Telangana High Court
M/S Kshitij Infraventures Pvt Limited vs The State Of Telangana on 29 April, 2025
Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka
Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
WRIT PETITION No. 6754 OF 2024
O R D E R:
Heard Sri N. Sreedhar Reddy, learned counsel for petitioner and learned Government Pleader for Labour on behalf of respondents.
2. This Writ Petition is filed challenging the proceedings in Crl.M.P.No. 1722 of 2023 on the file of Court of Hon'ble XII Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, initiated by the 2nd respondent under Section 33-C (1) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and consequently to quash the same by declaring them to be illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction.
3. It is the case of petitioner that it came into existence by virtue of the orders passed by this Court dated 01-09-2015 in Company Petition Nos. 175 to 178 of 2015, whereby a Scheme of Arrangement of Demerger was sanctioned. Under this Scheme, M/s Maheshwari Megaventures Limited was the demerged company and M/s Kshitij Infraventures Private Limited was the resultant entity. It is further stated that M/s Maheshwari Megaventures Limited itself came into 2 existence by virtue of the Orders of Amalgamation passed by this Court dated 22-03-2005 in Company Petition Nos. 201, 202 and 203 of 2004 concerning the amalgamation of M/s Ashish Developers and Builders and M/s RKM Builders Private Limited. It is stated that M/s Diwan Bahadur Ramgopal Mills (referred to as 'DBR Mills') commenced its operations in 1920 at Tank Bund Area in Hyderabad after entering into a lease deed with landowners, namely Chenai family. The land in question eventually devolved upon Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai, vendor of petitioner, pursuant to a Compromise Decree dated 20-10-1967 in Civil Suit No. 38 of 1967 instituted by Mrs. Freny Rashid Chenai, mother-in-law of Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai, on the file of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.
It is further stated that subsequently, the mill became financially unsustainable, was declared a sick unit under Section 15(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, and failed to remit lease rentals to the landowner, Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai. This led to initiation of eviction proceedings for recovery of possession and damages. Eventually, the dispute culminated in a compromise, wherein petitioner came to be impleaded as Plaintiff No.2 in O.S.No. 69 3 of 2003, filed for eviction and damages, and facilitated a settlement between the original landowner and tenant DBR Mills. Under the terms of compromise, Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai agreed to retain Acs.6.00 and relinquished her rights over Acs.16.00 in favour of the tenant, M/s DBR Mills, in order to amicably resolve the dispute.
It is averred that M/s DBR Mills, in turn, executed a Development Agreement with petitioner for the development of Acs.16.00 of the land. Further, petitioner's predecessor, M/s Ashish Developers and Builders, entered into an Agreement of Sale dated 03-12-1998 with Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai for purchase of the entire extent of Acs.22.5 by paying full sale consideration. It was based on this Agreement petitioner was impleaded as Plaintiff No.2 in O.S.No. 69 of 2003. Petitioner asserts that, while functioning as M/s Maheshwari Megaventures Limited, it entered into a Development Agreement dated 15-03-1999 with M/s DBR Mills Ltd. for development of the land admeasuring Acs.16.00 on which mill was situated. In consideration thereof, petitioner undertook the responsibility to settle the monetary claims payable to workers of DBR Mills. However, the said compromise entered into among petitioner, 4 DBR Mills and landowner Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai could not be effectuated and stood frustrated due to the conduct of DBR Mills, rendering it null and void and incapable of being enforced. Consequently, DBR Mills continued as a tenant at sufferance, and the ownership of the entire leasehold property reverted to Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai.
It is also mentioned that, out of the total land admeasuring Acs.22.00, registered conveyance deeds were executed by Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai in favour of petitioner in respect of Acs.6.00 under Document Nos. 1349 of 2009 and 1350 of 2009, executed on 27-10-2006 and 28-10-2006 respectively. During the subsistence of the said compromise and under the understanding among the parties, petitioner, acting as developer of Acs.16.00 for which DBR Mills held leasehold rights, entered into an arrangement for payment of dues to the mill's workmen.
It is stated that on 07-03-2017, six Workers' Unions of M/s DBR Mills entered into an agreement with petitioner company, under which they undertook to pay Rs.7,00,000/- (Rupees Seven Lakhs only) to each workman as full and final settlement of all arrears of salary, back wages, and other dues. 5 This agreement was recorded as a Memorandum of Settlement under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and Rule 60 of the Telangana State Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958, and was arrived at in the presence of the Conciliation Officer.
It is stated though the said agreement was entered into, the same cannot be construed as a valid and binding settlement under Section 12(3) of the 1947 Act, in strict legal terms. Petitioner contends that it is merely a Development Agreement Holder and not the employer of the said workmen, and hence, not amenable to proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act in such capacity. It is stated that prolonged disputes were pending before various Courts involving petitioner and management of M/s DBR Mills. It is further stated that there was no authentication or finalization of list of workers who were employed at the time when DBR Mills ceased operations, and due to this reason, petitioner was unable to effect any payments under the agreement dated 07-03-2017. Meanwhile, some workers purportedly filed Applications before the 2nd respondent, who, without verifying the maintainability of the claims under the Act, issued Certificate of Recovery and forwarded the same to the Hon'ble Court of XII Additional 6 Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, in Crl.M.P.No. 1722 of 2023, seeking to recover a sum of Rs.30,38,00,000/- from petitioner.
4. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that a settlement under Section 12(3) of the 1947 Act, can only be executed between an employer and its employees/workmen in the course of an industrial dispute and not with a third party, such as petitioner, who is merely a Development Agreement Holder. Therefore, it is submitted that the 2nd respondent acted without jurisdiction in issuing Certificate of Recovery and referring the matter under Section 33-C(1) of the Act. It is also argued that, assuming without admitting, even if any terms of the Agreement dated 07-03-2017 were violated, the only remedy available to the affected parties would be to approach the competent Civil Court for appropriate relief, and not to invoke the coercive mechanism available under the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel draws attention of this Court to Section 33-C(1) and contends that the said provision does not empower the 2nd respondent to issue Recovery Certificate against a third party who is not an employer, and especially in the absence of a valid employer-employee 7 relationship under the Act. Section 33-C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 reads as under::
" Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an Award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A, the workman himself or any other person authorized by him in writing in this behalf or in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a Certificate for that amount to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate having jurisdiction and the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, shall proceed to realize the money as if it were a fine imposed by such Magistrate.
Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which money became due to the workman from the employer.
Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period".
Learned counsel submits that a plain reading of the relevant provision reveals that jurisdiction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, to recover money under the Act is circumscribed by the existence of a due amount payable to the workman by the employer under either a settlement or an award or under the 8 provisions of Chapter V-A of the said Act. It was contended that, in the present case, petitioner is not the employer within the meaning of the Act. The settlement in question is alleged to have been entered into between the workmen unions and petitioner. However, it is submitted that it is a development agreement holder and does not fall within the definition of 'employer' as per the Act. It was further contended that Application filed by the workmen or their representatives was made after a lapse of more than three years from the date of the alleged settlement. Therefore, it was urged that proceedings in Crl.M.P. No. 1722 of 2023, initiated before the Court of the Hon'ble XII Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, should have been rejected at the threshold on the ground of limitation. It was further contended that the Magistrate entertained the Application and took cognizance of the matter without proper application of mind and mechanically, issued notice to petitioner based on the reference made by the 2nd respondent.
Learned counsel further submitted that definition of 'industrial dispute' under Section 2(k) and 'settlement' under Section 2(p) of the 1947 Act are applicable only in cases involving employer and employees or between employer and 9 workmen or even between workmen and workmen inter se. It was asserted that a third party like petitioner, who is merely a development agreement holder with no control or nexus with the functioning of the industry, cannot be brought within the fold of the said definitions. Therefore, it was submitted that the alleged settlement dated 07.03.2017 between petitioner and workmen unions cannot be treated as a settlement under the 1947 Act, particularly not one falling under Section 12(3). Accordingly, petitioner contends that jurisdiction exercised by the 2nd respondent and the subsequent action of the criminal court in Crl.M.P. No. 1722 of 2023 are wholly untenable and without legal basis. Such a matter cannot be adjudicated under the scheme of the Act, nor under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code in the manner presently undertaken. It is thus asserted that Crl.M.P. No. 1722 of 2023 pending before the Hon'ble XII Additional Metropolitan Magistrate at Hyderabad is liable to be quashed in its entirety.
Additionally, learned counsel submitted that even assuming without admitting that any enforceable right arises out of the agreement dated 07.03.2017, the proper remedy available to workmen or their unions would be to seek redressal 10 under the general civil law and not through invocation of criminal jurisdiction or proceedings under the 1947 Act. It is not the employer and has no privity with the industrial establishment for the purposes of attracting the applicability of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Further, it was submitted that reference application was filed before the Court only on 10.01.2023, which is more than five years after the date of the agreement, i.e. 07.03.2017. Therefore, it is contended that proceedings before the Hon'ble XII Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, vide Crl.M.P. No. 1722 of 2023 are barred by limitation and are unsustainable.
Learned counsel submits that petitioner had already filed Writ Petitions No. 1956 and 2011 of 2024 before this Court, challenging the order dated 22.09.2023 passed in I.A. No. 13 of 2021 in M.P. No. 5 of 2019 and I.A. No. 12 of 2021 in M.P. No. 4 of 2019 on the file of the Additional Industrial Tribunal-cum-Additional Labour Court, Hyderabad. In the said order, the petitioner was directed to deposit an amount of Rs. 49,00,000/- each in both cases to the credit of the respective proceedings. It was further brought to the notice of this Court that upon hearing petitioner, the impugned orders were 11 suspended and writ petitions are pending final adjudication. In addition, petitioner placed reliance on the fact that M/s DBR Mills also filed Writ Petition No. 33361 of 2023 before the Hon'ble High Court, in connection with the same or similar subject matter, wherein the Hon'ble Court was pleased to grant an interim order on 11.12.2023, directing all the parties to maintain status quo in all respects until further orders. The petitioner submits that the present criminal proceedings are sought to be continued in contravention of the status quo order granted in W.P. No. 33361 of 2023.
5. In the counter filed on behalf of the 2nd respondent, it is stated that petitioner deliberately and willfully refrained from impleading the management of M/s DBR Mills Limited and the Joint Action Committee of DBR Mills, which represents six trade unions and employees with whom petitioner had entered into a Memorandum of Settlement under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On this ground, the maintainability of the writ petition is questioned.
It is further stated that petitioner executed a Memorandum of Settlement on behalf of the management of M/s DBR Mills Limited, pursuant to the Development 12 Agreement dated 15-03-1999, which was entered into in favour of M/s Ashish Developers and Builders Private Limited. This entity was later merged with M/s Maheswari Megaventures Limited by virtue of the orders of the Hon'ble High Court dated 22-03-2005 in Company Petition Nos. 201, 202, and 203 of 2004, and is presently known as M/s Kshitij Infraventures Private Limited, i.e., the present petitioner. According to the terms of the said agreement, before any development activities could be initiated, the claims of the workers were to be settled either by the management of DBR Mills or by the developer. In the event that the developer settled the claims, it would be done in the account of M/s DBR Mills Limited.
The counter further avers that, in accordance with the terms of the Development Agreement and having regard to the prolonged suffering of the workers due to pending litigation, M/s Maheswari Megaventures Limited (now M/s Kshitij Infraventures Pvt. Ltd.), by virtue of the said agreement dated 15-03-1999, had given an undertaking to the Commissioner of Labour to settle the workers' claims subject to mutually agreed terms and conditions.
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It is asserted that out of a total extent of Acs. 26.00 possessed by DBR Mills Limited, an extent of Acs. 6.00 of land fell to the share of M/s Maheswari Megaventures Limited, now M/s Kshitij Infraventures Pvt. Ltd., by virtue of a compromise that attained finality before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Petitioner acquired absolute rights of ownership and possession over the said land and is free to deal with it. When petitioner commenced development works over this land, objections were raised by the Joint Action Committee representing various trade unions and workers which led to law and order issues and demands for settlement in accordance with the Development Agreement. To avoid further litigation, petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Settlement under Section 12(3) read with Rule 60 of the Telangana State Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958. The management of DBR Mills then filed Writ Petition No. 33361 of 2023 to quash Crl.M.P.No.1722 of 2023 and upon failing to obtain relief, colluded with petitioner to file the present Writ Petition to avoid compliance with the workers' settlement. Hence, the 2nd respondent contends that Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed as devoid of merit.
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The 2nd respondent further states that in view of the terms of the Development Agreement and continuing suffering of workers due to the prolonged litigation, M/s Kshitij Infraventures Pvt. Ltd. informed the Commissioner of Labour of their undertaking to settle the claims of the workers of DBR Mills Ltd. subject to mutually agreed terms. Therefore, they cannot now deny its joint and several liability and responsibility on account of the management's failure to fulfil its obligations. The counter also details that land bearing Survey Nos. 157/1 to 3, 158/1 & 2, 159/1, 28, 160/1 to 28, and 161/3 to 7, measuring Acs. 34.00, situated at Elchiguda, Bakaram Village, had fallen to the share of Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenoy by virtue of a compromise decree dated 20-10-1967 in O.S. No. 38 of 1967 on the file of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. It is further stated that prior to the said compromise decree, an extent of 26 acres forming part of these survey numbers was leased to M/s DBR Mills Ltd. under a lease deed dated 17th Aban 1328 Fasli (corresponding to the year 1918 A.D.). In 1994, M/s DBR Mills stopped paying rents and claimed ownership under the Inams Abolition Act, prompting Mrs. K.S. 15 Chenoy to file O.S. No. 1201 of 1995 for eviction and damages. During pendency of the suit, Mrs. Chenoy entered into an agreement of sale dated 03-12-1998 with M/s Ashish Developers and Builders Pvt. Ltd., which was subsequently merged with M/s Maheswari Megaventures Ltd. under orders of this Court dated 22-03-2005 in C.P. Nos. 201, 202, and 203 of 2004. The said company then came on record as plaintiff No. 2 in the eviction suit. The counter further narrates that after prolonged litigation, the issue relating to mill land attained finality upon dismissal of SLP Nos. 13630-13633/2005 and SLP No. 19446/2005 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Thereafter, Mrs. Chenoy executed two registered documents conveying 6 acres of land in favour of M/s Maheswari Megaventures Ltd. through Document Nos. 1349/2009 dated 27-10-2006 and 1350/2009 dated 28-10-2006. One of the conditions (Condition No. 26) of these documents specifically states that the second party (the developer) will settle and compromise with the landlady, and this compromise was filed on 17-03-1999. These documents were registered pursuant to the directions in Writ Petition No. 25181 of 2005 dated 01-02-2007 and Contempt Case No. 829 of 2009 dated 08-04-2009. Accordingly, in respect 16 of this 6-acre land, M/s Maheswari Megaventures Ltd. (now M/s Kshitij Infraventures Pvt. Ltd.) possesses absolute rights of ownership and possession and is free to deal with the same. It is finally stated that pursuant to the offer made by M/s Maheswari Megaventures Ltd., which was accepted by the workers of the erstwhile DBR Mills Ltd. in the presence of all parties and their representatives, a statutory settlement was recorded under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, on mutually agreed terms and conditions in order to bring about a fair and amicable resolution of the longstanding dispute.
It is stated in the counter that although petitioner is a party to the Certificate for Recovery Amount, which stems from a Statutory Agreement and is binding on him, the employees originally belonging to M/s DBR Mills Limited were treated as the employees of petitioner. This treatment formed the basis for execution of a Memorandum of Settlement. The said settlement continued the employer-employee relationship until final settlement of dues was made in full. Petitioner had stepped into the picture by virtue of the Development Agreement with M/s Ashish Developers and Builders Private Limited, a 17 company that was subsequently merged into M/s Maheshwari Megaventures Limited, which has since changed its name and is now known as Kshitij Infraventures Private Limited, writ petitioner. The counter further clarifies that one of the clauses in the said Development Agreement expressly allowed M/s Ashish Developers and Builders Private Limited the liberty to enter into any Statutory Agreements required for the smooth operation and completion of the project.
Following completion of the project, the procedure for recovery of fine amounts imposed by Criminal Courts is governed by Section 421(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code which mandates that Court shall issue a warrant for levy of such amounts by attachment and sale of any immovable property belonging to the offender. All parties who have a share or interest in the said property are to be made parties to the proceedings to the extent of their respective shares. In this context, the execution of the Memorandum of Settlement with the Joint Action Committee of M/s DBR Mills Limited was done in good faith and in conformity with statutory procedure. Petitioner, as per the counter, is bound to honour the same and complete all pending and remaining transactions. 18
The counter further states that as the Memorandum of Settlement dated 07-03-201 was not
implemented in its entirety, the competent authority, i.e., the Conciliation Officer under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, who also holds the post of Joint Commissioner of Labour, Twin Cities, was within his statutory right to issue a Certificate of Recovery. Accordingly, the said matter was referred to the Court of the XII Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, under Section 33C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, for effectuating the terms of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 07-03-201. Petitioner is under a continuing obligation to settle the dues of workers, as per the terms of the Memorandum of Settlement. While full payments have been made to some workers, balance amounts are yet to be paid to others.
6. In the reply filed by petitioner, it is denied that rights of management of M/s DBR Mills Limited or the Joint Action Committee representing six trade unions would be affected by any order in the writ petition, as they were not parties to the criminal proceedings initiated by the second respondent. It is stated, it became the owner of Acs.6.00 of land through a registered sale deed executed by Mrs. Khorshed 19 Shapoor Chenai, pursuant to orders from this Court in Writ Petition No. 25181 of 2006 and Contempt Case No. 1344 of 2007. Petitioner asserts that it did not step into the shoes of M/s DBR Mills Limited and acquired the land independently, and any settlement with labour unions could only be enforced through a Civil Court, not under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Additionally, M/s DBR Mills Limited filed objections before the Joint Commissioner of Labour, stating that petitioner had no rights to settle workers' dues. Petitioner argues that any settlement entered into with labour unions cannot be treated as a settlement under the Industrial Disputes Act, and the 2nd respondent lacks jurisdiction to invoke Section 33C(1) based on such a settlement.
7. The key issue in this writ petition is whether petitioner, as a development agreement holder, can be held liable for the workers' claims under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and whether the 2nd respondent acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the Certificate of Recovery under Section 33-C(1).
8. The record discloses that petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Settlement dated 07-03-2017 with the six 20 registered workers' unions of M/s DBR Mills Limited in the presence of the Conciliation Officer, under Section 12(3) of the 1947 Act and Rule 60 of the Telangana State Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958. A settlement arrived at during conciliation proceedings before a Conciliation Officer in terms of Section 12(3) is binding not only on the parties to the settlement but also on all workmen employed in the establishment. The contention that petitioner is not an 'employer' under the Act is inconsequential in the light of the admitted fact that petitioner voluntarily undertook liability to pay workmen as part of the compromise and further participated in the conciliation process leading to the settlement.
9. It is not in dispute that M/s Ashish Developers and Builders Pvt. Ltd. (predecessor of petitioner) executed Development Agreement dated 15-03-1999 with DBR Mills Ltd., under which petitioner undertook to settle the monetary claims of workmen, subject to mutually agreed terms. Clause 6 of the said agreement provides that repayment of liabilities, including workers' dues, was a pre-condition for commencement of any development activity. Petitioner, having derived commercial benefit and development rights under the said agreement, 21 cannot now disclaim the obligations that form an integral part of such commercial arrangement. Petitioner's plea that 12(3) settlement is not legally-binding on it, is contrary to the record for they participated in the conciliation proceedings and executed the settlement in the presence of the Conciliation Officer. Once such a settlement is reached, its enforceability is not contingent upon the petitioner's classification as a statutory employer under Section 2(g) or 2(k) of the Act. The doctrine of estoppel would apply to preclude petitioner from challenging a settlement it voluntarily entered into and acted upon.
10. Section 33-C(1) of the Act empowers the Labour Commissioner to issue a Certificate of Recovery for amounts due to workers, which are determined by an industrial adjudication or settlement. In the present case, petitioner entered into a settlement under Section 12(3) of the Act with the workers' unions, agreeing to pay the workers a specified sum in full and final settlement of their claims. The settlement was binding, and petitioner, having voluntarily undertaken responsibility for the settlement, cannot deny its obligations on the basis that it is not the employer. The core purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act is to ensure that workers are protected and their claims are 22 enforced in a timely manner. The Act recognizes the principle of justice and fairness for workers, even if the claims arise from complex contractual relationships, as in this case where petitioner entered into the settlement as part of its development agreement. Petitioner's claim of being a third party or not an employer is, therefore, not sufficient to absolve it of its obligations under the Act. They are not merely a passive third party but a central participant in the process, assuming responsibility for the workers' claims in exchange for the development rights granted by DBR Mills.
11. It is pertinent to observe that petitioner cannot rely on the notion that it was not directly involved in the employer- employee relationship, as the settlement was designed to address workers' dues directly with petitioner taking on the responsibility of making payments. Petitioner thus assumed the obligations of the employer in this context and the workers were entitled to seek recovery from the party responsible for the settlement. The recovery certificate issued by the 2nd respondent is referable to Section 33-C(1), which allows recovery of money due to a workman under a settlement. The existence of a binding 12(3) settlement suffices to trigger the provisions of 23 Section 33-C(1). The contention that petitioner is not an employer is irrelevant once it is established that they voluntarily accepted liability and undertook to make payments under a statutory settlement. The Authority acted within its jurisdiction in initiating recovery proceedings based on the settlement.
12. Further, petitioner has not impleaded either management of DBR Mills or the Joint Action Committee representing the workers' unions, despite their direct involvement in the matter. This suppression of necessary parties renders Writ Petition liable to be dismissed on the ground of non-joinder. Moreover, petitioner's conduct, including development activities undertaken on the land and negotiations with the workers, belies the claim of being a mere third party. The contention that workers must pursue a civil suit is untenable. Section 33-C(1) is a complete statutory mechanism for enforcing monetary claims under a settlement. The availability of a civil remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of statutory authorities to act under special legislation designed for the benefit of workmen.
13. In that view of the matter, petitioner, despite not being the direct employer of the workers, undertook 24 responsibility for their claims under the settlement and cannot escape liability on technical grounds. The settlement entered into was binding and the Labour Commissioner's issuance of the Certificate of Recovery was well within the statutory powers granted under Section 33-C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Writ Petition therefore, must fail.
14. The Writ Petition is accordingly, dismissed. No costs.
15. Consequently, the interim order dated 14.03.2024 shall stand dissolved automatically.
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NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J 29th April 2025 ksld