Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mahesh Kumar vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 13 December, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2005(1)MPHT263
Author: R.V. Raveendran
Bench: R.V. Raveendran, Shantanu Kemkar
ORDER R.V. Raveendran, C.J.
1. The petitioner claims that he was engaged on daily wage basis in the establishment of Electrical Foreman (M) at Bina. According to him, after verification of the casual service rendered by him, he was issued a Casual Labour Service Card, in pursuance of which he was given the status of a Monthly Rated Casual Labour (MRCL) with the benefit of pay scale applicable to Group "D" with effect from 13-4-1983. He was working continuously thereafter as a MRCL.
2. When the matters stood thus, he was issued a charge-memo, dated 5-7-1990 alleging that he had obtained the position of MRCL by producing a fake Casual Labour Service Card. The charge-memo was followed by an inquiry. The Inquiry Officer submitted a report holding the petitioner guilty of the charge. After furnishing a copy thereof to the petitioner, with opportunity to show cause, the Disciplinary Authority passed an order dated 27/29-10-1993 accepting the findings in the inquiry report and imposing the penalty of removal from service. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed an appeal. The appeal was dismissed by order dated 3-6-1994.
3. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority, the petitioner filed O.A. No. 82/1995. When the said application came up for consideration, the petitioner did not challenge the finding of guilt, but contended that certain others against whom similar charges were levelled, have been imposed a lesser penalty and that he should also be treated accordingly. The Tribunal therefore, disposed of the application by order dated 4-7-1997 and remitted the matter to the Appellate Authority with direction to consider the question of quantum of punishment in the light of two documents filed him, provided the petitioner made a representation in that behalf.
4. The petitioner accordingly gave a representation dated 18-8-1997. The Appellate Authority considered the representation and rejected it by order dated 3-9-1997. The petitioner filed a revision which was rejected on 1-9-1998. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Tribunal again in O.A. No. 864/1998, challenging the order of the Disciplinary Authority dated 27/29-10-1993 and the appellate order dated 3-9-1997 and revisional order dated 1 -9-1998. The Tribunal rejected the application by order dated 30-9-2003. The said order of the Tribunal is challenged in this petition on the following two grounds :-
(i) The inquiry was vitiated as he was not given due opportunity and as the disciplinary authority passed the order in a mechanical manner.
(ii) Similarly situated persons were dealt with leniently and therefore, he should also be accorded similar treatment. One Brijlal (MRCL) who was also removed from service on the same charge, was ordered to be taken back into service by the same Appellate Authority by order dated 15-11-1995. In regard to one Sitaram who was also similarly charged, post facto sanction of CM was taken and charge-sheet was dropped. Therefore, he should also be treated similarly.
Re: Contention (i)
5. Having regard to earlier round of litigation in O.A. No. 82/1995 on the file of the Tribunal disposed of on 4-7-1997, this contention is no longer available. In fact, during arguments in that application, the petitioner having no ground to make in regard to the validity of inquiry, only contended that as others similarly situated were imposed minor penalty, he should be dealt with accordingly. The Tribunal therefore, without disturbing the punishment of removal imposed by the order of the disciplinary authority dated 27/29-10-1993 and confirmed by the Appellate Authority by order dated 3-6-1994, directed that he may give a representation for lenient treatment on the basis of similar lenient treatment to others and the Appellate Authority should consider the same and pass appropriate orders. An order was passed accordingly. Therefore, the petitioner can not, in a proceeding challenging the order on representation, re-agitate the validity of the inquiry or the punishment. Those questions have attained finality by virtue of the order dated 4-7-1997 in O.A. No. 82/1995.
Re: Contention (ii)
6. The second question is whether on the ground that some lenient view was taken in the case of someone else, whether relief tan be claimed by the petitioner, who secured MRCL status, by producing a fake card. Firstly a person guilty of securing a particular employment on the basis of a fake service card, can not claim any equitable relief. He can not also complain of discrimination in such matters. Railway is a large organisation employing lakhs of persons. It has hundreds and thousands of Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities deciding thousands of disciplinary matters. For varied reasons, it is possible that different treatment might have been meted out to others; and it is also possible that others who were similarly guilty of production of fake service card were treated leniently. Assuming that others were wrongly favoured, as alleged, the question is whether petitioner can make such illegal favourable treatment to others, the basis for making a claim for a similar treatment in his case ?
7. The question is directly answered by the Supreme Court in Chandigarh Administration v. Jagjit Singh, (1995) 1 SCC 745, as follows :-
"We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, if it can be called one, on which the writ petition has been allowed by the High Court is unsustainable in law and indefensible in principle. Since we have come across many such instances, we think it necessary to deal with such pleas at a little length. Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order can not be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extra-ordinary and discre- tionary power of the High Court can not be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat the illegality over again and again, the illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law indeed, wherever it is possible, the Court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law but even if it can not be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioners' case is similar to the other persons' case. But then why examine another person's case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the Court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the Court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person's case, which other person is not before the case nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course barring exceptional situations- would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court can not ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, tactual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities can not be equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial world."
8. The Supreme Court in Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee (AIR 1996 SC 1175) held thus :-
"Apart from that, even if it is assumed that concession was shown to such stall holders by the NDMC, the appellants can not make grievance in respect of discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution. There appears to be some confusion in respect of the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees equality before law to all citizens. This guarantee of equality before law is a positive concept and it can not be enforced by a citizen or Court in a negative manner. To put it in other words, if an illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any individual or a group of individuals, the others can not invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this Court, that the same irregularity or illegality be committed by the State or an authority which can be held to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, so far such petitioners are concerned, on the reasoning that they have been denied the benefits which have been extended to others although in an irregular or illegal manner. Such petitioners can question the validity of orders which are said to have been passed in favour of persons who wore not entitled to the same. If such claims arc enforced, it shall amount to directing to continue and perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has been a discrimination."
9. Therefore, what happened in the cases of Brijlal and Sita Ram will not furnish any ground for claiming relief, apart from the fact that each of those cases depend on its own facts. We do not therefore, propose to examine whether the cases of Brijlal and Sita Ram were in fact different.
10. The petition has no merit and is accordingly dismissed.