Madhya Pradesh High Court
The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Ravi Shankar Singh on 2 November, 2020
Bench: Sanjay Yadav, Atul Sreedharan
1
MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT,
PRINCIPAL BENCH AT JABALPUR
R.P NO. 1010/2020
IN THE MATTER OF: -
Petitioner ... State of Madhya Pradesh, SPE
Lokayukta, Jabalpur
Versus
Respondents ... Ravi Shankar Singh and Others
For the Petitioner: Mr. Satyam Agarwal, Ld. Counsel
Coram: Mr. Justice Sanjay Yadav
Mr. Justice Atul Sreedharan
ORDER
(02/11/2020) Per: Atul Sreedharan J.
The Petitioner is aggrieved by guideline (a) in paragraph 32 of the order dated 08/05/2020, passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 19792/2019, requiring the examination of the sanctioning authority under section 311 Cr.P.C at the time of taking cognizance of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "PC Act").
2. The Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that the guideline mentioned hereinabove is in conflict with the judgements of the Supreme Court which hold, that the validity of the sanction order can only be examined during the course of the trial and not at the commencement of the proceedings before the Special Judge. The judgements of the Supreme Court that the order in question supposedly conflicts with are (1) Prakash Singh Badal Vs. State of Punjab - (2007) 1 SCC 1, (2) Dinesh Kumar Vs. Airport Authority of India - (2012) 1 SCC 532, (3) C.B.I Vs. Ashok 2 Kumar Aggarwal - (2014) 14 SCC 295 and (4) Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Pramila Virendra Kumar Agarwal and Another - 2019 SCC OnLine Supreme Court 1265.
3. Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner has also raised, according to him, a practical difficulty in enforcing guideline (a) as the sanctioning authorities are senior officers in the government and they would, on account of their official engagement, find it extremely inconvenient if they have to be examined as a witness at the very outset.
4. Three questions arise in this case. Two put forth by the Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner and the third which appears apparent to this Court. They are.
(1) Whether guideline (a) in paragraph 32 of the order dated 08/05/2020, passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 19792/2019, is in conflict with the judgements of the Supreme Court mentioned in paragraph No.2 supra, and (2) Whether guideline (a) is impractical and would result in much inconvenience to the sanctioning authority to appear and establish the validity of the sanction order at the very outset? and (3) Whether the instant Review Petition is maintainable in the light of S. 362 Cr.P.C?
QUESTION NO. 1
5. In Prakash Singh Badal Vs. State of Punjab - (2007) 1 SCC 1, the Petitioner had approached the Supreme Court being aggrieved by the order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. 3 The High Court had refused to quash the cases against the Petitioner, the then former Chief Minister of Punjab, registered against his family members and him under the provisions of the PC Act by the succeeding government in office. The ground taken before The Supreme Court was that prior sanction under section 19 of the PC Act was mandatory as the petition continued to be a public servant in his capacity as an MLA. Therefore, merely because the Petitioner was no longer the Chief Minister of Punjab, did not obviate the requirement of previous sanction u/s. 19 of the PC Act. On merits, malafides were alleged.
6. The core issue before the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh Badal's case was whether, previous sanction u/s. 19 of the PC Act was mandatory before the Special Judge could take cognizance for offences under u/s. 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the PC Act against a Public Servant, who no longer occupied the office he abused. The Supreme Court examined an issue, hitherto untouched. It was different from a situation where cognizance was to be taken against the accused who was a Public Servant, but not one, on the date the Court had to take cognizance of the offences, on account of his superannuation, dismissal, removal etc., from service. Instead, the Supreme Court examined a situation where the accused continued to be a Public Servant on the date on which cognizance was to be taken, but was not occupying the post which was allegedly abused by him and whether, in such a situation, previous sanction u/s. 19 of the PC Act was required? The Supreme Court arrived at the finding that where, the Public Servant ceased to occupy the office alleged to have been abused by him, there was no necessity of previous 4 sanction u/s. 19 of the PC Act, notwithstanding the fact that the accused continued to be a Public Servant in another capacity, occupying another public office. While holding so, the Supreme Court also held "The sanction in the instant case related to the offences relatable to the act. There is a distinction between the absence of sanction and the alleged invalidity on account of non-application of mind. The former question can be agitated at the threshold, but the latter is a question which has to be raised during trial"1. The Other judgments of the Supreme Court, relied upon by the Petitioner, have merely followed, what has been held by the Supreme Court in paragraph 48 of Prakash Singh Badal's case. It is relevant to mention here that this proposition of law, laid down in Prakash Singh Badal's case is no longer in effect on account of the amendment to S. 19 of the PC Act w.e.f. 26/07/2018 by which, explanation after the fifth proviso to s. 19(1), set to naught the law laid down by the Supreme Court, in the following words;
Explanation.- For the purposes of sub-section (1), the expression "public servant" includes such persons-
(a) who has ceased to hold the office during which the offence is alleged to have been committed; or
(b) who has ceased to hold the office during which the offence is alleged to have been committed and is holding an office other than the office during which the offence is alleged to have been committed. (emphasis added by the Court) 1Prakash Singh Badal Vs. State of Punjab - (2007) 1 SCC 1, paragraph 48 at page
37. 5
7. If, what has been stated by the Supreme Court in paragraph 48 of Prakash Singh Badal's case is a part of the ratio decedendi of that case, then it goes without saying that question No.1 would have to be answered in favour of the Petitioner. Even if the same is an obiter dicta, judicial discipline would require this Court to feel itself bound by it unless, the Supreme Court itself has held to the contrary in any other case, where the contrary opinion is the ratio decedendi of that case or, where the Supreme Court has held to the contrary by way of another obiter dicta, in an earlier case, where the strength of the bench is the same in both cases.
8. The Supreme Court in Director of Settlements A.P Vs. M.R. Apparao, has held that the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts in view of Article 141 in the following words "......Article 141 of the Constitution unequivocally indicates that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. The aforesaid Article empowers the Supreme Court to declare the law. It is, therefore, an essential function of the Court to interpret a legislation. The statements of the Court on matters other than law like facts may have no binding force as the facts of two cases may not be similar. But what is binding is the ratio of the decision and not any finding of facts. It is the principle found out upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. To determine whether a decision has "declared law" it cannot be said to be a law when a point is disposed of on concession and what is binding is the principle underlying a decision. A judgment of 6 the Court has to be read in the context of questions which arose for consideration in the case in which the judgment was delivered. An "obiter dictum" as distinguished from a ratio decidendi is an observation by the Court on a legal question suggested in a case before it but not arising in such manner as to require a decision. Such an obiter may not have a binding precedent as the observation was unnecessary for the decision pronounced, but even though an obiter may not have a binding effect as a precedent, but it cannot be denied that it is of considerable weight. The law which will be binding under Article 141 would, therefore, extend to all observations of points raised and decided by the Court in a given case......2".
9. In State of Haryana Vs. Ranbir, the Supreme Court, while deciding a case under the NDPS Act, held ".........A decision, it is well settled, is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. The distinction between a dicta and obiter is well known. Obiter dicta is more or less presumably unnecessary to the decision. It may be an expression of a viewpoint or sentiments which has no binding effect......."3.
10. Judgements are not to be interpreted as statutes and they must be read in the context in which they are passed. In Haryana Financial Corporation Vs. Jagdamba Oil Mills, the Supreme Court held "Courts should not place reliance on decisions 2 Director of Settlements A.P Vs. M.R. Apparao - (2002) 4 SCC 638, paragraph 7 at page 650 3 State of Haryana Vs. Ranbir - (2006) 5 SCC 167, paragraph 12 at page 171 7 without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are not to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark upon lengthy discussions, but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes, their words are not to be interpreted as statutes"4. The Supreme Court strongly emphasises that judgements should not be read and applied pedantically. It would lie upon the Court applying the judgement of the Supreme Court to cull the ratio decedendi and distinguish it from the obiter dicta of the Court.
11. Even in Prakash Singh Badal's case, the Supreme Court while dealing with the submission put forth on behalf of the Petitioner that a previous sanction for an offence u/s. 467 and 468 IPC would be essential in view of the judgement of the Supreme Court in Rakesh Kumar Mishra Vs. State of Bihar - (2006) 1 SCC 557, the Supreme Court observed that the said case had no relevance and held "Reference to a particular decision is an authority for what it actually decides. Reference to a particular 4Haryana Financial Corporation Vs. Jagdamba Oil Mills - (2002) 3 SCC 496, paragraph 19 at page 508 8 sentence in the context of the factual scenario cannot be read out of context"5
12. Where an obiter of the Supreme Court is in conflict with the clear and unambiguous words of the statute, the will of the legislature will have to prevail through the pen of the inferior Court. However, where the Supreme Court takes into consideration a statutory provision and thereafter gives a finding with reasons, or in other words, interprets a statutory provision, though the same may not have been necessary for the decision of the core issue of the case before it, the same being an obiter dicta of the Supreme Court, would still be a binding precedent under Article 141 on all Courts judicially subordinate to the Supreme Court.
13. As regards the judgements relied upon by the Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner, the main judgement for sustaining the postulate put forth on behalf of the Petitioner is Prakash Singh Badal's case. It is only in paragraph 48 of the said judgement that the Supreme Court observes, and that too fleetingly, that absence of sanction can be looked into at the threshold but the validity of sanction can only be enquired into at the stage of trial (paragraph 6 supra).
14. In this regard, it would be beneficial to examine the provision of S. 19(4) of the PC Act which is as hereunder;
19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution (1). XXX (2). XXX (3). XXX 5Prakash Singh Badal Vs. State of Punjab - (2007) 1 SCC 1 - paragraph 49 at page 37 9 (4). In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings.
Explanation. -For the purposes of this section,-
(a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction;
(b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature.
Sub section 4 of section 19 of the PC Act provides that the objection with regard to the absence of a sanction or any error, omission or irregularity, should be raised at the earliest stage of the proceeding. Here, it is relevant to mention that there has been a conscious usage of the word "proceedings" by the legislature instead of "trial". Every trial is a part of the Court proceeding but every Court Proceeding need not be a trial. In a criminal case, proceedings would start before the Court concerned after the report of investigating agency is filed u/s. 173(2) Cr.P.C and the Trial Court is called upon to take cognisance of the offence(s) u/s. 190 Cr.P.C. Trial would commence after charges are framed as shall be reflected upon by this Court with reference to the judgement of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh's case later in this judgement. Also, explanation
(a) to sub section 4 of section 19 of the PC Act clarifies, that "error" in the sanction order includes the competence of authority granting sanction.
10
15. The Supreme Court in Nanjappa Vs. State of Karnataka -
(2015) 14 SCC 186, has emphatically held in paragraph 22 that the statute forbids the taking of cognizance without previous sanction. It also lays down that the question regarding validity of sanction can be raised at any stage of the proceeding and where the sanction order is found to be invalid, the Trial Court can even discharge the accused. The judgement of the Supreme Court in Nanjappa's case has been elaborately examined by this Court in paragraph 14 and 15 of the impugned order. It goes without saying that where the Supreme Court has laid down that the accused can be discharged for an invalid sanction, it is obviously referring to a pretrial stage. In Nanjappa's case, the Supreme Court held that after the conclusion of the trial, if the Trial Court is of the opinion that the sanction order was invalid, then it ought not to acquit the accused and instead discharge him, as cognisance itself was wrongly taken on account of defective sanction and so, the entire trial itself was void ab initio. However, the Supreme Court did not order a retrial of the Petitioner in Nanjappa's case as, the Petitioner had already suffered an inordinately long trial.
16. It is also relevant to refer to another judgement of the Supreme Court, which precedes Prakash Singh Badal's judgement, also passed by a two judge bench, wherein the Supreme Court held in the following words "Ordinarily, the question as to whether a proper sanction has been accorded for prosecution of the 11 accused persons or not is a matter which should be dealt with at the stage of taking cognizance....."6.
17. That, the trial commences only after the framing of charges is also no longer res integra, as has been held by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab and others - (2014) 3 SCC 92 (paragraph 38). The judgment in Hardeep Singh has also been discussed by this Court elaborately in paragraph 21 of the impugned order.
18. It is relevant to mention here that the observation of the Supreme Court in Nagarajaswamy's case, which was passed by a two-judge bench was not referred, relied or distinguished by the subsequent two judge bench in Prakash Singh Badal's case. Also, the other judgements relied upon by the Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner, mentioned in paragraph 2 supra, have not broken any new ground and have all been passed by two judge benches of the Supreme Court, following the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 48 of Prakash Singh Badal's case. None of these judgements too, refer to the observation in paragraph 14 of Nagarajaswamy's case according to which, the validity of sanction must be looked into at the stage of taking cognizance, which as stated earlier, preceded the two bench judgement in Prakash Singh Badal's case.
19. Thus, in view of what this Court has discussed hereinabove, this Court holds that paragraph 48 of the judgement in Prakash Singh Badal's case is not a binding precedent but an obiter dicta, as it 6State of Karnataka Vs. C. Nagarajaswamy - (2005) 8 SCC 370, paragraph 14 at page 375 12 was not essential for a decision on the core issue before the Supreme Court. Also, as the obiter dicta does not consider the provisions of subsection 4 of section 19 of the PC Act and explanation (a) thereto, the obiter is not binding on this Court. It is also not binding on this Court in view of an earlier obiter dicta of the Supreme Court, to the contrary that validity of sanction must be examined at the stage of taking cognizance, as held in Nagarajaswamy's case.
20. What the Supreme Court has held in paragraph 22 of Nanjappa Vs. State of Karnataka - (2015) 14 SCC 186, clearly settles the law with regard to the stage of examining the validity of sanction, which is at any stage of the "proceedings" which includes the stage of framing of charges which is a pre-trial stage of the proceedings before the Special Court.
21. Therefore, the Court holds that guideline (a) in paragraph 32 of the order dated 08/05/2020, passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 19792/2019, is not in conflict with the judgements of the Supreme Court mentioned in paragraph No.2 supra, as all of them have followed the obiter dicta in paragraph 48 of Prakash Singh Badal's case, which is not a binding precedent under Article 141, as it is not supported by any reasoning and neither was the obiter dicta passed after examining the provisions of S. 19(4) and Explanation (a) of the PC Act. Also, an obiter to the contrary was passed by an earlier two judge bench of the Supreme Court in Nagarajaswamy's case in 2005, holding that the validity of sanction must be looked into ordinarily, at the time of taking cognizance which, as per the judgement of the 13 constitution bench of the Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh's case, is a pre trial stage. Consequently, the prayer of the Petitioner to review the order on this ground is rejected. QUESTION NO. 2
22. The Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that the guideline in question may not be pragmatic to implement as most of the sanctioning authorities are senior civil servants who would find it difficult to come and testify before the Trial Court at the pre-trial stage itself.
23. The argument is specious. Once a person is shown as a witness for the prosecution in the chargesheet, there is no escaping the witness box. Merely because the witness maybe a senior civil servant is no reason to assume that his testimony before the Trial Court can be avoided. It is only the sanctioning authority who can prove the validity of the sanction order so far as it relates to the application of mind. The competence of the sanctioning authority may be proved by a formal witness on the basis of documents but, the fact that the sanctioning authority had applied its mind to the record of the case against the accused, before granting sanction to prosecute u/s. 19 of the PC Act, can only be proved by the sanctioning authority. Therefore, the timing of the sanctioning authority taking the stand is not relevant.
24. The importance of the sanctioning authority establishing the validity of the sanction order at the earliest point of time cannot be underscored enough. In R.R. Chari Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh - AIR 1962 SC 1573, the Petitioner was convicted for 14 an offence of bribery and the Supreme Court had set it aside on the ground of invalid sanction and refrained from ordering a retrial on account of the Petitioner having suffered the trial for a period of fourteen years. In Sailendranath Bose Vs. State of Bihar - AIR 1968 SC 192, the accused was acquitted by the Supreme Court in a PC Act case on the ground of invalid sanction. In R.J. Singh Ahluwalia Vs. State of Delhi - (1970) 3 SCC 451, the conviction of the accused was set aside by the Supreme Court as the sanction was invalid. In Mohd. Iqbal. Ahmed Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh - (1979) 4 SCC 172, the accused was acquitted because of invalid sanction. In Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan Vs. State of Gujarat - (1997) 7 SCC 622, the accused was acquitted by the Supreme Court because of invalid sanction. In State (Inspector of Police) Vs. Surya Sankaram Karri - (2006) 7 SCC 172, the High Court acquitted the accused in appeal on the ground of invalid sanction and the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal in an appeal by the state. In Moti Lal Saraf Vs. State of J & K - (2006) 10 SCC 560, the case against the accused was quashed by the Supreme Court as even after twenty six years, not a single witness had been examined before the Trial Court in his case and in State of Karnataka Vs. Ameerjan - (2007) 11 SCC 273, the accused was convicted for taking bribe by the Trial Court but acquitted by the High Court on the grounds of invalid sanction which order, was upheld by the Supreme Court in appeal by the State.
25. The purpose of citing these cases as illustrations is to demonstrate, why it is so important to examine the sanctioning authority at the earliest stage under 311 Cr.P.C. If the order of 15 sanction is invalid, the chargesheet can be returned to the prosecution/police with liberty to file afresh with an appropriate sanction order. In all the cases referred to above, the accused may have been guilty on merits but gets away only on account of the sanction order being invalid, which is a travesty of justice. Today, the accused sits pretty as he knows that the dynamics of a trial under the PC Act are such that it invariably gets protracted on account of the difficulties endured by the prosecution in producing its witnesses. Most witnesses in a PC Act case are public servants themselves and the delay in securing their presence range from the prosecutor's office not knowing the current place of posting of the witness or worse, the witness having retired has settled in some other state. Therefore, the trial can stretch on for a decade or more and at the end of this long trial, it is galling if the accused is let off the hook only because of the sanction order was invalid though on merits he may be guilty of the offence.
26. It is all very well to say that after the judgements of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka Vs. C. Nagarajaswamy - (2005) 8 SCC 370, and Nanjappa Vs. State of Karnataka - (2015) 14 SCC 186, the law as it stands today is that where, at the end of a trial, it appears to the Trial Court that the sanction order was invalid, instead of acquitting the accused, the Trial Court should discharge him giving liberty to the State to initiate proceedings against the accused afresh after securing a valid sanction order. However, in Nanjappa's case itself, the Supreme Court did not allow fresh proceeding to recommence against the accused due to the extreme delay caused in the conclusion of the first trial 16 against the accused. In similar circumstances, the Supreme Court in Nagarajaswamy's case, directed fresh proceedings against the accused despite a long protracted trial in the first instance but directed the Trial Court to conclude the trial within a period of six months if possible, giving liberty to the accused to reagitate his case if the trial does not conclude within six months. The fact remains that if inordinate delay takes place in the conclusion of the trial, for no apparent fault of the accused, his right under Article 21 kicks in and his petition for quashing the retrial ordered on account of the first trial ending in a discharge due to invalid sanction, may effectively be sustained on the grounds of violation of the right to speedy trial. In such cases, it may be impractical to direct the trial Court to conclude the trial from scratch within six months, when the first trial itself took more than a decade to conclude.
27. As regards the inconvenience that pre-trail examination of the sanctioning authority may cause to senior civil servants, who are invariably the sanctioning authority, the present global crisis due to the corona virus, has uncovered solutions which were existing from before, but never explored. The State is blessed with one of the best IT infrastructures existing in the country. This Court has held in paragraph 25 of the impugned order that the sanctioning authority is not a material witness but only a witness to a fact of procedural fulfilment. Thus, there can be no objection from the accused to the examination and cross examination of the sanctioning authority through the medium of video conferencing. The sanctioning authority would not have to leave the comfort of his home or office, and yet testify before the Trial Court about the 17 validity of the sanction order. No time would be wasted in travelling and no expenditure incurred and so, in view of what has been discussed, the impracticality in implementation of guideline (a), is negated by this Court and the prayer of the Petitioner to review the impugned order on this ground is also rejected.
QUESTION NO. 3
28. This question, though not based upon the contentions of the Petitioner, is being explored by the Court on account of the perceived ramification it has. The question is, if the present review petition is maintainable in view of section 362 of the Cr.P.C which prohibits the review of an order passed in a criminal case once the case has been finally disposed of. The question assumes significance as the case before this Court was not filed for quash under section 482 Cr.P.C, but under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
29. In Nazma Vs. Javed Alias Anjum, the Supreme Court was examining the propriety of an order passed in a Criminal Miscellaneous Application by which, the High Court had reviewed its order, disposing off a Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition. The Supreme Court held "......Once the criminal Writ Petition has been disposed of the High Court becomes functus officio and cannot entertain review petitions or miscellaneous applications except for carrying out typographical or clerical errors. In the instant case, the High Court has entertained a 18 petition in a disposed of criminal writ petition and granted reliefs, which is impermissible in law"7.
30. As per the High Court Rules, there are only two categories of Writ Petition. (1) Writ Petition (S) for service matters and (2) Writ Petition or other than service matters, which includes writ petitions for quash of an FIR or a criminal case. Writ Petitions are not categorised as Criminal Writ Petitions or Civil Writ Petitions under the High Court rules and so it has to be examined if, in a Writ Petition, a prayer to quash an FIR is amenable to review after the final order is passed, which is not permissible had the relief been sought under S. 482 Cr.P.C.
31. A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Ram Kishan Fauji's case examined, if the power of intra court appeal could be exercised in a criminal case, where relief was sought under Article 226 instead of s. 482 Cr.P.C. No intra court appeal was maintainable if the petition was u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court held "The conception of "criminal jurisdiction" as used in Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is not to be construed in the narrow sense. It encompasses in its gamut the inception and the consequence. It is the field in respect of which the jurisdiction is exercised, is relevant. The contention that solely because a writ petition is filed to quash an investigation, it would have room for intra-court appeal and if a petition is filed under inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C, there would be no space for an intra-court appeal, would create an anomalous, unacceptable and inconceivable 7 Nazma Vs. Javed Alias Anjum - (2013) 1 SCC 376, paragraph 12 at page 380 19 situation"8. By analogy, the same reasoning would apply in a writ petition praying for the quash of a criminal proceeding. It is the content of the Writ Petition that would determine its nature. A final order passed in a quash petition filed u/art 226 would still be the order of a court exercising criminal jurisdiction and therefore, the bar u/s. 362 Cr.P.C would squarely apply. Thus, this Court is of the view that the present review petition is not maintainable and therefore, it is rejected on this ground too.
(Sanjay Yadav) (Atul Sreedharan)
Judge Judge
Digitally signed by SHYAMLEE
SHYAML SINGH SOLANKI
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF
MADHYA PRADESH, ou=HIGH
COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH,
EE SINGH postalCode=482002, st=Madhya
Pradesh,
2.5.4.20=ac96abb2e82eb894053e
SOLANKI
d4357d97cdbcaf87f54aa0ea21d1e
f4dfb2fe607f3cd, cn=SHYAMLEE
SINGH SOLANKI
Date: 2020.11.02 17:55:57 +05'30'
8Ram Kishan Fauji Vs. State of Haryana and Ors. - (2017) 5 SCC 533, paragraph 56 at page 565