvt Ltd (hereinafter referred to as the Appellant) are in appeal against the Order passed by the Adjudicating Authority vide OIO dt.30.03.2012 (impugned order). The impugned order decided the SCN dt.02.06.2011, whereby, certain demands were raised against the appellant. The appellants are in appeal before this Bench against the impugned order.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the appellants are engaged in providing various services like 'Renting of Immovable Property Service' (RIPS), 'Commercial or Industrial Construction Service' (CICS) and 'Site Formation & Clearance Service' (SFCS). On the basis of investigation by the department that the appellants have not properly discharged the Service Tax liability in relation to these services, demand for recovery of (2) ST/1566/2012 Rs.1,94,33,169/- on RIPS, Rs.36,30,661/- on the Rent advances received, Rs.18,56,223/- on CICS and Rs.1,67,77,806/- on SFCS was raised. On adjudication, the Adjudicating Authority has confirmed the demand of Rs.1,94,33,169/- in respect of RIPS for the period 01.06.2007 to 31.03.2011, Rs.36,30,661/- for rent advances received by them for the period 01.06.2007 to 31.03.2011 under RIPS, Rs.18,56,223/- in respect of CICS for the period 2005-06 to 2007-08, Rs.1,67,77,806/- in respect of SFCS for the period 01.06.2007 to 31.03.2011 and also imposed penalty of Rs.4,16,97,859/- in respect of these services and violations apart from appropriating certain amount already paid by the appellant in respect of SFCS.
3. The case of the department was that the appellants have entered into various agreements with some of their clients for renting out warehouses, as also open land. The department felt that in view of the topography and plot layout, the open land is nothing but land appurtenant to the covered shed/ warehouses rented out to their clients. Therefore, in view of explanation (1) to the definition of 'Renting of Immovable Property' under Section 65(105)(zzzz), the 'immovable property' also includes various other lands, which are either appurtenant or are incidental to use of such building or part of a building. However, the same does not include, inter alia, vacant land whether or not having facilities clearly incidental to the use of such vacant land. For ease of reference, the definition is cited below:-
"(105) "taxable service" means any service provided or to be provided,- (zzzz) to any person, by any other person, by renting of immovable property or any other service in relation to such renting for use in the course of or, for furtherance of business or commerce.
Explanation 1.-- For the purposes of this sub-clause, "immovable property" includes --
(i) building and part of a building, and the land appurtenant thereto;
(ii) land incidental to the use of such building or part of a building;
(iii) the common or shared areas and facilities relating thereto; and
(iv) in case of a building located in a complex or an industrial estate, all common areas and facilities relating thereto, within such complex or estate,
(v) Vacant land, given on lease or license for construction of building or temporary structure at a later stage to be used for furtherance of business or commerce.
but does not include-
(3)ST/1566/2012
a) vacant land solely used for agriculture, aquaculture, farming, forestry, animal husbandry, mining purposes;
b) vacant land, whether or not having facilities clearly incidental to the use of such vacant land;
c) land used for educational, sports, circus, entertainment and parking purposes; and
d) building used solely for residential purposes and buildings used for the purposes of accommodation, including hotels, hostels, boarding houses, holiday accommodation, tents, camping facilities."
4. Learned Advocate for the appellant, apart from reiterating the grounds taken in the appeal, has submitted that the Adjudicating Authority has not clearly appreciated the fact that there are clearly two distinct agreements; one, for the covered area and another, for the vacant land. It is not being disputed that they have not been discharging Service Tax liability on the covered area. However, what is being disputed is that the open/vacant land is not falling under the exclusion category but it would get covered within the definition of RIPS itself. Learned Advocate has also explained the layout with the help of map in respect of Sy.No.238 & 240 at IDA Vakalapudi, Kakinada.
5. On the other hand, learned AR for the department, apart from reiterating the findings of the Adjudicating Authority in the impugned order, has submitted that in view of the agreement, it is obvious that the vacant land is appurtenant to warehouses, covered under section 65(105)(zzzz) by virtue of explanation (1)(i). He has also submitted that said land is located in industrial estate as covered under section 65(105)(zzzz) by virtue of explanation (1)(iv). This is evident from the map submitted by the appellant, wherein, it is seen that said vacant industrial land is surrounded by several industrial establishments and hence, it is part of industrial estate. He has also submitted that said vacant land is given on lease for construction of temporary structures at a later stage to be used for furtherance of business as covered under section 65(105)(zzzz) by virtue of explanation (1)(v). This is obvious from the appellant's agreement with their tenant, where it was provided that tenant shall be entitled at its own cost to install furniture and fixtures to the property as may be required by tenant and the appellant shall have no objection to the same. He has also emphasized that two different agreements of the appellant with the same tenant were executed on the same date; one, for the warehouses and another, for vacant land, which clearly shows that appellant has intention to (4) ST/1566/2012 let out vacant land along with warehouses to single tenant and for the purpose of evasion of Service Tax, the said single transaction is artificially bifurcated to show as vacant land and warehouses separately.
6. Heard both sides and perused the records.
7. On going through the SCN and the impugned order, it is obvious that the main demand is regarding clubbing of vacant land into the value of services under the category of RIPS. For doing so, the department has gone through the physical visit by officers and statements recorded to conclude that these lands were nothing but lands appurtenant to the shed/warehouse area and therefore, they do not have any separate existence. Therefore, the first issue that needs to be decided is whether in the facts of the case the entire area for which separate agreements have been entered into by the appellants can be considered as land appurtenant to the warehouses or these are to be considered as standalone vacant lands, which cannot be part of the services under the category of RIPS. The Commissioner has relied on various relevant facts including the agreements involved and other relevant documents. For the clarity of discussion, issues under different services are discussed as under:-
(A) Renting of Immovable Property Service:-
8. The facts of the case are that the appellants let out property located at Sy.No.238P and 240P, IDA Vakalapudi, Kakinada to M/s Reliance Industries Ltd vide two agreements, both dated 19.05.2007. Vide the first agreement, they have let out part of the property i.e., open land on a monthly rent of Rs.24,00,000/- and vide the second agreement, they had let out three warehouses located in the same property on a monthly rent of Rs.13,00,000/-. He has also relied on some of the basic requirements in the agreement pertaining to covered warehouses i.e., (i) there should be a turning radius of 40 feet trailers, (ii) there should be fencing all around the premises up to 4 feet height and (iii) entrance and exit gates should be on the main road side.
9. He has also, on going through the site plan, satellite image of the site map and the photographs, found that there is no fencing demarcating the properties let out under the two agreements except for some granite poles (5) ST/1566/2012 erected intermittently. He has also observed that godowns numbered 74 & 75 in the sketch given on page 22 of SCN were not accessible to the main road without passing through the property let out under the open yard agreement. He has also noted that the requirements mentioned in the warehouse agreement cannot be provided by the appellant without taking into consideration the common facilities like internal pathway, boundary wall and gate, etc. He has also held that ratio of the open yard to the covered area would not change the nature of open yard being appurtenant to the covered area, as also that the nature of goods stored in the warehouse and that the open yard and that the rents were paid independently to these properties would not be relevant to decide whether the vacant land is appurtenant to the warehouse or otherwise. In view of the same, he has not considered this as vacant land and rather he held that the vacant land is appurtenant to the warehouse and hence covered under explanation (1) to the definition of RIPS given under section 65(105)(zzzz).
10. We have perused the map as also the agreements and observe that though the entire area at Sy.No.238 & 240 is having various sheds and open areas and the appellants have entered into different agreements with different clients viz., M/s Reliance Industries Ltd, M/s Avnash Automobiles Pvt Ltd, M/s ATR Cars Pvt Ltd, etc. In all these places, the remaining land of the survey area encompassed the covered sheds/warehouses, etc., in a manner that without using these vacant lands, the utility of these warehouses would diminish. In other words, considering the entrance and requirement for parking as well as turning radius for 40 feet trailers, etc., through 30 Meter wide road, which would be obvious that the land would have to be used, only then the material can reach to the warehouse. It is a fact that there is no clear cut definition of the word 'appurtenant' in the Finance Act. However, the expression in the Real Estate and Property Law generally refers to a piece of land or property that is attached or belonged to a larger property such as building. For example, a parking lot could be considered as area appurtenant to the office building. In fact, certain easements, gardens, yards, shared amenities, etc., can be considered as appurtenant to the dominant estate. The dominant estate would be the main building or the purpose for which the agreement has been made and the remaining vacant land, which appurtenant thereto, will be dependent on the facts of each case. Some of the basic characteristics of an appurtenant (6) ST/1566/2012 property are that they are physically attached or adjacent to the dominant estate and that the appurtenant property benefits the dominant estate enhancing its value or usefulness and that there is restriction about the usage of appurtenant property, which is often restricted to benefitting the dominant estate.
11. Thus, we find that in terms of the agreement, which has been relied upon by the Adjudicating Authority, it is obvious that the dominant estate in this case would be the covered shed/warehouse and the open land/yard would be appurtenant to this covered shed/warehouse. It is obvious from the wordings of the agreement, especially, Annexure-2 to the agreement for covered warehouses that it has got no utility without the facilities like turning radius suitable for 40 feet trailers, land being not low lying and free from flooding, inundation, fencing all around the premises up to 4 feet height, entrance and exit gates on the main road side, etc. Therefore, the area under covered warehouses can be accessed and optionally utilized only with these facilities when the vacant land is also used in conjunction with the closed warehouse. Interestingly, the agreement is for covered warehouse approximately measuring 20,000 Sq Meter subject to certain conditions. In Annexure-2 to the agreement, there are minimum requirements of closed warehouse like there should not be any high/low tension overhead lines, which obstructs movement of cranes and other MHEs and some of the other conditions discussed above. In addition, there is specification for covered shed, which also provides for sidewalls with bricks, lighting in close warehouses to ensure safe working, proper painting inside and outside, tube lighting, minimum two entries to be provided in each ends, gates collapsible shutters, etc., as well as amenities including parking facility for trucks and trailers. Therefore, a conjoint reading of the terms and conditions of these two agreements would show that the vacant land for which separate agreement has been entered into is nothing but land appurtenant thereto to the covered area/shed/warehouse. They are closely interlinked and interdependent. Thus, by relying on the definition of RIPS under section 65(105)(zzzz), the vacant land has to be considered as land appurtenant to the warehouses. Therefore, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned order confirming the demand on this count.
(7)ST/1566/2012
12. Insofar as the demand on account of vacant land at A9 Industrial Area Kapparada, Kancherapalam, Visakhapatnam to M/s Avnash Automobiles Pvt Ltd is concerned, the learned Advocate has submitted that as evident from the agreement effective from 01.09.2009 to 31.10.2015, the lease is only for the vacant land. However, it also expressly mentions that lessee shall construct a workshop on this premises. The Adjudicating Authority has held that the premises consisted of factory building of erstwhile M/s Sri Vijaya Ice Cold Storage and vacant land. However, the appellants are contesting that they had only given vacant land on lease and not shed, though admittedly for construction of building or temporary structure at a later stage. It is observed that section 65(105)(zzzz) was amended w.e.f. 01.07.2010 to include "vacant land, given on lease or license for construction of buildings or temporary structure at a later stage to be used for furtherance of business or commerce". Therefore, if at all a demand has to be made, it has to be made for the period beyond 01.07.2010. We find that from the agreement it is clear that there was intent to construct workshop, etc., on the said vacant land and therefore, it gets covered within the expression. However, since the agreement has already been signed prior to 01.07.2010, therefore, the issue as to whether for the period up to 01.07.2010, the demand can be made in view of the amended provision or otherwise. We observe that the Adjudicating Authority has denied the benefit on the ground that there was no proof to the effect that construction of the building was done by their client after the land was let out. In this case, the Adjudicating Authority has also held that the appellants are not contesting that the land is pertaining to the building and the only contention is that they have let out only vacant land to their client and the building does not belong to them. The appellants have a case because if there was no building at the time of leasing out the vacant land and if it was given prior to 01.07.2010, then there would not be any demand. The fact that they have constructed a building before hand, which was also let out to M/s Avnash Automobiles Pvt Ltd is also not clear. Therefore, this factual aspect needs to be examined by the Adjudicating Authority subject to appellant submitting the evidence to the effect that there was neither a building on the vacant land at the time of leasing out nor the provision for excluding vacant land from the purview of taxation was applicable at the time of leasing out. The fact that there were some other building for which no lease has been (8) ST/1566/2012 granted by the appellant to M/s Avnash Automobiles is obvious as the agreement is only for vacant land and there is no mention of any other agreement whereby the closed building, etc., was also given on lease. Therefore, merely because a land is appurtenant to any building, it will not get covered within the scope of service if building/shed has not been rented out. It is the other way round that where a building has been rented out, which also has land appurtenant thereto, then that land will also be included for the purpose of valuation of building. Therefore, this matter also needs to be remanded back to the Original Adjudicating Authority for redetermination of Service Tax liability.
13. Insofar as the letting out of property located at S.No.51/1 B, IDA, Block-A, Mindi, Visakhapatnam to M/s Avnash Automobiles, the Adjudicating Authority felt that the said property consisted of factory building/sheds located in a common compound with security gate and the said property was earlier used as a factory building of M/s Prax-Air India Pvt Ltd., from whom the property was purchased. It was felt that the appellants have let out the building along with the vacant land appurtenant to the building thereto. In this case, while the agreement is showing only land and there is no mention of any building but the Adjudicating Authority has considered that the entire premises was used for storage and pre-delivery inspection of the cars and the entire agreement has been for the building as well as the land, whereas, it was only shown as land. On the other hand, learned Advocate submits that the buildings were not given to their client and were retained by the appellants themselves and even the buildings had some materials belonging to the appellant. We find much force in the ground that there is no strong evidence on record to suggest that just because certain buildings were existing, the entire land would be considered as land appurtenant to the building, especially, when the agreement is only with respect to vacant land and there is no other cogent evidence by the department to prove that the clients of the appellants were using both building and the land though showing only land in their agreement. Therefore, in view of the same, the demand would not sustain on this ground and it will be only a vacant land, which is not includable for the purpose of charging Service Tax under RIPS.
(9)ST/1566/2012
14. Learned Advocate submits that there is no dispute as regards the exemption from Service Tax in respect of vacant land let out to M/s ATR Cars Pvt Ltd. However, no relief was given for want of quantification either in the SCN or in the appellant's reply. Learned Advocate submits that since demand was calculated based on the income shown in P&L account without considering the exemptions and the fact that during the relevant period, tax was payable on the basis of receipts, therefore, this demand is not sustainable. We find that the Adjudicating Authority has clearly held that the appellants have let out only the vacant land appurtenant to the building and not the building and therefore, liable for exclusion from the definition of 'immovable property' under section 65(105)(zzzz) of the Finance Act, 1994. Merely because he was unable to exclude the income arising out of this property, no relief was given, which is not correct. The appellants are at liberty to show them the breakup of rents received from M/s ATR Cars and the Service Tax liability which has been included in the total liability needs to be excluded for the purpose of calculating the demand. Therefore, this also needs to be remanded back.
(B) Non-payment of Service Tax during the period May, 2009 to Feb, 2010:-
15. It is an admitted fact that appellant has stopped making payment in respect of provision of RIPS during May, 2009 to February, 2010. There is no doubt about the classification or the valuation and the only dispute is as regards amount payable and paid. As per the appellant, the entire Service Tax liability was discharged except for the interest liability on the delayed payment but the same was not accepted in view of the fact that appellant has not included rent received for the open land and that certain documents were also not submitted. Since the issue as regards classification and Service Tax leviability is not disputed, the only dispute is whether the total amount of Service Tax is paid with interest or there is some short recovery. We find that since it would require recalculation of amount as well as verification of certain documents, etc., and therefore, to this extent, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is required to be remanded back to the Original Adjudicating Authority for recalculating the total demand of Service Tax along with interest after allowing abatement for tax and interest already paid.
(10)ST/1566/2012 (C) Rental Advances:-
16. The appellants have taken certain rental advances of Rs.72,00,000/- and Rs.39,00,000/-, which were to be deducted against monthly rents in 24 equal installments of Rs.3,00,000/- and Rs.1,62,500/- respectively. They have also received certain interest-free advance of Rs.2,10,000/-. The demand has been confirmed on the ground that the said amounts cannot be treated as security deposit, inasmuch as the said amounts were actually rental advances which were adjusted on the monthly pro rata basis as agreed upon in the agreement between the appellant and the tenant. The Adjudicating Authority has also considered that there is a possibility that in respect of some of these pro rata payments, the Service Tax would have been paid at the time of payment of rent. However, the said submission of the appellant could not be verified as no supporting documents were available. Therefore, the entire demand has been upheld. We find that the amount cannot be considered as security deposit, inasmuch as it has been applied continuously for discharging of rent, which is an admitted position and therefore, Service Tax would be leviable on the said amount. However, as the appellants are submitting that some of these amounts have already suffered Service Tax, this needs to be verified. Accordingly, this issue is also required to be remanded back for working out the net Service Tax payable.
(D) Site Formation & Clearance Service:-
17. The appellants were engaged in providing services of Muck clearing from 3 numbers of underground rock caverns and their disposal & dumping at the designated stack yard for strategic storage of crude oil project at Visakhapatnam in terms of the work order issue by M/s Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. In order to carry out this work, the appellants were required to use 30MT dumpers for construction of three numbers of underground rock caverns for strategic storage of crude oil project. As per the definition of SFCS under section 65(105)(zzza), the services of muck cleaning and disposal is rightly classifiable under the category of SFCS. The appellants have not refuted the amount of Service Tax demanded by the department, which they have paid under Works Contract Service (WCS) and also certain portion under SFCS. Therefore, as far as the classification is concerned, there is no dispute that it is in the nature of SFCS. However, (11) ST/1566/2012 there is dispute as regards some of the amounts already paid under the category of WCS as well as under the category of SFCS. These amounts need to be adjusted against the total amount demanded from the appellant under this category. Therefore, this issue is also required to be remanded back to the Original Adjudicating Authority for recalculation.
18. Though the appellants have tried to argue that their activities were not liable to be covered in the ambit of SFCS and they were only engaged in transportation and for mere transportation, no tax will be payable by the transporters, the Adjudicating Authority has found that the appellants were engaged in discharging service under the category of WCS to M/s Hindustan Construction Company Ltd but have not included certain amounts in the taxable value while discharging the said service. The nature of work undertaken consisted of muck cleaning and disposal at designated area using 30MT dumpers. Going by the definition of SFCS, the Adjudicating Authority felt that muck cleaning and disposal activity would be rightly classifiable under the category of SFCS. We further feel that going by the definition, this service also includes contaminated top soil stripping work as well as land reclamation work. Therefore, the nature of the activity of scooping the muck from the site and loading it on to the dumpers and taking it away would properly fall within these categories as without that further activities of construction at that site cannot take place. We further find that the appellants have not challenged the classification of their activities as SFCS and are merely contending that they were paying Service Tax under WCS and subsequently, they started paying under SFCS also and have already remitted the same with the department. However, from the OIO, it appears that the Adjudicating Authority on the ground that appellants have not produced certain documents in support of their having paid the Service Tax involved, therefore, has not given any relief on this count. Since there is no dispute about the classification and the only dispute is about recalculation of Service Tax remaining to be paid along with interest, this matter also needs to be remanded back.
(E) Commercial of Industrial Construction Service:-
19. The appellants, in terms of agreement with M/s Schlumberger Asia Services Ltd, had constructed a base station at Kakinada during the period (12) ST/1566/2012 2005-06 to 2007-08 but did not discharge any Service Tax. The Adjudicating Authority felt that in view of terms of agreement dt.09.07.2005, the nature of construction services provided to M/s Schlumberger Asia Services Ltd by the appellant would clearly fall under CICS and therefore, they are liable to pay Service Tax amounting to Rs.18,56,223/-. It is also an admitted fact that certain amount has already been paid against the said demand. It further appears that the Adjudicating Authority has not considered the abatement claimed by the appellant for calculating the total Service Tax liability while paying certain Tax liability under this category. The appellants could not put forth any evidence to claim having fulfilled the conditions for availing the benefit under Notification No.01/2006-ST dt.01.03.2006 and therefore, the same was denied by the Adjudicating Authority. Here, it is again felt that proper opportunities were not given to the appellant to adduce evidence in support of their claim for abatement in terms of Notification No.01/2006-ST. Therefore, this issue is also remanded back to the Original Adjudicating Authority for recalculation of Service Tax liability.
20. Learned Advocate has highlighted the fact that this is in terms of contract with M/s Schlumberger Asia Services Ltd for construction of warehouses and the contract was entered into on 09.07.2005 and the work was completed within two years time. This contract value was inclusive of both materials and services and therefore, in terms of judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Larsen & Toubro Ltd, for the period prior to July, 2007, indivisible contracts were not subjected to Service Tax. There is merit in the case, inasmuch as if it was in the nature of work contract then it could have been collected only as WCS and since prior to introduction of WCS as a separate service for the same contract, it cannot be charged to Service Tax under different head. However, there is no clear finding in this regards by the Adjudicating Authority to the effect whether the contract was in the nature of WCS or otherwise. Therefore, if it is in the nature of WCS and the period being prior to July, 2007, the demand will not sustain. Therefore, this also needs to be remanded back for redetermination of facts and recalculation of Service Tax, if any.
21. To sum up, we uphold the impugned order to the extent of demanding Service Tax amounting to Rs.1,94,33,169/- and imposing penalty, interest, etc., under 'Renting of Immovable Property Service'. However, in respect of (13) ST/1566/2012 other demands, the impugned order confirming the demand and imposing penalty, interest is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Original Adjudicating Authority for redetermination of Service Tax liability in view of observations and directions, supra. This appeal being an old matter, the Original Adjudicating Authority should decide the issues, which are being remanded back, within a period of three months subject to appellant cooperating and providing all the relevant documents relied upon by them in support of their contention as regards recalculation of demand.
22. Insofar as the issue of limitation is concerned, the appellants have not made any specific submission. However, on going through the impugned order, we find that the department had proposed to invoke proviso to section 73(1) in the facts of the case, keeping in view that the appellants had not taken registration and filed periodical returns nor discharged service tax liability until it was pointed out by the department and that too, the same was not discharged in full. It appeared to the adjudicating authority that they were willfully interpreting the law to not to discharge the appropriate service tax and have artificially bifurcated the agreement, etc., to suppress the value. It was also noted that despite having received substantial amount of Rs.16,28,61,433/- towards providing SFCS to M/s HCCL during the period 2008-09 to 2010-11, they had not correctly discharged their service tax liability on the said service. Therefore, in view of various omissions and commissions, the adjudicating authority felt that the extended period is rightly invocable in the factual matrix and penalty is also imposable. It was also taken into account that they had in fact collected certain service tax, which was not deposited by them in the Government account. Therefore, he held that appellant had suppressed and willfully mis- stated the facts with clear intention to evade payment of service tax.
23. We find that the appellants have not canvassed any concrete reasons as to why the extended period should not be invoked in the factual matrix of this appeal. In fact, they have although been claiming that the demand itself is not maintainable on merit. They have also taken a plea from time to time that certain amount of service tax has already been paid by them, though not as per the demand made by the department. Therefore, having regards to submissions from both sides and the facts of the case, we find no (14) ST/1566/2012 infirmity in the order of the adjudicating authority holding that extended period is invocable in this case.
24. Accordingly, appeal allowed partly by way of remand.
(Pronounced in the Open Court on 21.02.2025) (A.K. JYOTISHI) MEMBER (TECHNICAL) (ANGAD PRASAD) MEMBER (JUDICIAL) Veda