Kerala High Court
Nazeema K.H vs Abdul Kareem on 10 December, 2024
Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE C.PRATHEEP KUMAR
TUESDAY, THE 10TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2024 / 19TH AGRAHAYANA, 1946
CRL.REV.PET NO. 331 OF 2016
MC NO.11 OF 2014 OF ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE
(EO),ERNAKULAM
REVISION PETITIONER/PETITIONER
NAZEEMA K.H.,AGED 49 YEARS
D/O.HAMMED KB, KARUPPUM VEETIL, FASHION HOUSE,
CHAKKALAKKAL ROAD, PERUMANOOR, KOCHI 15.
BY ADVS.
SRI.P.SAMSUDIN
SRI.JITHIN LUKOSE
SRI.M.S.MOHAMMED ANSARY
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENT & STATE
1 ABDUL KAREEM, 59 YEARS,
S/O.KHADER, PARIPPUKALATHINKAL HOUSE, SANTHIPURAM,
PATHAYAKKAD POST - 680 668, VEMBALLOOR, SN PURAM
VILLAGE, KODUNGALLOOR, THRISSUR DISTRICT.
2 STATE OF KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
KERALA, ERNAKULAM 682 031.
BY ADV SRI.P.M.ABDUL JALEEL KODUNGALLUR
SMT.MAYA M.N. -PP
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION
ON 25.11.2024, ALONG WITH Crl.Rev.Pet.789/2017, THE COURT ON
10.12.2024 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017
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2024:KER:93156
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE C.PRATHEEP KUMAR
TUESDAY, THE 10TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2024 / 19TH AGRAHAYANA, 1946
CRL.REV.PET NO. 789 OF 2017
MC NO.11 OF 2014 OF ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE
(EO),ERNAKULAM
CRL.R.P NO.5 OF 2016 OF ADDITIONAL SESSIONS COURT - VII,
ERNAKULAM
REVISION PETITIONER
ABDUL KAREEM, AGED 64 YEARS
S/O. KHADER, PARIPPUKULATHINKAL HOUSE, SANTHIPURAM,
PATHAYAKKADU P.O, VEMBALLOOR, S.N.PURAM VILLAGE,
KODUNGALLOOR TALUK, THRISSUR - 680668
RESPONDENTS
1 NASEEMA K.H, AGED 50 YEARS
D/O. HAMEED K, KARUPPAM VEETTIL FASHION HOUSE,
CHAKKALAKKAL ROAD, PERUMANOOR, KOCHI - 15.
2 STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
SESSIONS COURT, ERNAKULAM
BY ADV SRI.P.SAMSUDIN
SMT.MAYA M.N - PP
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION
ON 25.11.2024,ALONG WITH Crl.Rev.Pet.331/2016, THE COURT ON
10.12.2024 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017
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2024:KER:93156
C.R.
ORDER
Dated this the 10th day of December, 2024 These revision petitions are filed against the order of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences) Ernakulam, against the order dated 18.11.2015 in MC. No.11 of 2014, filed under Section 3(1) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (Act of 1986). Crl.R.P. No.331 of 2016 was filed by the divorced wife, while Crl R.P. No.789 of 2017 was filed by the respondent husband. (For the purpose of convenience, the parties are hereinafter referred to as per their rank before the trial court).
2. The petitioner is the divorced wife of the respondent. Two children were born in that wedlock. Till the year 2010, they were living together as husband and wife, without any serious issues. The respondent was employed in Gulf, during the period from 1976 to 2010. During the said period, he had sent various amounts to the wife and she had expended the same, to purchase immovable property, vehicles etc. and also disposed of some of them. The case of the respondent is that his entire earnings from Gulf for the past 34 Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017 4 2024:KER:93156 years, till 2010 was misappropriated by the petitioner. However, according to the petitioner, she utilised the money only as directed by the respondent. In that respect, he had filed O.P. No.268 of 2012 before the Family Court and it was decreed in-part. The wife also filed OP No.1405 of 2010 before the Family Court, claiming return of gold and money and the said OP was dismissed. Dissatisfied with the above decrees in OP. Nos.268 of 2012 and 1405 of 2010, they have also preferred Mat. Appeal No.42 of 2014 and 244 of 2014 and those appeals are pending before this Court. In MC. No.220 of 2010 filed under S.125 Cr.P.C., the Family Court awarded maintenance to her at the rate of Rs.1,500/-per month.
3. While so, the respondent returned from Gulf and pronounced Talaq on 13.7.2010. According to the petitioner, she was expelled from the matrimonial home on 9.7.2010, suspecting her chastity. Thereafter, she preferred the present MC.11 of 2014 before the Magistrate, under Section 3(1) of the Act of 1986, claiming maintenance @Rs.15,000/- for three months Iddat period and a sum of Rs.18,00,000/- towards reasonable and fair provision for her future maintenance.
4. The evidence in the case consists of the oral testimonies of PWs 1 Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017 5 2024:KER:93156 and 2 and RWs 1 to 4 and documentary evidence Exhibits P1 to P15 and D1 to D17. After evaluating the available evidence, the learned Magistrate passed the impugned order, awarding maintenance @ Rs.4,000/- per month for a period of three months during the Iddat period and a sum of Rs.4,32,000/-(maintenance @4000/- for 9 years) towards reasonable and fair provision for her future maintenance, with interest @6% per annum, which is impugned by both parties.
5. According to the respondent, since his entire earnings from Gulf during the period from 1976 to 2010, including articles, gold ornaments, vehicles and other properties entrusted with the petitioner were misappropriated by her, he is not liable to pay any further amount to the petitioner, towards maintenance. He would also contend that, he has been regularly paying maintenance to the petitioner @ Rs.1500/-, as ordered in MC 220/2010. Awarding interest on the amount of maintenance was also challenged.
6. Now, the point that arises for consideration are the following:
1) Whether a claim under S.3(1) of Act of 1986 is maintainable during the pendency of an order under Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017 6 2024:KER:93156 S.125 of Cr.P.C.?
2) Whether the quantum of maintenance awarded by the learned Magistrate under S.3(1) of Act of 1986 is reasonable and fair?
3) Whether the order for payment of interest on the amount of maintenance, allowable?
7. Heard Sri. P. Shamsudin, the learned counsel for the Petitioner/wife and Sri.. P.M. Abdul Jaleel, the learned counsel for the respondent/husband.
8. The point: The marriage of the petitioner with the respondent was on 31.8.1981. They lived together as husband and wife till the respondent pronounced Talaq on 13.7.2010., suspecting the chastity of his wife. That means they lived together as husband and wife for a period of 29 years. Before this Court also, the main contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent is that, the entire earnings of the respondent from Gulf during the period from 1976 to 2010 was misappropriated by the petitioner. It was further contended that, the respondent has been paying maintenance at the rate of Rs.1,500/- to the petitioner, as ordered by the Family Court in MC. No.220 of 2010. Therefore, it was argued that the respondent, who is a senior Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017 7 2024:KER:93156 citizen at present, is not liable to pay any further amount to the petitioner, under S.3(1) of Act of 1986.
9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the petitioner would argue that, with respect to the properties, gold and money allegedly retained by the petitioner, the respondent had filed OP. No.268 of 2012, that the said OP was decreed in-part, against which a Matrimonial Appeal is pending before this court and as such the respondent cannot claim exemption from payment of maintenance under Section 3(1) of Act of 1986. Further according to him, Rs.4,000/- awarded by the learned Magistrate as monthly maintenance is too inadequate. Therefore, he prayed for enhancing the maintenance awarded by the learned Magistrate. The learned counsel for the respondent further prayed for reducing the maintenance awarded by the learned Magistrate.
10. As argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner, with respect to the money sent by the respondent in favour of the petitioner and the properties purchased by her using those amounts, he had already preferred O.P. No.268 of 2012 and the Family court decreed the same in-part. The wife has also filed another O.P. as 1405 of 2010 before the Family Court claiming Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017 8 2024:KER:93156 gold and money. Against the dismissal of the above OP, she also filed a Matrimonial Appeal as Mat. Appeal No.42 of 2014. Against the partial dismissal of OP. No.268 of 2012, the husband also filed Mat Appeal No.244 of 2014 and both those appeals are pending before this Court. Since, with respect to the disputed properties, gold and money, suits filed by them are now pending in appeal, those disputes will attain it's logical culmination, on disposal of those appeals. In the above circumstances, the contention raised by the respondent that, since he had sent his entire earnings to the petitioner, he is not liable to pay any amount under section 3(1) of Act of 1986, could not be entertained. In other words, since it is the statutory right of a divorced Muslim woman to get reasonable and fair provision for her future maintenance from her former husband, the respondent is liable to pay the same.
11. Now, the next question to be answered is whether a claim under S.3(1) of Act of 1986 is maintainable, during the pendency of an order passed under S.125 of Cr.P.C. It was argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that in view of Section 5 of the 1986 Act, the petitioner ought to have exercised her option at the earliest opportunity, either to proceed under Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017 9 2024:KER:93156 Section 125 Cr.P.C or under Section 3(1) of the 1986 Act. Section 5 of the 1986 Act reads as follows:
5. Option to be governed by the provisions of sections 125 to 128 of Act 2 of 1974-
If, on the date of the first hearing of the application under sub- section (2) of section 3, a divorced woman and her former husband declare, by affidavit or any other declaration in writing in such form as may be prescribed, either jointly or separately, that they would prefer to be governed by the provisions of sections 125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and file such affidavit or declaration in the Court hearing the application, the Magistrate shall dispose of such application accordingly.
12. It is true that, in this case, neither the petitioner nor the respondent has filed any such declaration or affidavit before the learned Magistrate expressing their preference to be governed by the provisions of Sections 125 to 128 of Cr.PC.
13. Various remedies available to a divorced Muslim woman, were enumerated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision in Mohd.Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana, AIR 2024 SC 3665, relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent. In the above decision, in paragraph 89, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:
"What emerges from our separate but concurring judgments are the Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017 10 2024:KER:93156 following conclusions:
a) Section 125 of the CrPC applies to all married women including Muslim married women.
b) Section 125 of the CrPC applies to all non-Muslim divorced women.
c) Insofar as divorced Muslim women are concerned, -
i) S.125 of the CrPC applies to all such Muslim women, married and divorced under the Special Marriage Act in addition to remedies avilable under the Special Marriage Act.
ii) If Muslim women are married and divorced under Muslim law then S.125 of the Cr.PC as well as the provisions of the 1986 Act are applicable. Option lies with the Muslim divorced women to seek remedy under either of the two laws or both laws. This is because the 1986 Act is not in derogation of S.125 of the Cr.P.C but in addition to the said provision.
iii) If S.125 of the Cr.PC is also resorted to by a divorced Muslim woman, as per the definition under the 1986 Act, then any order passed under the provisions of 1986 Act shall be taken into consideration under S.127(3) (b) of the Cr.P.C.
d) The 1986 Act could be resorted to by a divorced Muslim woman, as defined under the said Act, by filing an application thereunder which could be disposed of in accordance with the said enactment.
e) In case of an illegal divorce as per the provisions of the 2019 Act then,
i) relief under S.5 of the said Act could be availed for seeking subsistence allowance or, at the option of such a Muslim woman, remedy under S.125 of the CrPC could also be availed.
Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017 11 2024:KER:93156
ii) If during the pendency of a petition filed under S.125 of the CrPC, a Muslim woman is 'divorced' then she can take recourse under S.125 of the CrPC or file a petition under the 2019 Act.
iii) The provisions of the 2019 Act provide remedy in addition to and not in derogation of S.125 of the Cr.PC."
14. Therefore, it can be seen that, for divorced Muslim women, the remedies under S.125 of the Cr.PC as well as under the provisions of the 1986 Act are available. In paragraph 81 of Mohd.Abdul Samad (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court makes it clear that the choice is on the divorced Muslim woman to decide whether she has to proceed against the divorced husband either under Section 125 Cr.P.C or under Section 3 of the 1986 Act. At the same time, the petitioner cannot be permitted to get double benefit, both under S.125 Cr.P.C. as also under Section 3 of the 1986 Act.
15. The procedure to be followed in case already an order was passed under Section 125 Cr.P.C in favour of a divorced Muslim woman and thereafter, she files an application under Section 3 or 4 of the 1986 Act and an order is made under the said Act also, in the following words :-
".........The choice remains with her to be exercised in accordance with law and discretion. However, if a divorced Muslim woman already has an order passed under Section 125 of the CrPC, and thereafter also files an application under Section 3 or Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017 12 2024:KER:93156 Section 4 of the 1986 Act and an order is made under the said Act also, in such an event, there could be an alteration in the order of payment for maintenance or interim maintenance, as the case may be, under Section 127 of the CrPC. This is in order to ensure that there is no double benefit which would be availed by a divorced Muslim woman under Section 125 of the CrPC as well as under the 1986 Act. "
16. In the decision in Aboobacker C.K. v. Rahiyanath and Another, 2008 (3) KHC 492, a Single Bench of this Court after evaluating the scope of Sections 5 and 7 of the Act of 1986 held that, the right of a divorced Muslim woman to proceed under Section 125 Cr.P.C is not extinguished by the introduction of 1986 Act. In paragraph 35, the learned Single Judge held as follows:
"Sec.127(3)(b) continues to be available in the Cr.P.C., notwithstanding the enactment of the Act. Sec.127(3)(b) clearly shows that an order passed under Sec.125 will continue to remain in force even after divorce until the amount payable under the customary or personal law applicable to the parties is paid either before or after the order. That clearly shows that an order under Sec.125 can be passed even in respect of a divorced Muslim wife. But her right to claim maintenance under Sec.125 would come to a grinding halt when the amounts payable under the personal law on divorce are paid."
17. In the decision in Rajnesh v. Neha and Anr., (2021) 2 SCC Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017 13 2024:KER:93156 324, the issue of overlapping jurisdiction was dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in paragraph 134, as follows:
"To overcome the issue of overlapping jurisdiction, and avoid conflicting orders being passed in different proceedings, we direct that in a subsequent maintenance proceeding, the applicant shall disclose the previous maintenance proceeding, and the orders passed therein, so that the Court would take into consideration the maintenance already awarded in the previous proceeding, and grant an adjustment or set-off of the said amount. If the order passed in the previous proceeding requires any modification or variation, the party would be required to move the concerned court in the previous proceeding. "
18. Even though the above decision was not rendered in the context of overlapping of the jurisdictions under S.125 Cr.P.C. as also under Section 3 of the 1986 Act, both being in respect of maintenance payable under different jurisdictions, I hold that the principles of the above dictum can be applied in the present case also.
19. In this case, order for maintenance was passed by the Family Court, under S.125 Cr.P.C. and the petitioner has been receiving the maintenance regularly. At the same time, the proceeding under S.3(1) of 1986 Act has not attained finality, as this revision is pending. Therefore, in the light of the decisions in Mohd.Abdul Samad (supra) and Rajnesh (supra), the Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017 14 2024:KER:93156 chance of the petitioner getting double benefit, both under Section 125 of Cr.P.C and Section 3 of 1986 Act has to be avoided. It can be done, by giving set off for the amount already paid by the respondent to the petitioner, in the proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C, from the amount of maintenance likely to be awarded in this case.
20. Therefore, now the next question is whether the quantum of maintenance awarded by the Magistrate is reasonable and fair. Since, even according to the respondent, he earned huge amounts from his employment abroad, it is evident that, during the subsistence of the marital relationship, they were leading a moderate life. While determining the quantum of maintenance to be awarded to a divorced wife, the standard of living of the petitioner in the matrimonial home is the yardstick to be applied. The length of marriage, prospect of remarriage etc. are also to be considered while fixing the quantum of maintenance to be awarded.
21. The factors relevant for quantifying the amount to be awarded towards reasonable and fair provision for maintenance were dealt with by a learned Single Judge in the decision in Aboobacker v. Rahiyanath and Another, 2008(3)KHC 492, in paragraph 50, in the following words:
Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017 15 2024:KER:93156 "It may not be gratuity known to labour jurisprudence; but certainly the length of the period of matrimony would be crucially relevant. At what age the relationship commenced and at what age the relationship is ruptured will also be certainly relevant. The material conveniences of life which the partners are used to and the possibility of they being able to pursue an identical life style will also be very crucially relevant. The degree of financial affluence is certainly of vital relevance. The cause of the rupture will also certainly be of vital importance. Where it is a unilateral and arbitrary exercise of the extra judicial powers which the Muslim male alone has to liquidate matrimony, against the unwilling wife, that factor will certainly weigh with the judicial mind in fixing the quantum payable under Sec.3. Contumaciousness for the rupture of the relationship will certainly be relevant. The jurisdiction may not be penal, but greater the contumacious responsibility of the husband for the rupture, greater must be the amount payable - within his financial competence of course. The emotional trauma suffered by the partner who is the victim of such rupture will certainly have to be taken into account. The support, concern etc., which such victim partner had offered to the partner contumaciously responsible for the rupture of the relationship must also certainly be taken into account. The investment of the wife in marriage will also be of relevance. In the case of a working wife where spouses had pooled their resources to live and to acquire property in the name of the dominant male partner that fact must certainly weigh with the court. The wife who has laid trust in her husband may not have insisted that the acquisitions must be in her name or in the name of both. But her helplessness cannot be ignored or forgotten by the court called Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017 16 2024:KER:93156 upon to quantify the amount payable under Sec.3. Actual remarriage may not be an available input. But the possibility of remarriage will certainly be one relevant input. That possibility has to be realistically evaluated. "
22. At the time of arguments, the learned counsel would argue that the respondent is now aged 70 years and that he has no properties or source of income of his own. However, during the cross examination of the respondent as RW1, he admitted that he has seven cents of property, in which there are two shop rooms and another room, as noted in Exhibit P14 information furnished by the Village Officer, S.N.Puram. The respondent examined his son as RW4. During the cross examination of RW4, he also admitted that there are two shop rooms in the property standing in the name of his father. During the cross examination, RW4 further deposed that, his father had given him 20 cents of landed property, in which there is a residential building. He has rented out the said building and he is getting a rent of Rs.3,500/- from the same. Further, he admitted that he is the owner of the lorry, KL 47 A 9602 and his father is the driver of the said lorry.
23. From the above evidence of RW1 and RW4 it is revealed that the respondent has seven cents of landed property, 2 shop rooms and another room. It is also revealed from the evidence of RW4 that the respondent is Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017 17 2024:KER:93156 working as the driver of a lorry belonging to RW4. In the above circumstances, there is no merit in the contention of the respondent that he has no means or source of income. From the evidence of RW4, it is also revealed that the family of the petitioner is also financially sound and they were having textile shop as well as quarters of their own. The petitioner, who was hailing from such a background, married the respondent at the age of sixteen and she lived along with him for a period of 29 years, till her husband pronounced Talaq on 13.7.2010.
24. Though the respondent raised a contention that he was forced to pronounce Talaq as the petitioner was leading an immoral life, there is absolutely no evidence to prove the same. When the respondent was examined as RW1, he admitted that he had never seen any such relationship of the petitioner. RW4, the son of the respondent examined in this case also deposed that he has not seen any such relationship of his mother. He only stated that the petitioner used to telephone her friends. In the above circumstance, it is to be held that, the respondent has failed in proving the allegation of adultery levelled against the petitioner. In the above circumstance, considering the entire facts, I hold that maintenance awarded Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017 18 2024:KER:93156 by the learned Magistrate at the rate of Rs.4,000/- per month is quite inadequate. Further, I hold that, maintenance at the rate of Rs.5,000/- per month will be a reasonable one.
25. For fixing the quantum of maintenance, the learned Magistrate has taken the multiplier 9. That is, maintenance payable for a period of 9 (nine) years was taken as reasonable and fair provision for the future maintenance of the petitioner. The law is well settled that while fixing reasonable and fair provision for maintenance to be paid to a divorced Muslim woman, the Court shall keep in mind the status of the parties, capacity of the former husband to pay maintenance and other attendant circumstances. The amount so fixed must be enough to take care of the future needs of a woman in the prevailing socio-economic scenario (see Suhadath K.K. v. Shihab K.B., 2022 KHC 918). In the above decision, another Single Bench of this Court upheld the decision of the trial court, taking 8 (eight) years as multiplier.
26. In the decision in Aboobacker (supra), monthly maintenance payable for a period of 90 months (7½ years), was fixed as reasonable and fair provision for maintenance payable under S.3(1) of Act of 1986. The Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017 19 2024:KER:93156 above order of the Magistrate was upheld by this Court also.
27. Since in the decision in Aboobacker (supra) the multiplier applied was 7 ½ years and in Suhadath (supra) it was 8 years, I hold that in this case also a multiplier of 8 (eight) years will be reasonable, to do justice to both sides. If a multiplier of 8 years is applied, the total amount which the petitioner is entitled to, will come to Rs.4,80,000/- (5000 x 12 x 8). In addition to the same, she is entitled to maintenance for a period of three months during the iddat period which will come to Rs.15,000/-. Therefore, the total amount due to the petitioner will come to Rs.4,95,000/- (4,80,000 + 15,000).
28. As I have already noted above, the petitioner cannot claim double benefit both under Section 125 Cr.P.C as well as under Section 3(1) of 1986 Act, at the very same time. In this case, the Family Court has awarded maintenance to the petitioner, @ Rs.1500/- per month and admittedly, the respondent has been regularly paying the same to the petitioner, from 22.1.2013 onwards and till the last month. If so, the total amount paid by the respondent so far to the petitioner will come to Rs.2,13,000/- (1500 x 11 years and 10 months). And the same is liable to be set off from the amount Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017 20 2024:KER:93156 due under Section 3 of the Act of 1986. In short, the balance amount due to the petitioner will come to Rs.2,82,000/- (4,95,000 - 2, 13,000).
29. In this case, the learned Magistrate awarded interest at the rate of 6% per annum for the amount of maintenance awarded under Section 3(1) of the 1986 Act. The power of the learned Magistrate in awarding interest for the said amount was seriously questioned by the learned counsel for the respondent. However, in the decision in Chand Muhammed v. Zeenath and Another, 2011 KHC 786, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that when there is no specific provision for grant of interest on any amount due, the Court and even Tribunals have been held to be entitled to award interest in their discretion, under Section 3 of the Interest Act and Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code. Accordingly, in the above decision, the learned Single Judge awarded interest at the rate of 9% to the maintenance awarded under Section 3(1) of Act of 1986. I am in respectful agreement with the above finding of the learned Single Judge. In the above circumstances, interest awarded by the learned Magistrate @ 6% per annum for the amount of maintenance awarded under Section 3(1) of the 1986 Act is liable to be upheld.
Crl. R.P. Nos.331/2016 & 789/2017 21 2024:KER:93156
30. In short, for the balance amount of Rs.2,82,000/- due to the petitioner, she is also entitled to get interest at the rate of 6% per annum, from the date of the petition, till realisation. Points 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.
31. In the result, Crl.R.P 331/2016 is allowed in part as follows :
The 1st respondent/husband is directed to pay a total sum of Rs.2,82,000/-, along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the petition, till realisation to the petitioner/wife as reasonable and fair provision for her maintenance under Section 3(1) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, within a period of 2 months from today.
32. In the result, Crl.R.P.789/2017 is dismissed.
Sd/-
C.Pratheep Kumar, Judge sou/Mrcs/26.11