Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Kalyan Kumar Sen vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors on 14 May, 2008
Author: Tapen Sen
Bench: Tapen Sen
Form No. J(2)
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Present:
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice
Tapen Sen
And
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice
Sadhan Kumar Gupta
F.M.A. 2677 of 2007
Kalyan Kumar Sen
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
Mr. Abhijit Sarkar ......... For the Appellant
Mr. Milan Chandra Bhattacharjee
Ms. Daisy Basu ......... For the CTC
Mr. Alok Kumar Ghosh,
Mr. Nilanjan Chatterjee ......... For the State
Heard on: 25/3/2008, 09/4/2008 and 16/4/2008,
Judgment on: 14/5/2008
Sadhan Kumar Gupta, J.
This Appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 22/12/2006 passed by the ld. single Judge in W. P. no. 18547 (W) of 2005.
The fact leading to the filing of the writ petition is that the appellant/petitioner was an employee of the Calcutta Tramways Company since 1978 and he was working in the post of khalashi. While the appellant/petitioner was in service, he remained absent during the period from 16/5/1994 to 30/5/1994 due to his illness. He joined his duty on May 31, 1994 after he was declared medically fit by the Medical Officer of the company. But all on a sudden on June 1, 1994, he was informed by the authority that he was dismissed from the service. Since then, the company did not permit him to join duty though he submitted series of applications and appeals. The authority concerned informed him that because of the order of the Chairman-cum-Managing Director dated November 30, 1994, there was no scope to permit him to work in the company. Ultimately, on February 15, 2005 the appellant/petitioner was informed by the company that having regard to the past developments, there was no scope to re- engage him in the company unless there was any specific direction or order from the court or tribunal or authority. After receiving the said letter, the appellant/petitioner filed the writ petition challenging the action on the part of the company and also prayed that direction should be passed on the company to reinstate him along with all the back wages.
The writ petition was contested by the Calcutta Tramways Company by filing affidavit-in-opposition. The main contention of the company is that the petitioner/appellant was a habitual absentee. Previously he was discharged thrice due to his unauthorised absence. However, the authority reinstated him on those occasions. According to the opposite party/respondent, due to the petitioner's unauthorised absence from May 16, 1994 to May 30, 1994, by the order dated June 1, 1994, the General Manager of the company discharged him from service as per rules and regulations prevailing at the material time. As against this, the appellant/petitioner preferred an appeal which was also dismissed on 30/11/1994 by the disciplinary authority who was the Chairman- cum-Managing Director of the company and the order, so passed by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director was received by the writ petitioner on 5/12/1994. In spite of that the appellant/petitioner continued to submit representations which were duly replied from time to time. It was mentioned in those replies that after the appeal of the petitioner was rejected by the Chairman- cum-Managing Director, there was no scope to engage him in the company.
It is the case of the opposite party/respondent that the appellant/petitioner, before filing the writ petition, approached the Conciliation Officer as per provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in respect of his dismissal order and that proceeding is still pending before the said officer.
That apart, the opposite party/respondent has claimed that the appellant/petitioner committed fraud on the court by filing a document dated 30/11/1994 claiming the same to be the order passed by the Chairman-cum- Managing Director of the respondent/company. In fact no such document was ever served upon the writ petitioner, as claimed by him. The order dated 30/11/1994, passed by the appellate authority being the Chairman-cum- Managing Director, was completely different whereby the order of dismissal, as passed by the General Manager was confirmed. The petitioner duly received the said copy. In spite of that, by way of practising fraud, the petitioner produced another document claiming the same to be the order of the Chairman-cum- Managing Director in order to make out a case in support of his claim, as made in the writ petition. The respondent/opposite party prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
On the basis of such pleadings, both the sides made their respective submissions before the learned trial Judge, who was pleased to dismiss the writ petition by passing the impugned order. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of dismissal, this appeal has been preferred by the appellant/writ petitioner.
It is the contention of the appellant that the dismissal order which was passed against him by the authority was thoroughly illegal as no disciplinary proceeding was started against the petitioner by the authority before passing the dismissal order.
It is further submitted that the dismissal order was never served upon the appellant by the authority and as such, without such service, the authority cannot prevent the writ petitioner to join his duty. In this respect learned advocate for the appellant drew our attention to the letter dated 30/11/1994 which was allegedly written in the name of the appellant by the Chairman-cum- Managing Director of the company. Said letter has been annexed as Annexure P- 7 with the writ application and it is at page 37 of the paper book. Learned advocate for the appellant argued that from the said letter it does not reveal that the authority actually dismissed the writ petitioner from service.
Learned Advocate for the appellant further submitted that it is the case of the appellant that his signature was obtained by the authority in a blank paper which was filed in connection with the writ application. According to the learned advocate for the appellant, learned trial Judge did not consider this aspect at its proper perspective while dismissing the writ application.
Further contention of the learned advocate for the appellant is that the observation of the learned trial Judge that the appellant suppressed the fact of pendency of the conciliation proceeding before the Conciliation Officer in respect of the dispute amongst the parties, is not at all correct. According to him, in the writ petition it was mentioned that there was a conciliation proceeding started in respect of the dispute in question at the instance of the writ petitioner. As such, there was no suppression of fact, as observed by the learned trial Judge.
Learned advocate for the appellant argued that the learned trial Judge did not consider all these aspects, as placed before him by the appellant/writ petitioner and as such, learned Trial Judge was not at all justified in dismissing the writ petition. Learned advocate for the appellant thus, has prayed for setting aside the impugned judgment, as passed by the learned trial Judge.
As against this, Mr. Milan Chandra Bhattacharjee, learned advocate for the respondent/company submitted that the appellant/writ petitioner did not approach the writ court with clean hands. According to him, the appellant/writ petitioner based his claim on a forged document which was annexed as Annexure P-7 which is at page 37 of the paper book in order to misguide the learned trial Judge. As such, he argued that since the writ court is basically a court of equity, the writ petitioner cannot be favoured with any equitable relief, solely on the ground that he did not approach the writ court with clean hands.
Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned advocate for the respondent/company further argued by drawing our attention to the supplementary affidavit, as sworn by the then Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Calcutta Tramways Company, wherein said officer stated, on oath, that the letter dated 30/11/1994, as produced by the writ petitioner and which is at page 37 of the Paper Book was not at all written by him and it did not bear his signature also. Mr. Bhattacharjee submits that this Mr. D. K. Chakrabarty is now posted as the Secretary to the Government of West Bengal and as such, there cannot be any reason to disbelieve his statement, as made in his affidavit. On the contrary Mr. Bhattacharjee drew our attention to the fact that in fact this Mr. D.K. Chakrabarty in his capacity as Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Calcutta Tramways Company disposed of the appeal, as preferred by the writ petitioner on 30/11/1994 wherein after elaborate discussion, he was of the opinion that the writ petitioner did not deserve any mercy due to his past conduct and thereby rejected the appeal and in the process he confirmed the order of the General Manager (Admn) discharging the appellant with effect from 1/6/1994.
Mr. Bhattacharjee further submitted that this order was duly communicated to the writ petitioner who received the same by putting his signature on a paper acknowledging the receipt of the document. In this respect he has drawn our attention to the Annexure 'R' which is at page 81 of the paper book. According to Mr. Bhattacharjee, the claim, as made by the appellant/writ petitioner that his signature in this paper was obtained under duress cannot be accepted without any proof whatsoever to that effect. As such, he argued that it is clear that the appellant/writ petitioner was rightly dismissed from service by virtue of the order initially passed by the General Manager which was confirmed by the order dated 30/11/1994, as passed by the disciplinary authority.
As regards the submissions of the learned advocate for the writ petitioner/appellant that no disciplinary proceeding in its proper sense was started against the writ petitioner and as such, the dismissal order cannot be sustained in the eye of law, Mr. Bhattacharjee argued that in the Leave Rules of the company, as was prevalent at the material time, it was mentioned therein clearly that in case of continuous absence for more than 14 days, no formal charge-sheet is required to be served against a delinquent. In this respect he has relied upon the Rule IX (b) of the Leave Rules of the said company. According to him, the order of discharge, so passed by the General Manager which was subsequently confirmed in the appeal by the disciplinary authority was perfectly legal and it cannot be said that the appellant/writ petitioner was dismissed from service without any valid legal proceeding, as claimed by the writ petitioner.
Mr. Bhattacharjee further argued that the appellant/writ petitioner is guilty of suppression of material fact as he did not mention in his writ petition that over the dispute in question, a conciliation proceeding is still pending before the appropriate authority. As against this submission, learned advocate for the appellant pointed out that in the writ petition there was mention of this conciliation proceeding and as such, according to him, it cannot be said that the writ petitioner was guilty of suppression of fact. Against such submission, Mr. Bhattacharjee argued that it was simply mentioned in the writ petition that a conciliation proceeding was filed and the writ petitioner did not continue with the said proceeding. Mr. Bhattacharjee by drawing our attention to the Annexure R- 1, which is at page 86 of the paper book, argued that from this document it will be clear that the said conciliation proceeding was still pending before the Conciliation Officer at least on 12/4/2004. As such Mr. Bhattacharjee argued that on the basis of this document one can safely presume that the conciliation proceeding was pending before the appropriate forum and there is nothing on record to show that it was disposed of on the prayer of the appellant/writ petitioner, as claimed by him.
Lastly Mr. Bhattacharjee argued that the order of discharge was passed on 1/6/1994 and the writ petition was filed in the year 2005 i.e. after a lapse of 11 yeas. According to Mr. Bhattacharjee it is not permissible to allow the writ petitioner/appellant to challenge the dismissal order after a lapse of 11 years and if it is permitted at this stage, then it will cause serious prejudice and difficulties to the administration as well as for the other employees. As such, Mr. Bhattacharjee submitted that on the ground of this inordinate delay, the writ petition, as filed by the appellant, is liable to be dismissed. According to Mr. Bhattacharjee, there is nothing wrong in the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Judge and consequently there is no scope for this court to interfere with the said judgment of the learned court below. Accordingly, he prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
I have taken into consideration the submissions, as made by the learned advocates for both the sides. The learned Advocate for the appellant first of all argued that it is the admitted position that the appellant/writ petitioner was discharged/dismissed from service without initiating proper disciplinary proceeding. As such, he argued that said dismissal order of the writ petitioner without initiating any disciplinary proceeding, is per se illegal and the termination of service on the basis of such action on the part of the authority concerned being void ab initio, same should immediately be set aside and the writ petitioner should be permitted to join his duty. He further argued that by not initiating the departmental proceeding against the writ petitioner, the authority concerned practically deprived him of an opportunity to explain his part of his case before the appropriate authority to the effect that the absence from duty was not at all intentional.
As against this, Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned advocate for the respondent argued that the entire claim of the writ petitioner regarding his unauthorised absence, was taken care of by the order, as passed by the disciplinary authority and so the writ petitioner cannot have any grievance in this respect.
Mr. Sarkar, learned advocate for the appellant argued that even if the disciplinary authority took care of the submission of the writ petitioner regarding his absence, that cannot cure the defect which already crept in due to non- initiation of any disciplinary proceeding. In this respect he has relied upon the decision reported in AIR 1977 SC 747 (Mysore State Road Transport Corporation vs. Mirja Khasim Ali Bag & Anr.), wherein it was held that the order passed in appeal by the departmental appellate authority does not validate the invalid order of discharge.
That apart, Mr. Sarkar, learned advocate for the appellant, in support of his contention that the order of discharge without initiating any departmental proceeding was illegal, cited decisions, reported in AIR 1971 SC 1409 (Deokinandan Prasad vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.) and AIR 1966 SC 1364 (Mafatlal Narandas Barot vs. D. Rathod, Divisional Controller, State Transport Mehsana & Anr.).
In the decision reported in AIR 1971 SC page 1409 (supra), it has been held by the Apex Court that even though the rule prescribes automatic termination of service for continuous absence, an order passed to that effect without giving opportunity to the government servant offends Article 311 of the Constitution of India.
In the decision reported in AIR 1966SC page 1364 (supra) the Apex Court observed as follows:
"(11) Regulations 38 and 40 provide that irregular attendance, absence without leave and without reasonable cause and failure, without sufficient cause, to report, when directed, for duty amount to acts of misconduct. Clause 4(b) is specific and clear.
Under that clause, it is obligatory on the part of the respondent, to give the appellant a reasonable opportunity to show cause, by providing him with a copy of the charge or charges, as well as the statemet of the allegations that have been made againsthim. Admittedly, the respondent did not frame a charge against the appellant nor conduct any enquiry.
(12) It is true that the respondent may visit the punishment of discharge or removal from service on a person who has absented himself without leave and without reasonable cause, but this cannot entail automatic removal from service without giving such person reasonable opportunity to show cause why he be not removed. The appellant is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to show cause which includes an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence which he can do only when he knows what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based. In our judgment, the appellant was entitled to an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him." So, it appears that the ratio, as decided in all those cases is to the effect that without initiating a departmental proceeding and without giving an opportunity to the concerned employee to give explanation in respect of the alleged misdeed, the service of such employee should not be terminated. There cannot be any dispute in this respect. So, I have got no hesitation to hold that the manner in which the service of the writ petitioner/appellant was terminated appears to be not proper. Since it appears that the order of discharge, so passed by the departmental authority, without initiating any departmental proceeding, appears to be improper, so there cannot be any doubt that such defect could not be cured by the order passed by the appellate authority. The decision reported in AIR 1977 SC 747 (Mysore State Road Transport Corporation vs. Mirja Khasim Ali Bag & Anr.) is very much relevant in this respect. In the said decision the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:
" The second contention urged on behalf of the appellants that as the General Manager of the Mysore Government Road Transport Department confirmed on appeal the orders of dismissal of the first respondent that should be considered as substantial compliance with the provisions of Article 311 (1) of the Constitution is, in our judgment, devoid of substance. The original order of dismissal of the first respondents being without jurisdiction and as such void and inoperative having been passed in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 (1) of the constitution, the order passed on appeal by the General Manager could not cure the initial defect". In view of such decisions of the Apex Court, I am in full agreement with this submission, as made by Mr. Sarkar, learned advocate for the appellant.
In order to overcome this legal position, as discussed above, Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned advocate for the respondent argued that even if the dismissal order is considered to be improper, then also no relief can be granted to the writ petitioner as he did not approach the court with clean hands and is guilty of practising fraud upon the court. In this respect he has relied upon the decisions reported in AIR 1997 SC 1041 (Panchu Gopal Barua & Ors. vs. Umesh Chandra Goswami & Ors.) and AIR 2000 SC 1165 (United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Rajendra Singh & Ors.). In support of his contention, Mr. Bhattcharjee argued that the writ petitioner practised fraud upon the court by annexing the Annexure P-7, which is at page 37, in order to impress upon the court that actually no discharge order was passed by the appropriate authority. Mr. Bhattacharjee argued that there was no such existence of this document, as filed by the writ petitioner in support of his case. According to him, it is a forged document prepared for the purpose of the writ application. In this respect, he has drawn our attention to the affidavit sworn by the then Chairman-man-Managing Director of the Calcutta Tramways Company, who is at present serving as the Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, wherein it was clearly stated that no such document was issued by him in favour of the writ petitioner nor he signed in the said document, that is annexed as Annexure P-7 to the writ petition. There is no reason whatsoever to disbelieve the statement of the then Chairman-man-Managing Director and it appears that the learned Trial Judge was perfectly justified in holding that the writ petitioner practised fraud upon the court by way of using a document which is not genuine.
Mr. Bhattacharjee further contended that the writ petitioner is guilty of making several false statements in the writ application. In this respect, it appears that the writ petitioner claimed that the receipt, as filed by the respondent showing the service of the order of the disciplinary authority, was obtained from him under duress. But no prima-facie proof, in this respect, was given by the writ petitioner/appellant and as such, the learned trial Judge was perfectly justified in holding that the order of the disciplinary authority was duly served upon the writ petitioner in time.
That apart, it appears that the writ petitioner did not mention before the trial court that prior to his approaching the High Court, he submitted an application with the Conciliation Officer of the Government of West Bengal raising an industrial dispute, which is still pending. According to Mr. Bhattacharjee, as this fact was not disclosed by the writ petitioner, so it must be held that he was guilty of suppression of material fact. As against this, learned advocate for the appellant/writ petitioner argued that in the writ application, filing of the petition before the Conciliation Officer was mentioned and it was stated therein that due to the long drawn procedure in that forum, the writ petitioner did not proceed with the same. Although, such fact was stated in the writ petition, but it appears from the document R-1 which is at page 86 of the paper book that it was mentioned therein that the said conciliation proceeding was not yet disposed of, as claimed by the writ petitioner. In the absence of any such document, it must be presumed that the said proceeding is still pending before the appropriate authority. It was the duty of the writ petitioner/appellant to apprise the court about the said conciliation proceeding so that the trial Court could come to a definite conclusion in that respect. Under such circumstances, I have got no hesitation to hold that the writ petitioner/appellant is guilty of suppression of material fact before the learned trial Court. It is the settled position that the Writ Court is a court of equity and any person, being aggrieved by any order/action, can approach such court for equitable relief. As such, there cannot be any two opinions that the person who approaches the Writ Court praying for equitable relief, must come with clean hands. But so far as this matter is concerned, there is reason to believe that the writ petitioner/appellant did not approach the Writ Court, with clean hands, as indicated above. Under such circumstances, I have got no hesitation to hold that even if the order of discharge/dismissal appears to be illegal, that cannot be a reason for giving relief to the writ petitioner/appellant as he did not approach the court with clean hands and is guilty of practising fraud upon the Court.
Moreover, the order of dismissal was passed in the year 1994 and the writ petitioner filed the writ petition in the year 2005. There is no explanation whatsoever as to why the appellant/writ petitioner waited for such a long time in preferring the writ application. No relief therefore can be granted in favour of the writ petitioner/appellant. In this respect, decisions reported in 2005 (11) SCC 546 (Cheripalli Madar vs. Assistant Division Engineers & Ors.), AIR 1997 SC 2249 (Sudhir Vishnu Panvalkar vs. Bank of India), AIR 2007 SC 1365 (New Delhi Municipal Council vs. Pan Singh & Ors.), 1998 (6) SCC 549 (Scooters India & Ors. vs. Vijai E. Eldred), AIR 1992 SC 1414 (Bhoop Singh vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 2640 (Nadia Distt. Primary School Council & Anr. Vs. Sristidhar Biswas & Ors.) and AIR 1995 SC 1991 (State of Maharashtra vs. Digambar), may be referred to.
Mr. Sarkar, learned advocate for the writ petitioner/appellant argued that since 1994 and till the filing of the writ application, the wrong committed by the appropriate authority continued and as such, in view of the provisions of Sections 22 and 23 of the Limitation Act, the appellant is entitled to file the writ application before the High Court, although at a belated stage and said writ petition should not be treated as barred by limitation, as claimed by the respondent. He relied upon the decisions reported in AIR 1959 SC 798 (supra), AIR 1957 Cal 483 (supra) and AIR 1938 Patna 212 (supra).
I have taken into consideration the arguments, as advanced by the learned Advocates for both the sides. It is the admitted position that the appellant/writ petitioner was dismissed from service due to his unauthorised absence. There is no dispute also that prior to such dismissal order, the writ petitioner was dismissed from service on three occasions due to dereliction of duty. However, the authority was kind enough to allow his reinstatement. But so far as the present misconduct, as was alleged to have been committed by the writ petitioner, the authority was strict in its decision and did not allow any reinstatement. This decision of the authority was challenged by the writ petitioner by filing the writ petition. It has already been pointed out that the dismissal order was apparently passed not by initiating any disciplinary proceeding. We have also noted that the Supreme Court in various decisions observed that such dismissal order without starting a disciplinary proceeding should be treated to be not valid. However, the Writ Petition must be dismissed not only for the reasons stated above but also for the fact that for reasons best known to the writ petitioner, the writ petition itself was filed after a lapse of 11 years. There is no explanation for such inordinate delay as to why he waited for these 11 years in challenging the order of dismissal. In the decision reported in 2005 (11) SCC pg. 546 (supra) the Apex Court observed to the effect:
"The petition was actually filed after a delay of 3 years, naturally the High Court was not inclined to interfere in the matter because of the laches. Even on merits from the material the main award of the Tribunal we are satisfied that no injustice has been done. In the said view of the matter this appeal fails and the same is dismissed".
In the decision reported in AIR 2007 SC pg. 1365 (supra) it was held that relief sought for by the employee after a lapse of 17 long years should not be allowed.
Same principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in 1998 (6) SCC pg. 549 (supra) to the effect:
"That apart, the writ petition was filed more than 6 years after the date on which the cause of action is said to have arisen and there being no cogent explanation for the delay, the writ petition should have been dismissed on the ground of laches alone."
Almost same principle was laid down by the Apex Court in its decision reported in AIR 2007 SC pg. 2640 (supra) wherein it was clearly laid down that delay is very significant in matters of granting relief and courts cannot come to the rescue of the persons who are not vigilant of their rights.
So, from the decisions of the Apex Court, as discussed above, it is clear that the High Court should not allow the prayer for reinstatement when there is inordinate delay in filing the Writ Petition. Under such circumstances, I am of the opinion that the learned Trial Judge was perfectly justified in refusing to grant relief to the writ petitioner, as prayed in the writ application.
That apart, it has already been pointed out that the appellant/writ petitioner was thrice dismissed from service on the ground of unauthorised absence. So, it is clear that the writ petitioner is guilty of being of the habit of absenting himself from duty unauthorisedly. In the decision reported in 2008 (1) SCC pg. 224 (L & T KOMATSU Ltd. vs. M. Udaykumar) the Apex Court clearly held that habitual absenteeism amounts to gross violation of discipline and in case of his consequential dismissal from service the action should not be treated to be harsh and no interference by the Court is warranted. As such, in view of this decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court, I am also of the opinion that the appellant/writ petitioner should not be treated in a lenient way, as prayed by him.
Above all, we have already pointed out that the appellant/writ petitioner, in order to obtain relief from the Writ Court, relied upon a forged document claiming that it was issued by the Managing Director of the respondent/company. The writ petitioner also did not disclose before the Writ Court that a conciliation proceeding was pending in the Labour Court in respect of the dispute in between the parties. Under such circumstances, there cannot be any doubt that the appellant/writ petitioner did not approach the Writ Court with clean hands which is sine qua non for obtaining an equitable relief from a Court of equity i.e. the Writ Court.
In my discussion above, I have already pointed out that there is reason to believe that the appellant/writ petitioner practised fraud upon the Court by way of producing a forged document. In the decision reported in AIR 2000 SC pg. 1165 (supra) the Supreme Court was of the opinion that in case it is found that an order has been procured by a party by practising fraud upon the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, then it is always desirable that the Writ Court should immediately recall such order. In other words the Supreme Court clearly deprecated this practice of obtaining order from the Writ Court by way of practising fraud. So far as this hearing is concerned, it has already been pointed out that the writ petitioner/appellant is guilty of practising fraud by producing a document which is at page 37 of the paper book before the Writ court claiming the same to be a genuine one although from the affidavit of the person concerned i.e. the Managing Director of the company there cannot be any doubt that no such document was issued on behalf of such officer. This action on the part of the appellant/writ petitioner undoubtedly leads us in coming to the conclusion that the writ petitioner did not approach the Writ Court with clean hands. At the very outset we have mentioned that even if a person has got good a case in support of his contention, then also such person cannot be rewarded with any relief by the Writ Court if it is found that said person was guilty of making an attempt to obtain an order from the court by way of practising fraud and did not approach the said court with clean hands. So far as the present case is concerned, I have got no hesitation to hold that the appellant/writ petitioner is guilty of practising fraud upon the Court and also he did not approach the Court with clean hands. That apart, the appellant approached the Court with unusual delay and there is no reasonable/believable explanation for that. Under such circumstances, in my considered opinion, the appellant/writ petitioner is not entitled to get any relief, as prayed for although, there may be defect in the order passed by the authority in respect of the dismissal of the writ petitioner. It appears that the learned Trial Judge considered all these aspects in dismissing the writ application and I find no reason to interfere with the said finding of the learned Trial Judge in view of the discussion, as made above.
In the result, the appeal is dismissed on contest with Costs which is quantified at Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five thousand only). The same must be deposited by the appellant with the State Legal Services Authority within one month from today, failing which, the same shall be recoverable from the Appellant as arrears of land revenue.
Urgent photocopy of this judgment be handed over to the parties, if applied for.
(SADHAN KUMAR GUPTA, J.) I agree, (TAPEN SEN, J.)