Karnataka High Court
Sri. Asgar Khan vs The State on 19 November, 2020
Author: John Michael Cunha
Bench: John Michael Cunha
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 19TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2020
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.591/2017
C/W
CRIMINAL PETITION Nos.592/2017, 4864/2018,
1616/2017, 260/2017, 7426/2016, 1617/2017
IN CRL. P. NO.591/2017
BETWEEN:
SRI ASGAR KHAN,
S/O SRI AKTHAR KHAN,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
MANAGING PARTNER,
M/S.BHARATH ORES AND MINERALS
HOSAPETE,
R/AT NO.224, 5TH WARD, 2ND CROSS,
COLLEGE ROAD,
HOSAPETE,
BELLARY DISTRICT - 583 201.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI MURTHY D. NAIK, ADVOCATE)
AND:
THE STATE,
REPRESENTED BY
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE ,
S.I.T.,
KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA,
BELLARY ROAD,
GANGANAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 032.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI VENKATESH S. ARBATTI, SPECIAL PP AND
SRI B.S. PRASAD, SPECIAL PP)
2
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482
OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO:
I) QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET DATED 26.12.2015
BEARING NO.32/2015 AT ANNEXURE-B AGAINST
PETITIONER/ACCUSED NO.8 WHICH IS NOW PENDING AS
SPL.C.C. NO.459/2016 FILED IN CR. NO.18/2015 DATED
23.04.2015 FILED FOR THE OFFENCES U/S 379, 420 R/W 120B
OF IPC AND SECTION 21 R/W 4(1) (A) OF THE MMDR ACT.
II) QUASH THE PROCEEDINGS IN SPL.C.C. NO.459/2016
ON THE FILE OF THE XXIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND
SESSIONS JUDGE AND SPECIAL JUDGE, FOR PREVENTION OF
CORRUPTION ACT AT BANGALORE VIDE ANNEXURE-C AS
AGAINST PETITIONER/ACCUSED NO.8 FILED FOR THE OFFENCES
P/U/S 379, 409 AND 420 R/W 120B OF IPC AND SECTIONS 21,
23 R/W 4(1), 4(1A) OF MMDR ACT, 1957.
IN CRL. P. NO.592/2017
BETWEEN:
1. SRI H.M. UDAYA SHANKAR,
S/O SRI S.M. VEERASHIVA,
SHIVACHARYA,
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
PROPRIETOR: M/S. SRI BRINDA MINERALS,
R/AT M.P. PRAKASH NAGARA,
SAI COLONY,
BELLARY BYPASS ROAD,
HOSAPETE,
PRESENT ADDRESS:
NO.188/127, NEHRU COLONY,
4TH CROSS,
BELLARY - 583 101.
2. SRI H.M. GURUPRAKASH,
S/O SRI S.M. VEERASHIVA,
SHIVACHARYA,
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS,
M/S. SRI BRINDA MINERALS,
R/AT M.P. PRAKASH NAGARA,
SAI COLONY,
BELLARY BYPASS ROAD,
HOSAPETE,
3
PRESENT ADDRESS:
NO.188/127, NEHRU COLONY,
4TH CROSS,
BELLARY - 583 101.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI MURTHY D. NAIK, ADVOCATE)
AND:
THE STATE,
REPRESENTED BY
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE ,
S.I.T., KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA,
BELLARY ROAD,
GANGANAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 032.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI VENKATESH S. ARBATTI, SPECIAL PP AND
SRI B.S. PRASAD, SPECIAL PP)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482
OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO:
I) QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET DATED 16.01.2016
BEARING NO.02/2016 AT ANNEXURE-B AGAINST PETITIONER
NOS.1 AND 2/ACCUSED NOS.1 AND 2 WHICH IS NOW PENDING
AS SPL.C.C. NO.463/2016 FILED IN CR. NO.06/2015 DATED
09.01.2015 FILED FOR THE OFFENCES U/S 379, 420, 409 R/W
120B OF IPC AND SECTIONS 21, 23 R/W 4(1), 4(1-A) OF THE
MMDR ACT, RULE 165 R/W 144 OF KARNATAKA FOREST RULES,
1969.
II) QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN SPL.C.C.
NO.463/2016 ON THE FILE OF THE XXIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL
AND SESSIONS JUDGE, AND SPECIAL JUDGE, FOR PREVENTION
OF CORRUPTION ACT AT BANGALORE VIDE ANNEXURE-C AS
AGAINST PETITIONERS NO.1 AND 2 ACCUSED NOS.1 AND 2
FILED FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 379, 420, 409 R/W 120B OF
IPC AND SECTIONS 21, 23 R/W 4(1), 4(1)(A) OF MMDR ACT,
1957, AND RULE 165 R/W 144 OF KARNATAKA FOREST RULES,
1969.
IN CRL. P. NO.4864/2018
4
BETWEEN:
SRI VINOD KUMAR T.R.,
S/O LATE RAMACHANDRA RAO T.K.,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
OFFICE AT OWNER: M/S. MEGA MINERALS,
OPP: TALUK OFFICE,
CHIKKANAYAKANAHALLI,
TUMKUR,
RESIDING AT NO.189,
'NARASIMHASWAMY NILAYA',
4TH CROSS, LAKSHMAMMA BADAVANE,
HIRIYURU - 572 143,
CHITRADURGA DISTRICT.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI MURTHY D. NAIK, ADVOCATE)
AND:
THE STATE,
REPRESENTED BY
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE ,
S.I.T.,
KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA,
BELLARY ROAD,
GANGANAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 032.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI VENKATESH S. ARBATTI, SPECIAL PP AND
SRI B.S. PRASAD, SPECIAL PP)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482
OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO:
I) QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET BEARING NO.12/2016 AT
ANNEXURE-B AGAINST THE PETITIONER/ACCUSED NO.13 WHICH
IS NOW PENDING AS SPL.C.C. NO.91/2017 ON THE FILE OF THE
XXIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE AND
SPECIAL JUDGE, FOR PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT AT
BANGALORE (CCH-24) FILED IN CR. NO.3/2015 DATED
06.01.2015 FOR THE OFFENCES U/S 409, 420 R/W 120B OF IPC
5
AND SECTIONS 21, 23 R/W SECTION 4(1) (A) OF MMDR ACT
AND RULE 165 R/W 144 OF KARNATAKA FOREST RULES, 1969.
II) QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN SPL.C.C.
NO.91/2017 ON THE FILE OF THE XXIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL
AND SESSIONS JUDGE AND SPECIAL JUDGE, FOR PREVENTION
OF CORRUPTION ACT AT BANGALORE (CCH-24) VIDE
ANNEXURE-C AS AGAINST THE PETITIONER/ACCUSED NO.13
PENDING FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 409, 420 R/W 120B OF IPC
AND SECTIONS 21, 23 R/W SECTION 4(1) (A) OF MMDR ACT
AND RULE 165 R/W 144 OF KARNATAKA FOREST RULES.
IN CRL. P. NO.1616/2017
BETWEEN:
1. SRI G.B. SHIVAKUMAR,
S/O G.A. BABBANNA,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
PROPRIETOR, M/S GBS TRANSPORTS,
R/AT OPP. KSPL COLLEGE,
DWARAKAMAAYI NILAYA,
BASAVESHWARA BANDAVANE,
HOSPET - 583 201.
2. SRI G.S. GOPALKRISHNA,
S/O LATE S. LINGAPA,
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
PROPRIETOR, M/S BALAJI ROADLINES,
R/AT NO.31/9, ANUGRAHA,
M.P. PRAKASHNAGAR,
HOSPET - 583 201.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI MURTHY D. NAIK, ADVOCATE)
AND:
THE STATE,
REPRESENTED BY
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE ,
S.I.T.,
KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA,
BELLARY ROAD,
GANGANAGAR,
6
BENGALURU - 560 032.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI VENKATESH S. ARBATTI, SPECIAL PP AND
SRI B.S. PRASAD, SPECIAL PP)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482
OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO:
I) QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET DATED 17.12.2015
BEARING NO.30/2015 AT ANNEXURE-B AGAINST THE
PETITIONERS/ACCUSED NOS.1 AND 2 RESPECTIVELY WHICH IS
NOW PENDING AS SPL.C.C. NO.598/2015 FILED IN CRIME
NO.19/2015 DATED 23.04.2015 FILED FOR THE OFFENCES U/S
379, 420 R/W 120B OF IPC AND SECTION 21 R/W 4 (1) (A) OF
THE MMDR ACT, 1957.
II) QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN SPL.C.C.
NO.598/2015 ON THE FILE OF THE XXIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL
AND SESSIONS JUDGE AND SPECIAL JUDGE, FOR PREVENTION
OF CORRUPTION ACT, BENGALURU CITY (CCH-24) VIDE
ANNEXURE-C AS AGAINST THE PETITIONERS/ACCUSED NOS.1
AND 2 RESPECTIVELY WHICH IS NOW PENDING AS SPL. C.C.
NO.598/2015 FILED IN CRIME NO.19/2015 DATED 23.04.2015
FILED FOR THE OFFENCES U/S 379, 420 R/W 120B OF IPC AND
SECTION 21 R/W 4(1) (A) OF THE MMDR ACT, 1957.
IN CRL. P. NO.260/2017
BETWEEN:
1. SRI K. JANARDHAN REDDY,
S/O LATE VEMANARAYANA REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
PARTNER, M/S. S.B. LOGISTICS,
HOSAPETE,
PRESENTLY R/AT NO.201,
4TH CROSS, 2ND MAIN,
"AASHRAYAA HOMES",
SARVABHOUMA NAGAR,
NEAR BANNERGHATTA ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 076,
PERMANENT ADDRESS:
NO.10/404, MAIN ROAD,
7
MULAKALACHERAVU,
THAMBALAPALLI TALUK,
CHITTURU DISTRICT,
ANDHRA PRADESH.
2. SRI D. BHEEMARAJU,
S/O SRI D. VENKATESHWARALU,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
PARTNER, M/S. S.B. LOGISTICS,
HOSAPETE - 583 201.
PRESENTLY R/AT NO.301,
4TH CROSS, 2ND MAIN,
"AASHRAYAA HOMES",
SARVABHOUMA NAGAR,
NEAR BANNERGHATTA ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 076.
3. SRI JAREEF ADIL,
S/O SRI RIYAZUDDIN,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
OWNER: M/S. AMAN ENTERPRISES,
HOSAPETE,
R/AT MADIYA RESIDENCY,
2ND CROSS, J.P. NAGARA,
HOSAPETE - 583 201.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI MURTHY D. NAIK, ADVOCATE)
AND:
THE STATE,
REPRESENTED BY
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE ,
S.I.T.,
KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA,
BELLARY ROAD,
GANGANAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 032.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI VENKATESH S. ARBATTI, SPECIAL PP AND
SRI B.S. PRASAD, SPECIAL PP)
8
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482
OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO:
I) QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET NO.3/2016 DATED
19.01.2016 AT ANNEXURE-B AGAINST PETITIONER NOS.1 AND
2/ACCUSED NOS.1 AND 2 FILED FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 379,
409, 420 R/W 120(B) OF IPC AND SECTION 21 R/W 4(1) (A) OF
THE MMDR ACT AND RULE 165 R/W 144 OF KARNATAKA FOREST
RULES IN SPL. C.C. NO.467/2016.
II) QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET NO.3/2016 DATED
19.01.2016 AT ANNEXURE-B AGAINST THE PETITIONER
NO.3/ACCUSED NO.3 FILED FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 379 AND
420 R/W 120(B) OF IPC AND SECTION 21 R/W 4(1) (A) OF THE
MMDR ACT IN SPL. C.C. NO.467/2016.
III) QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN SPL.C.C.
NO.467/2016 ON THE FILE OF THE XXIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL
AND SESSIONS JUDGE, AND SPECIAL JUDGE, FOR PREVENTION
OF CORRUPTION ACT, BENGALURU VIDE ANNEXURE-C AS
AGAINST THE PETITIONER HEREIN.
IN CRL. P. NO.7426/2016
BETWEEN:
1. ALEEM S. AHAMED,
S/O SYED RAHEEMUDDIN PASHA,
AGED ABOUT 73 YEARS,
OCC: WORKING PARTNER,
M/S. MUNEER ENTERPRISES,
HOSPET,
R/AT 3RD CROSS, 16TH WARD,
BASAVESHWARA LAYOUT,
HOSPET - 583 201.
2. SYED NAYEEMUDDIN,
S/O SYED RAHEEMUDDIN PASHA,
AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS,
OCC: WORKING PARTNER,
M/S. MUNEER ENTERPRISES,
HOSPET, R/AT 1ST CROSS,
OPP: TAYABA MASJID,
M.J. NAGARA,
9
HOSPET - 583 201,
BELLARY DISTRICT.
3. PRAKASH GOPALKRISHNA HEGDE,
S/O LATE GOPALKRISHNA HEGDE,
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS,
PARTNER,
M/S. ORIENTAL LOGISTICS COMPANY,
HOSPET - 583 222.
4. LINGAD BAYAL, YALLAPURA,
UTTARA KANNADA DISTRICT,
NOW RESIDING AT NO.58,
AKSHAYA COLONY,
NEAR CHETHANA COLLEGE,
HUBLI - 580 020.
5. PRABHAKARA MANJA DEVADIGA,
S/O MANJA DEVADIGA,
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS,
OCC: PARTNER,
M/S. ORIENTAL LOGISTICS COMPANY,
HOSPET - 583 222.
ADDRESS: AYYAPPANAGARA,
NEAR A.P.M.C. YARD,
HUBLI ROAD, SIRSI - 581 402,
UTTARA KANNADA DISTRICT.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI MURTHY D. NAIK, ADVOCATE)
AND:
THE STATE,
REPRESENTED BY
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE ,
S.I.T., KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA,
BELLARY ROAD,
GANGANAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 032.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI VENKATESH S. ARBATTI, SPECIAL PP AND
SRI B.S. PRASAD, SPECIAL PP)
10
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482
OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO:
1) QUASH ANNEXURE-A FIR DATED 20.10.2014 IN CR.
NO.28/2014 REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 379, 420
R/W 120B OF IPC, SECTION 13(2) R/W 13(1) (d) OF P.C. ACT
AND SECTION 21, 23 R/W 4(1), 4(1)(a) OF MMDR ACT, QUA THE
PETITIONER NOS.1, 3 AND 4.
2) QUASH THE ENTIRE CHARGE SHEET DATED
17.10.2015 AT ANNEXURE-B FILED FOR THE OFFENCES U/S 409,
420 R/W 120B OF IPC AND SECTION 21 R/W 4(1-A) OF MMDR
ACT, SECTION 165 R/W 144 OF KARNATAKA FOREST RULES,
1969, QUA ALL THE PETITIONERS.
3) QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN SPL. C.C.
NO.551/2015 ON THE FILE OF THE XXIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL
AND SESSIONS JUDGE AND SPECIAL JUDGE, BANGALORE URBAN
DISTRICT, BANGALORE (CCH-24) VIDE ANNEXURE-C QUA ALL
THE PETITIONERS.
IN CRL. P. NO.1617/2017
BETWEEN:
SRI SOUMITH RANJAN JENA,
S/O SRI SANDEEP JENA,
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS,
OWNER M/S. PISCES EXIM
MUMBAI,
EVEREST GRENADE, A/205,
2ND FLOOR, MAHAKALI CAVES ROAD,
SHANTHINAGAR,
ANDHERI EAST,
MUMBAI - 93.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI MURTHY D. NAIK, ADVOCATE)
AND:
THE STATE,
REPRESENTED BY
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE ,
11
KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA,
BELLARY ROAD,
GANGANAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 032.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI VENKATESH S. ARBATTI, SPECIAL PP AND
SRI B.S. PRASAD, SPECIAL PP)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482
OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO:
I) QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET DATED 10.09.2016 AT
ANNEXURE-B AGAINST THE PETITIONER/ACCUSED NO.1 WHICH
IS NOW PENDING AS SPL.C.C. NO.488/2016 ON THE FILE OF
XXIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, SPECIAL
JUDGE, BENGALURU FILED IN CRIME NO.14/2015 DATED
17.03.2015 FILED FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 409 AND 420 R/W
120(B) OF IPC AND SECTION 21, 4(1), 4(1A) OF MINES AND
MINERALS REGULATION OF DEVELOPMENT ACT AND SECTION
165 R/W 144 OF KARNATAKA FOREST RULES.
II) QUASH THE PROCEEDINGS IN SPL.C.C. NO.488/2016
ON THE FILE OF THE XXIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND
SESSIONS JUDGE, AND SPECIAL JUDGE, BENGALURU VIDE
ANNEXURE-C AS AGAINST THE PETITIONER/ACCUSED NO.1
FILED FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 409 AND 420 R/W 120(B) OF
IPC AND SECTIONS 21, 23 R/W 4(1), 4(1A) OF MINES AND
MINERALS REGULATION OF DEVELOPMENT ACT AND SECTION
165 R/W 144 OF KARNATAKA FOREST RULES.
THESE CRIMINAL PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED ON 22.10.2020 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING:
12
ORDER
Petitioners in this batch of petitions have sought to quash the charge sheets and the entire proceedings initiated against them for the offences punishable under Sections 379, 409 & 420 r/w Section 120-B of IPC and Sections 21 and 23 r/w Section 4(1), 4(1A) of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (for short 'M.M.D.R. Act') and Rules 165 and 144 of the Karnataka Forest Rules, 1969.
The details of the proceedings, rank of the petitioners and the gist of the allegations made against them are detailed in the table herebelow:-
Criminal Rank
Petition of the Crime Gist of the allegations
Spl.CC.No.
No. parties No.
591/2017 A8 18/2014 459/2016 The petitioner being the Managing partner of M/s
Bharath Ores and Minerals, Hosapete, entered into a criminal conspiracy with accused Nos. 1 and 2 namely M/s Ashapura Minekem Ltd., and Chethan Sha, Managing Director by making use of the Invoice drawn in the name of M/s Balaji Minerals, transported 2015.780 MT of Iron Ore, which was stolen from somewhere, without obtaining prior permit and without payment of royalty and caused loss of Rs.24,02,470/- to the State Exchequer and thereby committed the aforestated offences.
13592/2017 A1 & 6/2015 463/2016 The petitioner No.1 being the proprietor of M/s A2 Sree Brunda Minerals and petitioner No.2 being the representative of petitioner No.1 (accused No.1) purchased 10000 MT Iron Ore without valid permit from K Ramappa, Plot Kallahalli without obtaining any permit and also purchased 7200 MT of Iron ore from M/s Haripriya Logistics (Babanna Crushers), Vaddarahalli, near Ramappa Plot Kallalli and sold the same to M/s Prathyusha Associates Private Ltd., illegally stored the same with M/s Sjhantha Lakshmi Jayaram mining area and thereafter stored the same in Nagappa Plot without valid permit from the Forest department and thereby caused loss of Rs.3,69,63,959.00 to the State Exchequer and thereby committed the aforestated offences.
4864/2018 A13 3/2015 91/2017 Petitioner being the proprietor of M/s Megha
Minerals, Chikkanayakanahalli, Tumakuru,
purchased 1318.64 MT Iron ore from M/s
Manjunataheshwara Minerals; 183.34 MT iron ore from M/s Lakshmivenkateshwara Minerals and 2205.92 MT Iron ore from M/s Shaphia Minerals, in all 4320.37 MT Iron ore and sold the same to M/s K.L.A. India Public Ltd., without valid permit and without payment of royalty and thereby caused loss to an extent of 17,73,978.47/- to the State Exchequer and thereby by committed the aforesaid offences.
1616/2017 A1 & 19/2015 598/2015 Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 being the proprietors of A2 M/s GBS Logistics and M/s Balaji Road Lines entered into a criminal conspiracy and in furtherance of criminal conspiracy the petitioners illegally procured, supplied and transported 39,861.645 MT of iron ore to M/s Kalyani Earth Movers without valid permit, invoice and bills from M/s Kiran Enterprises plot Koppal to M/S SS Maritime Plot Baleguli Taluk, Ankola and caused loss to the extent of Rs.94,98,520/- to the State Exchequer and thereby by committed the aforesaid offences.
260/2017 A1 15/2015 467/2016 Petitioner No.1 is the Partner of M/s S.B. A2 Logistics, and has been arraigned as Accused A3 No.1 in the charge sheet on the allegation that he has entered into oral agreement with M/s Kineta Minerals and Metals Ltd., for sale of 25,000 M.T. 14 from Belikeri Port, and thereby has sold the same at the Belikeri Port. It is further allegation that in respect of the said 25,000 M.T. Petitioner No.1 has raised the invoice in the name of M/s Aman Enterprises though the proceeds of the sale has been credited to the account of M/s S.B. Logistics. It is further alleged that in respect of the said material no permits have been obtained from the Mines and Geology Department.
Petitioner No.2 has been arraigned as Accused No.2 in the charge sheet on the basis that he is the Partner of M/s S.B. Logistics, and has participated in the transaction pertaining to sale of iron ore to M/s Kineta Minerals and Metals Ltd., as stated above.
7426/2016 A1 28/2014 551/2015 Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 were the partners of A2 M/s.Muneer Enterprises, Hospet. Petitioners A3 Nos.3 and 4 are the partners of M/s. Oriental A4 Logistics Company, Hospet. Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 entered into a criminal conspiracy with other accused persons and in furtherance thereof purchased 26,925 MT of iron ore from M/s.
Oriental Logistics Company, without valid permit and without paying royalty and exported the same and thereby caused loss of Rs.4,63,86,489/- to the State Exchequer and thus committed the above offences.
1617/2017 A1 14/2015 488/2016 Petitioner being the proprietors of M/s Pisces Exim Mumbai purchased 11,397.44 MT Iron Ore from M/s S.B. Minerals and stored in Sri SVK Plot and other mining areas without obtaining prior permission and without payment of royalty and illegally transported the same and thereafter sold the same to M/s Pec India Limited in Belikeri Port and thereby caused loss to the tune of Rs.1,34,55,668/- to the State Exchequer and thereby committed the aforesaid offences.
2. The learned counsel for petitioners has raised the following contentions:
15
(i) The Firms or the Companies of the petitioners are not made an accused and therefore, prosecution of petitioners without making the Companies or the Firms as accused is legally untenable.
(ii) There is no concept of vicarious liability in criminal law unless the statute specifically provides for.
When Company is the offender, vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed automatically in the absence of any statutory provisions to this effect. In support of this submission, the learned counsel for petitioners has relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R. KALYANI Vs. JANAK C. MEHTA & OTHERS (2009) 1 SCC 516; K.SITARAM & ANOTHER Vs. CFL CAPITAL FINANCIAL SERVICE LTD. & ANOTHER (2017) 5 SCC 725; SHARAD KUMAR SANGHI Vs. SANGITA RANE (2015) 12 SCC 781; SRI. RAJESH ADANI & ANOTHER Vs. ASSISTANT LABOUR COMMISSIONER & ANOTHER, ILR 2010 Kar. 3287, ANEETA HADA Vs. GODFATHER TRAVELS & TOURS (P) LTD., (2012) 5 SCC 661, SUNIL BHARTI MITTAL Vs. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609 and 16 THERMAX LTD., & OTHERS VS. Q.M. JOHNI & OTHERS (2011)13 SCC 412.
(iii) The averments made in the charge sheet indicate that the petitioners were mere traders. The allegations made against them go to show that they had merely purchased and exported the iron ore. Petitioners are therefore not required to obtain any license or permit either from the Mines Department or from the Forest Department. As per Section 9 of the M.M.D.R. Act, liability to pay royalty is on the holder of the mining lease. Referring to Sub-Section (2) of Section 9 of the M.M.D.R. Act, the learned counsel for the petitioners pointed out that as per the said provisions:
"(2) The holder of a mining lease granted on or after the commencement of this Act shall pay royalty in respect of any 1 [mineral removed or consumed by him or by his agent, manager, employee, contractor or sub-
lessee] from the leased area at the rate for the time being specified in the Second Schedule in respect of that mineral."
17On this point, learned counsel has relied on the following decisions:
1) (2014) 6 SCC 590, GOA FOUNDATION VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS and
2) AIR 2008 All. 75, VIRENDRA GIRI vs. STATE OF UP & Others.
Further, placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in GOA FOUNDATION case (supra), with reference to paragraphs 33 and 34 thereof, it is argued that under "Section 4 of the M.M.D.R. Act, a person who holds a mining lease granted under the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder is entitled to carry on mining operations in accordance with the terms of the lease in the leased area and may carry on all other activities connected with mining within the leased area."
Based on these observations, the learned counsel for petitioners would submit that since the petitioners were not holding any mining lease, they are not liable to pay royalty and therefore, charges leveled against the petitioners being illegal amount to an abuse of process of Court. 18
(iv) Further, it is contended that the order taking cognizance of the alleged offences is also defective. It does not disclose application of mind by the learned Special Judge. It is a bald order, which does not specify the offences for which the alleged cognizance has been taken. On this point, learned counsel has relied on the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SUNIL BHARTI MITTAL Vs. CBI, (2015) 4 SCC 609; the Constitution Bench decision in SARAH MATHEW Vs. INSTITUTE OF CARDIO VASCULAR DISEASES, (2014) 2 SCC 62 and the decision in MEHMOOD UL REHMAN Vs. KHAZIR MOHAMMAD TUNDA & OTHERS, (2015) 12 SCC 420. It is contended that the order taking cognizance being illegal, the subsequent proceedings initiated against the petitioners are liable to be quashed.
(v) The charge sheets filed by the respondent do not disclose the basic ingredients constituting offences alleged against the petitioners and in the said 19 circumstances, proceedings initiated against the petitioners being illegal and an abuse of process of Court, the proceedings are liable to be quashed.
(vi) The next contention urged by the learned counsel for petitioners is that the registration of FIR for the offences under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (for short 'M.M.D.R. Act') and the charge sheet filed for the alleged offences, is illegal in view of the bar contained under Section 22 of the M.M.D.R. Act. In support of this submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in STATE (NCT OF DELHI) Vs. SANJAY (2014) 9 SCC 772.
3. Meeting these arguments, the learned Spl. P.P. appearing for respondent would submit that petitioners are prosecuted in their individual capacity as well as partners of the Company. Referring to paragraphs 40 and 41 of the Sunil Bharti Mittal's case the learned counsel would submit that alleged offences having been committed by the 20 petitioners as partners of the relevant company, petitioners are also liable to answer the said charges.
4. Further, the learned Spl. P.P. at the outset would submit that the petitioners are sought to be prosecuted for the offences under Sections 4(1A) of the M.M.D.R. Act. The allegations made in the complaint squarely fall within the ambit of Section 4(1A) of the M.M.D.R. Act. There are clear allegations that the petitioners were traders, involved in purchase and exportation of iron ore. Under the said circumstances, the allegations made against the petitioners clearly fall within the ambit of Section 4(1A) of the M.M.D.R. Act, as such, there no illegality in the proceedings initiated against the petitioners.
5. Regarding defect in the cognizance order as highlighted by the learned counsel for petitioners is concerned, the learned Spl. Public Prosecutor would submit that the order passed by the learned Special Judge taking cognizance of the alleged offences meets the legal 21 requirements of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court in umpteen number of cases. There is a conceptual difference between the cognizance taken in the case arising out of a private complaint under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. and cognizance taken on the police report filed under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. In the instant case, the learned Special Judge having taken cognizance on the basis of the police report/final report as well as in terms of the written complaint filed by the authorized officer in terms of Section 22 of the M.M.D.R. Act, no fault could be found with the order taking cognizance by the learned Special Judge. For the same reason, the learned Special P.P. would submit that the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for petitioners on this aspect, are not applicable to the facts of the case.
6. Lastly, with regard to the facts constituting ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioners are concerned, the learned Special P.P. submitted that the allegations made in the complaint, charge sheet as well as 22 the documents filed in support thereof clearly discloses the ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioners, as such, there is no illegality whatsoever in the proceedings initiated against the petitioners and thus, sought for dismissal of the petitions.
7. Considered the submissions and perused the records.
8. The contention urged by learned counsel for the petitioners that the allegations leveled in the charge sheet are directed only against the Firm and therefore the prosecution of the petitioners is not tenable in the eye of law, is also liable to be dismissed. A reading of the charge sheets and the allegations made in the complaints clearly disclose that the petitioners are sought to be prosecuted not only as the partners of the involved Firms, but also in their personal capacity.
9. As could be seen from the above narration, petitioners have been implicated in the alleged offences in 23 their individual capacity and not as alter ego of the Company. There are no allegations in the entire charge sheets that the alleged offences were committed by the Firm or Company. The question of making the Firm or the Company an accused would arise only when such Company commits an offence involving mens rea, it would normally be the intent and action of the individual who would act on behalf of the Company. Only then an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an offence on behalf of a Company can be made an accused, along with the Company, if there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent. This is the law laid down in SUNIL BHARTI MITTAL vs. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, (2015)4 SCC 609 (paras 40, 42 and 43), which is extracted herebelow:-
"40. It is abundantly clear from the above that the principle which is laid down is to the effect that the criminal intent of the "alter ego" of the company, that is the personal group of persons that guide the business of the company, would be imputed to the company/corporation. The legal proposition that is laid down in the aforesaid judgment is 24 that if the person or group of persons who control the affairs of the company commit an offence with a criminal intent, their criminality can be imputed to the company as well as they are "alter ego" of the company.
42. No doubt, a corporate entity is an artificial person which acts through its officers, directors, managing director, chairman etc. If such a company commits an offence involving mens rea, it would normally be the intent and action of that individual who would act on behalf of the company. It would be more so, when the criminal act is that of conspiracy. However, at the same time, it is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so.
43. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the commission of an offence on behalf of a company can be made accused, along with the company, if there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent. Second situation in which he can be implicated is in those cases where the statutory regime itself attracts the doctrine of vicarious liability, by specifically incorporating such a provision."
10. In the instant cases, the allegations are directed only against the petitioners. The role played by the petitioners has been narrated. It is not the case of the respondent that the alleged acts were committed by the 25 petitioners for and on behalf of the Company. They are not prosecuted in their capacity as the partners of the Firm because they are partners. When the notion of the Company or its corporate identity is used to circumvent law, to defeat public policy, perpetuate fraud or illegality and used as a cover or façade to justify wrong, defend crime, to lend a name to a private dealing, law will not regard the Company as a corporate entity and afford the protection which is otherwise entitled under law. When camouflaged transactions are carried on behind the legal façade, Court may lift this veil and look behind the artificial personality of the Company and identify the real personalities or natural persons operating behind the veil. The facts and circumstances disclosed in the material collected by Investigating Officer undoubtedly point out that the petitioners ingeniously have been operating behind the cover of Firm or Company by entering into conspiracy with other accused with an intent to make unlawful gain making out the ingredients of offence under sections 420 and 120B of IPC. Therefore, the contention of the petitioners that the 26 prosecution launched against them is bad for non- prosecution of the Firm or the Company does not hold water.
11. Validity of Order of Cognizance and Summons:
On perusal of the order sheets maintained by the Special Court in the respective proceedings, it is noticed that except in Criminal Petition Nos.1616/2017 and 7426/2016, detailed orders have been passed by the Special Court taking cognizance of the offences and issuing summons to the petitioners. A specimen of the said order in Special C.C.No.598/2015 is reproduced hereinbelow:
"Perused the final report. Cognizance is taken against accused No. 1 and 2. Register the case against accused No. 1 and 2. Register the case and issue summons to accused No. 1 and 2 returnable by 16.1.2016."
12. As rightly submitted by the learned counsels appearing for the respective petitioners/accused that this order does not specify the offences in respect of which cognizance has been taken by the Special Court. It is also 27 not forthcoming in these orders as to whether cognizance has been taken in respect of the offences under IPC or under the provisions of MMDR Act or Forest Rules. In other cases, detailed orders have been passed taking cognizance of specific offences and accordingly, summons have been issued to the petitioners. Nonetheless, it is submitted at the Bar that the summons issued to the respective accused contained the details of the offences for which the summons were issued. Records also indicate that on appearing before the learned Special Judge, the petitioners moved for bail based on the offences mentioned in the summons. Therefore, it is clear that right from the inception, the petitioners were aware of the offences for which summons were issued to them. It is in this background, the objection raised by the petitioners/accused questioning the correctness and legality of the order of cognizance and the consequent summoning order issued by the Special Court requires to be considered.
28
13. What is taking cognizance is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code. But, it is now well settled that any Magistrate who takes cognizance of an offence must apply his mind to the facts of the case for the purpose of proceedings in a particular way. In R.R.CHARI vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH, AIR(38) 1951 SC 207, the Hon'ble Supreme Court relying on the dicta on GOPAL MARWARI AND OTHERS vs. EMPEROR, AIR (30) 1943 Pat. 245, has observed that, "the word 'cognizance' was used in the Code to indicate the point when the Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. It is a different thing from the initiation of proceedings". Section 209 of the Code also provides for taking cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate while committing the case to the Sessions Court for trial but, the cognizance taken by the Magistrate under Section 209 is quite different from the cognizance taken by the Magistrate under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code or the cognizance taken by the Sessions Court before commencing the trial after committal. In the instant case, undisputedly, the learned Special Judge has proceeded to take cognizance 29 of the alleged offences after the submission of the final report by SIT.
14. The reading of the cognizance orders passed by the learned Special Judge clearly indicate that on perusal of the charge sheet submitted by the SIT learned Special Judge has taken cognizance of the alleged offences purportedly under Section 190(1)(a) of the Code and has proceeded to issue summons to the petitioners/accused, as such, there cannot be any difficulty in holding that by considering the facts of the case as borne on the final report, the learned Special Judge has taken cognizance of IPC offences as well as the offences under the provisions of Forest Rules and MMDR Act.
15. It is trite law that while taking cognizance and issuing summons in respect of IPC offences, based on the report under Section 173 of the Code, law does not require the Magistrate to pass elaborate order recording reasons for issuance of summons; though the order must reflect that he has considered the final report and satisfied himself that 30 there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused named in the final report.
16. In BHUSHAN KUMAR vs. STATE OF (NCT OF DELHI), (2012) 5 SCC 424, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated the requirement of application of mind in the process of taking cognizance and following the decision in CHIEF ENFORCEMENT OFFICER vs. VIDEOCON INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, (2008) 2 SCC 497, has held that in the process thus issued, the Magistrate need not explicitly state the reasons. Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the decision in CHIEF ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, read as under:-
"12. A "summons" is a process issued by a court calling upon a person to appear before a Magistrate. It is used for the purpose of notifying an individual of his legal obligation to appear before the Magistrate as a response to violation of law. In other words, the summons will announce to the person to whom it is directed that a legal proceeding has been started against that person and the date and time on which the person must appear in court. A person who is summoned is legally bound to appear before the court on the given date and time. Wilful disobedience is liable to be punished under Section 174 IPC. It is a ground for contempt of court.
13. Section 204 of the Code does not mandate the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for 31 issuance of summons. It clearly states that if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding, then the summons may be issued. This section mandates the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether there exists a sufficient ground for summons to be issued but it is nowhere mentioned in the section that the explicit narration of the same is mandatory, meaning thereby that it is not a prerequisite for deciding the validity of the summons issued."
17. In the backdrop of the above principle, if the order of cognizance and the summons issued by the learned Magistrate in the instant cases is analyzed, it is clear from the above order that on consideration of the final report submitted by SIT, the learned Special Judge has taken cognizance of the alleged offences and has issued summons to the petitioners. Therefore, there can be no difficulty in upholding the validity of the cognizance taken by the learned Special Judge and the summons issued to the petitioners insofar as the IPC and Forest offences are concerned.
18. However, the difficulty arises in respect of the offences under the provisions of MMDR Act. Section 22 of 32 the Act creates a restriction on the Courts in taking cognizance of the offences under the Act. The Section reads as under:
"22. Cognizance of offences.― No court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act or any rules made thereunder except upon complaint in writing made by a person authorised in this behalf by the Central Government or the State Government."
19. Learned Counsel for the petitioners/accused has placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of STATE (NCT OF DELHI) vs. SANJAY, (2014) 9 SCC 772, in paragraph 70, wherein it is held as under:
" 70. There cannot be any dispute with regard to restrictions imposed under the MMDR Act and remedy provided therein. In any case, where there is a mining activity by any person in contravention of the provisions of Section 4 and other sections of the Act, the officer empowered and authorized under the Act shall exercise all the powers including making a complaint before the jurisdictional magistrate. It is also not in dispute that the Magistrate shall in such cases take cognizance on the basis of the complaint filed before it by a duly authorized officer. In case of breach and violation of 33 Section 4 and other provisions of the Act, the police officer cannot insist Magistrate for taking cognizance under the Act on the basis of the record submitted by the police alleging contravention of the said Act. In other words, the prohibition contained in Section 22 of the Act against prosecution of a person except on a complaint made by the officer is attracted only when such person sought to be prosecuted for contravention of Section 4 of the Act and not for any act or omission which constitute an offence under the Penal Code."
(underlining supplied)
20. What emerges from the above decision is that based on the final report filed under Section 173 of the Code, the Special Court cannot take cognizance of the offences under the provisions of the MMDR Act. Apparently, to get over this restriction, the respondent appears to have filed a complaint in each of the proceedings before the Special Court in terms of Section 22 of the MMDR Act. Learned Special Public Prosecutor for the respondent has made available copies of the complaints filed by the authorized officer before the learned Special Judge which contain the very same allegations as found in the charge sheet submitted by SIT. These complaints therefore could be taken as due compliance of the statutory requirement 34 prescribed in Section 22 of the MMDR Act. But the question still remains to be considered is, whether by mere filing the complaint, can it be said that the Special Court has taken cognizance of the offences based on the said complaint as mandated in Section 22 of the MMDR Act?
21. Though it is vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners/accused that such exercise has not been done by the Special Court as the impugned orders of cognizance does not reflect that the learned Special Judge has looked into the averments made in the complaints yet, what is significant to be noted is that the allegations made in these complaints as well as the facts constituting the offences alleged against the petitioners/accused in the final report filed by the SIT are one and the same. Under the said circumstance, if the learned Special judge has looked into the allegations made in the final report filed by the SIT and on satisfying himself that these allegations prima facie disclose the commission of offences by the petitioners/accused under IPC as well as 35 under the MMDR Act, it could possibly be held that the learned Special Judge has taken cognizance of the offences in terms of Section 22 of MMDR Act.
22. In drawing the above conclusion, I am fortified by the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of FAKHRUDDIN AHMAD vs. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL AND ANOTHER, (2008) 17 SCC 157, wherein it is observed that "whether Magistrate has or has not taken cognizance of offence will depend upon circumstances of the particular case, including mode in which case is sought to be instituted and the nature of preliminary action". No doubt, even in the said case it is held that "before a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance of an offence, it is imperative that he must have taken notice of accusations and applied his mind to allegations made in complaint or in police report or information received from a source other than a police report, as the case may be, and material filed therewith. It is only when the Magistrate applies his mind and is satisfied that allegations, if proved, would constitute an offence and 36 decides to initiate proceedings against the alleged offenders, that it can be positively stated that he has taken cognizance of the offence."
23. Similar view is taken in MEHMOOD UL REHMAN vs. KHAZIR MOHAMMAD TUNDA AND OTHERS, (2015) 12 SCC 420, wherein it is held that "though no formal or speaking or reasoned orders are required at the stage of Ss.190/204 Cr.P.C., there must be sufficient indication in the order that the Magistrate is satisfied that: (i) the facts alleged in the complaint constitute an offence, and (ii) these facts when considered along with the statements recorded under S.200 CrPC and the result of inquiry or report of investigation under S.202 CrPC, if any, prima facie make the accused answerable before the criminal court."
24. As the impugned orders and the records of the proceedings disclose that the learned Special Judge has considered the material placed before him namely, the charge sheets which contain identical allegations as found in the complaints filed by the authorized officer under Section 37 22 of the Act, I hold the cognizance taken by the learned Special Judge and the summons issued by him in respect of MMDR offences is in accordance with Section 22 of MMDR Act.
25. Viewed from another angle, on filing a complaint either under Section 200 Cr.P.C., or under Section 22 of MMDR Act, the course open for the Court/Magistrate was either to take cognizance based on the facts alleged in the complaint or to refer the complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., or to postpone the process and hold an enquiry in terms of Section 202 of Cr.P.C. In the instant cases, detailed investigation into the alleged offences having already been undertaken by SIT pursuant to the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and necessary evidence having been collected in respect of the alleged offences, the Special Court could not have ordered a parallel investigation nor could it have rejected the final report. It is not the case of the petitioners that the report submitted by the SIT is without authority of law. Even 38 otherwise, investigating of the offences is within the domain of the police and the power of the police officer to investigate into cognizable offence is not ordinarily impinged by any fetters. There is no provision under the MMDR Act that the appropriate authority alone shall investigate any complaint of breach of any of the provisions of the MMDR Act. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in KANWAR PAL SINGH vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (Crl.Appeal No.1920/2019, arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.10707/2019, dated December, 18, 2019), "the violation of Section 4 being cognizable offence, the police could always investigated the same, there being no bar under the MMDR Act". Therefore, it follows that when the police have the power to investigate the contraventions of Section 4 of the Act, they have also the power to submit the final report. Therefore, no illegality could be attached to the final report and the evidence collected by the police officers in proof of the offences investigated by them under the Act. This report, therefore, cannot be excluded from consideration while taking cognizance of the offence under the Act, 39 provided a complaint as required under Section 22 is filed by the authorized officer. If the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is accepted, despite there being a report on investigation, the Court has to either order for fresh investigation or hold an enquiry under Section 202 of Cr.P.C., which would tantamount to nullifying the investigation ordered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Government of Karnataka, which in the circumstances of the case cannot be permitted. It is a cardinal principle of law that every law is designed to further the ends of justice and shall not be frustrated on mere technicalities. When the law authorizes the police/SIT to investigate the offences including the offences under the MMDR Act, the said report cannot be excluded from consideration at the stage of cognizance or issuance of summons to the accused subject to the compliance of the requirements of Section 22 of the Act.
26. In the light of these principles and for the reasons discussed above, and especially keeping in mind 40 the peculiarities of the present cases and the special circumstances arising on account of the investigation report submitted by SIT, in my view, the course adopted by the learned Special Judge in considering the final report for issuing process to the petitioners cannot be faulted with. Likewise, as held in the above decisions, non recording the reasons by the Special Court while issuing summons to the petitioners also cannot be a reason to set aside the orders of cognizance and the summons issued to the petitioners. In the circumstances of the case, even if there is an error or omission on the part of the learned Special Judge, it is not something so vital as to cut at the root of jurisdiction so as to render the impugned orders illegal or without jurisdiction so as to quash the entire proceedings as sought for by the petitioners. Since the petitioners were notified of the offences at the earliest point of time before their appearance, there is substantial compliance of the "outward forms of the law" as held by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in WILLIE (WILLIAM) SLANEY vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH, AIR 1956 SC 116.
41
27. As a result, I hold that the impugned orders of cognizance and the consequent orders of summons issued by the learned Special Judge do not suffer from any error or illegality vitiating the proceedings pending against the petitioners.
28. Regarding the contention urged by learned counsel for petitioners that the petitioners being the traders they were not involved in the purchase or sale of the iron ore and therefore they were not required to obtain prior permit or to pay royalty to the concerned Department is concerned, suffice it to note that the allegations made against the petitioners squarely attract Section 4(1A) of the M.M.D.R. Act. The section reads as under:
"4(1A) No person shall transport or store or cause to be transported or stored any mineral otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Rules made thereunder."42
As there are clear allegations that the petitioners were instrumental in purchase/storage/transportation of the iron ore, in my view, even the said contention does not merit acceptance.
29. The allegations made in the respective complaints which are duly supported by the materials collected by SIT during investigation, undoubtedly make out the ingredients of the offences under Sections 379, 409, 420 r/w. 120(B) of IPC and Sections 21, 23 r/w 4(1) and 4(1A) of MMDR Act, 1957 and Rules 165 r/w 144 of Karnataka Forest Rules, 1969. In the course of the arguments, the learned Special Public Prosecutor has referred to the relevant documents which prima facie disclose the involvement of the petitioners in the alleged offences. Under the said circumstances, the criminal action having been rightly initiated against the petitioners, I do not find any justifiable ground to interfere in the impugned proceedings. Accordingly, rejecting the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners, Criminal Petition 43 No.591/2017, Criminal Petition No.592/2017, Criminal Petition No.4864/2018, Criminal Petition No.1616/2017, Criminal Petition No.260/2017, Criminal Petition No.7426/2016 and Criminal Petition No.1617/2017 are dismissed.
In view of dismissal of main petitions, all pending I.As are also dismissed.
At this juncture the learned counsel for the petitioners seeks leave of the court to reserve the right of the petitioners to urge appropriate contentions before the trial court at the stage of hearing before charge.
Such a right is available to the petitioners under law and the same is not taken away by this order. The Trial Court shall hear the petitioners and consider the grounds raised at the stage of hearing before charge and shall proceed in the matter as per law.
Sd/-
JUDGE Psg* Bss