Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
T. Shambhoji Rao vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh Rep. By ... on 28 April, 2006
Equivalent citations: 2006(3)ALD819, 2006(3)ALT516
Author: Ramesh Ranganathan
Bench: J. Chelameswar, Ramesh Ranganathan
ORDER Ramesh Ranganathan, J.
1. The petitioner seeks to have the Selection of Assistant Conservator of Forests in the 1976 Recruitment, and the concerned files including the impugned Memo dt. 12-4-2001, quashed to the extent candidates, who availed age concession based on their community reservation, were appointed against O.C. vacancies without fulfilling the conditions of age requirement prescribed for open competition. The petitionerseeks a declaration that he is entitled to be considered for appointment as Assistant Conservator of Forests in the 1976 Recruitment and to be granted consequential benefits such as notional seniority etc. The petitioner also seeks a consequential direction to set aside the judgment of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal, in O.A.No. 2692 of 2001 dated 22-9-2005, as illegal.
2. Facts, to the extent necessary, are that the petitioner was appointed as a Forest Range Officer, through the Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission, (for short "A.P.P.S.C."), on 1-11-1968. While the petitioner was working as a Forest Range Officer, the A.P.P.S.C. issued a notification in the year 1976 inviting applications for direct recruitment to eight posts of Assistant Conservator of Forests (Five in the O.C. category; One in the B.C.-'A' category; One in the S.C. category and One in the S.T. category). The age prescribed for O.C. candidates was between 19 to 24 years as on 1-5-1976. In response to the said notification, the petitioner appeared for selections and was placed at Rank No. 3. Since three B.C. candidates got marks higher than him, the petitione r was placed at Rank No. 6. The three B.C. candidates, (Sri S. Balakrishna, Sri D. Satyanarayana and Sri B. Trinath Rao), all of whom belonged to the B.C.-'D' category, were placed above the petitioner in the order of merit and were appointed against O.C. vacancies. In view thereof the petitioner was not selected in the 1976 recruitment.
3. The petitioner would submit that, while Sri S. Balakrishna was aged 25 years 8 months, Sri D. Satyanarayana was aged 27 years one month and 20 days and Sri B. Trinath Rao was aged 24 years two months and 5 days as on 1-5-1976, by virtue of their belonging to the backward classes, they were given the benefit of five years relaxation in age and were selected as Assistant Conservator of Forests in the 1976 recruitment. According to the petitioner, inasmuch as these three candidates had been given five years relaxation in the upper age limit, as a concession to the backward classes, they ought to have been considered for appointment only against vacancies reserved in favour of the backward classes and selections, for vacancies in the open category, ought to have been made without granting them relaxation in the upperage limit. Petitioner would contend that granting relaxation of age, in favour of candidates who belonged to the backward classes, and permitting them to compete for the O.C. vacancies, despite their being over aged to be treated as open category candidates, was discriminatory and had resulted in the petitioner, ranked 3rd among the qualified O.C. candidates, being deprived of appointment to the post of Assistant Conservator of Forests in the 1976 recruitment. Petitioner would contend that the three Backward class candidates, who were appointed under the open category as Assistant Conservator of Forests, enjoyed the double benefit of reservation i.e., age relaxation as backward class candidates and selection against O.C. vacancies. According to the petitioner, while there was only one post reserved for B.C.-'A', granting relaxation to these three candidates, in addition to the B.C-'A' candidate, meant that three more persons, over and above what was permitted, were appointed giving them the benefit of age relaxation. Petitioner would contend that the mistake committed by the A.P.P.S.C. enabled B.C. candidates, by virtue of their age relaxation, to compete for selection against O.C. vacancies on the basis of merit and against B.C. vacancies on the basis of reservation. Petitioner would submit that the action of the A.P.P.S.C. in selecting the three backward class candidates, for posts in the open category, is in violation of Rule 22 Clause 2(d) Proviso of the A.P. State and Subordinate Services Rules which reads as under:
... Provided that the claims of members of the Scheduled (SIC)Ctes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Class, Women and the Physically Handipcapped persons or the Ex-Servicemen as the case may be, shall be filled on the basis of open competition, the number of appointments reserved for the category shall in no way be affected during the period the reservation for that category is in force.
4. Petitioner would submit that it is only when the seniority list, of Assistant Conservator of Forests, was issued in 1998 that he came to know that these three officers, though they belonged to the B.C. category, were selected against O.C. vacancies though they were aged more than the upper age limit prescribed for O.C. candidates which was 24 years as on 1-5-1976. Petitioner is said to have submitted a detailed representation contending that there was no rule or regulation regarding grant of age concession, to the backward classes or others, against O.C. vacancies, that his fundamental right under Article 16(2) was violated and that he was discriminated against, on the basis of his caste, from being considered for selection to the five posts in the open category. Petitioner would contend that, in view of the irregularities committed by the A.P.P.S.C., he was deprived of his legitimate right for selection as an Assistant Conservator of Forests, against an O.C. vacancy, in the selections made in the 1976 recruitment. Petitioner would seek a direction that he may be given notional seniority in the post of Assistant Conservator of Forests and be placed below the last direct recruitment made to the post of Assistant Conservator of Forests in the 1976 batch.
5. Petitioner would submit that pursuant to another representation, submitted by him on 31-10-2000 seeking rectification of the mistake committed earlier by the respondents, the Government in November, 2000 itself had called for information from the A.P.P.S.C. regarding the number of vacancies notified, community wise, for the post of Assistant Conservator of Forests, the age prescribed in the advertisement for various categories and the list of candidates selected against O.C., B.C., S.C. and ST. vacancies. Since no decision was communicated to him, the petitioner filed O.A. No. 1035 of 2001 before the A.P. Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad and the Tribunal, by order dated 20-2-2001, directed the respondents to examine the representation of the petitioner and pass appropriate orders within three months. The 1st respondent, vide memo dated 12-4-2001, informed the petitioner that his request was examined in consultation with the A.P.P.S.C. and that selection of reserved candidates, against O.C. vacancies, was done in accordance with the rules and the selection list needed no change or revision. Aggrieved thereby the petitioner approached the A.P. Administrative Tribunal filing O.A. No. 2692 of 2001. On the said O.A. being dismissed, on 4-5-2002, the petitioner filed W.P. No. 9878 of 2002 which was allowed on 26-4-2005 and the matter was remanded back to the A.P. Administrative Tribunal.
6. The A.P. Administrative Tribunal, in its order dated 22-9-2005, held thatthe petitioner herein, and the B.C. candidates, had availed the benefit of age relaxation and since the petitioner had availed age relaxation as an "in-service" candidate, he was estopped from contending that the three selected B.C. candidates could not be considered for the O.C. slot. The Tribunal held that, if the contention of the petitioner was accepted, he would not have been eligible to participate as he was an O.C. candidate and was not within the prescribed age limit, without the benefit of age relaxation given in favour of "in-service" candidates. The Tribunal also took note of the fact that the petitioner had not challenged the notification. The Tribunal drew a distinction between eligibility and selection and held that once a candidate belonging to B.C. or S.C. or S.T., after availing the benefit of age concession available under the rules, becomes eligible, he cannot be segregated while preparing the merit list on the ground of his having availed concession of age. The Tribunal held that if such a candidate comes up as per his merit, in the merit list of O.C. candidates, he has to be selected in the open category and the age concession availed of by him cannot come in his way of being selected in accordance with merit in the open category and he cannot be denied his place in the O.C. selection list as per his merit.
7. The Tribunal extracted the relevant portion of the notification which reads as under:
If a qualified and suitable candidate belonging to Group 'A' of the B.Cs. is not available for appointment in the turn allotted for them in the cycle, the turn should accrue to the next group of B.Cs. in the rotation and only if no suitable and qualified candidate is available in any of the four groups the turn shall be deemed to be allotted to the Open Competition.Candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes will also be eligible for appointment to any of the vacancies to be filled by open competition on the basis of merit and where such candidates are selected on the basis of merit, the number of appointments reserved for them, if any, will not in any way be affected.
8. The Tribunal held that the notification supported this view and since the petitioner had not challenged the notification in 1976, when he was not selected, he was estopped from challenging the selection at this stage after the selection and appointment of other candidates. The Tribunal held that the O.A. filed by the petitioner herein did not merit consideration and was accordingly dismissed.
9. Sri Nooty Rammohan Rao, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri P.V. Subrahmanya Sarma, learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that while a candidate belonging to the reserved category was entitled to compete along with others, on the basis of his merit, for the available posts in the open category, he could only do so if he fulfilled the eligibility criteria prescribed for appointment to posts in the said category. Learned Counsel would submit that since candidates in the open category constitute a distinct class, for whom a common eligibility criteria is prescribed, a candidate who does not fulfil the eligibility criteria is not entitled to be considered for appointment to posts in the open category. Learned Counsel would submit that it is only those candidates, who though fall under the reserved category but fulfil the age requirement, of between 19 and 24 years as on 1-5-1976, who alone were entitled to compete with other open category candidates for appointment to O.C. posts strictly in their order of merit. Learned Counsel would submit that having been given the benefit of age relaxation, meant exclusively for the backward classes, candidates who belonged to the B.C. category, and had become eligible by virtue of the said age relaxation, could compete only for posts reserved in favour of the backward classes and were not entitled to compete for posts in the open category. Learned Counsel would submit that candidates, who belonged to the B.C. category and who had been permitted to participate in the selection process by virtue of the age relaxation given in favour of the backward classes, could not be given a further concession permitting them to compete for posts in the open category since this, in effect, amounted to double reservation which is impermissible. Learned Counsel would place reliance on Rule 22 of the A.P. State and Subordinate Services Rules in this regard. Learned Counsel would submit that two different criteria cannot be prescribed for candidates competing for the same slot of posts in the open category. Learned Counsel would submit that reserved category candidates, who may have chosen not to avail the benefit of reservation and had competed along with others for selection to posts in the open category, would also suffer, if other candidates belonging to the reserved category were permitted to steal a march over them on the basis of the age relaxation granted in their favour. Learned Counsel would place reliance on P.G. Institute of Medical Education and Research v. K.L Narasimhan . Learned Counsel would submit that the Tribunal had erred in equating age relaxation granted in favour of "in-service" candidates with the age relaxation granted in favour of the B.C. S.C. and S.T. candidates. Learned Counsel would submit that the age relaxation of five years for "in-service" candidates was applicable equally to all categories of O.C., B.C., S.C. and ST., and since this age relaxation was uniform to all "in-service" candidates, it could not be treated on par with the age relaxation given in favour of the backward classes. Learned Counsel would submit that "in-service" candidates constitute a separate class and inasmuch as, within the said class, the criterion prescribed is uniform, the question of discrimination between one "in-service" candidate and another did not arise. According to the learned Counsel, the order of the Tribunal holding that the petitioner himself, being a beneficiary of age relaxation, was estopped from challenging the age relaxation granted in favour of the backward classes, was erroneous and was required to be set aside.
10. Learned Advocate General, who appeared in the matter at our request, would submit that age relaxation was only a concession given to enable candidates, belonging to the backward classes, to compete in the selection process for appointment to the post of Assistant Conservator of Forests. Learned Advocate General would draw a distinction between the eligibility criteria prescribed for a candidate to compete in the selection process and his selection on the basis of his merit. Learned Advocate General would submit that once a candidate has been given the benefit of age relaxation, which made him eligible to compete for selection, there after the selections were made and posts in the open category filled up strictly in the order of merit and since the three backward class candidates were found more meritorious than the petitioner it is they, and not the petitioner, who were rightly appointed to the posts of Assistant Conservator of Forests in the open category. Learned Advocate General would submit that the benefit of age relaxation was not a double concession given to them nor did it amount to double reservation and that this benefit only enabled them to compete, along with other candidates in the open category, on the basis of merit and, along with other backward classes, for the posts reserved in favour of the backward classes. Learned Advocate General would submit that this concession was given to B.C. candidates only to help them to overcome their social handicap and could not therefore be faulted. He would place reliance on Indra Sawhney v. Union of India in this regard.
11. The relevant portion of the notification, as extracted in the order of the Tribunal, would render candidates, belonging to S.C., ST. and B.Cs., eligible for appointment to any of the vacancies to be filled by open competition on the basis of merit and, as a result of such candidates being selected on the basis of their merit for posts in the open category, the number of posts reserved for their category would not be affected.
12. Reservations, in favour of S.Cs., S.Ts. and other B.Cs., under Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India is in addition to merit. Candidates from the reserved category are entitled to compete, along with others, and be appointed in open category posts, in the order of merit. In Indra Sawheny, the Supreme Court held as under:
... In this connection it is well to remember that the reservations under Article 16(4) do not operate like a communal reservation. It may well happen that some members belonging to say, Scheduled Castes get selected in the open competition filled on the basis of their own merit; they will not be counted against the quota reserved for Scheduled Castes; they will be treated as open competition candidates....
(emphasis supplied)
13. The submission made in the case on hand, is that, while a candidate who belongs to the reserved category is entitled to compete along with others for posts in the open category, he would be entitled to do so only if he fulfils the eligibility criteria prescribed for being considered for appointment to the posts in the open category. The submission, in substance, is that such of the candidates from the reserved category, who satisfy the age requirement of between 19 to 24 years as on 1-5-1976, would alone be eligible to compete for posts in the open category and that candidates who belong to the reserved category, and who have availed the benefit of age relaxation, can compete only for posts reserved for that particular reserved category and not for posts in the open category.
14. In Indra Sawhney (2 supra), the Supreme Court held thus:
The question then arises whether Clause (4) of Article 16 is exhaustive of the topic of reservations in favour of backward classes. Before we answer this question it is well to examine the meaning and content of the expression "reservation". Its meaning has to be ascertained having regard to the context in which it occurs. The relevant words are "any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts". The question is whether the said words contemplate only one form of provision namely reservation simpliciter, or do they take in other forms of special provisions like preferences, concessions and exemptions. In our opinion, reservation is the highest form of special provision, while preference, concession and exemption are lesser forms. The constitutional scheme and context of Article 16(4) induces us to take the view that larger concept of reservations takes within its sweep all supplemental and ancillary provisions as also lesser types of special provisions like exemptions, concessions and relaxations, consistent no doubt with the requirement of maintenance of efficiency of administration- the admonition of Article 335. The several concessions, exemptions and other measures issued by the Railway Administration and noticed in Karamchari Sangh are instances of supplementary, incidental and ancillary provisions made with a view to make the main provision of reservation effective i.e., to ensure that the members of the reserved class fully avail of the provision for reservation in their favour. The other type of measure is the one in Thomas AIR 1976 SC 490. There was no provision for reservation in favour of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes in the matter of promotion to the category of Upper Division Clerks. Certain tests were required to be passed before a Lower Division Clerk could be promoted as Upper Division Clerk. A large number of Lower Division Clerks belonging to SC/ST were not able to pass those tests, with the result they were stagnating in the category of LDCs. Rule 13-AA was accordingly made empowering the Government to grant exemption to members of SC/ST from passing those tests and the Government did exempt them, not absolutely, but only for a limited period. This provision for exemption was a lesser form of special treatment than reservation. There is no reason why such a special provision should not be held to be included within the larger concept of reservation. It is in this context that the words "any provision for the reservation of appointments and posts" assume significance. The word "any" and the associated words must be given their due meaning. They are not a mere surplusage. It is true that in Thomas AIR 1976 SC 490 it was assumed by the majority that Clause (4) permits only one form of provision namely reservation of appointments/posts and that if any concessions or exemptions are to be extended to backward classes it can be done only under Clause (1) of Article 16. Infact the argument of the writ petitioners (who succeeded before the Kerala High Court) was that the only type of provision that the State can make in favour of the backward classes is reservation of appointments/posts provided by Clause (4) and that the said clause does not contemplate or permit granting of any exemptions or concessions to the backward classes. This argument was accepted by Kerala High Court. This Court, however, by a majority (Ray, CJ. Mathew, Krishna lyerand Fazal Ali, JJ.) reversed the view taken by Kerala High Court, holding that such exemptions/ concessions can be extended under Clause (1) of Article 16. Beg, J. who joined the majority in upholding the validity of notification rested his opinion on a different basis. According to him, the exemption provided by impugned notification was indeed a kind of reservation and was warranted by and relatable to Clause (4) of Article 16 itself. This was because- according to the learned Judge- Clause (4) was exhaustive of the provisions that can be made in favour of the backward classes in the matter of employment. We are inclined to agree with the view taken by Beg, J. for the reasons given hereinabove.ln our opinion, therefore, where the State finds it necessary-for the purpose of giving full effect to the provision of reservation to provide certain exemptions, concessions or preferences to members of backward classes, it can extend the same under Clause (4) itself. In other words, all supplemental and ancillary provisions to ensure full availment of provisions for reservation can be provided as part of concept of reservation Itself. Similarly, in a given situation, the State may think that in the case of a particular backward class it is not necessary to provide reservation of appointments/posts and that it would be sufficient if a certain preference or a concession is provided in their favour. This can be done under Clause (4) itself. In this sense, Clause (4) of Article 16 is exhaustive of the special provisions that can be made in favour of "the backward class of citizens". Backward Classes having been classified by the Constitution itself as a class deserving special treatment and the Constitution having itself specified the nature of special treatment, it should be presumed that no further classification or special treatment is permissible in their favour apart from or outside of Clause (4) of Article 16.
It may be added here that reservations can take various forms whether they are made for backward or other classes. They may consist of preferences, concessions, exemptions, extra facilities etc. or of an exclusive quota in appointments as in the present case. When measures other than an exclusive quota for appointments are adopted, they form part of the reservation measures or are ancillary to or necessary for availing of the reservations. Whatever the form of reservation, the backward classes have to look for them to Article 16(4) and the other classes to Article 16(1)....
(emphasis supplied)
15. As held in Indra Sawheny (2 supra), for the purpose of giving full effect to the provision of reservation under Article 16(4), it is open to the State to provide exemptions, concessions or preferences to members of the backward classes. Article 16(4) is exhaustive of the special provisions that can be made in favour of the backward classes. The words "any provision for reservation of appointments of posts" in Article 16(4) would bring, within the sweep the large concept of reservation, all supplemental and ancillary provisions, like exemptions, concessions and relaxations, consistent with the requirement of maintenance of efficiency of administration, under Article 335 of the Constitution of India.
16. In the present case, the State Government, in its wisdom, has chosen to provide five years age relaxation in favour of the backward classes, for being considered for appointment to the posts of Assistant Conservator of Forests, a concession given to enable them to overcome their social handicap and compete with the general candidates, younger than them in age, for posts in the open category. This concession, in the upper age limit, merely enables candidates, who belong to the backward classes, to compete along with others for appointment to the posts of Assistant Conservator of Forests, in the open category, on the basis of merit. The fact that the three candidates, from the backward classes, were found more meritorious and were therefore appointed as Assistant Conservator of Forests, in preference to the petitioner, is not in dispute. As held earlier, the five year relaxation in the upper age limit, given to the backward classes, is a concession ancillary or supplemental to Reservations under Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India. The State, in exercise of its enabling power under Article 16(4), is entitled to provide such concessions in favour of the backward classes.
17. The contention regarding double reservation does not merit acceptance. Under Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India, the State is not disabled from providing both concessions and reservations in favour of the backward classes. Forsuch posts, which are reserved in favour of the backward classes, it is only those who belong to this reserved category who are entitled to compete. Candidates, who do not belong to the category for whom posts are reserved, are entitled to compete only for posts in the open category. The concession of an enhanced upper age limit, would enable backward class candidates to compete not only for posts reserved for their category but also for posts in the open category. The State, in exercise of its enabling power under Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India, is not prohibited from providing both Reservations and other Concessions in favour of the backward classes.
18. Reliance on Clause 2(d) proviso to Rule 22, of the A.P. State and Subordinate Services Rules, is also misplaced. All that is provided therein is that, while a candidate belonging to S.C., S.T. and B.C. is entitled to be appointed on the basis of his merit to posts in the open category, such of those, from among the reserved categories who are appointed on the basis of open competition, will not be counted against the quota prescribed for the reserved categories. As a result, the number of posts reserved, for each of the reserved categories, would not be affected. Clause 2(d) proviso to Rule 22, of the A.P. State and Subordinate Services Rules, is only a reiteration of the settled legal position that Reservation is in addition to Merit.
19. The judgment in K.L Narasimhan (1 supra) is also of no assistance to the petitioner here in. Backlog vacancies in various posts, and for admission to doctoral courses and Ph. D. Programmes, reserved for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, were sought to be filled up, and an advertisement was issued inviting applications. Candidates who belonged to the general category challenged the advertisement, for recruitment to the posts of Assistant Professors, contending that since it was a single post cadre, it amounted to 100 percent reservation and was therefore unconstitutional. This contention was accepted by a Single Judge of the Punjab and Harayana High Court. In so far as the Ph. D. programmes and doctoral courses are concerned, a single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that reservation to post in doctoral courses and Ph.D. programmes undermined efficiency detrimental to excellence for which purpose the Post Graduate Institute was established and was therefore unconstitutional. Appeals preferred there against were dismissed by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. When the matter came in appeal, the Supreme Court held thus:
... It was decided that no relaxation in respect of qualifications or experience would be recommended by Scrutiny Committee for any of the applicants including candidates belonging to Dalits and Tribes. In furtherance thereof, the faculty posts would be reserved without mentioning the speciality; if the Dalit and Tribe candidates were available and found suitable, they would be treated as reserved candidates. If no Dalit and Tribe candidate was found available, the post would be filled from general candidates; otherwise the reserved post would be carried forward to the next year/advertisement. It is settled law that if a Dalit or Tribe candidate gets selected for admission to a course or appointment to a post on the basis of merit as general candidate, he should not be treated as reserved candidate. Only one who does get admission or appointment by virtue of relaxation of eligibility critera should be treated as reserved candidate....
(emphasis supplied)
20. In K.L. Narasimhan (1 supra), the Supreme Court reiterated the law laid down in a catena of judgments of the Supreme Court, including Indra Sawhney (2 supra), that Reservation is in addition to Merit, and Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates selected and appointed to posts on the basis of their merit, are required to be treated as general candidates and not counted against the quota reserved for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. The judgment in K.L. Narasimhan (1 supra)cannot be read out of context to contend that relaxation in the eligibility criteria given to candidates, belonging to the backward classes, would enable them to compete only for posts reserved in favour of B.Cs. and not for posts in the open category.
21. In Sri Konaseema Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. N. Seetharama Raju 1990 (2) ALT 1 : 1990 (1) An.W.R. 675 : AIR 1990 A.P. 171 (F.B.), a Full Bench of this Court held thus:-
... While-on this subject, it is necessary to remind ourselves of certain basic truisms, it would be reasonable to assume that the Supreme Court-where it proposes to depart from an established line of authority and an established legal position- would not do so without even referring to its earlier decisions. It would not be reasonable on the part of the High Court to say that the Supreme Court would effect a radical departure from an established position without even referring to its earlier decisions, particularly where such position is established by decisions of large Benches. Even if there are any words which do not strictly fit into the established legal position, it would be more reasonable to read them consistent with the well-established legal position than to infer a conflict, or to say on that basis thatthe previous law stands overruled. In the interest of certainty of law and judicial discipline, we ought to construe the several decisions of the Supreme Court as constituting motifs of a harmonious pattern. After all, judgments ought not to be read as statutes; they are authority for what they decide. A word here or a word there, should not be made a basis for inferring inconsistency or conflict of opinion. Law does not develop in a casual manner. It develops by conscious, considered steps....
(emphasis supplied)
22. It is also well settled that judgments are not to be read as statutes. In Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamanr .1 (DNSC) the Supreme Court held thus:
... Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Norton 1951 AC 737 (AC at p. 761) Lord Mac Dermott observed: (All ER p. 4 C-D) The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge....
In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970) 2 All ER 294 (all ER p.297 g-h) Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin's speech... is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in ivew circumstances". Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2) (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972) 2 WLR 537 Lord Morris said: (All ER p.761 c) There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they we re words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.
Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus:
Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line acase falls, the borad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.
* * * Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.
(emphasis supplied)
23. In Ashwani Kumar Singh v. U.P. Public Service Commission and Union of India v. Amritlal Manchandam Supreme Court held thus:
... Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations or courts are not to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark upon lengthy discussions, but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes....
(emphasis supplied)
24. The question as to whether concession in the upper age limit, given in favour of the backward classes, enables them to compete for posts in the open category, did not arise for consideration in K.L. Narasimhah (1 supra). The judgment of the Apex Court in K.L. Narasimhan (1 supra), has therefore, no application to the facts of the present case.
25. The contentions urged are required to be rejected on another ground also. The petitioner as an "in service candidate" was given the benefit of age relaxation, It is true that the benefit of age relaxation, given in favour of "in-service" candidates, was extended to all categories i.e., O.C., B.C., S.C. and S.T. The fact, however, remains that no post was separately reserved in favour of an "in-service" candidate and they, by virtue of the age relaxation, were permitted to compete along with other candidates who did not have the benefit of age relaxation, for posts in the open category. But for the concession in age, given in favour of "in-service" candidates, the petitioner himself would not have been eligible to be considered for appointment to posts in the open category. Having been the beneficiary of age relaxation granted in favour on "in-service" candidates, it is not open to the petitioner to turn around and contend that the age relaxation given in favour of the backward classes must be so restricted so as to enable them to compete only for the posts reserved in favour of the backward classes and not for posts in the open category.
26. The action of the respondents in considering backward class candidates, (who had been extended the concession of relaxation of the upper age limit), for posts in the open category, on the basis of merit, cannot be faulted.
27. The writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.