Madhya Pradesh High Court
Bilaal Hussain vs Smt. Jyoti Goyal on 27 September, 2019
1
Review Petition Nos.621/2019 & 422/2019
THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
PRINCIPAL SEAT AT JABALPUR
Review Petition No.621/2019
(Bilaal Hussain Vs. Smt. Jyoti Goyal and another)
&
Review Petition No.422/2019
(Bilaal Hussain Vs. Smt. Jyoti Goyal and another)
Date of Order 27.09.2019
Bench Constituted Single Bench
Order delivered by Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay
Dwivedi
Whether approved for
reporting
Name of counsels for For Petitioner: Shri Ashok
parties Lalwani, Advocate.
For Respondent No.2 : Shri
Abhishek Gulatee, Advocate.
Law laid down Significant Para Nos.
Reserved on : 12.09.2019 Delivered on : 27.09.2019 (O R D E R) (27.09.2019) As per the office note, these review petitions are barred by 514 and 236 days respectively, for which, I.A. Nos.5061/2019 and 3843/2019 have been filed for condonation of delay, which have been duly replied by respondent No.2 opposing the same.
2Review Petition Nos.621/2019 & 422/2019
2. However, looking to the fact situation of the case, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the matters are heard finally.
3. Since the issue involved in both the petitions is identical, the parties are also same and the facts involved in both the cases are also similar, therefore, both these petitions are being decided by this common order.
4. For the purpose of convenience, the facts of Review Petition No.621/2019 are being taken up for consideration.
5. By the instant petition, the petitioner is seeking recall of order dated 30.10.2017 passed in First Appeal No.267/2016.
6. The relevant facts of the case need to be mentioned are that the first appeal was filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for brevity the 'Code') against the judgment and decree dated 02.03.2016 passed by the Second Additional District Judge, Sehore in Civil Suit No.21-A/2015. The present petitioner entered into agreement with non-applicant/respondent No.1 on 11.12.2012 and 23.01.2015 to purchase the land bearing Khasra Nos. 244, 240/2, 243/1 and 244/1 situated at Patwari Halka No.11 of village Jharkhera, Tehsil and District Sehore measuring 11.20 acres.
7. Non-applicant/respondent No.1 further entered into an agreement on 24.12.2013 with Fusion Infrastructure Private Limited to sell the aforesaid land. The applicant/petitioner being Power of Attorney holder 3 Review Petition Nos.621/2019 & 422/2019 of non-applicant/respondent No.1, executed sale-deed for sale of 3.25 acres of land on 15.07.2014 in favour of Fusion Infra Estate Private Limited (non-applicant No.2).
8. A civil suit was filed by Fusion Infrastructure Private Limited for specific performance of agreements entered into between the parties. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff therein by filing an application, amended the nomenclature of the plaintiff to "Fusion Infra Estate Private Limited".
9. An application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code was filed by the present applicant/petitioner and the same was allowed and the suit was dismissed vide order dated 02.03.2016, against which, First Appeal No.267/2016 was preferred under Section 96 of the Code.
10. In the said appeal, an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code was filed asking change in the nomenclature of the plaintiff. The said application was registered as I.A. No.6316/2016. The Court ordered for deciding the said application at the time of final hearing. The appeal was referred for mediation where the parties entered into the compromise and the agreement was drawn containing the terms and conditions of the compromise and also asked for compromise decree. A copy of the said agreement is available on record as Annexure-A-1.
11. The parties had also entered into an agreement subsequent to the agreement executed before the Mediator. The subsequent agreement is available on 4 Review Petition Nos.621/2019 & 422/2019 record as Annexure-A-2.
12. On 31.10.2017, the counsel for the parties appeared before the High Court and stated that in the light of compromise arrived between the parties before the Mediator, the impugned judgment and decree be set aside and the matter be remitted back to the trial Court for deciding the same on merits. The Court was pleased to direct refund of court fee, as parties entered into compromise, as per provisions of Section 16 of the Court Fees Act.
13. Thereafter, the review petition was preferred by non-applicant/respondent No.2 seeking review of the order dated 31.10.2017 pointing out that the decree as per the order of the Court has not been drawn and the same be directed to be drawn in view of the terms and conditions of the agreement i.e. Annexure-A-1. The said review petition was registered as R.P. No.913/2018, in which, vide order dated 22.06.2018, this Court directed the Registry to draw a decree in terms of the agreement dated 06.07.2017.
14. This review petition has been filed by the present applicant/petitioner contending that the order dated 31.10.2017 passed in first appeal has been passed in contravention of the Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code. It is alleged that the Court had no jurisdiction to decide the first appeal. It is further alleged that vide order dated 31.10.2017, the order passed on 02.03.2016 by the trial Court was set aside, the said order being under Order 7 5 Review Petition Nos.621/2019 & 422/2019 Rule 11 of the Code, could not have been passed in the light of the compromise between the parties. The provision of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code cannot be ignored and bypassed with the consent of the parties. The said error in the order of the High Court passed on 31.10.2017 is apparent on the face of it. It is further alleged that the High Court has committed mistake permitting compromise between the parties as settled before the Mediator and it is contrary to the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code. The basic contention of the applicant/petitioner is that the compromise cannot take place unless the required ingredients of Order 23 Rule 3 are fulfilled. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner that the court fee could not have been refunded in pursuance to the order dated 31.10.2017 and the said direction is contrary to the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code. It is contended by the applicant/petitioner that the order dated 31.10.2017 is unlawful and, therefore, it deserves to be recalled.
15. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for non-applicant/respondent No.2 submitted that there is no ground available for recalling of the order and the petition is absolutely misconceived. It is contended by him that the conduct of the applicant/petitioner is highly depreciated as after signing agreement before the Mediator, he is alleging the legality of the order passed by the High Court. There is nothing illegal on the part of the Court while passing the order dated 31.10.2017. He 6 Review Petition Nos.621/2019 & 422/2019 further submitted that the procedure regarding mediation and drawing of decree pursuant thereto is governed by the Civil Procedure Alternative Dispute Resolution & Mediation Rules, 2006 (for short the 'Rules, 2006'), for which, separate application under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code is not required. He has also contended that it is not a case of the applicant/petitioner that the decree drawn in pursuance to the order passed on 31.10.2017 is contrary to the agreement dated 06.07.2017. It is further contended by him that no prejudice is caused to the applicant/petitioner in not providing any opportunity of hearing while allowing the Review Petition No.913/2018 because the Court has done nothing in the case but only directed the Registry to draw a decree in pursuance to the order dated 31.10.2017. It is also contended by the learned counsel for non-applicant/respondent No.2 that after admission before the Mediator, the applicant/petitioner cannot criticize the order passed by the Court which is based upon the agreement carried out by the parties before the Mediator.
16. Arguments heard and record perused.
17. The basic contention of the learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner is that the order passed on 31.10.2017 and thereafter directing the Registry to draw a decree according to the agreement entered into between the parties before the Mediator, is not in consonance to the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code. He submitted that without there being any 7 Review Petition Nos.621/2019 & 422/2019 application under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code, no compromise can be done before the Court and as such, the order dated 31.10.2017 is liable to the recalled.
18. It is not denied by the applicant/petitioner that when the matter was referred to the Mediator, settlement took place between the parties and terms of settlement were reduced in writing on 06.07.2017. It is also not a case of the applicant/petitioner that he signed the agreement under any fear or pressure, meaning thereby, he has admitted the terms and conditions of the agreement and also admitted the fact that he entered into compromise with non-applicant/respondent No.1.
19. If the order of this Court is seen, there is nothing illegal committed by the Court directing that the matter is compromised in view of the terms and conditions settled between the parties before the Mediator. Undisputedly, the proceedings initiated in pursuance to the direction given by the High Court and the matter was referred to the Mediator as per the requirement of law and if the same is settled before the Mediator, there was no occasion for the parties to move a separate application under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code. The provision for drawing a decree in mediation proceeding is prescribed under the Rules, 2006 and in view of the law laid down by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Cri. Ref. No. 1/2016 (Dayawati v. Yogesh Kumar Gosain), 2017 SCC OnLine 11032, the Court has also considered the aspect as to whether any separate 8 Review Petition Nos.621/2019 & 422/2019 application under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code would be required or not if the matter is already settled before the Mediator in view of the order passed by the Court referred the same as per Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure and observed as under:-
"IV. Scope of Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
34. Mediation as a mode of alternate dispute settlement thus finds statutory recognition in Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
35. Valuable light is thrown on the interpretation of Section 89 in the judicial pronouncements rendered by the Supreme Court of India in (2003) 1 SCC 49, Salem Advocate Bar Assn. v. Union of India (Salem Bar I); (2005) 6 SCC 344, Salem Advocate Bar Assn. v. Union of India (Salem Bar II) and (2010) 8 SCC 24, Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey Constructions Co.
Pvt. Ltd.
36. Extensive amendments were effected to the Code of Civil Procedure by the Legislature by Act 46 of 1999. Amongst the provisions inserted, was Section 89 which provided for settlement of disputes outside the court through use of alternate dispute redressal mechanisms. Several writ petitions came to be filed before the Supreme Court of India challenging the amendments effected to the Code of Civil Procedure by the Amendment Act 46 of 1999 and Amendment Act 22 of 2002. Amongst these was W.P. (C) No. 496/2000 titled Salem Advocate Bar Assn. v. Union of India. This writ petition came to be decided, along with connected writ petitions, by way of the judgment dated 25th October, 2002 reported at (2003) 1 SCC 49, Salem Advocate Bar Assn. v. Union of India (commonly known as Salem Bar I). So far as the amendments and insertion of Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure was concerned, the Supreme Court observed that Section 89 was a new provision and even through arbitration or conciliation had been in place as modes of settling the disputes, this had not really reduced the burden of the courts. The court was of the view that modalities had to be formulated for the manner in which Section 89 as well as other provisions which had been introduced by way of amendments, may have to be operated. For this purpose, a Committee was constituted to ensure that the amendments made became effective and resulted in quicker dispensation of justice.
37. This was followed by a later pronouncement in 9 Review Petition Nos.621/2019 & 422/2019 the same case reported at (2005) 6 SCC 344, Salem Advocate Bar Assn. v. Union of India (commonly referred to as Salem Bar II), whereby the Supreme Court further clarified the position holding as follows:
"57. A doubt has been expressed in relation to clause
(d) of Section 89(2) of the Code on the question as to finalisation of the terms of the compromise. The question is whether the terms of compromise are to be finalised by or before the mediator or by or before the court. It is evident that all the four alternatives, namely, arbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement including settlement through the Lok Adalat and mediation are meant to be the action of persons or institutions outside the court and not before the court. Order 10 Rule 1-C speaks of the "Conciliation Forum" referring back the dispute to the court. In fact, the court is not involved in the actual mediation/conciliation. Clause (d) of Section 89(2) only means that when mediation succeeds and parties agree to the terms of settlement, the mediator will report to the court and the court, after giving notice and hearing to the parties, "effect" the compromise and pass a decree in accordance with the terms of settlement accepted by the parties. Further, in this view, there is no question of the court which refers the matter to mediation/conciliation being debarred from hearing the matter where settlement is not arrived at. The judge who makes the reference only considers the limited question as to whether there are reasonable grounds to expect that there will be a settlement, and on that ground he cannot be treated to be disqualified to try the suit afterwards, if no settlement is arrived at between the parties.
xxx xxx xxx
62. When the parties come to a settlement upon a reference made by the court for mediation, as suggested by the Committee that there has to be some public record of the manner in which the suit is disposed of and, therefore, the court has to first record the settlement and pass a decree in terms thereof and if necessary proceed to execute it in accordance with law. It cannot be accepted that such a procedure would be unnecessary. If the settlement is not filed in the court for the purpose of passing of a decree, there will be no public record of the settlement. It is, however, a different matter if the parties do not want the court to record a settlement and pass a decree and feel that the settlement can be implemented even without a decree. In such eventuality, nothing prevents them 10 Review Petition Nos.621/2019 & 422/2019 in informing the court that the suit may be dismissed as a dispute has been settled between the parties outside the court."
(Emphasis by us)
38. In (2010) 8 SCC 24, Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Cherian Varkey Constructions Co. Pvt. Ltd., the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the scope of Section 89 of the CPC. Certain errors by the draftsman were noted in Section 89 of the CPC. In this judgment, the court further interpreted the statute to implement the spirit, object and intendment of the provisions. We may usefully refer to para 25 of the judgment in this regard, which reads as follows:
"25. In view of the foregoing, it has to be concluded that proper interpretation of Section 89 of the Code requires two changes from a plain and literal reading of the section. Firstly, it is not necessary for the court, before referring the parties to an ADR process to formulate or reformulate the terms of a possible settlement. It is sufficient if the court merely describes the nature of dispute (in a sentence or two) and makes the reference. Secondly, the definitions of "judicial settlement" and "mediation" in clauses (c) and (d) of Section 89(2) shall have to be interchanged to correct the draftsman's error. Clauses (c) and (d) of Section 89(2) of the Code will read as under when the two terms are interchanged:
(c) for "mediation", the court shall refer the same to a suitable institution or person and such institution or person shall be deemed to be a Lok Adalat and all the provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987) shall apply as if the dispute were referred to a Lok Adalat under the provisions of that Act;
(d) for "judicial settlement", the court shall effect a compromise between the parties and shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed.
The above changes made by interpretative process shall remain in force till the legislature corrects the mistakes so that Section 89 is not rendered meaningless and infructuous."
(Emphasis supplied)
39. With regard to anomalies in Section 89 of the CPC, the Supreme Court has thus held that where the court has referred the matter to mediation, the mediator shall be deemed to be a Lok Adalat under the Legal Services Act. For cases covered under Section 89 of the CPC, it is thus abundantly clear that the mediated 11 Review Petition Nos.621/2019 & 422/2019 settlement and settlement before "another Judge", would have the same efficacy and binding status as an award of the Lok Adalat which is deemed to be a decree.
40. The Supreme Court has also stipulated that mediated settlement would have to be placed before the courts concerned for recording of the settlement and disposal of the case. We extract hereunder para 39 of Afcons wherein this is discussed :
"39. Where the reference is to a neutral third party ("mediation" as defined above) on a court reference, though it will be deemed to be reference to Lok Adalat, as the court retains its control and jurisdiction over the matter, the mediation settlement will have to be placed before the court for recording the settlement and disposal. Where the matter is referred to another Judge and settlement is arrived at before him, such settlement agreement will also have to be placed before the court which referred the matter and that court will make a decree in terms of it."
(Emphasis supplied)
41. As a result of the pronouncement in Afcons, Section 89 of the C.P.C. thus stands modified to the extent noted above.
42. So far as the procedure to be adopted by a court upon reference of the disputes in a civil case to an ADR mechanism is concerned, the same stands further considered in Afcons. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under :
"43 We may summarise the procedure to be adopted by a court under Section 89 of the Code as under:
(a) When the pleadings are complete, before framing issues, the court shall fix a preliminary hearing for appearance of parties. The court should acquaint itself with the facts of the case and the nature of the dispute between the parties.
(b) The court should first consider whether the case falls under any of the category of the cases which are required to be tried by courts and not fit to be referred to any ADR processes. If it finds that the case falls under any excluded category, it should record a brief order referring to the nature of the case and why it is not fit for reference to ADR processes. It will then proceed with the framing of issues and trial.
(c) In other cases (that is, in cases which can be referred to ADR processes) the court should explain the choice of five ADR processes to the parties to enable them to exercise their option.12
Review Petition Nos.621/2019 & 422/2019
(d) The court should first ascertain whether the parties are willing for arbitration. The court should inform the parties that arbitration is an adjudicatory process by a chosen private forum and reference to arbitration will permanently take the suit outside the ambit of the court. The parties should also be informed that the cost of arbitration will have to be borne by them. Only if both parties agree for arbitration, and also agree upon the arbitrator, the matter should be referred to arbitration.
(e) If the parties are not agreeable for arbitration, the court should ascertain whether the parties are agreeable for reference to conciliation which will be governed by the provisions of the AC Act. If all the parties agree for reference to conciliation and agree upon the conciliator(s), the court can refer the matter to conciliation in accordance with Section 64 of the AC Act.
(f) If the parties are not agreeable for arbitration and conciliation, which is likely to happen in most of the cases for want of consensus, the court should, keeping in view the preferences/options of parties, refer the matter to any one of the other three ADR processes: (a) Lok Adalat; (b) mediation by a neutral third-party facilitator or mediator; and (c) a judicial settlement, where a Judge assists the parties to arrive at a settlement.
(g) If the case is simple which may be completed in a single sitting, or cases relating to a matter where the legal principles are clearly settled and there is no personal animosity between the parties (as in the case of motor accident claims), the court may refer the matter to Lok Adalat. In case where the questions are complicated or cases which may require several rounds of negotiations, the court may refer the matter to mediation. Where the facility of mediation is not available or where the parties opt for the guidance of a Judge to arrive at a settlement, the court may refer the matter to another Judge for attempting settlement.
(h) If the reference to the ADR process fails, on receipt of the report of the ADR forum, the court shall proceed with hearing of the suit. If there is a settlement, the court shall examine the settlement and make a decree in terms of it, keeping the principles of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code in mind.
(i) If the settlement includes disputes which are not the subject-matter of the suit, the court may direct 13 Review Petition Nos.621/2019 & 422/2019 that the same will be governed by Section 74 of the AC Act (if it is a conciliation settlement) or Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (if it is a settlement by a Lok Adalat or by mediation which is a deemed Lok Adalat). If the settlement is through mediation and it relates not only to disputes which are the subject-matter of the suit, but also other disputes involving persons other than the parties to the suit, the court may adopt the principle underlying Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code. This will be necessary as many settlement agreements deal with not only the disputes which are the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding in which the reference is made, but also other disputes which are not the subject-matter of the suit.
(j) If any term of the settlement is ex facie illegal or unenforceable, the court should draw the attention of parties thereto to avoid further litigations and disputes about executability."
(Emphasis by us)
111. Reference can usefully be made to certain pronouncements under the Code of Civil Procedure, wherein the Legislature has provided Rule 3 of Order XXIII, which specifically provides for "Compromise of suits". The Legislature has prescripted that if it is "proved to the satisfaction of the court" that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any "lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties", the court shall order such agreement or compromise to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance thereof, so far as it relates to the parties in the suit. It is important to note that Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC permits the consideration of the agreement, whether or not the subject matter of the agreement or compromise is the same as the subject matter of the suit. While the Code of Civil Procedure would have no application to the proceedings which are guided by the Criminal Procedure Code, however, given the legislative vacuum, there appears to be no reason as to why the principles which apply to consideration of a settlement under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC cannot be applied for consideration of a settlement which is the subject matter of consideration by a court under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. or Section 147 of the NI Act. The principles of Rule 3 or Order XXIII of the C.P.C., as laid in judicial pronouncements, can be summarized thus:
(i) For a compromise to be held to be binding, it has to be signed either by the parties or by their counsels or both, failing which Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC would not be applicable. (Ref. : (1988) 1 SCC 270, Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel; (2009) 6 SCC 194, Sneh Gupta v. Devi Sarup) 14 Review Petition Nos.621/2019 & 422/2019
(ii) Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC casts an obligation on the court to be satisfied that the settlement agreement is lawful and is in writing and signed by the parties or by their counsels. (Ref. : (1978) 2 SCC 179, Suleman Noormohamed v. Umarbhai Janubhai; (2006) 1 SCC 148, Amteshwar Anand v. Virender Mohan Singh).
(iii) An obligation is cast on the court under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC to order the agreement to be recorded and pass a decree in accordance thereof. (Ref. : (2006) 1 SCC 148, Amteshwar Anand v. Virender Mohan Singh (paras 26 and 27)).
(iv) A consent decree is really a contract between the parties with the seal of the court superadded to it. (Ref. :
(1969) 2 SCC 201, Baldevdas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors (India) P. Ltd.; (2002) 100 DLT 278, Hindustan Motors Ltd. v. Amritpal Singh Nayar; (2007) 14 SCC 318, Parayya Allayya Hittalamani v. Sri Parayya Gurulingayya Poojari).
(v) A consent decree may operate as an estoppel as well.
[Ref.: AIR 1956 SC 346, Raja Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. State of Orissa; (2007) 14 SCC 318, Parayya Allayya Hittalamani v. Sri Parayya Gurulingayya Poojari (para 15)].
112. The practice followed by the civil court before whom the settlement in writing, duly signed by the parties, is placed, is to record the statements of parties confirming that the settlement was entered into voluntarily, without any force, pressure or undue influence; that it contained the actual terms of the settlement; and undertakings of the parties to remain bound by the terms thereof. Upon being satisfied that the settlement was voluntary and lawful, the civil court takes it on record accepting the undertaking and passing a decree in terms thereof."
In view of the above, there is no iota of doubt that the Court can direct for drawing a decree directly on the basis of the settlement took place between the parties before the Mediator. These review petitions are frivolous and showing unbecoming conduct of the applicant/petitioner, unnecessarily entering into the arena of procedural irregularity alleging that the application should have been filed under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code.
20. In the present case, when admittedly the 15 Review Petition Nos.621/2019 & 422/2019 applicant/petitioner has entered into the agreement (Annexure-A-1), signed the same and on the basis of which the decree has been drawn, there is no reason for the applicant/petitioner to file a frivolous petition dragging the parties unnecessarily into litigation and wasting the precious time of the Court that too making allegation against the Court itself that it has committed illegality, not followed the procedure and not granted any opportunity of hearing to the applicant/petitioner.
21. Had it been a case of the applicant/petitioner that the decree drawn, was not in consonance with the terms of agreement (Annexure-A-1), then it would have been a case otherwise not. I am not convinced with the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner and in my opinion, the present petition is nothing but a frivolous exercise on the part of the applicant/petitioner harassing other party unnecessarily.
22. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the review petition i.e. R.P. No.913/2018 has been allowed by the Court without giving opportunity of hearing to the applicant/petitioner, but infact that was not an illegality on the part of the Court because no prejudice has been caused to the applicant/petitioner. The only direction was given by the Court to draw a decree which was slipped with the Court at the time of passing the order dated 31.10.2017.
23. In case of Shashi Kuchhwaha Vs. Municipal 16 Review Petition Nos.621/2019 & 422/2019 Corporation, Satna, reported in 2006 (4) MPLJ 225, the Court has observed that in a case where giving an opportunity would be an empty formality and would perpetuate illegal action for some more time, no mistake is committed by the Court for not granting the opportunity of hearing to the applicant/petitioner and on this count, the position cannot be restored.
24. Since, there is no mistake apparent on the face of record, the case of Chetram Meena Vs. State of M.P. and another reported in 2016 (3) MPLJ 311, relied upon by the learned counsel for non-
applicant/respondent No.2, is fully applicable in this case.
25. In view of the above, I do not find any error apparent on the face of the record committed by this Court as is being alleged and pointed out by the petitioner in these petitions. Although, the petitioner has filed these frivolous litigation alleging several things against the Court unnecessarily. The conduct of the petitioner is very shocking when he entered into an agreement with the other party before the Mediator and also agreed before the Court to decide the first appeal and pass compromise decree in terms of the agreement executed before the Mediator, there was no reason for the petitioner to come before the Court again by filing these frivolous petitions, therefore, these petition are dismissed with a cost of Rs.50,000/- (rupees fifty thousand) upon the applicant/petitioner out of which Rs.25,000/- (twenty five thousand) to be deposited with the M.P. High Court 17 Review Petition Nos.621/2019 & 422/2019 Legal Services Committee, Jabalpur and the remaining shall be paid to respondent No.2 within a period of one month from today.
Accordingly, the review petitions filed by the applicant/petitioner are dismissed.
(SANJAY DWIVEDI) JUDGE ac/-
Digitally signed by ANIL CHOUDHARY Date: 2019.09.30 13:00:06 +05'30'