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[Cites 5, Cited by 19]

Supreme Court of India

Firm Panjumal Daulatram vs Sakhi Gopal on 3 May, 1977

Equivalent citations: 1977 AIR 2077, 1977 SCR (3) 767, AIR 1977 SUPREME COURT 2077, 1977 3 SCC 284, 1977 (2) RENTLR 6, 1977 3 SCR 767, 1977 U J (SC) 380, 1977 JABLJ 705, 1977 (2) RENCR 520

Author: V.R. Krishnaiyer

Bench: V.R. Krishnaiyer, Ranjit Singh Sarkaria, Jaswant Singh

           PETITIONER:
FIRM PANJUMAL DAULATRAM

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
SAKHI GOPAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT03/05/1977

BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
SINGH, JASWANT

CITATION:
 1977 AIR 2077		  1977 SCR  (3) 767
 1977 SCC  (3) 284


ACT:
	   Madhya   Pradesh  Accommodation  Control  Act,  1961	  S.
	12(1)(e) & (f)--Scope of---Bona fide  requirement---Require-
	ment of the land-lord of  accommodation of both	 residential
	and non-residential part of the building,  if  proved  enti-
	tled eviction of the tenant.



HEADNOTE:
	    Under sub clauses (e) and (f) of S. 12(1) of the  Madhya
	Pradesh	 Accommodation	Control Act, 1961,  a  landlord	 can
	evict  a tenant, if the residential and the  non-residential
	accommodation respectively let out to the latter is required
	bona  fide by him for occupation as a residence and for	 the
	purpose of continuing or starting his business.	  Accommoda-
	tion under the Act means any building or part of a building,
	whether residential or non-residential.
	    The	 appellant-tenant was inducted in by the  respondent
	in  1955 for the dual purposes of residential and  non-resi-
	dential purpose of running a cloth shop. The landlord,	bona
	fide required the building for his residence and  also	 for
	starting his business of running a Chemist shop.  The  Evic-
	tion  Suit filed  by him was dismissed by the  trial  court,
	but  the  appellant and the  High  Court  ,,ranted  him	 the
	eviction decree.
	Discussing the appeal by special leave, the Court.
	    HELD: The residential portion as well as a	non-residen-
	tial portion are parts of the building and each is an accom-
	modation  by definition.  The landlord is entitled to  evic-
	tion  of  the "accommodation" if he makes out  a  bona	fide
	residential and non-residential requirement of the portions.
	In  the instant case the contract was integral but had	dual
	purpose.   The landlord	 has  put forward dual	requirements
	which  neatly fit into S. 12(1)(e) and	(f)  of	 the  Madhya
	Pradesh	 Accommodation Control Act, 1961.  The findings	  of
	the  appellate Court regarding the bona fide requirement  of
	the  landlord, not having been challenged in the High  Court
	and  in this Court in the memorandum  of Appeal, the  conse-
	quence viz. eviction is inevitable. [769 E-G]
	S. Sanyal v. Gianchand [1968] 1 S.C.R. 536, distinguished.
	    [The  Court, however granted time to the appellants	 for
	vacating the building till 1-1-1978, in terms of equity].



JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 991/76. (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 21.1.1976 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 415 of 1971) S. Choudhury, D.N. Mishra, O.C. Mathur and Shri Narain for the appellant.

G.L. Sanghi, V.K. Sanghi, R.K. Sanghi and S.N. Khanduja for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J. A suit for eviction of an accommodation from the tenant to whom it had been let for residential and non-residential 768 purposes resulted in dismissal by the trial Judge. But in an appeal, the final court of fact took the view that the landlord (respondent) was entitled to eviction. The tenant challenged the appellate decree before the High Court in Second Appeal without success and has therefore come up to this Court with this appeal by special leave. A short point has been raised which deserves only a short answer. Since we agree with the High Court which in turn has agreed with the first appellate court, our judgment can afford to be brief.

A statement of necessary facts may now be given. The landlord had let out the premises, which is a storeyed building, to be tenant as per Ex. P-1 of 1955. The signif- icant clause in the lease deed runs thus:

"1 XXX
2. I take your house for my own use i.e. for opening a cloth shop and for residential purposes and I will not sublet your house to anybody.
		      XXX		   XXX			 XXX
		      XXX."
The tenant has thus put the building to busi- ness and residential purposes. The landlord, who is an M. Sc., claimed the building back on the score that he wanted to run a medical store on the ground floor a non-residential purpose---and stay on the first floor with his wife--a residential purpose. Thus the acommo- dation was let out for dual purposes, was being used presumably for these requirements and was being claimed back by the landlord for the twin purposes mentioned above. The final court of fact has held that the landlord needs the building for his chemist's shop and for his residential use.The High Court in Second Appeal has upheld this finding and added that "the finding as to his bonafide requirement was rightly not challenged before me ...... The conclusion that the courts have reached is the only conclusion possible on the evidence on record in the light of the circumstances appearing."

This statement by the High Court that the bonafide requirement of the landlord was not challenged before it has not been questioned in the memorandum of appeal to this Court. It must therefore be taken that the bonafide need of the landlord is validly made out. The short point that survives is as to whether the composite purposes of the lease would put it out of the ground set out for eviction under s. 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The said Act defines 'accommodation' thus:

" 'accommodation' means any building or part of a building, whether residential or non- residential and includes,--
		      XX					 XXX
		      XXX."
		      769
It follows that an accommodation can be resi- dential, non-residential or both. S. 12 bars an action of eviction of a tenant from any accommodation except on one or more of the grounds set out therein. S. 12(1) (e) and
(f), bearing on the present case, may be appropriately extracted here:
"12. Restriction on eviction of tenents (1)
(a) to (d) x x x x x
(e) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held. and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommoda-

tion of his own in the occupation in the city or town concerned;

(f) that the accommodation let for non- residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasona- bly suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned;.

		      XXX					 XXX
		      XXX."

The residential portion is a part of the building and is an accommodation by defini- tion. The non-residential portion is also a part of the building and is an accommoda- tion by definition. The lease has been given for residential as well as non-residential purposes. The landlord is entitled to evic- tion of the residential portion if he makes out a bonafide residential requirement. Likewise he is entitled to eviction of the non-residential portion which is an accommoda- tion if he makes out a non-residential requirement. We have already found that the final court of fact, affirmed by the High Court, has found in favour of the landlord regarding his residential as well as non- residential requirements. Therefore, nothing more can be done in defence of the tenant in the light of the present law.

Counsel contended that in a decision of this Court, viz, S. Sanyal v. Gian Chand,(1) it has been held that it is not permissible for the court to split up a contract in an eviction proceeding. We agree. There is no question of splitting up of the contract in the present case, as is abundantly plain from what we: have stated. The contract was integral but had dual purposes. The landlord has put forward dual requirements which neatly fit into s. 12(1)(e) and (f). The conse- quence is inevitable that the eviction order has to be upheld.

(1) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 536.

770

It is seep, that the tenant has been doing a thriving cloth business, with goodwill attached to it, for well knigh 30 years. It is therefore but fair that the. tenant is given sometime to rehabilitate himself by securing an alter- native but suitable accommodation. In our towns where scarcity of accommodation is the rule it is not that easy to secure alternative premises. Taking due note of this reali- ty, we direct that while dismissing the appeal the eviction order shall not be put into execution before 1st January, 1978.

Parties will bear their respective costs.

	S.R.						      Appeal
	dismissed.
	771