Delhi High Court
Ex. Ct. D.V.R. Krishan Kumar vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 23 November, 2004
Equivalent citations: 115(2004)DLT570, 2006(1)SLJ172(DELHI)
Author: Mukundakam Sharma
Bench: Mukundakam Sharma, Gita Mittal
JUDGMENT Mukundakam Sharma, J.
1. The present writ petition is directed against the order dated 20th January, 2000 passed by the respondents imposing upon the petitioner the punishment of removal from service with immediate effect and also the order dated 9th June, 2003 whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner against the aforesaid order of removal was rejected.
2. The petitioner was recruited as a Constable on 22nd December, 1992. In the writ petition it is stated by him that the petitioner came to know, for the first time, in 1994-1995 that a criminal case had been registered against him in the Police Station Dabri, Palam, pursuant to a First Information Report lodged on 4th December, 1997 under Section 424 of the Indian Penal Code. It is stated that immediately on coming to know of the said fact the petitioner surrendered before the Judicial Magistrate at Patiala House Courts on 12th July, 1995 and was granted regular bail on 13th July, 1995. It is also stated that in the challan filed by the Police before the trial court on 16th April, 1993 the petitioner's name was shown in column No. 2. A charge sheet, however, came to be prepared against the petitioner and the same was issued to the petitioner. The said charge sheet reads as follows:-
"STATEMENT OF ARTICLE OF CHARGE FRAMED AGAINST NO.933020026 DVR (SECtor) CT.KRISHAN KUMAR OF GROUP CENTRE CRPF GUWAHATI.
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ARTICLE - I That No. 933020026 DVR Ct. Krishan Kumar of Group Centre, CRPF, Guwahati, committed on (an) act of misconduct in his capacity as a member of the Force under Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act, 1949, in that he concealed the fact of his involvement in Case No. 4 dated 4/12/92 U/s 324/34 IPC registered at PS:-Dabri Delhi to secure employment in the Force.
Sd/-
(G.Kuppaswamy) Commandant GC,CRPF, Guwahati-23"
3. Along with the aforesaid Statement of Article of Charge, a Statement of Imputation of Misconduct in support of the Article of Charge was also sent to the petitioner. The statement of defense, which was submitted by the petitioner was found to be unsatisfactory by the disciplinary authority and consequently he ordered for holding a regular departmental enquiry against the petitioner and appointed an enquiry officer for the purpose. The enquiry officer conducted the enquiry and on completion of the same submitted his report finding the petitioner guilty of the charge. The disciplinary authority agreed with the aforesaid finding of the enquiry officer and by his order dated 20th January, 2000 imposed upon the petitioner punishment of removal from service with immediate effect. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the same. The appellate authority after going through the same found no ground to interfere with the order of removal from service and rejected the appeal of the petitioner. The revision filed by the petitioner as against the aforesaid order was also rejected by the order dated 27th July, 2000. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a writ petition in this court, which was registered as CW No. 4416/2000. The learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 30th April, 2002 disposed of the said writ petition holding that a lenient view is liable to be taken in respect of the petitioner. The learned Single Judge set aside the impugned orders with a direction that the petitioner should be reinstated in service holding further that the petitioner would not be entitled to any salary and pecuniary benefits from the date of dismissal till the date of the said order.
4. The Union of India being aggrieved by the aforesaid order filed an appeal, which was registered as LPA No. 551/2002. This court considered the said appeal and by judgment and order dated 20th September, 2002 allowed the appeal setting aside all the conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge to the effect that the petitioner should be reinstated in service but without any salary and pecuniary benefits. The learned Division Bench remitted back the matter to the disciplinary authority for consideration of quantum of sentence afresh. The Division Bench, however, made it clear that no part of the observations made in the said judgment should be considered as any opinion or view expressed by the Division Bench that the said punishment was in any manner harsh or disproportionate making it clear that the appellate authority would be entitled to pass an appropriate order in accordance with law.
5. Pursuant to the aforesaid order passed by the Division Bench, the appellate authority took up the appeal of the petitioner once again and considered the same in the light of the documents on record. After going through the same, the appellate authority held that the punishment of removal from service as awarded to the petitioner was minimal and fully justified considering the gravity of the offence committed by the petitioner and the same was upheld. While coming to the aforesaid conclusion, the appellate authority has given its reasons in Para 7 and 8 of the said order. It was held by him that the petitioner had deliberately suppressed material facts in the verification roll and he continued to suppress the said fact till the same was revealed after police verification. In the context of the aforesaid conduct of the petitioner, it was held by the appellate authority that the petitioner with mala fide intention suppressed the fact to gain appointment in the force and, therefore, the charge framed against the petitioner was fully proved. The appellate authority also held that retention of such a person in a uniformed and disciplined force like CRPF would be detrimental to the very image and functioning of the force and that a person having such attributes in his character and conduct could not be allowed to serve in any Government department and the least in an Armed Force like CRPF where moral integrity is of paramount importance.
6. He also held that the entire edifice of a force would collapse if persons of low moral values and dubious character/antecedents are allowed to serve in the force. The appellate authority also referred to a decision of the Division Bench of this court in Virender Pal Singh v. Union of India and Others being CWP No. 5321/2001 wherein it was held that a person, who is to be appointed as Constable, should disclose all material facts and that any concealment of material facts for the purpose of obtaining appointment itself would be a ground for cancellation of appointment. In the said decision a reference was also made to a decision of the Supreme Court in D.A.D v. Sushil Kumar reported in 1996 (2) SCC 605. The following observations of the Supreme Court were also extracted in the said order:-
"Verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to a post under the State. Though he was found physically fit, had passed the written test and interview and was provisionally selected on account of his antecedents record, the appointing authority found it not desirable to appoint a person of such record as a Constable to the disciplined force. The view taken by the appointing authority in the background of the case cannot be said to be unwarranted. The tribunal, therefore, was wholly unjustified in giving the direction for reconsidering of his case. Though he was discharged or acquitted of the criminal offences, the same was nothing to do with the question. What would be relevant is the conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a service and not the actual result thereof. If the actual result happened to be in a particular way, the law will take care of the consequences. The consideration relevant to the case is the antecedents of the candidate. Appointing authority, therefore, has rightly focussed this aspect and found him not desirable to appoint him to service."
7. Counsel appearing for the petitioner, during the course of his arguments submitted that the provisions of Section 11(1) read with Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, under which the impugned order was passed, are not applicable to a case of removal from service, which is a major penalty. He submitted that Rule 11 empowers the concerned authority to impose only minor punishment and ,therefore, in exercise of the said powers no major penalty could be awarded.
8. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, we have also considered the provisions of Section 11 of the CRPF Rules, which read as under:-
"11. (1) The Commandant or any other authority or officer as may be prescribed, may, subject to any rules made under this Act, award in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal any one or more of the following punishments to any member of the Force whom he considers to be guilty of disobedience, neglect of duty, or remissness in the discharge of any duty or of other misconduct in his capacity as a member of the Force, that is to say,-
(a) ..................................
(b) ...................................
(c) ....................................
(d) ....................................
(e) removal from any office of distinction or special emolument in the force.
9. In that view of the matter we are of the considered opinion that the aforesaid submission of the counsel for the petitioner has no merit. Even otherwise, the aforesaid submission cannot be entertained at this stage as the Division Bench, in the earlier writ petition, upheld the order of the disciplinary authority finding the petitioner guilty of the charge but remitted the matter only for the purpose of considering the punishment of the petitioner. While remitting back the matter, it was also observed by the said court that none of the opinions expressed by the said court in its judgments should be taken as if the punishment imposed upon the petitioner was harsh and disproportionate.
Therefore, we are now required to and called upon to consider only if the said order passed by the appellate authority upholding the order of punishment of removal of service passed against the petitioner is disproportionate to the offence.
10. It was sought to be submitted by the counsel appearing for the petitioner that the petitioner did not give any false information inasmuch as in the criminal case petitioner's name appeared in Column 2 which is a column for a person who is suspected to be an accused, from which it is apparent that the petitioner was not a named accused and since the petitioner was later on acquitted on 1st September, 1999, it should be held that the petitioner did not give any false information to the respondents. We have perused the records to appreciate the aforesaid contention of the counsel for the petitioner and on perusal of the same we find that the petitioner was not honourably acquitted but he was acquitted as the charge could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In any case, no verification of the petitioner could be carried out by the respondents at the time of his entry in the force and the only verification that is carried out by the respondents, which is clearly established from the records is the verification done in 1999.
11. It is an admitted position that the petitioner had knowledge of pendency of the criminal case against him, at least in the year 1995, which fact is also admitted by the petitioner in para 5 of the writ petition. The verification roll was given to the petitioner in 1999 wherein as against the entries, particularly 12-A and B, which read as under:-
"12(a) Have you ever been arrested, prosecuted kept under detention or bound down/fixed, convicted by a Court of law for any offence or debarred/disqualified by any public service commission from appearing at its examination/selection, or debarred from taking any examination/restricted by any university or any other education authority/institute.
(b) is any case pending against you in any Court of law, university or any other education authority/institute at the time of filling up this verification roll? If answer to (a) or (b) is yes, then give details of prosecution, detention, fine, conviction, and punishment etc. and statement about the case pending within the court /university/education authority at the time of filling up in this form.
The petitioner had answered the above question with an emphatic no. It was meant thereby that the petitioner was never arrested nor prosecuted. In the event that the petitioner answered in Col. 12 (a) & (b) in the affirmative, he was required to give full particulars.
12. In 1995, when the petitioner filled up the aforesaid verification form, he had full knowledge of the case and that he was arrested in a criminal case. He had also been prosecuted but was acquitted on benefit of doubt. The said facts should have been mentioned in the aforesaid verification roll and he not having mentioned the said facts despite being conscious of the same, he suppressed material facts.
He was, therefore, liable to be terminated and removed from service, in terms of the warning which appeared in the said verification roll.
13. Accordingly, a chargesheet was drawn up and a departmental enquiry was held against the petitioner, in which the petitioner was found guilty of the charge. The said order of finding the petitioner guilty by the appellate authority also stands upheld by the Division Bench of this court in the earlier writ petition. Therefore, the only question that arises for our consideration is the validity of the quantum of punishment awarded to the petitioner.
14. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India . In para 18 of the aforesaid decision the Supreme Court held as under:-
"18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof."
15. A similar view has taken in one of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in Principal Secretary, Government of A.P. & Anr. v. M. Adinarayana decided on 6th October, 2004 (Civil Appeal No. 2332 of 2003) wherein it was held that the court should not interfere with the quantum of punishment where there is some relevant material, which the disciplinary authority has accepted and which material has reasonable support.
16. Therefore, unless and until it is found by the court that the punishment awarded is disproportionate to the offence and it is shocking to the conscience of the court, no interference with the punishment should be done by a court. In the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner, this court remitted back the matter to the appellate authority for reconsideration. The appellate authority has reconsidered the matter and has given reasons for its decision. The said reasons given by the appellate authority cannot be held to be, in any manner, extraneous, arbitrary or unreasonable. It also cannot be held that no reasonable person appropriately instructed in law could arrive at a different reasoning on the said facts.
17. Counsel appearing for the petitioner, during the course of his submissions, also submitted that he was not provided with any defense assistant and also was not furnished with certain documents. These issues cannot be raised in this writ petition as the finding of guilt of the petitioner was upheld by the Division Bench in the earlier proceedings and this writ petition is restricted only to the limited extent of quantum of punishment awarded to the petitioner. We find force in the reasons given by the appellate authority, which in our opinion are cogent and reasonable. We, therefore, find no ground to interfere with the said order. Accordingly, there is no merit in this writ petition and the same is dismissed.