Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
G. Krishnam Raju vs K.A. Parvathi And Anr. on 16 April, 1991
Equivalent citations: 1991(2)ALT127, 1991CRILJ2601
ORDER
1. The is an application by the sole petitioner in the writ petition for taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act, for deliberately violating the order of this court dated 29-11-1989 in W.P. No. 18475/1988. The sole respondent in the writ petition is Sri Padmavathi Mahila Viswavidyalayam, Tirupati, represented by its Registrar. It is useful to extract the entire judgment and also to notice that it has become final as no appeal or review petition has been filed :
"The sole petitioner seeks a direction in the nature of mandamus against the 1st respondent-University to appoint him as a Superintendent in its service from the date he was selected. The 2nd respondent who is a lady working in some other Institution, has been appointed on deputation as Superintendent.
The petitioner holds a M.Com. Decree from S.V. University and a Post-graduation Diploma in Public Administration. He has passed both Typewriting and Shorthand (Higher Grade-English) and has been working in Sri Venkateswara University as an U.D. Steno since 1977. The 1st respondent-University published an advertisement dated 12-12-1986 in the newspapers inviting applications from suitable candidates for various posts. Item No. 4 of the advertisement is regarding item the Superintendent in the pay scale Rs. 700-1200. The number of vacancies indicated in the advertisement are four. As the petitioner fulfilled the criteria mentioned in the advertisement, he applied through proper channel. The petitioner and another candidate were called for Interview which was held on 28-3-1987 by the Selection Committee consisting of the Registrar, Vice-Chancellor's nominee and the Principal of the S.P. Mahila University College constituted by the Vice Chancellor in accordance with the statutory provisions. As the petitioner did not hear anything thereafter, he made representations which are of no avail. Thereafter, he has filed this writ petition. A reference is made to the Ministerial Service Rules of the University which are effective from 18-3-1986 and are framed under its statutory powers i.e. prior to the notification. According to the said Rules, the post of a Superintendent is classified under category-I and the method of recruitment includes by transfer from category of Stenographer or by direct recruitment. It also contemplates preparation of a list of approved candidates. There is no statutory provision disqualifying a male from being appointed to the said post. According to the petitioner he has not been appointed merely on the ground of being a male candidate relying upon some instructions of the Government which cannot be treated as valid. He has further pointed out that several men working in the respondent-University and, in fact, twenty men have been appointed after the interview of the petitioner.
In the counter-affidavit filed by the person who was then holding the post of Registrar it is stated that a policy decision was taken that as far as possible only eligible women should be appointed. It is also pointed out that the advertisement contains a clause that women will be preferred. Reference is made to some Government instructions which cannot be given a go-by. It is not disputed that the Selection Committee had selected the petitioner but it is contended that mere selection cannot confer a right on the petitioner. The fact of representation made by the petitioner within six months after the interview and that no reply was given to the petitioner is not disputed.
The petitioner has filed a reply. According to him, the counter-affidavit contains inaccuracies. According to him, in response to the advertisement 81 persons had applied for the post of Superintendent and after screening, the University had called for interview only three persons but only two including the petitioner had appeared for the interview and the petitioner was selected. It is also pointed out that the reference to the meeting of the Executive Council dated 8-12-1988 is only to distort the facts as the question of appointing the petitioner was neither on the Agenda nor considered. He has also pointed out that one K. Ramadas, who was working as L.D. Steno in the Osmania University with only B.Com, and Lower Grade Stenography qualification was appointed in May, 1983 on deputation in the 1st respondent-University, and subsequently permanently absorbed and still working.
The records produced by the standing counsel for the University were looked into on 10-11-1989. As the records did not show any decision of the Vice-Chancel regarding the appointment of the petitioner as Superintendent and the reliance on some notes which were referred to in the counter-affidavit was prima facie irrelevant, the University counsel was asked to produce the records relating to the material and any resolution or order where decision was taken about the appointment of the petitioner or anything concerned with it. On 21-11-1989 it was stated by the Standing Counsel for University that in the records of the University there is no material to show that a decision was recorded by the Vice-Chancellor regarding appointment or non-appointment of the persons selected for appointment by direct recruitment to the post of Superintendent including the petitioner. But it was urged that the petitioner being a male cannot claim a right to any appointment in the respondent-University.
The University is a statutory authority and also a State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. It has, therefore, not only bound by the Constitutional mandate contained in Arts. 14 and 16 but the statutory provisions like the Ministerial Service Rules as well as the need to take a decision pursuant to a selection made by the Selection Committee in response to an advertisement. Neither the Rules nor the advertisement contain any clause disqualifying men from applying. The advertisement only indicates preference in favour of women. That does not amount to a disqualification and it is not the case of the respondents that any other woman candidate has applied. The need to consider the validity of any such policy decision does not arise as there is no material to show that such a decision was taken by any authority exists. Any letter written by an officer of the Government cannot be a valid direction of the Government or a policy decision in the face of statutory Rules.
The vacancy existed on the date of advertisement, on the date of interview and is existing even now. The denial of appointment to an eligible and selected candidate in accordance with the rules is not only a violation of the obligation cast by the statutory rules but amount to discriminatory treatment of the petitioner in violation of Arts. 14 and 16 and an arbitrary action.
In the circumstances, there shall be a direction to the respondent-University to take action regarding the filling up the vacancy of the post of Superintendent by considering the petitioner and ignoring the circumstance that he is a male candidate. This shall be done within two weeks of the receipt of this order. The writ petition is allowed with costs assessed at Rs. 500/-."
As no action was taken after the judgment and even after issue of a legal notice the petitioner has filed this Contempt Case on 2-3-1990 impleading the person who was then occupying the post of Registrar by name as the sole respondent and notice before admission was directed on 4-6-1990. On 18-6-1990, respondent appeared and time was granted for counter and personal attendance was dispensed with until further orders. The Contempt Case was admitted on that day. A counter-affidavit sworn to by respondent No. 1 on 18-6-1990 was filed on 6-7-1990. On 9-7-90 the respondent was directed to produce the records in respect of the action taken consequent upon the judgment in the writ petition and time was given to the petitioner to file any reply. A reply affidavit sworn to on 27-7-1990 was filed on the same day. On 10-8-1990 it was stated by the counsel for the respondent that the orders of the court have been complied with and order of appointment issued and the petitioner's counsel wanted to verify the same and the matter was adjourned. When the matter came up on 27-8-1990 the counsel for the respondent placed before the court a proceedings dated 10-8-1990 by which the petitioner was temporarily appointed as Superintendent and he was asked to report for duty on or before 23-8-1990; otherwise the order was to be cancelled. It was also stated by the counsel for the respondent that on 18-8-90 the petitioner had filed an application seeking extension of time for certain clarifications regarding the terms of appointment etc. The petitioner's counsel took time to verify. On 30-8-90 the counsel for the petitioner has brought to the notice of the court that the order of appointment dated 10-8-90 was in violation of the direction in the writ petition and statutory provisions. The respondent was directed to file a further counter-affidavit indicating the number of persons appointed by direct recruitment pursuant to the advertisement to which the petitioner applied and also placing the appointment orders issued to them. The respondent filed a rejoinder affidavit sworn to on 8-9-90 and an affidavit sworn to on the same day giving the particulars directed by the court. At that stage, the petitioner filed Contempt Application No. 124/1991 on 27-2-1991 for impleading the 2nd respondent, who has been working as in charge Vice-Chancellor from 16-7-90 and had made the appointment. Notice to the proposed party was ordered on that application on 28-2-1991 and the Contempt Case was adjourned along with the said application counter-affidavits to the application were filed by the proposed party and also by the respondent in the Contempt Case raising various objections. By an order dated 29-3-91 2nd respondent was impleaded as a party in the Contempt Case observing that the objections raised would be decided in the Contempt Case. Documents produced by respondent No. 2 were marked by consent as Exs. C-1 to C-5 and arguments were also heard in the Contempt Case on that day. The petitioner has filed a reply-affidavit in this application. The counsel for 1st respondent also addressed arguments and at his request it was adjourned to 1-4-1991 for further arguments. The 1st respondent has filed a further affidavit sworn to on 1-4-1991 enclosing a copy of G.O.Ms. No. 117 Education (UE) Department dated 7-5-1990. On 1-4-1991 arguments were concluded and orders reserved. On 1-4-1991 the file containing reserved. On 1-4-1991 the file containing some relevant papers was produced by the respondents.
2. Sri Padmavathi Mahila Viswavidyalayam, Tirupati, is established under Sri Padmavathi Mahila Viswavidyalayam Act, 1983 (Andhra Pradesh Act No. 16 of 1983). In exercise of the powers conferred by the said Act the General and Subordinate Service Rules as well as Ministerial Service Rules have been framed which are in force from March, 1986. The appointing authority under R. 13 of the Ministerial Service Rules is the Vice-Chancellor. The Ministerial Service consists of ten categories. Category I is the Superintendent/Secretary to VC. Rule 2 prescribes the method of recruitment and for Category-I there are four sources viz., promotion, transfer, deputation from other University direct recruitment. R. 2 of the General and Subordinate Service Rules provide for first appointment to the service by the appointing authority from list of approved candidates prepared by the Selection Committee. Some time in 1987 the University had advertised for recruitment of 14 teaching staff members and 13 non-teaching staff members to the existing vacancies. The selection for these was held by the Selection Committee as contemplated by the statutory provisions. The Committee had prepared a list of approved candidates for the post of Superintendent and the petitioner was placed at number 1. The petitioner has been working since 1977 in S.V. University and had applied through the employer.
3. The term of the previous Vice-Chancellor viz., Smt. Rajyalakshmi expired on 2-5-1990. Since then, a Vice-Chancellor has not been appointed for this University. It is stated across the Bar that there is no Vice-Chancellor for several other Universities in the State like Sri Venkateswara University, Andhra University, Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University and Health University and only in charge arrangements are continuing. After the expiry of the term of the last Vice-Chancellor by G.O.Ms. No. 117 Education dated 7-5-1990 the respondent No. 1, who is the Registrar, was appointed to exercise the powers and perform the functions and discharge the duties of the Vice Chancellor until a new Vice Chancellor assumes office. A copy of this G.O. is filed by respondent No. 1. No Vice Chancellor has been appointed but by another order the 2nd respondent, who is an IAS Officer holding the post of Managing Director of Andhra Pradesh Urban Development and Housing Corporation, has been made the in charge Vice Chancellor since 17-7-1990. Respondent No. 1 was the Registrar during the pendency of the writ petition and continues till today. She was in charge Vice-Chancellor since 7-5-90 to 16-7-90. Since 17-7-90 2nd respondent is in charge Vice-Chancellor. The G.O.Ms. No. 117 Education dated 7-5-1990 appointing the last respondent as the in charge Vice Chancellor referred to sub-cl. (2) of statute I of the Statutes, which reads as follows :
"X X X X X X X
Notification
In exercise of the powers conferred under the proviso to Clause (2) of Statute 1 of the Statutes set out in the Schedule to Sri Padmavathi Mahila Viswavidyalayam Act, 1983 (Act No. 16 of 1983), I, Krishan Kant, Chancellor of Sri Padmavathi Mahila Viswavidyalayam, hereby appoint Dr. K. A. Parvati, Registrar, to exercise the powers, perform the functions and discharge the duties of the Vice-Chancellor of the said Mahila Viswa Vidyalayam until a new Vice-Chancellor assumes office.
Sd/-
Krishan Kant Chancellor."
According to Clause 15 of the Ministerial Service Rules women should be appointed to the post in the service as far as possible. This is also reflected in the advertisement in response to which the petitioner had applied which indicated that preference will be given to female candidates. Admittedly, no female candidate had applied for this post. As was noticed in the judgment, not only several males were already working in the University but a person with qualifications inferior to that of the petitioner was appointed by deputation and confirmed in the Ministerial service after the advertisement and probably without undergoing any process of selection. The only ground on which the writ petition was resisted was a D.O. letter from an officer of the Government to the effect that males shall not be appointed. The said D.O. letter cannot override the statutory provisions or the terms of the advertisement particularly when no female candidate had applied for this post. In these circumstances a direction was given in the writ petition that the petitioner's case should be considered for appointment ignoring the circumstance that he was a male, and a time limit was specified within which such consideration was to be made. As this direction was violated this Contempt Case was filed and the person holding the office of the Registrar at that time was made the sole respondent making certain allegations against her. From the Note-file, which is marked by consent as Ex. C-5, it is seen that the judgment of the court was received by the University on 6-12-1989 and the matter was also placed before the 35th Executive Council on 23-12-1989 when it was resolved to take legal opinion. Thereafter, steps were initiated to get the service record of the petitioner from the S. V. University where the petitioner has been working. The previous Vice-Chancellor, however, made an endorsement on 15-2-1990 that the particulars of the petitioner may be sent to the Counsel. The Note-File as produced, does not show any progress till after the 2nd respondent has taken over as Vice-Chancellor. A lengthy Note was circulated giving the particulars of his service in the S.V. University etc. On this, the 2nd respondent has passed an order on 9-8-90 appointing the petitioner temporarily as Superintendent in the pre-revised scale of Rs. 700-1200/-. The order of appointment was communicated by the 1st respondent in the proceedings dated 10-8-1990 which, however, contains the following addition viz., "he should report to duty on or before 23-8-1990 failing which his appointment will be cancelled". The petitioner wrote a letter dated 18-8-90 requesting for extension of time to join till 30-9-90 and also stating that the Contempt Case is also pending. The record produced by the University does not disclose that the 1st respondent has placed this letter before the 2nd respondent but has herself by a letter dated 22-8-1990 refused the request for extension of time. Thereafter, the petitioner has written another letter dated 23-8-90 again requesting for extension of time. After the receipt of this letter, on the direction of the 1st respondents a letter was addressed to the Registrar of S.V. University to ascertain whether the petitioner had got relieved or not from them and the Registrar of S.V. University has replied on the same day that he was not yet relieved. Nothing further has been done thereafter.
4. Ex. C-4 is the extract of the particulars of the appointment orders issued to the non-teaching staff who were selected pursuant to the advertisement for which the petitioner his applied. A bunch of these appointment orders are contained in Ex. C-2. Out of 13 persons appointed, 11 have been appointed on probation. One M. Jayanthi was appointed as Typist temporarily against a ST vacancy, though Ex. C-4 shows that she was also put on probation subsequently. Another candidate M. V. Rama Devi was appointed as Typist temporarily but, she was also subsequently put on probation which was also declared to have been completed subsequently. No reason for her temporary appointment is given. In the case of teaching staff, Ex. C-3 extract and the bunch of appointment orders Ex. C-1 show that some were appointed on probation while several others were appointed temporarily even though they are females. No material is placed for making such temporary appointments to existing vacancies in respect of some candidates. Most of such temporary appointees among teaching staff have resigned and left the service.
5. All appointments to the service are required to be made by the appointing authority from the list of approved candidates under R. 2 of the General Rules. R. 7 provides for the right of the probationers and approved probationers and R. 8 for the discharge and re-employment of probationers and approved probationers. R. 10(a)(1) deals with the temporary appointments, which reads as follows :
"Where it is necessary in the public interest to fill emergently a vacancy in the post borne on the cadre of a service, class or category and if the filling of such vacancy in accordance with rules is likely to result an undue delay, the appointing authority may appoint a person temporarily otherwise than in accordance with the said rules."
It is clear that in the case of an approved candidate included in the list prepared by the Selection Committee for appointment to the existing vacancies there is no justification or authority to make an appointment under R. 10(a)(1). Nor any material is placed to show the reason for such appointment. R. 10(a)(1) confers power only to fill emergently a vacancy in public interest when filling of such vacancy in accordance with the rules is likely to result in undue delay. In this case, such conditions did not exist. The direction of this court was to consider the case of the petitioner for appointment to the existing vacancy as the petitioner was a selected candidate ignoring the circumstance that he was a male candidate. Once a decision was taken to appoint him, the making of a temporary appointment contrary to rules is not only unwarranted but also violating the judgment of this court. From the Chart regarding appointments to other non-teaching posts it is clear that those who have been selected were appointed on probation. The temporary appointment of an OC candidate as a Typist on a ST vacancy is understandable, as probably. ST candidate was not available. Similarly, a temporary appointment of another Typist must have been for some such reason though the respondents have not chosen to disclose it. The petitioner, who is a selected candidate, has been singled out for a temporary appointment. The petitioner is already holding a regular post in another University. The action of the respondents in issuing a temporary appointment order which is liable to be terminated at any time and which, under the Rules, does not confer any right on him and asking him to leave a secure job and place his future in the hands of the respondents is apparently a ruse to show compliance with the order of the court. This, to my mind, is a deliberate action to see that the petitioner will not leave his regular job and create an impression that the order of the court is obeyed. Even the request of the petitioner to extend the time was not placed before the 2nd respondent and was rejected by 1st respondent. Apart from this, for the reasons best known to them, attempts have been made by the 1st respondent by approaching the S.V. University for getting some particulars prior to the order of appointment but also even subsequently. The petitioner had applied through his employer and was selected by the Committee. There is no relevance in again corresponding with S.V. University, which is only to delay the consideration as directed by Court.
6. The petitioner had filed the Contempt Case when the direction of this Court to consider his case for appointment was not taken up within the period mentioned in the judgment. The previous Vice-Chancellor is not a party and it is not necessary to go into any default or violation committed by her but the 1st respondent has been working as Registrar throughout and had contested the writ petition and was appointed as Acting Vice-Chancellor from first week of May till 2nd respondent was appointed Acting Vice-Chancellor from 17-7-1990. Are the 1st respondent and 2nd respondent guilty of civil contempt by deliberately disobeying the order of Court ?
7. Sri Y. Suryanarayana, learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent has contended that the in charge Vice-Chancellor cannot exercise any statutory functions like considering the case for making an appointment and for this proposition has relied upon the decision of the Karnataka High Court reported in M. Maridev v. The State of Mysore 1968 SLR 369 (Mysore) (para 7) and also certain passages in the Book "Services under the State" by Justice M. Rama Jois. The passage relied upon by the counsel for the 1st respondent is at page 507 and it reads as follows :
"(vii) "In charge" "additional charge"; If a person holding a lower post is placed in charge or independent charge of a higher office, he is not entitled to perform the statutory functions attached to the higher post. However, additional charge arrangement is separate and distinct from in charge arrangement. In this arrangement, the person holding an equivalent rank is asked to hold additional charge of another post of equivalent status when the latter post is vacant. In service parlance, such an appointment is called "Combination of Appointment". In such a case, the person placed in additional charge of another post is entitled to discharge all the duties including statutory functions of both the posts.
Combination of appointment can be made only by the appointing authority. The power to transfer an officer from one post to another conferred on a lower authority does not include the power to make combination of appointments."
Another passage in the aforesaid book at page 522 reads as follows :
"30. Independent charge : (1) Independent charge is no promotion : Placing a subordinate officer in independent charge of the current duties of a vacant post does not amount to promotion to the higher post. Officiating appointments and in charge arrangements are well understood terms in civil service. When an officer is appointed to officiate in a higher post he is invested with the powers of the higher post but when he is placed in charge of the current duties of a vacant post in higher category, whether in addition to his own duties or independently, he cannot exercise any of the statutory powers of the office; he can merely perform day to day office duties only."
(2) xx xx xx xx xx xx".
According to him, the 1st respondent could not have taken action as in charge Vice-Chancellor. The statutory provision under which the 1st respondent was appointed as in charge Vice-Chancellor has already been extracted earlier. The language of this provision and the G.O. appointing her indicate that the appointment is under a statutory provision and the appointee shall exercise the powers, perform the functions and discharge the duties of a Vice-Chancellor until a new Vice-Chancellor assumes office. There are no words of restriction either under the Act, the Statute or the G.O., and the appointee has to perform the functions which will include statutory functions. Neither the judgment cited by the 1st respondent nor the passages in the book referred to above support the case of the 1st respondent. They deal with officiating appointments and in charge arrangements in Civil Service which require conferment of statutory power in a given case. In this case, the statute and the G.O. confer power on the 1st respondent to exercise all the powers of the Vice-Chancellor. The Vice-Chancellor is a statutory authority under the Act. There is no substance in the distinction sought to be made between a statutory function or other functions in this case. The File produced discloses that the 1st respondent does not appear to have taken any action for complying with the order of the court when she was in charge Vice-Chancellor i.e. during first week of May till 16th July, 1990. However, she was writing to the S.V. University to get particulars about the petitioner's service there which, to my mind, was unnecessary and irrelevant and only to delay the implementation of the order.
8. It is not disputed that the 2nd respondent also is appointed in charge Vice-Chancellor in the same manner as 1st respondent. The circumstances that 1st respondent was pursuing with the S.V. University authorities for getting particulars of service of the petitioner even while the Contempt Case was pending and was being adjourned at her request from time to time for some months and thereafter her putting up a Note to the 2nd respondent for action to he taken on the orders of the court indicates that she was aware that the acting Vice-Chancellor (viz., 2nd respondent at this stage) could take action pursuant to the order of the court i.e. to take up consideration of appointment of the petitioner. The lengthy Note submitted to 2nd respondent does not anywhere disclose that incharge Vice-Chancellor cannot take any such action nor is it mentioned that 1st respondent had not taken action because of being only an incharge Vice-Chancellor. In the Note submitted to the respondent No. 2 neither the provisions of the General Rules or Ministerial Service Rules of the University nor the manner in which earlier appointments were made pursuant to the advertisement for existing vacancies was given. There is no controversy that the petitioner being eligible was selected by the Committee and placed at number one and the vacancy for which he was selected has been existing. The 2nd respondent, after considering the matter, has decided to appoint the petitioner but it is stated that it is only a temporary appointment. A person like the petitioner holding a regular appointment in S.V. University would be reluctant to accept a temporary appointment, more so in the context of pending contempt case. There is neither any justification nor authority to invoke R. 10(a)(1). The 1st respondent had on her own added a couple of sentences in the proceedings issued for appointment to the effect that", unless the petitioner joined duty on or before ......... the appointment will be cancelled". Such an endorsement was not made by the incharge Vice-Chancellor i.e. 2nd respondent. When the petitioner wrote a letter seeking extension of time seeking clarification and pointing out the pendency of the contempt case, the 1st respondent rejected the request and the file does not disclose that this was after obtaining the orders of the Vice-Chancellor. In the counter-affidavit of the 2nd respondent it is stated that the petitioner's services will be regularised later. But this is inconsistent with the order of the 1st respondent cancelling even the temporary appointment. These actions of the respondents are clearly obstruction in the course of justice and implementation of the order of this court which had become final.
9. It is unfortunate that such a small matter of appointment of a person who is already selected and is serving in another University as Superintendent is made a prestige issue by the authorities defying the orders of the court. The practice of having incharge Vice-Chancellors for long periods is also not conducive to healthy functioning of the University. The action of the 2nd respondent in making a temporary appointment which is not authorised by the rules of the University and contrary to the practice in other appointments and disabling the petitioner from joining the post is a clear violation of the direction of the court. The petitioner being number one in selection list and the attempt to offer him a temporary appointment is an attempt to circumvent and defy the orders of the court by disabling the petitioner from getting what was due to him, after being considered to be appointed. No person in the position of the petitioner would like to leave a permanent job and go over as a temporary employee, more so in the circumstances of this case.
10. For examining the contentions raised by the counsel for the 2nd respondent about the maintainability of the contempt Case in view of S. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, it is useful to extract the same :
"20. Limitation for action for contempt :-
No court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed."
It is also useful to extract certain portions of the counter-affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent (para 3) :
"I, therefore, submit that the directions of this hon'ble Court have been duly complied with and the allegations made by the petitioner against me, are incorrect and untenable. The judgment of the High Court did not contain any direction other than what has been mentioned above as to the nature of the appointment to be issued in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner's case has to be considered excluding the circumstances that he is a male candidate. That was duly done and the petitioner has been appointed. The appointment has been issued in the first instance that the petitioner be placed in the basic pay applicable to the scale of the post, in view of the fact that he has been directly recruited. This, however, does not mean that his claim for any protection is going to be ignored. The question will be considered as and when he joins the said post and in the light of rules in force. The petitioner's allegations that the description of appointment as temporary is not adequate compliance with the orders of the High Court, are wholly without substance of force. It is submitted that any appointment to a substantive post is usually made in the first instance on a temporary basis. When the appointment is going to be regularised, the temporary service will be taken into account and normally the probation shall be commenced in such a manner as to include the entire temporary service."
Further the 1st respondent had earlier filed a counter-affidavit sworn to on 19-6-1990 i.e. while she was working as incharge Vice Chancellor. Para 5 reads as follows :
"5. That service certificate being not sufficient to consider the case of the petitioner, the Vice-Chancellor, Dr. Rajyalakshmi, directed the respondent to call for the service register of the petitioner from S.V. University. The respondent sent a letter dated 27-12-1989 in SP. MVV./RP/89 to the Registrar of the S.V. University to send the service register of the petitioner to enable the Vice-Chancellor to consider the case of the petitioner. In response to my letter on 8-2-1990 in R/PA/90 the Registrar of S.V. University informed the respondent that service register cannot be sent. On 2-3-1990 I sent a letter in SP.MVV/RP/90 dated 2-3-1990 informing the Registrar of S.V. University as follows :
"Though, he (petitioner) has produced certain documents, the University is not satisfied with these records and the University authorities would like to assert whether at any time he has worked in the capacity of Senior Assistant dealing with files independently. Therefore it will be better if you could spare the service register through a responsible officer which will be scrutinised and will note down the relevant information and return the service register to the officer who brings it to our University."
I submit that till date Sri Padmavathi Mahila Viswavidyalayam did not receive any reply from S.V. University. I humbly submit that in the above said circumstances, inspite of the efforts of University, for want of necessary and full information, the Vice Chancellor, the appointing authority, could not consider the case of the petitioner as directed by this Hon'ble Court .........."
11. A learned single Judge of this court in case reported in Advocate General v. A. V. Koteswara Rao, 1984 (1) ALT 69 : (1984 Cri LJ 1171) has held that, unless the contempt proceedings are initiated within the period of one year of the contempt it will be barred by time. As noticed earlier, the writ petition was allowed on 29-11-1989. The Contempt Case was admitted on 18-6-1990 after notice well within the period of one year as the grievance was of non-consideration within the period fixed in the judgment. The petitioner has not chosen to implead the University as a respondent in the contempt case but had impleaded 1st respondent alone making certain allegations against her. As held by a Bench of this court in A.K.E. Society v. V. P. Rama Rao (3) it may not be necessary for impleading a particular officer eo nomine as a party and it will be enough if the Government itself is impleaded as a party. Referring to this judgment it is contended by Sri V. Venkataramanaiah, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent that the University was not impleaded in this case and the application to implead 2nd respondent was only filed on 27-2-1991 which was beyond a period of one year from the judgment and, therefore, it ought not to be entertained.
12. It may be that the petitioner might well have impleaded University itself as the respondent but, as observed by the Bench because of the insistence of the office of this Court sometimes an offencer is impleaded eo nomine respondent. If the petitioner is able to show that the person who was impleaded is guilty of contempt of court the fact that the Institution is not impleaded or the earlier Vice Chancellor is not impleaded may not make any difference, if any contempt is held to be committed by the impleaded party. The question of limitation does not arise in the case of 1st respondent. The petition was filed within one year and the grievance was that steps were not taken to implement the judgment. So far as 2nd respondent is concerned the grievance is not that she has not taken any action but that while the contempt case was pending an order of appointment was made by her contrary to the directions of the court and the statutory provisions. The said appointment order was issued on 10-8-1990 and the petition to implead the 2nd respondent has been filed on 27-2-1991 which is within one year. The controversy is about the violation of the judgment of this Court and a civil contempt by interference with the course of justice. The 2nd respondent was appointed as incharge Vice-Chancellor only in the middle of July, 1990 and she has passed the order of appointment on 9-8-1990. The limitation for the contempt, if any, committed by her will, therefore, commence only from the date of the order which is said to be to defeat the judgment of this court. The impleading petition is well within time and it has also been ordered on 29-3-1991 i.e. contempt application was admitted against 2nd respondent also. The objection regarding limitation is, therefore, without substance. Section 12(4) of the Act also indicates that the person incharge as Vice-Chancellor can be proceeded with in such cases.
One more contention was urged by Sri Y. Suryanarayana counsel for the 1st respondent viz., that the validity of the order of appointment cannot be gone into in the contempt proceedings and it is for the petitioner to challenge it in a separate writ petition. I am not able to appreciate this contention either. The controversy in this case is whether the respondents have been obstructing the course of justice and implementation of the judgment of this court ? If the answer is in the affirmative the action has to be taken under the contempt of Courts Act. Otherwise by passing orders in defiance of the direction of the court a plea can always be raised that subsequent order ought to be challenged and action ought not to be taken under the Contempt of Courts Act. Several allegations have been made by the petitioner against the 1st respondent but, I do not consider it necessary to go into them as the facts mentioned above clearly establish that she has been guilty of interference with the course of justice by not implementing the orders of this court while she was acting Vice-Chancellor and for other actions mentioned above. The 2nd respondent has violated the order of the court in making a temporary appointment not contemplated by the rules and disabling the petitioner from getting the consequences of the judgment.
13. The 1st respondent has further aggravated the contempt by imposing a condition fixing a time limit for the petitioner to report for duty and then rejecting his application for extension of time even without reference to 2nd respondent. It is also not clear why the 1st respondent was particular about looking into the files of the S.V. University pertaining to the petitioner, more so when the petitioner was included in the approved list after he had applied through proper channel. No such enquiry appears to have been done in the case of other candidates who were appointed. The circumstances that other members of the non-teaching staff were appointed on probation also shows that the action of the respondents in making the temporary appointment is a deliberate attempt to deny to the petitioner the result and consequences of the judgment. This shows the continued defiance of the orders of the court even during the pendency of the contempt case which aggravates the contempt. I am firmly of the opinion that unless such actions, by the authorities are dealt with firmly the constitutional system of adjudication by an independent judiciary will break down. Such a trend is noticed in several cases in the recent past and it is the duty of the court to curb these tendencies, and uphold the rule of law.
14. In view of what is held above both the respondents have deliberately obstructed the course of justice and wilfully disobeyed the judgment of this court in the writ petition and are, therefore, guilty of civil contempt.
15. Coming to the question of sentence, it is evident, that not only the judgment of this court has been wilfully disobeyed but the disobedience continues even till today and a defiant attitude is adopted by the respondents. I think a mere imposition of fine as contemplated by S. 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act will neither meet the ends of justice nor be sufficient. I am conscious and aware of the fact that the respondents are ladies and occupy a position in society. In the facts and circumstances of this case these circumstances do not alter the requirement that courts should see that the course of justice is not obstructed. The imposition of fine alone as contemplated by S. 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act will not be sufficient. Therefore, in addition to a fine of Rs. 2,000/- each, the 1st respondent is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a term of two months and the 2nd respondent is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a term of one month. The respondents shall pay costs of these proceedings assessed at Rs. 1,000/-. The Contempt Case is, accordingly, allowed.
16. Petition allowed.