Kerala High Court
K.K. Krishnan Nair vs Scrutiny Committee, Secretary, ... on 5 March, 1993
Equivalent citations: II(1993)ACC619, AIR1993KER313, AIR 1993 KERALA 313, (1993) 2 KER LT 48 (1993) 2 ACC 619, (1993) 2 ACC 619
ORDER G.H. Guttal, J.
1. The question for consideration is whether the constitution of a committee by the Regional Transport Authority known as "scrutiny committee" and the decision by such committee to grant permits to ply stage carriages is valid. The question arises out of the facts stated in the next paragraph.
2. The respondent No. 1 is the scrutiny committee appointed by the Regional Transport Authority who is the respondent No. 3 to this petition. The respondent No. 2 is the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Malappuram. The petitioner Krishnan Nalr operates his stage carriage No. KLM 5578 on the route Perinthalmanna-Palemade in Malappuram District. The respondent No. 4 V. Hamza, ow ner of stage carriage No. KL10/4933, applied for grant of permit on the route Pertinthalmanna-Marutha-puzhakadevue which overlaps the petitioner's service for 55 Kms. The respondent No. 4 submitted a set t-f proposed timings which clash with the petitioner's timings. In view of representations by local bodies, students and villagers, the Regional Transport Authority, Malappurum, constituted a scrutiny committee consisting of Secretary, R.T.A., Deputy Director of Education, Malappuram and Principal, Malappuram College. The Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Malappuram in his counter-affidavit admits that the Regional Transport Authority, Malappuram, "decided to form such a scrutiny committee to consider and dispose off applications for temporary permits after hearing members of public as well as students."
On 24-12-1992 the scrutiny committee considered the application by the respondent No. 4 for a fresh temporary permit for 20 days. The order dated 24-12-1992 (Ext. P2 to the petition) records that the application was "considered by the scrutiny committee, Malappuram on 24-12-1992" and the permit was granted so that the vehicle could touch a place known as Mampad college. In pursuance of this permit the Secretary, R.T.A. Malappuram, on 24-12-1992 issued the permit (Ext. P3 to the petition). These two orders are impugned in this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the authority to grant permits belongs to the Regional Transport Authority. Any application for grant of permit has to be considered and disposed of by such authority and not by the scrutiny committee.
4. The Regional Transport Authority is constituted by the Government in exercise of its power under S. 68 of the Motor Venicles Act. The Regional Transport Authority exercises the powers and performs the functions conferred by Chapter V of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Regional Transport Authority is composed of a Chairman and not more than two members. The Chairman shall be a person with experience as an adjudicator. The scheme of Chapter V of the Act is that the authority to consider application for permits and grant them belongs to the Regional Transport Authority.
5. It will be seen therefore that the, constitution and composition of the Regional' Transport Authority envisages experience as an adjudicator capable of taking decisions. The Regional Transport Authority is expected to know the provisions of the Motor Venicles Act and the Rules. The duties and , functions of the Regional Transport Authority demand the ability to examine, scru-: tinise and evaluate the merits of an application in the background of a knowledge of the Act and the Rules. The legislature created the office of the Regional Transport Authority with the clear unmistakable intention that the Authority is capable of undersatanding and applying the Act and the rules.
6. With its wide powers the Regional Transport Authority affects the citizens' right to carry on business. The necessary implication of the constitution and composition of the Regional Transport Authority is that its powers shall be exercised and duties performed by such authority and no one else. It stands to reason therefore that the only authority that can grant permits is the Regional Transport Authority.
7. The Scrutiny Committee appointed by the Regional Transport Authority has no place under the statute. The Regional Transport Authority has no power to delegate its statutory functions to such committee. Such "delegation" is wholly unauthorised. Two principles of Administrative Law, emerging from the doctrine of ulta vires have been violated by the "delegation" of "authority" to the scrutiny committee. (For the Doctrine of ultra vires see Administrative Law by H.W.R. Wade, Fifth Edition, Pages 38 & 329).
It is a fundamental rule of administrative law that a public authority like the Regional Transport Authority shall not act beyond its powers. The Regional Transport Authority acted beyond its authority in creating scrutiny committee and allowing it to do what the Regional Transport Authority is by law charged to do. Thus the "delegation" to such committee of the statutory power to consider and dispose of the application for temporary permits is illegal surrender of authority by the Regional Transport Authority.
Another related principle of administrative law is that a power conferred on one authority shall not be exercised by another. In this case the statutory authority conferred on the Regional Transport Authority has been exercised by a group of unauthorised persons. The result is that the decision of the scrutiny committee is without jurisdiction, void and without legal effect.
8. The impugned orders leave no doubt that the decision to grant the permit was made not by the Regional Transport Authority but by the unauthorised body known as the scrutiny committee. For the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs the order granting permit (Ext. P2) is void and without legal effect.
9. All that has been said in the foregoing paragraphs does not mean that consultation with interested sections of the public is forbidden by any rule of law. But the authorities like the Regional Transport Authority must bear in mind the difference between considering the current public need and the total surrender of one's authority to a group of people. Seeking information in regard to the public need, through consultations is one thing; retaining and exercising one's discretionary authority is another thing.
10. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 and respondent No. 1 urged that this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. The respondent No. 4 filed an appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam, against the order of the Secretary, R.T.A. Malappuram (Ext. P3 to the petition) which was a followup of the order of the scrutiny committee (Ext. P2 to the petition). The respondent No. 4 was aggrieved by the imposition of a condition by the Secretary. R.T.A. On 8-1-1993 this petition challenging the order of the scrutiny committee was filed. Meanwhile the petitioner came to know of the appeal and after filing of this original petition, had himself impleaded in the appeal. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, in its order dated 10-2-1993 disposing of the appeal, held that the petitioner could not, in the appeal, raise objections against the grant of permit. On the basis of these facts counsel for the respondent 1 and respondent No. 4 urge that the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal binds the petitioner until it is set aside. According to them therefore this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable.
11. The arguments of the respondents assume that there was a valid appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. There are two reasons why the appeal itself was incompetent. In the first place, the appeal was against the order issuing a permit in pursuance of the order granting the permit. "Issuance" of the permit is only a ministerial act necessarily following the grant of the permit. What is appealable is the order granting the permit, namely, the order made by the scrutiny committee. The appeal against the ministerial order of issuing permit was therefore incompetent. (Kundur Rudrappa v. The Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1975 SC 1805). The second reason is this. As I have held, the order made by the scrutiny committee granting the permit is wholly without authority. The grant of permit by the scrutiny committee is without the sanction of law. Since the scrutiny committee's act was void, the act of issuing the permit, consequent upon the void order was also void. Therefore the entire exercise of appeal and the decision-making by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal were without authority.
The petition is based on the assertion that the grant of permit is wholly without legal sanction. Having regard to my finding on the validity of the order of the scrutiny committee, and of the appeal, I reject the argument that the petition is not maintainable.
12. For the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs, this petition is allowed. The order dated 24-12-1992 (Ext.P2 to the petition) is quashed. Consequently the order of the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Malappuram, dated 24-12-1992 (Ext. P 3 to the petition) is also quashed.