Madras High Court
D.Sudhakar vs The State Of Tamil Nadu on 7 March, 2014
Author: P.N.Prakash
Bench: S.Rajeswaran, P.N.Prakash
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 07..03..2014
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR . JUSTICE S.RAJESWARAN
AND
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.N.PRAKASH
Criminal Appeal No.226 of 2012
1.D.Sudhakar
2.D.Letchumanan
3. G.Dhanapal
4.Sivaprakasam
5.Tamil Selvi ... Appellants
-Vs-
The State of Tamil Nadu
rep by Inspector of Police
Neyveli Thermal Police Station
Neyveli
(Crime No.359/2010) ... Respondent
This Criminal Appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 20.03.2012 passed in S.C.No.34/2011 on the file of the Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.III, Vridachalam.
For Appellants : Mr.Vibheeshanan, Senior Counsel
for Mr.S.Saravana Kumar
For Respondent : Mr.V.M.R.Rajendran
Additional Public Prosecutor
J U D G M E N T
(Judgment of the Court was delivered by P.N.PRAKASH, J.) Five accused who were convicted by the the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court -III, Vridachalam, in S.C.No.34/2011 on 20.03.2012 and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and other terms of imprisonment, are the appellants before us.
2. A1 and A2 are the sons of A3 and A5. A4 is the nephew of A3. The deceased Paramasivam is the younger brother of A3 and the two injured witnesses P.W.1 and P.W.2 are the sons of the deceased. Thus it is essentially a dispute between the members of two families. It is the case of the prosecution that there was a land dispute between Dhanapal [A3] and his younger brother Paramasivam [deceased], though they had partitioned their lands some twenty years before.
(a) It is the case of the prosecution that on 20.07.2010, Dhanapal [A3] put up a fence in the land that was common to both parties and annexed it to his property. On the same day evening, Parthiban [P.W.2], son of the deceased Paramasivam removed the fence and threw it away. On 26.07.2010 it is alleged that Sudhakar [A1] the son of Dhanapal [A3], came to the house of the deceased and picked up quarrel with the family members and abused them. On the same day, before dusk, Bagyalakshmi [P.W.3] who is the wife of the deceased and the mother of P.Ws.1 and 2, went in search of their cattle which had gone away for grazing. Since she did not return, Paramasivam [deceased] and his two sons P.Ws.1 and 2, went around 7.00 p.m. to help P.W.3 to collect the cattle and bring them back home. As they were passing through the house of Dhanapal [A3] it is alleged by the prosecution that they were wrongfully restrained by A1 and A2. Then Dhanapal [A3], Sivaprakasam [A4, nephew of A3] and Thamizhselvi [A5; wife of A3] came. Except A5, others were armed with eucalyptus sticks. At that time, Dhanapal [A3] exhorted his sons to beat the victim party and Thamizhselvi [A5] abused them in vulgar language. Then, A1 and A2 started indiscriminately attacking Paramasivam [deceased] and his two sons P.Ws.1 and 2. A3 joined them. A4 hit P.W.1 and also the deceased on two hands. Soon Bagyalakshmi [P.W.3] also came to the spot and saw the occurrence. On account of the attack, Paramasivam fell near the canal that was passing by. Thereafter, the assailants left the place as crowd gathered.
(b) The injured persons, namely Bharathidasan [P.W.1], Parthiban [P.W.2] and the deceased were taken by Sathasivam [P.W.5] to the General Hospital, Neyveli Thermal Plant, where Dr.Naveen [P.W.17] examined them at around 7.50 p.m. Paramasivam was brought dead to the hospital and Dr.Naveen [P.W.17] noted seven injuries on his body which have been noted in the Accident Register, the copy of which was marked as Ex.P24. Dr.Naveen also examined Bharathidasan [P.W.1] and noted one injury on his left shoulder. The copy of the Accident Register relating to Bharathidasan [P.W.1] is Ex.P22. Dr.Naveen [P.W.17] examined Parthiban [P.W.2] and noted three injuries on his body and the same have been referred to in the Accident Register, the copy of which is Ex.P23. The injury sustained by P.Ws.1 and 2 were simple in nature as opined by Dr.Naveen [P.W.17].
(c) On receipt of information from the hospital, Asai Thambi, [P.W.24], the Sub Inspector of Police, Neyveli Thermal, went to the General Hospital and recorded the statement of Bharathidasan [P.W.1] which was treated as a complaint in this case and was marked as Ex.P1. The Sub Inspector of Police [P.W.24] registered a case at 21.15 hours on 26.07.2010 in Neyveli Thermal Police Station Cr.No.359/2010 under Sections 147, 341, 294, 323, 302 and 506(ii) IPC against the five accused above named. The complaint and a copy of the printed FIR was sent to the learned Judicial Magistrate, who received the same at 22.40 hours on 26.07.2010, as could be seen from his endorsement thereon.
(d) The investigation was taken over by Subbarayulu [P.W.25], the Inspector of Police, Neyveli Thermal, who went to the scene of occurrence on 27.07.2010 at 6.30 a.m. and in the presence of witnesses Kalivaradan [P.W.6] and Ravi [P.W.7] prepared Observation Mahazar [Ex.P4 ]and Rough Sketch [Ex.P30]. He took samples of earth, with and without blood stains, and a chappal of the deceased under the cover of Mahazar [Ex.P5] in the presence of the same witnesses.
Thereafter, he proceeded to Neyveli Thermal Power General Hospital, where the body of Paramasivam was kept in the mortuary and in the presence of Panchayatdars, conducted inquest over the body from 9.00 a.m. to 11.30 a.m. on 27.07.2010. The Inquest Report is Ex.P31. Thereafter, he sent the body for postmortem. Autopsy was done by Dr.Nagarajan [P.W.18], who in his evidence and in the Postmortem Certificate [Ex.P25] has noted the following injuries and has given his opinion as to the cause of death.
"E1. Contusion 5 x 4 cm (right side) of face
2. Contusion right side neck 3 x 4 cm
3. Laceration 1 x 4 cm lower lip
4. Abrasion 2 x 1 cm right side abdomen
5. Abrasion 3 x 2 cm right shoulder
6. Contusion with abrasion present 4 x 2 cm lower 1/3 right forearm
7. Contusion with abrasion 5 x 4 cm right lower 1/3 of left forearm
8. Contusion with abrasion 1 x 2 cm wrist
9. Contusion presents right parietal (head) 4 x 3 cm External Appearance : Eyes opened, no discharge from ear nose, mouth opened, tongue inside, thorax well formed, scrotum intact. IE : no fracture of ribs, heart congested filled with blood lungs congested hyoid intact, stomach contains undigested food particles 200 gms present, liver spleen kidney congested intestine distended with gas, bladder empty, and skull lower fracture 3 cm right parietal (head), brain pale .... ......
Postmortem concluded at 2.40 p.m. On 27.07.10 Time of death 18 to 20 hours prior to PM Opinion as cause of death A. the deceased would appear to had been died of shock due to head injury."
(e) The Investigating Officer went in search of the accused on 28.07.2010. At around 5.45 p.m., he arrested A1 to A5 in the presence of witnesses Selvakumar [P.W.8] and Kanagathillai [P.W.9]. Selvakumar [P.W.8] turned hostile to the prosecution case. The Investigating Officer recorded the confession statement of A1 to A4 and the admissible portion of the same are Exs.P34 to 37 respectively. Based on the information provided by A1, the stick [M.O.1] used by A1 in the attack was recovered under the cover of Mahazar [Ex.P38] in the presence of witnesses [P.Ws.8 and 9].
(f) Similarly, from the disclosures made by A2, A3 and A4, Eucalyptus sticks M.Os.2, 3 and 4 were recovered under the cover of Mahazar Exs.P39, 40 and 41 respectively in the presence of the witnesses Selvakumar [P.W.8] and Kanagathillai [P.W.9]. The accused were thereafter produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate, who remanded them to judicial custody. The Investigating Officer proceeded with the investigation of this case by examining the witnesses, including the two doctors. He completed the investigation and filed a final report on 28.11.2010 before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Neyveli, who took cognizance of the offences in PRC No.34/2011.
(g) On appearance of the accused, the provisions of Section 207 Cr.P.C. were complied with and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions. The Sessions Court framed the following charges against the five accused.
CHARGE NO.
SECTION OF LAW 1 Against A1 to A5 for forming unlawful assembly punishable u/s 147 IPC 2 Against A1 to A5 for intimidating the deceased and P.W.1 and P.W.2 punishable under Section 506(ii) IPC 3 Against A5 for using abusive language and threatening the victims, punishable u/s 294 IPC 4 Against A1 and A2 for wrongfully restraining the deceased, P.Ws.1 and 2, punishable u/s 341 IPC 5 Against A1, A2 and A3 for fatally attacking Paramasivam and causing his death punishable u/s 302 IPC 6 Against A4 and A5 for being part of the unlawful assembly and causing the death of Paramasivam, punishable u/s 302 r/w 149 IPC.
7Against A2 for causing simple injuries to Parthiban [P.W.2]; against A4 for causing simple injuries on Bharathidasan [P.W.1], punishable u/s 323 IPC.
4. When the accused were questioned, they pleaded 'Not Guilty' to the charges. The prosecution examined 25 witnesses, marked 41 exhibits and 10 Material Objects. When the accused were questioned about the incriminating circumstances against them u/s 313 Cr.P.C., they denied the same. Two witnesses wee examined on behalf of the accused.
5. After analysing the evidence adduced by the Prosecution, the trial Court convicted and sentenced them as follows:
CHARGE NO.
SENTENCE 1 A1 to A5 convicted u/s 147 IPC and sentenced to undergo six months S.I. and pay a fine of Rs.500/-; i/d to undergo one month S.I. 2 All the accused acquitted for the offence u/s 506(ii) IPC 3 A5 convicted and sentenced to a fine of Rs.200/- ; i/d to undergo one week S.I. for u/s 294(b) IPC 4 A1 and A2 convicted for the offence u/s 341 IPC and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.200/- each; i/d to undergo one week S.I. 5 A1 to A3 convicted for the offence u/s 302 IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- each i/d to undergo one year R.I. 6 A4 and A5 convicted for the offence u/s 302 r/w 149 IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- each; i/d to undergo R.I. for one year 7 A2 and A4 convicted for the offence u/s 323 IPC and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.500/- each; i/d to undergo two months S.I. The sentences were directed to run concurrently and set off was given under Section 428 Cr.P.C.
6. Challenging the aforesaid conviction and sentence, the appellants have come by way of appeal to this Court. Out of 25 witnesses examined, the alleged eyewitness Sadasivam [P.W.5], Saminathan [P.W.10], Ramesh [P.W.11], Ponmudi [P.W.12], Selvaraj [P.W.13] and Ravikumar [P.W.19] turned hostile to the prosecution case. Kalivaradhan [P.W.6] who was examined to prove the Observation Mahazar and recovery of blood stained earth from the place of occurrence turned hostile to the prosecution case. Similarly Kanagathillai [P.W.9] who was examined to speak about the arrest, confession and recovery of material objects pursuant to the disclosure statements given by the accused, turned hostile to the prosecution case.
7. Now we are left with the evidence of Bharathidasan [P.W.1] and Parthiban [P.W.2] who are the injured eyewitnesses, and Bhagyalakshmi [P.W.3] and Panneerselvam [P.W.16].
8. Before analysing the evidence of the eyewitnesses, it may be essential to give a finding as to the cause of death of the deceased. The prosecution, through the evidence of Dr.Naveen [P.W.17] has established that the deceased Paramasivam was brought to Neyveli Hospital by his sons Bharathidasan [P.W.1] and Parthiban [P.W.2] at around 7.50 p.m. When Paramasivam was examined , Dr.Naveen found that he had already died and had found about 7 injuries on his person. Similarly Dr.Nagarajan [P.W.18]who performed the autopsy on the body of deceased Paramasivam has also noted about 9 injuries on the body of the deceased. The evidence of the Doctor corroborates the finding in the inquest proceedings substantially as to the cause of death. The deceased Paramasivam was aged about 45 years at the time of his death. There is no material produced to show that he was already ill or was suffering from any disease. Therefore, we have no hesitation in concluding that the death of Paramasivam was homicide due to the attack that took place on 26.07.2010 at around 7.00 p.m.
9. At this juncture, it may be relevant to address one argument by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that the deceased Paramasivam dashed himself on to a tree while fleeing, on account of which he had sustained the fatal injuries. In support of this argument, the learned Senior Counsel took us through the evidence of Dr.Naveen [P.W.17] who has stated in his cross examination that, if a person runs and rams on to a tree, he would suffer injuries mentioned by him in his chief examination. This answer does not advance the defence case in any way for the simple reason that no questions were put to the Doctor with reference to the particular fatal injury sustained on the head by Paramasivam. A vague and general question was put to the Doctor, for which he gave an equally vague and general answer, with which the defence cannot make great bones of. No such question was even put to Dr.Nagarajan [P.W.18] who noted the injury on the head and also the fracture in the skull and opined that the death was on account of shock due to head injury. It is obvious from the injuries that Paramasivam was belaboured and the only question is who did it? For this the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 and P.W.16 have to be appraised.
10. P.W.1 in his evidence stated that his father had a land dispute with Dhanapal [A3] and that on 20.07.2010 Dhanapal [A3] had put a fence in the common area and annexed it to his land. On the same day, Parthiban [P.W.2] removed the fence forcibly. Thereafter, on 26.07.2010 at around 4 o'clock , Sudhakar [A1] came to the house of P.W.1 and started abusing his family members. At that time Paramasivam, the deceased, told others not to react to anything and that all matters can be settled in the village panchayat. On the same day around sunset, when P.Ws.1, 2 and the deceased were going to help their mother get back the grazing cattle, they were restrained by the accused party near the house of the third accused. At that time, A1 to A4 were armed with eucalyptus sticks. A1 to A3 started attacking Paramasivam and A4-the nephew attacked P.Ws.1 and 2. A4 has also attacked the deceased and caused injuries in the left and right hands. When Parthiban [P.W.2] intervened, he was also attacked by A2. Similarly P.W.2 in his evidence stated that on 26.07.2010 he removed the fence put up by his paternal uncle Danapalan [A3] in the common land which incensed A1 who came to their house and started abusing them. On 26.07.2010, when P.W.2 was accompanying his father and elder brother [P.W.1] to help their mother in herding back their cattle, they crossed the house of A3, where they were stopped and attacked on the exhortation of A3. He also stated in his evidence that A1, A2, A3 and A4 were armed with eucalyptus sticks. In the cross examination of PW.1, the measurements of the sticks were put to the witness in order to impeach his credibility.
11. To P.Ws.1 and 2, the defence has put a specific suggestion that on the said date and time, the victim party had come to the house of the accused party in order to attack A1 and at that time, A2 took a stick as a measure of self defence and chased them. At that time when the victim party was fleeing, since it was dark, the deceased tripped and his head dashed on a tree and after falling he rolled over the ground thereby, sustaining the injuries noted by the Doctor, resulting in his death. This has been the consistent case of the defence, thereby, the defence has accepted the fact that at the said time and place, they were there with the victims and that some incident had taken place.
12. We are aware of the legal proposition that prosecution cannot rely on the defence theory alone, but should independently prove its case. We find that, de hors the said defence taken by the accused, the prosecution by cogent evidence has established that the victims were attacked by the accused party at the relevant point of time.
13. Yet another argument that was taken by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants is that, the place was dark at around 7.00 p.m. on that day. In the month of July, the area in question namely, Neyveli will not be pitch dark. Admittedly, the accused and the deceased knew each other very well and unlike city dwellers, villagers have better night vision as they are less exposed to blinding lights. Moreover, apart from the head injury, there were about 8 injuries all over the body of the deceased which the defence wants to explain away by stating that he rolled on the ground after dashing himself on the tree. This argument sounds incredible.
14. One important factor has to be borne in mind, that is, P.Ws.1 and 2 are injured witnesses themselves and the fact that they were treated for the injuries at around the same time by Dr.Naveen [P.W.17] clearly shows that they were present at the scene of occurrence and became victims of the assault by the members of the accused party.
15. The fact that P.Ws.10 to 13 and P.W.19 the alleged eyewitnesses turned hostile to the prosecution case, would not in any way diminish the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 as they are found to be cogent and reliable. Bagyalakshmi [P.W.3] the wife of the deceased, in her evidence stated that she had gone to the fields to get back her cattle in the evening of 26th and was returning with the cattle, at that time she saw her husband falling near the canal and the accused armed with sticks running away from the place. This is a very powerful circumstance, which corroborates the version of P.Ws1 and 2, who also said that the accused ran away after assaulting them.
16. As regards the evidence of Panneerselvam [P.W.16], the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that he was not at all an eyewitness and he could never had been available at the place of occurrence because his 161 statement was recorded only on 29.07.2010 after a delay of three days. Pannerselvam [P.W.16] in his evidence before the Court stated that he is the son-in-law of the deceased and he was working under Neyveli Lignite Corporation contractor. According to P.W.16 he had gone to a relative's house for a condolence and was returning to the village on 26.07.2010 in the evening. At that time he had seen the appellants attacking the deceased, P.W.1 and P.W.2 The learned counsel for the defence pointed out that the evidence of P.W.16 is not reliable because he has stated that all the five were armed with sticks, but whereas the prosecution case is A5 was unarmed. Similarly, it is the case of the prosecution that after Paramasivam sustained injuries, he was carried to the hospital in a vehicle by P.W.1.
Whereas P.W.16 has stated that the deceased was carried in the vehicle of Sadasivam [P.W.5] by Parthiban [P.W.2]. On account of this inconsistency, the evidence of P.W.16 cannot be relied upon, is the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants. It is true that P.W.1 in his evidence stated that he had carried his father in the vehicle of Sadasivam [P.W.5] to the hospital, but Sadasivam [P.W.5] turned hostile to the prosecution case and did not support it. The fact remains that all the three, namely P.W.1, P.W.2 and the deceased had gone to the Neyveli hospital at around that time and were treated by Dr.Naveen. Therefore, based only on this discrepancy it cannot be said that the evidence of P.W.16 is unreliable. It is alleged by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that P.W.1 , P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W.16 are all close relatives and therefore, they are falsely implicating the appellants. This argument is very frequently raised in Courts and a fitting reply has been given by the Supreme Court wayback in 1953 in Dalip Singh and others v. The State of Punjab, [AIR 1953 SC 364].
"25. We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eye-witnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in 'Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 4 at pg. 59(A). We find, however, that it unfortunately still persists, if not in the judgments of the Courts, at any rate in the arguments of counsel."
Law does not allow Courts to reject the testimony of a witness who is closely related to the deceased and it is only a rule of caution that a closer scrutiny of such evidence should be made. We scrutinised the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 and found no tangible reasons to discard their testimony.
17. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that the prosecution had failed to prove the place of occurrence satisfactorily. In support of his contention, he drew our attention to the evidence of Dr.Naveen [P.W.17] and the three copies of Accident Reports, namely Exs.P22, 23 and 24 relating to P.Ws.1 and 2 and the deceased respectively, wherein it is stated in English "Alleged to have assaulted by known persons by a stick at 7.00 p.m at his residence on 26.07.2010." The learned Senior counsel contended that P.Ws.1 and 2 have stated to Dr.Naveen that they were assaulted in their residence, but whereas in their evidence they say that the assault was near the house of A3. Therefore, he contends that the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 should not be relied upon.
18.This criticism of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants can be addressed from two angles. Time and again, the Supreme Court has held that the statement of the injured to the Doctor has no great significance. In
(i) Pattipati Venkaiah vs. State of Andhrapradesh [1986 MLJ Crl. 23(SC)], the Supreme Court has held:
"17. ......A doctor is not at all concerned as to whether the person brought to him is a criminal or an ordinary person, his primary effort is to save the life of the person brought to him and inform the police in medico-legal cases. In this state of confusion, P.Ws.1 and 2 may not have chosen to give details of the murder to the doctor. It is well settled that doctors before whom dead bodies are produced or injured persons are brought, either themselves take the dying declaration or hold the postmortem immediately and if they start examining the informants they are likely to become witnesses of the occurrence which is not permissible."
(ii) P.Babu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh [1994 SCC Crl. 424], the Supreme Court has held :
".......It is a matter of common knowledge that such entry in the injury certificate does not necessarily amount to a statement. At that stage the doctor was required to fill up that column in a normal manner and it was not the duty of the doctor to enquire from the injured patient about the actual assailants and that the inquiry would be confined as to how he received the injuries namely the weapons used etc."
After all the injured witnesses in this case are village peasants and in the aftermath of a brutal act, they will naturally be in tension and therefore, much importance cannot be given to such statements to the Doctor at the time of their examination.
19. The second angle from which this issue could be dealt with is as follows:
Assuming for a moment that P.W.1 and P.W.2 had told Dr.Naveen that the incident had taken place at their residence contrary to what they have deposed in the Court subsequently, then their statement to the doctor is a previous statement reduced into writing. The credibility of a witness can be impeached under Section 155 (3) of the Evidence Act by proof of former statements which are inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted. The previous statement of a witness which has been reduced into writing can be definitely used to contradict him and the manner in which it should be done has been clearly postulated in Section 145 of the Evidence Act, which reads as under:
"145. Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing---A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him."
20. Section 145 of the Evidence Act is divided into two parts. The first part is, without showing or proving the previous statement, general questions can be put to the witness in the cross examination. In this case, without showing the Accident Register copy, if P.W.1 had been asked, "Did you tell Dr.Naveen that the incident took place in your house?" for which if he had replied "Yes", then that is sufficient. If he had replied "No", then the second part of Section 145 comes into play if the defence wants to contradict him and thereby impeach the credibility of his testimony under Section 155(3) of the Evidence Act. Then the attention of P.W.1 must be drawn to the statement recorded by DR.Naveen in the Accident Register copy and an opportunity should be given to him to explain. Without resorting to this procedure, it is not permissible to prove a contradiction. The following example given by the legal Colossus Vivian Bose, J. in Bhagwan Singh vs. State of Punjab [AIR 1952 SC 214], is locus clasicus on this aspect.
"22. A witness is called and he says in chief, "I saw the accused shoot X". In cross examination he resiles and says "I did not see it at all." He is then asked "but didn't you tell A, B & C on the spot that you had seen it?" He replies "yes, I did." WE have, of set purpose, chosen as an illustration a statement which was not reduced to writing and which was not made either to the police or to a Magistrate. Now, the former statement could not be used as substantive evidence. I could only be used as corroboration of the evidence in chief under S.157 of the Evidence Act or to shake the witness's credit or test his veracity under S.146. Section 145 is not called into play at all in such a case. Resort to S.145 would only be necessary if the witness 'denies' that he made the former statement. In that event, it would be necessary to prove that he did, and 'if the former statement was reduced to writing', then S.145 requires that his attention must be drawn to those parts which are to be used for contradiction. But that position does not arise when the witness admits the former statement. In such a case all that is necessary is to look to the former statement of which no further proof is necessary because of the admission that it was made."
21. In this case, the defence has merely put a suggestion to P.W.1 which he has denied. We are extracting that portion from the evidence of P.W.1, "It is not correct to say that I told the Doctor that the incident had taken place near our house." The defence has not specifically drawn the attention of P.W.1 to the statement recorded in the Accident Reports [Exs.P22, P23 and P24] and confronted him with it. Reference can be profitably made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajinder Pershad vs. Smt.Darshana Devin [JT 2001 (6) SC 400] "4.There is an age old rule that if you dispute the correctness of the statement of a witness you must give him opportunity to explain his statement by drawing his attention to that part of it which is objected to as untrue, otherwise you cannot impeach his credit. In State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh (dead) and Ors. [JT 1998 (2) SC 41 = 1998 (3) SCC 561], a Bench of this Court (to which I was a party) stated the principle that Section 138 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right to cross-examination a witness tendered in evidence by opposite party. The scope of that provision is enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act by permitting a witness to be questioned, inter alia, to test his veracity. It was observed:
"The oft-quoted of Lord Hershell, L.C. In Browne v. Dunn clearly elucidates the principle underlying those provisions. It reads thus:
"I cannot help saying, that it seems to me to be absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination showing that that imputation is evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged, and then, when it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he might have been able to do if such questions had been put to him, the circumstances which, it is suggested, indicate that the story he tells ought not to be believed, to argue that he is a witness unworthy of credit. My Lords, I have always understood that if you intend to impeach a witness, you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give an opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a case, but it is essential to fair play and fair dealing with witness."
22. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants is holding the Accident Register copies [Exs.P22, P23 and P24] in one hand and the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 in the other hand and he is arguing that they contradict each other and so these witnesses are untrustworthy. We are sorry to say that such a procedure is unknown to law. Therefore, we reject the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that there is contradiction in the evidence of P.W.1, P.W.2, vis-a-vis the entry by Dr.Naveen in English in Exs.P22, P23 and P24 since the contradictions have not been established in a manner known to law.
23. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that the statements of the witnesses had reached the Court only on 27.12.2010 and therefore, the evidence of these witnesses become suspect. We are unable to countenance this argument, because mere delay by the police in not sending the 161 statement to the Court cannot lead to any inference that the witnesses are not trustworthy. In fact, in Raman and Yadav vs. Prabhunath Jha [2004 MLJ Crl. 284 SC] even while dealing with the delay in recording the 161 statement of witnesses, the Supreme Court has said that unless the Investigating Officer is categorically asked as to why there was a delay in examination of the witnesses, the defence cannot gain any advantage therefrom. When that is the legal position, even with regard to the delay in recording the statement of witnesses, mere delay in sending the 161 statements to the Court cannot ipso facto make the evidence of the eye witnesses suspect. In any event the complaint and FIR given by the injured eyewitness, P.W.1, contained the entire prosecution version and it had reached the Court at 22.40 hrs on 26.07.2010 without delay.
24.The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants contended that the defence by examining two witnesses have established that the accused 3 and 4 were not at all in the scene of occurrence. The defence examined one Subramaniam, who in his evidence stated that Dhanapalan [A3] was in his house from 6.00 p.m. to 8.00 p.m. on 26.07.2010 and only thereafter when A1 came to his house to fetch his father he knew of the incident. In the cross examination, this witness stated that he does not know the cell phone of Dhanapalan and as to how Sudhakar [A1] knew that Dhanapalan was in the house of the witness at the relevant point of time. Similarly, Venkatesan [D.W.2] in his evidence stated that Sivaprakasam [A4] and he were drinking liquor between 6.00 p.m. and 8.00 p.m. on 26.07.2010 and on coming to know that there was a fracas in the village, they went to the village and A4 was taken away by police and a case was foisted against him. In the cross examination he stated that they were in the wine shop which was about 1 km away from the village and when specifically asked as to how he came to know about the incident while they were drinking liquor in the wine shop, he stated that he overheard some people talking about it. He has further stated that they voluntarily went to the police station to make enquiries about this incident. This is unbelievable because if they have been drinking liquor at that time, there is no reason for Sivaprakasam [A4] to go all the way to the police station without going to the village to know what exactly had happened. Notwithstanding all these, there is no suggestion made to any of the prosecution witnesses that A3 and A4 were never in the scene of occurrence. Not even in the examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., such an explanation was put forward by the accused. On the contrary, the accused in the cross examination took a stand that when the victim party came to their house they were chased by A2 pursuant to which the deceased dashed on a tree and sustained the fatal injuries. Therefore, we reject the defence witnesses as not worthy of acceptance.
25. Lastly the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants contended that there was no common object between the members of the assembly. In support of his contention he submitted that the accused had not gone to the place of the deceased as aggressors. Even assuming the prosecution case to be true, the deceased party were near the house of the accused, where they were stopped by A1 and A2. There seems to be some force in the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants. It is true that on 20.07.2010 even according to P.W.2, he did remove the fence that was illegally put by A3. With regard to that, A1 had already come to their house on 26.07.2010 and had abused them and had gone back. While the victim party was passing through the house of A3, they were stopped by the accused party, but according to P.W.1, A1 to A4 only were armed with sticks, and not A5. It is true that an assembly of five members can turn out to become an unlawful assembly if they develop a common object to commit an offence. Did this assembly develop a common object to commit any offence is the question that requires determination. From the evidence on record, it appears to us that A5 did not share any common object with the others to commit any offence. Admittedly, A5 a lady was not armed. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that every member of an unlawful assembly must be armed. Her presence in the place of occurrence which is near her house cannot be held to be unusual. The trial Court has acquitted her for the offence under Section 506(ii) IPC thereby holding that she had done nothing to intimidate the victim party. Therefore, we hold that the conviction of A5 under Section 147 IPC is not maintainable and consequently her conviction under Section 302 read with 149 IPC is not sustainable and she is acquitted of that charge.
26. When once A5 is acquitted of the offence under Section 147 IPC, the magic number five falls to four and an assembly cannot be termed unlawful within the meaning of Section 143 IPC and therefore, the participants can be convicted only for their individual acts or with the aid of Section 34 IPC and therefore, A4 cannot be convicted under Section 302 r/w 149 IPC. Now we have to see whether A4 shared a common intention with A1 to A3 for causing the death of Paramasivam. The question whether a person who is charged for an offence under Section 302 r/w 149 IPC be convicted for the offence under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC is no longer res integra, in view of the Constitution Bench Judgment of the Supreme Court in Willy [William] Slaney vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [AIR 1956 SC 116]:
"60. Now when several persons join in the commission of a crime and share a common intention, it means that each has the requisite intention in himself; the fact that others share it does not absolve any one of them individually, and when the crime is actually committed in pursuance of the common intention and the accused is present at its commission, the crime becomes the offence actually committed because of section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 114 does not create the offence nor does section 34.
These sections enunciate a principle of criminal liability. Therefore, in such cases all that the charge need set out is the offence of murder punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code committed by the accused with another and the accused is left to gather the details of the occurrence as alleged by the prosecution from other sources. The fact that he is told that he is charged with murder committed by himself with another imports that every legal condition required by law to constitute the offence of murder committed in this way was fulfilled: Section 221(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code."
27. Now it should be seen whether A4 shared any common intention with A1 to A3 so as to make him liable under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC. The overt act against A4 is that he attacked the witness and caused injuries on the hands of the deceased. A4 is not the son of A3 and he is the nephew of A3. He is also closely related to the deceased. There is no evidence to show that he had any motive against the deceased. Hence, we hold that A4 did not share any common intention with the other accused for causing the death of Paramasivam. A4 is acquitted of the offence under Section 302 r/w 149 IPC, because we have held that there was no unlawful assembly of five members. There is no evidence to convict A4 under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC also. The conviction is altered to one under Section 323 IPC for causing hurt to P.W.1 and the deceased and he is sentenced to undergo one year Rigorous Imprisonment totally for two counts.
28. P.W.1 also narrated the foul language used by A5 to abuse the deceased. Therefore, we hold that the third charge against A5 stands proved and the conviction and sentence imposed on A5 for the offence under Section 294B IPC by the trial Court is maintained.
29. From the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2, the prosecution has established that A1 and A2 wrongfully restrained the victim party and therefore, we uphold the conviction and sentence imposed upon A1 and A2 by the trial Court for the offence under Section 341 IPC.
30. Reverting to the fifth charge, we find from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that there was a land dispute between the victim party and the accused party and that on 20.07.2010, Dhanapal [A3] had put a fence in the common area which was removed by Parthiban [P.W.2] on the same day. With regard to this, Sudhakar [A1] had gone to the house of the victim party and has abused them on the day of the incident, namely, on 26.07.2010 at around 4 o'clock. Thereafter, it is the case of the victim party that they were passing by the house of the accused party for collecting the cattle. The cross examination by the accused is that the victim party had come to assault A1 and in order to protect him, A2 had chased them away. Be that as it may, it is not the prosecution case that the accused knew in advance that the victim party were going to pass through that way and that they were laying in wait for confronting them. It is also not the prosecution case that the accused party were already armed with deadly weapons like knife or bill hook. It is also not the prosecution case that the accused party had gone in search of the victim party to assault them. The place of incident, admittedly, is near the house of the accused party and therefore, the presence of the members of the accused party at that place was not unusual. According to P.Ws.1 and 2 they were stopped by A1 and A2, and A3 exhorted them to attack. The deceased had sustained 9 injuries, of which only one injury is on the head which turned out to be the fatal injury and rest of the injuries are on the non vital parts of the body and they are only abrasions and contusions. It is in the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 that they also sustained injuries which were found to be simple injuries. It is also the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 that after the incident they took their father who was alive to the hospital. The prosecution witnesses say that the accused party ran away thereafter. Thus from the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we find it difficult to infer that A1, A2 and A3 shared common intention to commit the murder of the deceased so as to attract the first part of Section 300 IPC. There is no evidence to show that the accused knew that the deceased suffered any illness so that by causing a bodily injury to him, he would die. Hence this case also does not fall under the second part of Section 300 IPC. It is not in the evidence of the doctor that the ninth injury on the head is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death so as to attract the third limb of Section 300 IPC. But the accused, by beating the deceased on his head cannot say that they did not have the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death within the meaning of the second limb of Section 299 IPC. Therefore, we hold that A1 to A3 shared the common intention to commit culpable homicide falling within the second part of Section 299 IPC. Accordingly, we hold that A1 is guilty of the offence under Section 304(i) IPC for causing the fatal injury and sentenced to ten years Rigorous Imprisonment. A2 and A3 are convicted for the offence under Section 304(i) r/w 34 IPC and sentenced to ten years Rigorous Imprisonment with fine. The conviction and sentence on A1, A2 and A3 for the offence under Section 302 IPC is set aside.
In the result:
(1) The conviction and sentence under Section 147 IPC against A1 to A5 is set aside.
(2) A5 is convcited for the offence under Section 294(b) IPC and the sentence imposed on her by the trial Court is confirmed.
(3) A1 and A2 are convicted for the offence under Section 341 IPC and the sentence imposed upon them by the trial Court is confirmed.
(4) A1 is convicted for the offence under Section 304(i) IPC, and A2 and A3 are convicted for the offence under Section 304(i) r/w 34 IPC and all are sentenced to 10 years Rigorous Imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000/- each, in default to undergo one year Rigorous Imprisonment.
(5) The conviction and sentence imposed upon A1 to A5 for the offence under Section 302 IPC and 302 r/w 149 IPC is set aside.
(6) A4 is convicted for the offence under Section 323 IPC [2 counts], namely, for causing simple injuries to Paramasivam [deceased] and Bharathidasan [P.W.1] and is sentenced to undergo one year Rigorous Imprisonment totally for both counts.
(7) A2 is convicted for the offence under Section 323 IPC for causing simple injuries to Parthiban [P.W.2] and the sentence imposed on him by the trial Court to pay a fine of Rs.500/- in default to undergo two months Simple Imprisonment is confirmed.
The sentences are directed to run concurrently. The accused are entitled to set off under Section 428 Cr.P.C. 1973.
With the above modification, this appeal is partly allowed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand discharged. The appellants are directed to surrender forthwith to serve the remainder sentence, if any, failing which the Respondent/Police may take them into custody in accordance with law for serving the sentence.
[S.R.,J.] [P.N.P.,J.]
07..03.2014
gms
Index : Yes
Internet : Yes
To
1.The Inspector of Police
Neyveli Thermal Police Station
Neyveli.
2.The Addl. District & Sessions Judge,
Fast Track Court No.III, Vridachalam.
3.The Public Prosecutor,
High Court, Madras.
S.RAJESWARAN, J.
AND
P.N.PRAKASH, J.
gms
Judgment in
Crl.A.No.226 of 2012
07.03.2014