Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Karnam Bala Rama Krishna Murthy vs Bandla Suryanarayana Babu on 12 November, 2019
Author: M. Satyanarayana Murthy
Bench: M. Satyanarayana Murthy
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY
+ CRIMINAL PETITION Nos.5143 AND 5144 OF 2018
% Dated 12.11.2019
CRL.P.No.5143 of 2018
#
Karnam Bala Rama Krishna Murthy
Ongole, Prakasam District ..... Petitioner
Vs.
$
Bandla Suryanarayana Babu,
Ongole Prakasam District, ..Respondents
CRL.P.No.5144 of 2018
#
Karnam Bala Rama Krishna Murthy
Ongole, Prakasam District ..... Petitioner
Vs.
$
Smt. Udayalakshmi, IAS
Collector & District Magistrate, Prakasam District ..Respondents
! Counsel for the petitioner : Sri Ramachandra Rao Gurram
^ Counsel for the respondent : learned Public Prosecutor
<GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1. AIR 1965 SC 87
2. AIR 1970 SC 771
3. (2012) 7 Supreme Court Cases 621
4. (2015) 6 Supreme Court Cases 308
5. ARI 1990 SC 494
6. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
7. AIR 2000 SC 1869
8. (1974) QB Page 398, 2 ALL ER PAGE 142
9. (2002) 1 S.C.R. 3
10. (1967) 2 QB 459
11. (1985) 1 WLR 490
12. [1966] 2 All E.R 536
13. [1990] 1 SCR 225
14. 333 U.S. 591 (1948)
15. 332 U.S. 575 (1948)
16. 356 U.S. 464 (1958), affirming 21 N.J. 496, 122 A.2d 628 (1956)
17. 21 N.J. 496, 506, 122 A.2d 628, 634 (1956)
18. 340 U.S. 558 (1951)
19. 332 U.S. 575 (1948)
20. LR (1950) AC 458
21. 1956 CriLJ 805
22. (Cr A No. 185 of 1966, decided on October 25,1968)
23. (1963) 3 All E.R. 510
24. 1970 AIR 962
MSM,J
Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018
2
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY
CRIMINAL PETITION NOs.5143 & 5144 OF 2018
COMMON ORDER:
Both the criminal petitions are filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the proceedings against the petitioner/accused in C.C.Nos.256 & 296 of 2008 on the file of III Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ongole, now transferred to the Special Court for Trial of Criminal Cases Relating to Elected MPs and MLAs at Vijayawada.
As the grounds urged in both the criminal petitions are one and the same, hence, I find it expedient to decide both the petitions by common order. Crl.P.No.5143 of 2018 is taken as a leading petition.
The petitioner is arrayed as accused in both the calendar cases registered for the offences punishable under Sections 353, 186, 341, 506 & 509 of Indian Penal Code (for short 'I.P.C') for obstructing and assaulting and intimidating the officials while they were discharging public functions. It is also averred in the charge sheet that this petitioner is also liable for punishment for the offence punishable under Section 509 of I.P.C for insulting the modesty of Smt. Udayalakshmi, I.A.S (L.W.9)/first respondent in Crl.P.No.5144 of 2018 and further liable for punishment under Section 7(1) of Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932 for prejudice of employment.
The first respondent/Bandla Suryanarayana Babu who was the then Superintending Engineer, Projects at Ongole submitted a complaint to the Station House Officer, Maddipadu Police Station dated 17.09.2006 alleging that Government included Kandulu Obulreddy Project (Gundlakamma Project) as one of the prioritized water project and intended to supply water to the backward areas MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 3 of Prakasam District to an extent of Ac.30,000. The engineers struggled day and night to implement the same. On 16.09.2006, on account of heavy rain in the upper regions of Gundlakamma river, the flood water flown over the lands of the farmers through the diverted channels. In this regard, the first respondent/Bandla Suryanarayana Babu along with Executive Engineer went to remove cofferdam. When the villagers of Mallavaram obstructed them, he convinced them and started to work. Then, one Raghava, a villager of Mallavaram obstructed them from removing the cofferdam to minimise the damage. The police convinced him. Thereafter, 50 villagers of Mallavaram obstructed them. At the same time, the villagers of Mallavaram under the leadership of Raghava conducted "Rasta Roko". When the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Ongole went to prevent "Rasta Roko", asked them about their problems. They replied that, if the executive engineer gives answers they will call off 'Rasta Roko'. Then the Superintending Engineer went to Mallavaram and patiently answered their doubts. On 17.09.2006, the Superintending Engineer along with the District collector, technical advisors and chief engineers together went to the project for verification. After verifying the project, they came to Mallavaram Village and answered the questions put to them by Mallavaram villagers. At about 1:00 PM, MLA of Addanki, Sri Karanam Balaramakrishna Murthy used bad language referring them as "vadu, veedu" and subjected the first respondent to mental agony. Hence, requested to take action against Karanam Balaramakrishna Murthy who subjected the officials to humiliation before the public.
It is also contended that the District Collector and District Magistrate of Ongole also lodged a report on 17.09.2006 to the II Town Police, Ongole with regard to the same incident. The MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 4 II Town Police in turn sent the said report to Maddipadu Police Station on the point of jurisdiction who registered the same as Crime No.131 of 2006 on 18.09.2006 for the same offences Sections 353, 186, 341, 506 & 509 of I.P.C and Section 7(1) of Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932, The gist of the complaint is that the petitioner is said to have used bad language against her saying as "siggu lekunda matladuthunnav' and thereby obstructed her to discharge her legitimate duties and caused annoyance and humiliation. The said crime was also investigated and the police filed charge sheet, which is now pending for trial in C.C.No.296 of 2008.
Based on these reports, F.I.R.Nos.129 & 130 of 2006 were registered for the offences punishable under Sections 353, 186, 341, 506 & 509 of I.P.C.
On the basis of F.I.R, the police investigated into the crimes and filed charge sheet against the petitioner and 20 others for the alleged offences and the same is now pending before the Special Court for Trial of Criminal Cases Relating to Elected MPs and MLAs at Vijayawada.
In the present case, both the petitions are filed to quash the proceedings in C.C.Nos.256 & 296 of 2008, a direction was sought to club all the calendar cases, since the two incidents in all the petitions is one and the same, but multiple prosecutions were filed, which is impermissible under law and filing of different charge sheets for one offence is contrary to the settled principles of law, since it would cause hardship and prejudice to this petitioner. Apart from that, filing of multiple prosecutions would amount to violation of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Crl.P.No.1310 of 2009 dated 04.03.2010 passed the following order.
MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 5 "Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, and keeping in view the Section 300 Cr.P.C and Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India, it is directed that the trial court shall go ahead with the trail of C.C.No.255 of 2008 pending on its file and the proceedings in the other two cases i.e. in C.C.Nos.256 & 296 of 2008 shall be stayed till the disposal of C.C.No.255 of 2008."
Consequent upon the order passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, the petitioner/accused was tried in C.C.No.255 of 2008 by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ongole, found him not guilty and acquitted the petitioner for the same offences. The persons who have said to have obstructed were the District Collector and official witnesses, they were examined as witnesses in C.C.NO.255 of 2008 and their evidence was also considered. The acquittal was based on entire evidence on record and in view of acquittal in C.C.No.255 of 2008 and in view of the earlier order of High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, proceeding with prosecution of this accused for various offences in C.C.Nos.256 & 296 of 2008 based on the complaints of Chief Engineer and District Collector is nothing but harassment to the petitioner, as it violates the earlier order of the Court, apart from the principles of Double Jeopardy or the Issue Estoppel.
The only allegation made against this petitioner is that, he used improper language in the alleged incident against the officials who lodged reports with the police and registered three F.I.Rs and three charge sheets were filed against the petitioner for the same incident, contrary to the provisions of law. As the petitioner was acquitted in one case, he cannot be prosecuted on the basis of evidence of same witnesses and it is hit by principles of natural justice and Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India.
MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 6 It is specifically contended that, in any view the Trial Court considered the evidence of the witnesses who were said to have been obstructed, humiliated and found the same not attracting any offences. Even if the other two calendar cases are tried, the same evidence is to be considered, since the witnesses already examined in other calendar case are estopped to resile from their earlier statements. In such an event, the Court cannot record a finding offsetting the earlier finding of acquittal with regard to the same incidents and events arising out of the same transaction. The point in issue was considered by the Apex Court referring to the principle of issue estoppel, in Manipur Administration, Manipur v. Thokchom Bira Singh1 held that issue estoppel does not prevent the trial of any offence as does autrefois acquit but only precludes evidence being led to prove a fact in issue as regards which evidence has already been led and a specific finding recorded at an earlier criminal trial before a court of competent jurisdiction. The same principle is reiterated by the Apex Court in State Of Andhra Pradesh v. Kokkiliagada Meerayya and another2, in view of the principles laid down in the above judgments, requested to quash the proceedings against this petitioner in C.C.Nos.256 & 296 of 2008 on the file of III Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ongole, now transferred to the Special Court for Trial of Criminal Cases Relating to Elected MPs and MLAs at Vijayawada.
The first respondent in both the criminal petition did not file any counter.
During hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Rama Chandra Rao Gurram contended that, lodging a report by three 1 AIR 1965 SC 87 2 AIR 1970 SC 771 MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 7 persons against the petitioner for the same incident and registration of three crimes against this petitioner, filing of three charge sheets is a serious illegality. Even otherwise, when the accused was found not guilty in C.C.No.255 of 2008 by the competent court, the proceedings against this petitioner in C.C.Nos.256 & 296 of 2008 based on the same material would amount to subjecting this petitioner to unnecessary humiliation. When the issue was already decided by the competent court having jurisdiction, in C.C.No.255 of 2008 vide judgment dated 01.03.2017, the proceedings against this petitioner to try him for the offences hit by Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and contrary to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and another3, Manipur Administration, Manipur v. Thokchom Bira Singh (referred supra), State Of Andhra Pradesh vs Kokkiliagada Meerayya and another (referred supra), Ashwani Kumar alias Ashu v. State of Punjab4, on the basis of the law declared by the Apex Court in the judgments referred supra, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that proceedings against this petitioner to try for the offences referred above, not only would cause much prejudice, besides inconvenience and violates fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and prayed to quash the proceedings against the petitioner/accused in C.C.Nos.256 & 296 of 2008 for the offences referred supra.
Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor for the State of Andhra Pradesh would contend that, merely because the accused was found not guilty in C.C.No.255 of 2008 by competent court, that would not come to the aid of this petitioner to seek quashment of 3 (2012) 7 Supreme Court Cases 621 4 (2015) 6 Supreme Court Cases 308 MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 8 the proceedings in C.C.Nos.256 & 296 of 2008 for different offences stated above and that, issue estoppel cannot be applied in the preset facts of the case, prayed to dismiss the criminal petitions.
Considering rival contentions, perusing the material available on record, the point that arises for consideration is:
"Whether the Principle of Estoppel or Collateral Estoppel is applicable to the criminal cases. If so, whether the proceedings in C.C.Nos.256 & 296 of 2008 on the file of II Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ongole, are liable to be quashed?"
P O I N T:
Admittedly, three crimes were registered against the petitioner based on three complaints lodged by the first respondent in both the criminal petitions and another one by Bandla Suryanarayana Babu s/o Bangaraiah on the same day i.e. on 17.09.2006, copy of F.I.R No.129 of 2006 is placed on record by the learned counsel for the petitioner to substantiate his contention that all the three crimes were registered based on the same incident that allegedly occurred on 17.09.2006 from 13:00 hours in Crime Nos.129 & 130 of 2006, whereas, in Crime No.131 of 2006, the time of occurrence was mentioned as 12:45 hours onwards. But, the allegations made in all the three complaints are one and the same. The accused was tried in C.C.No.255 of 2008 which the subject matter of Crime No.131 of 2006, allegedly occurred since 12:45 onwards, on 17.09.2006. But, as seen from the allegations made in the complaint, the incidents in the three complaints took place on the same day and at same time. But, due to mentioning of time of occurrence, the Investigating Agency filed three charge sheets against this petitioner after completion of investigation in all the three crimes.
MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 9 The main endeavour of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, when the petitioner was tried in C.C.No.255 of 2008 and found not guilty based on the evidence of some witnesses proposed to be examined, trial of this petitioner in C.C.Nos.256 & 296 of 2008 would not serve any purpose and requested to quash the proceedings.
Learned counsel for the petitioner laid foundation based on 'issue of estoppel' contained in Section 115 of Indian Evidence Act and in support of his contention; he placed reliance on various judgments referred supra.
Turning to the facts of the above case, the time and place of occurrence and the witnesses proposed to be examined, scene of offence in C.C.Nos.256 & 296 of 2008 is one and the same. But, whereas, in C.C.NO.255 of 2008, the time of occurrence is not definite, but it is from 12:45 onwards. However, the scene of offence, the witnesses cited in the list of witnesses and examined are one and the same. When the same witnesses were examined and did not support the prosecution case, they cannot resile from their earlier depositions recorded by Magistrate, in the trial of other calendar cases before the Court, if they are examined in pending C.C.Nos.256 & 296 of 2008. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that, even if the petitioner is tried in C.C.Nos.256 & 296 of 2008 for the offences mentioned supra, no purpose would be served, except roaming around the courts for years together, while attending the courts in connection with the cases.
Whereas, learned Public Prosecutor contended that, issue estoppel cannot be applied to the present facts of the case, since it is rather rule of evidence and not creating any total interdict on the trial of the accused to decide his complicity at the end. At best, the MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 10 petitioner may take advantage of the principle of double jeopardy contained under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. However, the same principle of double jeopardy or autrefois acquit cannot be applied, since the complainants in all the three cases are distinct persons, though they are officials and examined before the court in C.C.No.255 of 2008. Consequently, question of quashing the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C does not arise.
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent powers to prevent abuse of the process of Court. In proceedings instituted on complaint or on police report exercise of the inherent power to quash the proceedings is called for only in cases where the complaint or police report does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If, the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482. It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case, before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complaint or charge sheet has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious. In that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court as held by the Apex Court in "Mrs.Dhanalakshmi v. R.Prasanna Kumar5"
5
AIR 1990 SC 494 MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 11 In "State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal6" the Apex Court considered in detail the powers of High Court under Section 482 and the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. The Apex Court summarized the legal position by laying down the following guidelines to be followed by High Courts in exercise of their inherent powers to quash a criminal complaint:
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.6
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 12 (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. The scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C. is well defined and inherent powers could be exercised by the High Court to give effect to an order under the Cr.P.C.; to prevent abuse of the process of court; and to otherwise secure the ends of justice. This extraordinary power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae. However, in exercise of such powers, it is not permissible for the High Court to appreciate the evidence as it can only evaluate material documents on record to the extent of its prima facie satisfaction about the existence of sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused and the court cannot look into materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial. Any document filed alongwith the petition labelled as evidence without being tested and proved, cannot be examined. Law does not prohibit entertaining the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the charge sheet even before the charges are framed or before the application of discharge is filed or even during its pendency of such application before the court concerned. The High Court cannot reject the application merely on the ground that the accused can argue legal and factual issues at the time of the framing of the charge. However, the inherent power of the court should not be exercised to stifle the legitimate prosecution but can be exercised to save the accused to undergo the agony of a criminal trial.
In "M/s. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma Private Limited v. M/s. Biological E. Limited7" the Apex Court held that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C has to be exercised with care and 7 AIR 2000 SC 1869 MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 13 sparingly, High Court has only to see whether allegations in complaint make out prima facie case. It has no power to examine truth and correctness of allegations. Exercise of jurisdiction under the inherent power as envisaged in Section 482 Cr.P.C to have the complaint or the charge-sheet quashed is an exception rather a rule and the case for quashing at the initial stage must have to be treated as rarest of rare so as not to scuttle the prosecution. To exercise powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. the complaint in its entirety shall have to be examined on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint and the High Court at that stage has no authority or jurisdiction to go into the matter or examine its correctness. Whatever appears on the face of the complaint shall be taken into consideration without any critical examination of the same, but the offence ought to appear ex facie on the complaint.
In view of the law declared by the Apex Court in various judgments referred supra, this Court can exercise its power in rarest of rare cases, and it cannot be used to stifle the legitimate prosecution, the only requirement is verification of the allegations made in the charge sheet to find out whether the allegations on their face value would constitute offence punishable under the penal provisions of any Act and in view of the power conferred on this Court, by exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C, this Court has to examine the issue before this Court with reference to the law declared by various Courts.
The Principle of Doctrine of Estoppel is purely a rule of evidence which debars the parties from resiling from earlier statements when other person changes his position. based on the Act of the other. Though the Doctrine of Estoppel is identical to Section 11 of Civil Procedure Code, the distinction is that, Section MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 14 11 of C.P.C is a Rule of Procedure, whereas Section 115 of C.P.C is Rule of Evidence. The witnesses proposed to be examined before the Court in C.C.Nos. 256 & 296 of 2008 are one and the same and if they are examined before the Court in C.C.Nos. 256 & 296 of 2008, they cannot resile from their earlier statements recorded by the Magistrate during trial in C.C.No.255 of 2008, since they are precluded from deposing contrary to the earlier deposition/statements recorded by the Magistrate in C.C.No.255 of 2008 and most of them are official witnesses, in view of the principle laid down in Section 115 of Indian Evidence Act.
For better appreciation of facts, it is appropriate to furnish details of the list of witnesses cited in C.C.Nos. 256 & 296 of 2008 and the witnesses examined in C.C No.255 of 2008 and they are as under:
C.C.No.256 of 2008 C.C.No.296 of 2008 C.C.No.255 of 2008
1. Bandla Suryanarayana 1. Smt. B. Udayalakshmi, 1. D. Prasad Babu, s/o Bangaraiah, IAS, Collector and 2. N. Hanumantha Rao age 56 yrs, Supervising District Magistrate, 3. N. Chenchireddy Engineer in Projects, Prakasam District. 4. B. Surayanrayana Ongole. 2. Siddardha Jain, IAS, Babu
2. Bandaru Siva Rao, s/o Joint Collector, 5. V. Koteswara Rao Bhogeswara Rao, age 58 Prakasam District, 6. R. Venkateswarlu yrs, Kamma, Panchayat Ongole. 7. V. Ranga Rao Secretary, Mallavaram 3. T.S. Prakasa Rao, Retired 8. A. Ram Babu village. Engineer-in-Chief, 9. B. Srinivasa Rao
3. Nalluri Hanumantha Rao Technical Advisor, 10. P. Venkata Reddy s/o Raghavulu, age 53 Irrigation Department, J- 11. Ch. Kishore yrs, Kamma, Panchayat Block, 7th floor, A.P. 12. V. Koteswara Rao Secretary, Mallavaram Secretariat, Hyderabad. 13. S. Seshagiri Rao village. 4. Bhandaru Siva Rao, 14. B. Udayalakshmi
4. Dokka Prasad s/o Rama Chief Engineer 15. I. Subbarami Reddy Subbaiah, age 50 yrs, (Projects), Ongole 16. B. Prasad Madiga, village, servant, 5. B. Suryanarayana Babu, 17. K. Srinivasa Rao Mallavaram village. Superintendent Engineer 18. K. Naga Babu
5. Marripudi Venkateswarlu (Projects), Ongole. 19. K. Koteswara Rao s/o Venkata Subbaiah, 6. I. Subba Rami Reddy, 20. K. Baig age 46 yrs, Rajaka, Special Collector, 21. Siddartha Jain Village servant, Veligonda Project, Mallavaram. Ongole.
6. Narahari Chenchi 7. R. Sreelatha, Special Reddy s/o Venkata Deputy Collector, Subba Reddy, age 45 Kandula Obula Reddy yrs, Reddy, Cultivation, Project (Gundlakamma vice-Sarpanch, Project), Ongole.
Mallavaram village.
7. Ipparapalli Ramanujam 8. K. Naga Babu, Revenue s/o Ramamurthy, 55 yrs, Divisional Officer, Ongole.
Mandal Revenue Officer, 9. Vejendla Koteswara Rao, Maddipadu Mandal. s/o Ananda Rao,
8. Ravala Venkateswarlu Executive Engineer, s/o Venkaiah, age 51 Gundalakamma Project yrs, Mandal Revenue Division-II, Ongole.
Inspector, Maddipadu. 10.Ipparapalli Ramanujam,
9. Smt. B. Udayalakshmi, s/o Rama Murthy, 55 IAS, Collector and yrs, Mandal Revenue MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 15 District Magistrate, Officer, Maddipadu.
Prakasam District, 11.Ravala Venkateswarlu,
Ongole. s/o. Venkaiah, age 51
10. Siddardha Jain, IAS, yrs, Mandal Revenue
Joint Collector, Inspector, Maddipadu.
Prakasam District, 12.Nalluri Hanumantha Rao,
Ongole. s/o Raghavulu, age 53,
11. I. Subba Rami Reddy, Kamma, Panchayat
Special Collector, Secretary, Mallavaram
Veligonda Project, village.
Ongole. 13.Narahari Chenchireddy
12. Vejandla Koteswara Rao s/o Venkata Subba
s/o Ananda Rao, Reddy, age 45 yrs, Reddy,
Executive Engineer, Cultivation, Vice-
Gundlakamma Division- Sarpancha, Mallavaram
II, Ongole. Village, Maddipadu
13. Smt. R. Sreelatha, Spl. Mandal.
Dy. Collector, K.O. R.P. 14.Vaddempudi Koteswara
Gundalakamma, Ongole. Rao s/o Venkata
14. Nara Subbareddi s/o Seshaiah, 51 yrs, Deputy
Balireddi, age 44 yrs, Executive Information
Reddi, Mallavaram Officer, Prakasam
Village. Bhavan.
15. Marripudi Hanumantha 15.Suddapalli Seshagiri Rao
Rao s/o Nageswara Rao, s/o Venkata Subba Rao,
age 32 yrs, Rajaka, 32 yrs, Record Asst-cum-
Mallavaram Village. Videographer, District
16. Ravuri Madhusudhana Information Officer,
Rao s/o Andraiah, age 40 Prakasam Bhavan,
yrs, Kamma, Executive Ongole.
Engineer, Gundlakamma 16.Vallabhaneni Ranga Rao,
Division-I, Ongole. s/o Suryanarayana, 26
17. Sri B. Prasad, S.I of yrs, Kamma, Eenadu
Police, S.N. Padu, P.S reporter, Ongole.
18. D. Venkateswarlu, HC 17.Chilakamarthi Kishore
1341, Maddipadu P.S. s/o Lakshmi Narayana,
19. PC 1712 A. Rambabu of 37 yrs, TV-9 News
Maddipadu P.S. Channel, Videographer,
20. Sri K. Koteswara Rao, SI Ongole.
of Police, Maddipadu P.S 18.B. Prasad, Sub-Inspector
21. Sri V. Subba Reddy, of Police, S.N. Padu Police
Inspector of Police, Station.
Ongole Rural Circle. 19.J. Lakshmi Narayana,
Camp Clerk to the
Collector, Ongole.
20.V. Bhushanam, Sub-
Inspector of Police, II
Town Police Station,
Ongole.
21.K. Koteswara Rao, Sub-
Inspector of Police,
Maddipadu Police
Station.
22.V. Subba Reddy,
Inspector of Police,
Ongole Rural Circle.
Most of the witnesses cited in the list of witnesses proposed to be examined in both C.C.Nos. 256 & 296 of 2008 and examined in earlier C.C.No.255 of 2005 are one and the same. But, some of them were not examined before the III Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Ongole, as they were given up by the Public Prosecutor. However, the complainants in C.C.Nos. 256 & 296 of 2008 were examined and they are the prime witnesses to MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 16 substantiate the case of prosecution being the official witnesses. All the witnesses, except Smt. Udayalakshmi, I.A.S - the then District Collector, who is cited as L.W.1 in C.C.No.296 of 2008, her evidence was disbelieved by the Judicial Magistrate of First class in C.C.No.255 of 2008. The witnesses cited in C.C.Nos. 256 & 296 of 2008 even if examined, they cannot improve the prosecution case in view of earlier statements recorded by the Magistrate in C.C.No.255 of 2008, due to application of the Doctrine of Estoppel.
The main endeavour of the learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Rama Chandra Reddy Gurram is that, if the petitioner is compelled to undergo ordeal of trial, he being a people's representative has to roam around the Courts, sparing lot of time both on the journey and in the Courts. But, that alone may not be a ground to sustain the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. However, I would like to advert to examine the issue based on the law declared by the Courts in various judgments and before going into the law declared by the Courts, it is appropriate to advert to the meaning of Rule of Issue Estoppel and its applicability to criminal law.
Issue Estoppel is defined as the proposal that an argument is moot as it has been previously decided, distinctly put in issue in an earlier proceeding where it was fundamental to the decision.
"Issue estoppel is a species of res judicata. It applies where an issue in a cause of action was decided in a previous action. It must be a finding that is fundamental to the outcome of the decision, so fundamental that if a different conclusion had been reached on the issue, the outcome would have been different. If such is the case, then this issue cannot be raised in subsequent litigation."
According to Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edition, Volume 16, page 1030 &1530: "An estoppel which has come to be known as MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 17 "issue estoppel" may arise where a plea of res judicata could not be established because the causes of action are not the same. A party is precluded from contending the contrary of any precise point which, having once been distinctively put in issue, has been solemnly and with certainty determined against him. Even if the objects of the first and second actions are different, the finding on a matter which came directly (not collaterally or incidentally) in issue in the first action, provided it is embodied in a judicial decision that is final, is conclusive in a second action between the same parties and their privies. This principle applies whether the point involved in the earlier decision, and as to which the parties are estopped, is one of fact or one of law, or one of mixed fact and law."
In R v Hogan8, Justice Hogan offered this concise statement of law pertaining to the legal definition of issue estoppel as follows:
"Issue estoppel can be said to exist when there is a judicial establishment of a proposition of law or fact between parties to earlier litigation and when the same question arises in later litigation between the same parties. In the later litigation the established proposition is treated as conclusive between those same parties."
In Shaju v. Canada, Minister of Citizenship & Immigration9, Justice Nadon of the Federal Court of Canada used these words:
"The underlying notion of issue estoppel is to prohibit one party to previous litigation from putting a concluded issue, finally determined therein, into contention again in newly instituted proceedings taken against the same opponent before the same, or another, tribunal having jurisdiction to adjudicate and determine that issue anew."
In Mills v Cooper10, Justice Diplock offered: 8
(1974) QB PAGE 398; 2 ALL ER PAGE 142 9 [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 10 [1967] 2 QB 459 1967 MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 18 ""This doctrine (of issue estoppel), so far as it affects civil proceedings, may be stated thus: a party to civil proceedings is not entitled to make, as against the other party, an assertion, whether of fact or of the legal consequences of facts, the correctness of which is an essential element in his cause of action or defence, if the same assertion was an essential element in his previous cause of action or defence in previous civil proceedings between the same parties or their predecessors in title and was found by a court of competent jurisdiction in such previous civil proceedings to be incorrect, unless further material which is relevant to the correctness or incorrectness of the assertion and could not by reasonable diligence have been adduced by that party in the previous proceedings has since become available to him....
"Issue estoppel is a particular application of the general rule of public policy that there should be finality in litigation. That general rule applies also to criminal proceedings, but in a form modified by the distinctive character of criminal as compared with civil litigation. Here it takes the form of the rule against double jeopardy....
"I think with great respect that the use of that expression in criminal and civil proceedings alike may lead to confusion, for there are obvious differences-lack of mutuality is but one-between the application of the rule against double jeopardy in criminal cases, and the rule that there should be. finality in civil litigation."
In D. S. v. Silo Und Verwaltungs Gesellschaft M. B. H. v Owners of the Sennar11, Justice Diplock held as follows:
"In English law, when a plaintiff, who, basing his claim on a particular set of facts, has already sued the defendant to final judgment in a foreign court of competent jurisdiction and lost, then seeks to enforce a cause of action in an English court against the same defendant based on the same set of facts, the defendant's remedy against such double jeopardy is provided by the doctrine of issue estoppel. It is far too late, at this stage of the development of the doctrine, to question that issue estoppel can be created by the judgment of a foreign court if that court is recognised in English private international law as being a court of competent jurisdiction. Issue estoppel operates regardless of whether or not an English court would regard the reasoning of the foreign judgment as open to criticism.
"To make available an issue estoppel to a defendant to an action brought against him in an English court on a cause of action to which the plaintiff alleges a particular set of facts give rise, the defendant must be able to show (1) that the same set of facts has previously been relied on as constituting a cause of action in proceedings brought by that plaintiff against that defendant in 11 (1985) 1 WLR 490 MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 19 a foreign court of competent jurisdiction and (2) that a final judgment has been given by that foreign court in those proceedings."
In Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v. Rayner And Keeler Ltd And Others12, Justice Guest of the House of Lords proposed these requirements of issue estoppel:
"... (1) that the same question has been decided; (2) that the judicial decision which is said to create the estoppel was final; and, (3) that the parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised or their privies...."
In R. v. Van Rassel13, Supreme Court of Canada judge Beverley McLachlin opined that issue estoppel:
"... applies only in circumstances where it is clear from the facts that the question has already been decided."
The principle of Doctrine of Estoppel can also be called as a Collateral Estoppel in criminal cases. Issue Estoppel or Collateral Estoppel can also be applied in criminal cases and this Doctrine is mostly prevalent in United States, but rarely being used in India. A judgment settles certain issues between the parties to an action. The issues so settled are those which must have been settled in order to reach the judgment. According to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, such issues are conclusively determined and cannot be raised again in a different action between the same parties (vide Commissioner v. Sunnen14). The doctrine of collateral estoppel has received most attention in civil cases. Various courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have, however, stated that the doctrine applies also to criminal cases. (vide Sealfon v. 12 [1966] 2 All E.R 536 13 [1990] 1 SCR 225 14 333 U.S. 591 (1948) MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 20 United States15). The recent case of Hoag v. New Jersey16 furnishes a classic example of the kind of criminal case in which the doctrine of collateral estoppel may become important. In this respect, Hoag sets the stage for a discussion of the problems involved in the use of collateral estoppel in criminal law. The defendant was accused of participating in the armed robbery of five tavern patrons at one time. He was tried for the robbery of three of the victims and was acquitted when four of the five victims failed to identify him as one of the hold-up men. The state then tried him for the robbery of a fourth victim. This time he was convicted. According to the jury instructions at the first trial, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the victims had been put in fear, (2) property had been taken from them, and (3) the defendant was one of the robbers. The defense at the first trial did not deny the state's allegations that the victims had been put in fear and that property had been taken from them. The sole defense was that the accused could not have participated in the crime because he had been elsewhere when it was committed. (vide State v. Hoag17 (dissenting opinion)). Upon the second trial, the defendant contended that his prior acquittal established his non- participation in the crimes. He argued that he was therefore entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. This plea was denied, and his conviction followed. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the conviction. The United States Supreme Court affirmed, the Justices dividing five to three. The New Jersey Supreme Court opinion emphasized one of the most important problems in the application of collateral estoppel to criminal law. The state court based its opinion upon 15 332 U.S. 575 (1948) 16 356 U.S. 464 (1958), affirming 21 N.J. 496, 122 A.2d 628 (1956) 17 21 N.J. 496, 506, 122 A.2d 628, 634 (1956) MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 21 the theory that the general verdict of acquittal at the first trial decided no specific issues. The jury, said the court, might have acquitted, even though it believed the defendant was a participant, because it believed either that the victims had not been put in fear or that property had not been taken from them.
Whether a general verdict of acquittal can ever be said to decide any specific issues is a question which runs throughout the cases on collateral estoppel in criminal law. The effort here will be to analyze in practical terms, the difficulty in determining upon what grounds a jury bases a general verdict. Moreover, the Hoag case indicates another important problem which appears to inhere in the application of collateral estoppel to criminal cases. This problem is whether the prosecution as well as the defense should be allowed to use collateral estoppel. That is, even if one can argue that the defendant should be entitled to use the doctrine-which means resolving the problem of the general acquittal verdict in his favor-should the doctrine of mutuality, as enunciated in civil cases, carry over into criminal law?
Controversy is set at naught by the United States Supreme Court in the latter judgments. When a defendant obtains an acquittal in the first trial and the state attempts a second trial for another offence committed at the same time, the question is what issues have been conclusively decided. The New Jersey court's decision in Hoag is an application of the theory that a general acquittal verdict establishes no specific facts. In effect, the theory is that a general verdict of acquittal means no more than that the prosecution has failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt All but one of the small number of state courts which have spoken directly on the subject support this position. The Georgia Supreme Court, however, has taken the opposite viewpoint and has held MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 22 that a court can infer the basis of a prior general jury verdict by looking at the record." This view apparently was endorsed and then later rejected by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The United States Supreme Court seems to have approved the principle that the basis of a jury verdict in a prior criminal trial can be inferred from the record. (vide Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corporation18, Sealfon v. United States19). Thus, the United States Courts by applying the Principle of Collateral Estoppel or Issue Estoppel to the criminal law, drawing certain inferences from general verdict. That means a verdict pronounced by Court on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the Principle of Issue Estoppel or Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel can be applied even to the criminal trials.
Even in India, the Courts have applied the Principle of Issue Estoppel based on the principle laid down by Malaya High Court in Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya20, where the Court observed as follows:
"The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent court on a lawful charge and after a lawful trial is not completely stated by saying that the person acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence. To that it must be added that the verdict is binding and conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the adjudication. The maxim "Res judicata pro veritate accipitur" is no less applicable to criminal than to civil proceedings. Here, the appellant having been acquitted at the first trial on the charge of having ammunition in his possession, the prosecution was bound to accept the correctness of that verdict and was precluded from taking any step to challenge it at the second trial. And the appellant was no less entitled to rely on his acquittal in so far as it might be relevant in his defence. That it was not conclusive of his innocence on the fire-arm charge is plain, but it undoubtedly reduced in some degree the weight of the case against him, for at the first trial the facts proved in support of one charge were clearly relevant to the other having 18 340 U.S. 558 (1951) 19 332 U.S. 575 (1948) 20 LR (1950) AC 458 MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 23 regard to the circumstances in which the ammunition and revolver were found and the fact that they fitted each other."
In Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya (referred supra) the appellant was tried for the offence of being in possession of ammunition in violation of Regulation 4(1)(b) of the Emergency (Criminal Trials) Regulations, 1948. He was acquitted of the charge. Later he was tried for the offence of carrying a fire-arm contrary to Regulation 4(1)(a) of the Emergency Regulations and was convicted by the Supreme Court of the Federation of Malaya. An appeal was carried to the Judicial Committee and the legality of the conviction was challenged on the grounds, inter alia, that so long as the order of acquittal in respect of the carrying of ammunition stood, the facts proved in support of that charge were in the circumstances of the case clearly relevant to the second charge, and the appellant was entitled to rely upon the acquittal in so far as it was relevant to his defence. The plea so raised was accepted by the Judicial Committee.
In Pritam Singh v. The State of Punjab21, this Court held that where a person has been tried under Section 19(f) of the Arms Act and is acquitted because the prosecution has failed to establish the possession of a revolver by the accused as alleged, in a subsequent trial of the offence of murder, where the possession of the revolver was a fact in issue which had to be established, the prosecution could not ignore the finding at the previous trial. In later judgments of the Apex Court, the Principle of Issue Estoppel/Collateral Estoppel has received approval.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court to the judgment of Apex Court in Manipur 21 1956 CriLJ 805 MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 24 Administration, Manipur v. Thokchom Bira Singh (referred supra) and Banwari Godara v. The State of Rajasthan; Lalta & others v. the State of U.P22 succinctly held that the Principle of Issue Estoppel can be applied even to criminal trial. The question raised for decision in Pritam Singh v. The State of Punjab (referred supra) however was different and was whether where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of an accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence but as precluding the reception of evidence to disturb that finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by the terms of Section 403 (2). It would not be correct to say that the principle underlying in Sambasivan's case was dissented from in R. v. Connelly23. Besides, it should be pointed out that the principle underlying the decision in Pritam Singh v. The State of Punjab (referred supra) did come up for consideration before the Apex Court on several occasions, but it was never dissented from though in some of them it was distinguished on facts. Judgments in Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab (referred supra), R. v. Connelly (referred supra) and Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya (referred supra) were relied on. Finally, the Court concluded that "the rule of issue-estoppel does not prevent the trial of an offence as does autre fois acquit but only precludes evidence being led to prove a fact in issue as regards which evidence had already been led and a specific finding recorded at an 22 (Cr A No. 185 of 1966, decided on October 25,1968) 23 (1963) 3 All E.R. 510 MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 25 earlier criminal trial before a court of competent jurisdiction". The rule of issue-estoppel is not the same as the plea of double jeopardy or autre fois acquit is also clear from the statement of the law by Lord Mac Dermott in Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya (referred supra). It is clear that Section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not preclude the applicability of this rule of issue-estoppel. The rule being one which is in accord with sound principle and supported by high authority and there being a decision of this court in Pritam Singh v. The State of Punjab (referred supra) which has accepted it as a proper one to be adopted, there is no reason for discarding it.
In view of the principle laid down in Manipur Administration, Manipur v. Thokchom Bira Singh (referred supra), the Apex Court in State Of Andhra Pradesh v. Kokkiliagada Meerayya and another (referred supra) held that, Principle of Issue Estoppel can be applied to the criminal cases. In the facts of the above judgment, K. Meerayya, K. Venkatanarayana--respondents in the appeal and two others were charged before the Judicial Magistrate, Second Class, Avanigadda, for offences under Section 323 and 324, I.P. Code, for voluntarily causing injuries to Seetharamayya and Veeraraghavayya on 22.06.1964. The Trial Magistrate convicted Meerayya and Venkatanarayana-- first for the offence under Section 324 and the second for the offence under Section 323 I.P.C. In appeal to the Court of Session, Krishna Division at Machilipatnam, the order was confirmed. The High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, set aside the order of conviction and sentence. The State of Andhra Pradesh had appealed to the Apex Court with MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 26 special leave. The case raises a question of some importance in the administration of justice. The findings recorded by the Trial Magistrate and confirmed by the Sessions Judge were that the respondents had committed assault upon Seetharamayya and Veeraraghavayya and that they could in law be properly convicted. But it was urged that there was a bar against prosecution of the two accused Meerayya and Venkatanarayana because of the "principle of issue estoppel". The plea is raised on the ground that the Station House Officer, Kodur Police Station, had instituted proceedings in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bandar, under Section 107, Code of Criminal Procedure, against 96 persons, amongst whom were the two respondents and an order under Section 112, Code of Criminal Procedure, was made stating that the persons named therein were indulging in acts of violence involving breach of public peace and tranquility in the village of Salempalam and were endangering peace in the village, and that they had formed themselves into a party and were thereby disturbing the public peace and tranquility by committing acts of violence, and on that account they were required to show cause why each person named should not execute a bond for keeping the peace for a period of one year in the sum of Rs.1,000 with two sureties in a like amount each. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate conducted an inquiry and held that respondents were not concerned with the incident and passed an order holding that these two persons were involved in the incident. The order became final and it was upon the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Avanigadda to hold contrary in respect of the same incident. The Magistrate and Sessions Judge rejected the said plea, but the High Court in the revision accepted this contention and the matter reached Supreme Court. The Supreme Court by referring the MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 27 judgments in Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya (referred supra), Pritam Singh v. The State of Punjab (referred supra), Manipur Administration, Manipur v. Thokchom Bira Singh (referred supra), R. v. Connelly (referred supra), concluded that the rejection of evidence given in the earlier proceeding to sustain an order for binding over the respondents to keep the peace does not preclude the trial of the respondents in respect of the specific incident which together with the other incident was sought to be made the basis of the order of binding over the respondents. The Supreme Court in Assistant Collector of Customs and another v. L.R. Malwani24 declined to apply the Rule of Issue Estoppel to a case arising under the Sea Customs Act in which there was an inquiry held by the Collector of Customs and a criminal prosecution was then filed. The Apex Court finally held that, the High Court was in error in holding that the respondents could not be tried and convicted of offences under Sections 324 and 323, I.P.C, because in the earlier proceeding under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, evidence with regard to the incident out of which offences which are the subject-matter of the present appeal was taken, and was regarded as insufficient to sustain the order and allowed the appeal for the State, setting-aside the order of the High Court.
Learned counsel for the petitioner brought to the notice of this Court the other judgment of the Apex Court in Ashwini Kumar v. Ashu (referred supra), wherein, an identical issue came up for consideration and the Apex Court by referring the judgment in Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (referred supra) held that, the Rule regarding Issue Estoppel relates to 24 1970 AIR 962 MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 28 admissibility of evidence in subsequent proceedings which is designed to up-set a finding of fact recorded on the previous occasion and mandates that the finding so rendered on earlier occasion must operate as issue estoppel in subsequent proceedings. It makes it impermissible to lead any such evidence at a subsequent stage or occasion. The attempt on part of learned counsel is just the opposite. He seeks to rely on the finding at a subsequent stage to up-set a finding of fact recorded on a previous occasion. The law on the point was succinctly stated by the Supreme Court in Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (referred supra) in following words:
"23. This Court has time and again explained the principle of issue estoppel in a criminal trial observing that where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent court on an earlier occasion and a finding has been recorded in favour of the accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence, but as precluding the acceptance/reception of evidence to disturb the finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently for a different offence. This rule is distinct from the doctrine of double jeopardy as it does not prevent the trial of any offence but only precludes the evidence being led to prove a fact in issue as regards which evidence has already been led and a specific finding has been recorded at an earlier criminal trial. Thus, the rule relates only to the admissibility of evidence which is designed to upset a finding of fact recorded by a competent court in a previous trial on a factual issue..."
Based on the principle referred supra, the Court refused to apply the principle of issue estoppel.
In view of the judgment in Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (referred supra) and other judgments placed on record, it creates a bar on admissibility of evidence, but does not debar the trial of the case before a court on account of trial of the accused for the same offence earlier and got acquittal. Thus, it is abundantly clear from the catena of decisions of the Apex Court, issue Etoppel precludes the party to adduce evidence in a subsequent trial when the same witnesses were examined in the earlier trial in a different case, but for the same offence on the MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 29 same facts, as such, issue estoppel can be said to be a principle of preclusion, debarring any witness of giving different statements before a court in a subsequent trial for the statement already recorded in the pre-trial or earlier trail.
There is a marked difference between the principle of Double Jeopardy/Autrefois acquit and issue estoppel. The Doctrine of Double Jeopardy is a complete bar to try the accused for the same offence and the parties must be the same. The principle of Double Jeopardy can be said to be identical to the Principle of Resjudicata, whereas, the Principle of Issue Estoppel only precludes a party to adduce evidence before the Court on a particular issue which was already decided by the Court in earlier case. hence, the Doctrine of Issue Estoppel, at best, bars the admissibility of evidence of a particular witness who was examined earlier and on the basis of such evidence, the Court recorded a finding of fact while acquitting the petitioner/accused not guilty. But, it will not bar the trial of the accused.
In view of the fine distinction between Doctrine of Double Jeopardy and Issue Estoppel or Collateral Estoppel, trying the petitioner/accused for the same offence is not a clear bar. Moreover, it does not amount to relitigating on the same issue of fact.
In C.C.Nos.256 & 296 of 2008, witnesses are shown in the table and out of them, some witnesses were examined before the III Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate in earlier round of litigation in C.C.No.255 of 2008. But the Court disbelieved the evidence of main witnesses, found the accused not guilty as the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, the other witnesses who are cited in C.C.Nos.256 & 296 of 2008 as witnesses in the list of witnesses MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 30 examined before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class in C.C.No.255 of 2008 lodged by altogether a different complainant who are not examined by the Magistrate in C.C No.255 of 2008 against this petitioner and if the evidence is sufficient, the Court may record conviction of the accused for the said offences. But, the issue involved in earlier C.C.No.255 of 2008 and in present C.C.Nos.256 & 296 of 2008 is one and the same. Hence, the Trial of the petitioner/accused is not barred and it cannot be interdicted by applying the principle of Issue Estoppel or Collateral Etoppel. At best, the petitioner may take advantage of the earlier statements of the witnesses to contend that the evidence adduced in the subsequent trial in C.C.Nos.256 & 296 of 2008 is inadmissible. If, the inadmissible evidence is excluded from consideration, the Court has to examine based on admissible evidence and can the Court record conviction or not, such question will arise only after completion of trial. But, interdicting trial based on the principle of Issue Estoppel or Collateral Estoppel at this stage is premature.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner being a people's representative is bound to suffer ordeal of trial. But, that by itself is not a ground to quash the proceedings by exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. On the other hand, the petitioner may seek exemption from appearance as and when necessity arises or obtain permission to represent him by any Advocate, from the Magistrate or Sessions Court, where the case is pending to avoid serious inconvenience likely to be caused to the petitioner in the event, he is tried for the offences in C.C.Nos.256 & 296 of 2008.
Considering totality of the circumstances and the law declared by the Apex Court in various judgments referred supra, I am of the considered view that it is not a fit case to quash the proceedings at this stage, leaving it open to this petitioner to raise MSM,J Crl.P_5143 & 5144_2018 31 such contentions during trial, if the same witnesses are examined in the present case, taking advantage of their statements recorded in the earlier C.C.No.255 of 2008.
The power of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C, as discussed above is limited and the Court cannot quash the proceedings merely on account of the bar to admit the evidence or on account of the decision in earlier C.C.No.255 of 2008, since such admissibility of evidence can be decided by the Trial Court, if the prosecution proposed to examine the same witnesses before the Magistrate or Sessions Court, where the case is pending. Hence, I am not inclined to exercise the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the proceedings against this petitioner and having found no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
In the result, criminal petitions are dismissed, leaving it open to the petitioner to raise his contentions at the time of admitting the evidence or at appropriate stage during trial of C.C.Nos.256 & 296 of 2008.
Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also stand dismissed.
_________________________________________ JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY Date:12.11.2019 SP