Madras High Court
A. Somu Thevar vs Sivakumar And Anr. on 15 November, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1997(1)CTC57
Author: M. Karpagavinayagam
Bench: M. Karpagavinayagam
ORDER M. Karpagavinayagam, J.
1. Generally this Court is reluctant to disturb an acquittal recorded by the trial Court, in a revision against such acquittal, that too at the instance of a private party, when the State has not preferred any appeal. However, it becomes a duty to do so, inter alia when incriminating evidence of a satisfactory character is completely ignored or overlooked, and when there is a total misreading of evidence, resulting in an unwarranted acquittal, in order to redeem the course of justice, so that the grave injustice occasioned could be set right. The present is one of such cases.
2. The unfortunate petitioner, who is the father of the deceased a young son of 20 years old, and the first informant examined as P.W.1, has knocked at the doors of this Court, by presenting this revision, challenging the judgment of acquittal in S.C.No. 63 of 1991, on the file of the Sessions Court, Thanjavur, in respect of an offence under Section 302, I.P.C.
3. The brief facts of the case are as follows;-
(i) the deceased Kalaiarasan, aged about 20 years is the second son of P.W.1 Somu Thavar, a resident of Paravakottai, having his residence at the main road itself. The deceased was having a cycle shop in front of Anna statue in the main road, in the name and style of "Vinayagar Cycle Co.". The accused Sivakumar, the 1st respondent herein, is also a resident of the same village. P.W.2 Kumarasamy and P.W.3 Thangaraj also hailed from the same village. P.W.4 Thangavelu is having a grocery shop in the main road at Paravakottai village, next to the cycle shop of the deceased, on the northern side. P.W.5 Rajangam, is owning a tailoring shop, at the southern side of the cycle shop of the deceased.
(ii) The first respondent/accused used to come to the cycle shop of the deceased and take cycle on hire charges. There were some arrears to be paid by the accused to the deceased. On 4-12-1989, in the evening, there was raining. A few hours later, the rain stopped. The deceased kept the shop closed. At about 7.30 P.M., P.W.1, the father and his son, the deceased, were talking together in front of the cycle shop. At that time, the street lights were burning. Opposite to the road, P.W.2 Kumarasamy, P.W.3 Thangaraj, and one Uthirapathy were standing and conversing with each other.
(iii) At that point of time, the accused/1st respondent herein came to the cycle shop and demanded the deceased-Kalaiarasan, to give a cycle on hire. The deceased replied:
(Since it is rainy day, cycle cannot be given for hire, 'you leave the shop'.) The first respondent, however, insisted for the cycle on hire. Then the deceased said:
(You are already in arrears. Cycle cannot be given to the fellows who are in dues.) Then, there was a wordy quarrel between the deceased Kalaiarasan and the 1st respondent- Sivakumar. P.W.2, P.W.3 and another, who were standing nearby, came and tried to pacify them. But the accused exclaimed (I have been named as a "person of debt." So, I would not simply leave, without killing him.) Even then, the witnesses persuaded and asked him to go home. But the accused said that he was insulted, and so, at any cost, he would murder him. Saying so, he suddenly took out a knife kept in his waist and stabbed on the chest of the deceased Kalaiarasan. The deceased cried"
The accused carrying the knife took to his heels towards the northern side. P.W.2 Kumarasamy the said Uthirapathy, and P.W.3 Thangaraj chased him, but the accused has fled away.
(iv) Immediately thereafter, P.W.1 Somu Thevar, the father of the deceased, with the help of his another son took the victim in a bus, which came at that time in the main road, to the Government Hospital, Mannargudi. P.W.8 Doctor examined the victim at 10.10 P.M., and found that he was already dead.
(v) Leaving his another son near the dead body at the Hospital, P.W.1 came to Paravakottai Police Station and gave a complaint to P.W.11- Sub-Inspector of Police at about 10.00 P.M. This was reduced into writing by P.W.11 and signature of P.W.1 was obtained thereon. This Ex.P.1. Then a case was registered in Crime No. 426 of 1989, for the offence under Section 302, I.P.C. against the 1st respondent. The printed F.I.R., is Ex.P11. P.W.11 forwarded Ex.P1 and Ex.P11 to the Court, and the copies of the same to the higher police officers.
(vi) P.W.12-Inspector of Police, Mannargudi, on receipt of the message at about 10.15 P.M., through telephone from Paravakottai Police Station, rushed to Paravakottai police station, and received the copy of F.I.R., and took up investigation. At about 10.45 P.M., P.W.12 went to the spot. He prepared Ex-P2 observation mahazar and Ex.P.12 rough sketch. At about 11.15 P.M. P.W.12 collected blood-stained earth - M.O.2 and sample earth - M.O.3, in the presence of the P.W.6 and one Shanmugham, under Ex.P3. P.W.12, on that spot, examined P.W.1 - Somu Thevar, P.W.2 -Kumarasamy, P.W.3 - Thangaraj, P.W.4 Thangavelu, P.W.5 -Rajangam, P.W.6 - Govindaraj and others.
(vii) Thereafter, P.W.12 - Inspector of Police went to the Government Hospital, Mannargudi, along with the witnesses. On 5-12-1989, between 6.00 A.M., and 8.30 A.M., he conducted inquest and examined P.Ws.1, 2, 3 and others. Ex.P13 is the inquest report. After the inquest, he sent the body through P.W.7 - Police Constable along with Ex.P6-requisition for post-mortem to Doctor.
(viii) P.W.9-Doctor Govindasamy, on receipt of the Ex.P.6 - requisition at about 10.10 A.M., on 5-12-1989, conducted post- mortem at about 11.45 A.M., and found the following:-
"Ext.injury: A stale wound present over the 5th costal carlilage of the chest - 1 1/2 cm. to the left of the midline of the body. The direction of the wound is vertical. Size of the wound: 2 cm. in length - width 1 1/2 cm. at the middle of the wound. The depth of the wound is approximately about 4 cm. The edge of the wound is clean cut. No fracture of ribs. The left 5th costal carlilage has given way corresponding to the ext.injury.
Int. Examination: There is extravagation of blood present in the anterior mediastinum. Blood approximately about 100 ml. Pericardial cavity contains about 100 ml. dark coloured blood. Heart: 250 gm. vertical wound present in the middle of Rt.ventricle canterior wall; Length 1 cm. bredth 1/4 cm. approximately 50 ml. of dark coloured blood present in Rt ventricle lungs; Rt.450 G.Lt. 400 G.pale; stomach -400 gm. of undigested food particles present. Liver 1400 G.Pale. Spleen 160 G.Pale. kidney Rt. 110 G.Lt. 100 G. Pale. Intestines -dialated. Bladder -Empty. Brain 1350 G.Pale."
Ex.P7 is the post-mortem certificate. The Doctor was of the opinion that the deceased would appear to have died of shock and halmorrhage, due to the injury on the vital organs.
(ix) After the post-mortem, P.W.7 - Police Constable Natarajan, recovered M.O.4-lungi and M.O.5 - shirt worn by the deceased, and handed over the same in the police station. He entrusted the dead body of the deceased to his relatives.
(x) On coming to know that the accused surrendered before the Judicial Magistrate No. 2, Pudukottai, on 9-12-1989, P.W.12, presented a petition before the Judicial Magistrate, for police custody. On 14-12-1989, as per the orders of the Court, the custody of the accused was handed over to P.W.12. On 15.12.1989, between 6.00 A.M., and 8.00 A.M., the accused gave a confessional statement the admissible portion of which is Ex.P4. Then, the accused took the police and witnesses to Ayyanar koil and took out the bloodstained knife (M.O. 1) kept concealed in a thorn-bush on the northern side of the Ayyanar Koil, and handed over the same to P.W.12. This was recovered under Ex.P5 mahazar. At about 10.00A.M., P.W.12 went to the shop of the deceased and recovered Exs.P8 and P9 - the account books relating to the hiring of cycles produced by P.W.1 -Somu Thevar under Ex.P10. On 20-12-1989, he sent all the M.Os. to the Court with Ex.P14-requisition to send the same for chemical analysis. The M.Os. were sent to the forensic laboratory under the covering letter of the Magistrate concerned. Ex.P15 is the chemical analyst's report and Ex.P16 is the serologist's report. After finishing investigation, P.W.12, filed charge sheet on 21.12.1989, against the accused for the offence under Section 302,1.P.C.
4. On committal, the learned Sessions Judge, framed charge against the accused for the above offence and questioned him. The accused/first respondent herein pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
5. In order to substantiate the charge, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 12, filed Exs.P1 to P16 and marked M.Os.1 to 5. After the evidence was over, the trial Court under Section 313, Cr.P.C, questioned the accused with reference to the incriminating circumstances found against him in evidence brought on record. The 1st respondent denied his complicity in the crime. However, no evidence was adduced on behalf of the defence.
6. On consideration of the evidence, oral and documentary, the learned Sessions Judge, concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the case against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt, and acquitted the accused in respect of charge under Section 302, I.P.C. Being aggrieved over the said judgment, the petitioner/the first informant, who is the father of the deceased has approached this Court, by way of revision, since State did not file any appeal against acquittal.
7. Mr. R.N. Kothandaraman, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner took me through the judgment of the Court below, and contended that the findings given by the learned Sessions Judge, for acquitting the accused are perverse, and manifestly erroneous on misreading of evidence, having over-looked various vital pieces of evidence available in this case. In order to substantiate his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner, pointed out various portions of the evidence adduced in the prosecution and demonstrated as to how the Judgment has caused serious miscarriage of justice. Mr. M. Maasco, learned counsel for 1st respondent repelled the above submissions.
8. Let me first set out the grounds of acquittal found in the judgment of trial court.
(i) According to the prosecution, P.W.1 gave Ex.P1-complaint to P.W.11-Sub-Inspector of Police, Paravakottai police station. But, P.W.1 would state that he gave a complaint to the Inspector of Police-P.W.12, the Inspector of Police. So, the complaint given to P.W.12-Inspector of Police, has been suppressed. Ex.P1, said to have been given to P.W.11 is a one introduced belatedly. This creates a doubt over Ex.P.1.
(ii) The motive for this case is the refusal of the deceased- Kalaiarasan to give a cycle on hire to the accused, since he was already in arrears. But, there is no proof to show that the accused was in arrears. Exs.P8 and P9, the account books were recovered by P.W.12-Inspector of Police only after eleven days. Even through these documents, the prosecution did not prove that the accused was to pay arrears to the deceased towards hiring charges. In the account books, there is no reference about arrears relating to accused. These documents were also not marked through P.W.1, the father of the deceased. So, the motive is not proved.
(iii) On 5-12-1989, P.W.12, under Ex.P5 recovered M.O.1 - Pitchuva kathi, in pursuance of the confession-Ex.P4, given by the accused. P.Ws.1 to 5 would state that the accused used Kathi for inflicting injuries on the chest of the deceased. They would also admit that they know the difference between 'kathi' and 'pitchuva kathi'. So, there is a doubt, as to whether the weapon used for the commission of offence is kathi or pitchuva kathi.
(iv) P.W.9, the Doctor, who conducted the post-mortem would say that M.O.1 was shown to him after the post-mortem. He would further say that he was not able to remember, whether the weapon was shown to him on the date of post-mortem or on the next day. The post-mortem was done on 5-12-1989. The knife was recovered on 15-12-1989. When such is the case, a doubt arises whether the weapon could have been shown to the Doctor.
(v) P.W.11, the Sub-Inspector of Police, in his statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C, would state that he received the complaint from P.W.1, and went through it. But, according to the prosecution. P.W.11 recorded the statement from P.W.1, and obtained signature thereon. So, the evidence of P.W.11 is contrary to his statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. So again doubt arises in respect of Ex.P1.
(vi) P.W.1 would admit that from 6-00 P.M., to 8.45 P.M., the deceased did not take any food. The Doctor, declared at 9.45 P.M., that he was dead. The Doctor who conducted post-mortem - P.W.9, would state as per Ex.P7-post-mortem certificate, that he found 400 gems. undigested food. So the evidence of P.W.1 that he was with the deceased throughout from 6.00 P.M., to 8.45 P.M., cannot be believed.
(vii) P.W.6, Govindaraj - Village Administrative Officer, is a mahazar witness, who attested Ex.P2 to P5. Exs.P2 and P3 were prepared on 4.12.1989. He also would state that P.W.11 Sub- Inspector was found along with P.W.12 Inspector of Police, when he came to the spot. But, P.W.11 would state that on 4-12-1989 night, at 11.00 P.M., he went in search of the accused and came back to Paravakottai police station on 8-12-1989. But, P.W.12, the In-spector of Police would state that he only prepared Exs.P2 to P5. But, P.W.6 would say that the Inspector of Police did not write Exs.P2 to P5, and he did not remember who actually wrote those documents. So, there is a doubt with reference to these documents also.
9. On perusal of the entire records of the case, it is crystal clear that the grounds of acquittal referred to above are absolutely on misreading of evidence, which has resulted in a serious and flagrant miscarriage of justice. Let me discuss one by one.
(i) The observation of the trial court, that P.W.1 would admit that he gave a complaint to P.W.12, the Inspector Police, whereas P.W.11, Sub-Inspector of Police would say that P.W.1 gave the complaint to him, which is Ex.P1, is factually wrong. There is no such admission by P.W.1. There is no evidence whatever to the effect that such complaint was given to P.W.12. P.W.1 would say that after he was informed by the Doctor, that his son was dead, he straight-away came to Paravakottai police station and gave a complaint to (P.W.11) Inspector of Police, at Paravakottai police station. He would further say that at 10.30 P.M., the Inspector of Police, Mannargudi (P.W.12), came to Paravakottai police station and before his arrival he gave the complaint to the Inspector of Police, Paravakottai (P.W.11). He would further say, that subsequently he was taken by the Inspector of Police, Mannargudi (P.W.12) to the spot and examined. He was examined by the Inspector of Police, Mannargudi (P.W.12) again during the course of inquest. This shows that P.W.1 is quite aware that Inspector of Police, Paravakottai (P.W.11) is different from Inspector of Police, Mannargudi (P.W.12). But P.W.1, instead of stating as "Sub-Inspector of Police", Paravakottai, mentioned as 'Inspector of Police' as Paravakottai. This does not mean that P.W.1 admitted that he gave a complaint to P.W.12, the Inspector of Police, at Mannargudi. Both in the chief as well as in cross examinations, he clearly gave details differentiating the Inspector of Police, Paravakottai and inspector of Police, Mannargudi. P.W.1 is categoric in saying that he gave the complaint to P.W.11, at Paravakottai Police Station. In the spot and during the inquest, he was examined by the Inspector of Police, Mannargudi (P.W.12). His evidence is as follows:-
This evidence adduced before the Court below, would make it clear that P.W.1 did not give any complaint to P.W.12, and he gave Ex.P.1-complaint only to P.W.11. So, the first ground of acquittal is not based on any evidence, and as such, the trial court's observation is quite wrong.
(ii) (a) The second ground is the failure to prove the motive. The trial Court observed that according to the prosecution, the accused was in arrears of hire charges and so, the deceased, the owner of the cycle shop refused to give cycle to the accused on hire on the date of occurrence, but there was no proof to establish that the accused had to pay any arrears to the deceased. This observation is also factually wrong.
(b) P.W.1, the father of the deceased would state that the accused-Sivakumar used to come and take the cycle from the cycle shop of his son on many occasions, and he was not regular in payment, and he was in arrears to the tune of Rs. 12.90. P.W.1, the father of the deceased, P.W.2-Kumarasamy, P.W.3. Thangaraj , were conversing with each other in front of the cycle shop, at the time of occurrence. P.W.4 Thangavelu, owning a grocery shop on the northern side of the cycle shop of the ;deceased and P.W.5 Rajangam, having a tailoring shop on the southern side of the cycle shop of the deceased, were also present at the time of occurrence. They would uniformly state that at the time of occurrence, the deceased refused to give a cycle to the accused on hire, since the accused did not pay the dues. There is no cross examination on this aspect.
(c) P.W.12, Inspector of Police, Mannargudi, while referring about Exs.P8 and P9-registers recovered from the cycle shop of the deceased, would state that the accused on various dates took the cycle on hire and did not pay the hire charges. The observation of the trial Court, that the registers Exs.P8 and P9 did not show the arrears of hire charges relating to the accused- Sivakumar, is also not correct. During the course of cross- examination, P.W.12-Inspector of Police, would admit that there are two columns in the registers Exs.P8 and P9, the first one is "credit" and the second one is "debit". The tabular column given below, as mentioned in the registers, would reveal that the accused was in arrears to the tune of Rs. 13.85.
Cycle No. Name Address Credit Debit 11 09-05-89 Sivakumar 6-00 7 11-05-89 Sivakumar Paravai 0-75 7 04-11-89 Sivakumar 0-75 7 06-11-89 Sivakumar Paravai 0-60 1 07-11-89 Sivakumar 0-70 8 10-11-89 Sivakumar 0-?5 1 16-11-89 Sivakumar 0-75 11 17-11-89 Sivakumar 3-25 7 20-11-89 Sivakumar 0-10 I 22-11-89 Sivakumar 0-25 7 26-11-89 Sivakumar 0-35
(d) It is not the case of the accused, that he never took cycle on hire from the shop of the deceased at any time. When there are abundant materials to show that the accused was in arrears, the trial Court is wrong in observing that there is no such evidence.
(iii) The third ground is a doubt with regard to the nature of the weapon. P.Ws.1 to 5 would uniformly state and identify M.O.1-Pitchuva knife, as the weapon used by the accused for stabbing the deceased. P.W.1 would specifically say during the course of cross examination that P.W.3 Thangaraj would also state that P.W.5, an another eye witness would also say that So, a reading of the evidence of all the witnesses, would show that pitchuva knife is one among the various varieties of knives. Of-course, they would admit that there is a difference between the ordinary knife and pitchuva knife. The evidence of P.W.3 and P.W.5 would show that M.O.1 is a pitchuva knife, which can be called as knife also. Merely because P.W.1 mentioned in F.I.R., - Ex.P.1 as 'kathi', it cannot be concluded that M.O.1 -pitchuva is not a knife at all. A knife is available in so many varieties. Some knives are called as pitchuva, some are surul and some may be called as pen knives. So, in this case, the word "knife" used by P.W.1 in the F.I.R. is a common one. The pitchuva knife identified by all the witnesses in the Court cannot be said to be one, which is not a knife at all. Pitchuva knife means it is inclusive of a knife. No doubt, the witnesses would admit the difference between the ordinary knife and the pitchuva knife. But a reading of the entire evidence of these witnesses would show that the knife, which was used for the commission of the offence is a pitchuva knife, one of the varieties of knives. As such, the doubt expressed by the trial Court, with reference to the nature of the weapon was not on basis of the evidence. Moreover, all the prosecution witnesses would identify M.O.1-Pitchuva knife as a weapon used by the accused. The trial Court without discussing the available evidence through P.Ws.1 to 5 , who explained about the nature of the weapon and as to why they have stated the pitchuva knife, as knife in the F.I.R., has committed a grave error.
(iv) The fourth ground referred to by the trial Court is regarding the recovery of M.O.1-weapon from the accused on 15-12- 1989. P.W.9-Doctor, would say that M.O.1 was shown to him after the post-mortem. He would also say that he did not remember whether M.O.I was shown to him on the date of the post-mortem or on the next date. From this evidence, the trial Court entertained a doubt whether the knife would have been shown to Doctor on 5-12-1989, or on the next day. No doubt, P.W.9-Doctor would admit during ;his cross-examination, that he was shown M.O.1-knife by the investigating officer. But, he was not able to remember when exactly, M.O.1 was shown to him. P.W.12 would state that he examined the Doctor-P.W.9, on 15-12-1989, and that he showed M.O.1 to the Doctor, after its recovery from the accused. It is not the case of the accused, that knife was not at all shown to the Doctor. With reference to this evidence, there is no cross-examination. Merely, because P.W.9-Doctor stated that he was not able to remember the exact date on which M.O.1 knife was shown to him, whether it was on the date of post- mortem or on the next day, it does not mean that knife was shown to Doctor by the investigating officer, only on these days. P.W.12, the Inspector of Police, would state that he filed an application for police custody of the accused on 9-12-1989, and after obtaining permission of the Court, he took the custody of the accused and while interrogation the accused voluntarily made a confession, the admissible portion of which is Ex.P4, and in pursuance of the same, M.O.1 knife was recovered. M.O.1 was bloodstained one, which is found to be 'human' as per Ex.P16- serologist's report. So, as per the evidence of P.W.12, M.O.1- Pitchuva knife was shown to the Doctor-P.W.9, only after the recovery on 15.12.1989. The Doctor never admitted that he was shown M.O.1 -knife even prior to the date of recovery. Therefore, this ground also has no foundation.
From this, the trial Court inters that P.W.11 received some written report from P.W.1, whereas Ex.P1 was reduced in writing by P.W.11. This is also factually wrong. P.W.11-Sub-Inspector of Police is confronted with his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C, made to P.W.12-Inspector of Police. He has stated as follows:-
(vi) The next ground is that in view of the evidence of P.W.9- Doctor, that the stomach of the deceased, who died at 8.45 P.M., contained undigested food, the evidence of P.W.1, who stated that from 6-00 P.M., and 8.45 P.M. till his death, the deceased did not take any food. This is also not based on evidence. P.W.1 would admit that he was talking with the deceased from 6.00 P.M. to 7.30 P.M, and that during that time, the deceased did not take any food. P.W.8-Doctor Ilangovan, who examined the victim at 8.45 P.M., on the date of occurrence, declared that he was dead. P.W.9-the Doctor, who conducted the post-mortem would state that the stomach of the deceased contained undigested food. He also would state that the deceased must have taken food fifteen minutes prior to his death. The evidence of P.W.1 was only to the effect that between 6.00 P.M., and 7.30 P.M., the deceased did not take any food. Subsequent to the occurrence, the deceased was alive for about one hour. There was no admission from P.W.1 as observed by the Court below, that between 7.30 P.M., and 8.45 P.M., no food was taken by the deceased. This means that the deceased must have taken food anywhere just before he was examined by P.W.8-Doctor. Further more, the deceased was accompanied by his elder brother Selvendran, and his father -P.W.1. So, in the absence of admission by P.W.1, in his evidence that the deceased did not take food between 7.30 P.M. and 8.45 P.M., it cannot be concluded that P.W.1 could not have been with the deceased from 6.00 P.M., to 7.30 P.M. viz., during the time of occurrence. So, the presence of undigested food found during post-mortem, and the evidence of P.W.9, that such food must have been taken by the deceased only fifteen minutes prior to his death, would not affect the credibility of P.W.1 who saw the occurrence.
(vii) The last ground is with reference to the evidence of P.W.6-ma-hazar witness, regarding a doubt in respect of preparation of Exs.P2 to P5. Exs.P2 and P3 are the observation mahazar and mahazar for recovery of bloodstained earth and sample earth (M.Os.2 and 3) from the scene of occurrence on 4-12-1989 at about 10.45 P.M. P.W.6-Village Administrative Officer, never admitted that Exs.P2 and P3 were prepared in the presence of P.W.11-Sub-Inspector of Police. Exs.P4 and P5 are the admissible portion of the confession statement given by the accused, and the mahazar for recovery of M.O.1 -weapon of the crime, respectively on 15-12-1989. As per the evidence of P.W.11, he went on 4-12-1989, in search of the accused, and came back on 8-12-1989. P.W.11 - Sub - Inspector of Police would admit that after the registration of F.I.R., he came to the scene of occurrence. He left the place only at 11.00 P.M. So, the evidence of P.W.6, relating to the presence of P.W.11, at the scene of occurrence along with P.W.12 - Inspector of Police, till 11-00 P.M., cannot be said to be a false one. Exs.P2 and P3, were not written by P.W.12, Only the confession statement - Ex.P4 was written by P.W.12, the Inspector of Police. Moreover, P.W.6 would admit that the confession statement of the accused was recorded by the Inspector of Police, P.W.12.
10. Thus, the factors above discussed would make it clear that all the grounds of acquittal are as a result of complete misreading of evidence, and that the findings record by the trial Court in acquitting the 1st respondent/accused are unreasonable and palpably wrong, and that it may be categorised as perverse.
11. Of course, this Court is conscious of the fact, that the scope of revisional jurisdiction is so limited. But it does not mean that there could be no interference, even when this Court sees perversity, resulting in the flagrant miscarriage of justice. It is settled law that in the cases, where there is a misreading or perversity which has led to the grave miscarriage of justice, the interference is imperative, otherwise the existence of the revision power shall be rendered meaningless.
12. Therefore, let me refer about the various citations of this Court, as well as the Apex Court, with regard to the categories of cases, attracting interference of the High Court, on a revision filed by a private party.
(i) D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, ; (ii) Manohar Lal v. The State, ; (iii) Logendranath Jha and Ors. v. Shri Polai Lal Biswas, ; (iv) K. Chinnaswamy V. State of Andhra Pradesh, ; (v) Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh and Anr., ; (vi) Khetra Basi Samal and Anr. v. The State of Orissa etc., ; (vii) Changanti Kotaiah v. Goginoni Venkateshwar Rao, ; (viii) Akalu ahir and Ors. v. Ramdeo Ram, ; (ix) Samson Hyam Kemkar v. State of Maharashtra, ; (x) Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju and Ors. v. Bonapalli Peda Appadu and Anr., A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1854; (xi) Satyendra Nath Dutta v. Ram Narain, ; (xii) Ramaswami v. Muthu and Ors.-(Madras H.C.), 1976 Crl.L.J. 1504; (xiii) Iqbal Singh v. Gurmol Singh and Anr., 1980 Crl.L.J.45 (N.O.C.); (xiv) Ayodhya Dube v. Ram Sumer Singh, ; (xv)Marappa Gounder v. Venkatachalam and Anr.) (Madras High Court), 1983 L.W.(Crl.)1; (xvi) In Re: Krishnamoorthy and Anr., 1984 Crl.L.J. 243; (xvii) Laxman Sintgh v. Jai Prakash and Ors., 1984(2)Crimes 918; (xviii) S.K. Grover v. Chandra Prakash and Anr., 1985 L.W.(Crl) 30; (xix) Joseph and 16 others v. Papusami Reddiar, 1985 L.W.(Crl.)31; (xx) Kadiresan v. Kasim and Ors., 1987 L.W. (Crl.) 64; (xxi) Soundararajan v. Subramani and Anr. 1987 L.W. (Crl.) 495; (xxii) Babu v. State of Kerala, 1988 Crl. L.J. 56 (N.O.C.); (xxiii) Baidyanatha Das v. Gnana Das and Ors. - Orissa High Court, 1989(3) Crimes 492; (xxiv) Niranjan Kumar Das v. Ranadhir Roy and Ors., 1990 Crl. L.J. 683; (xxv) Benudhar Routra v. Raula @ Maheshwar Sam and Anr., 1991 Crl. L.J. 220; (xxvi) Kalandi Charon Pani v. Ganesh Dalai and Ors., 1992 Crl.L.J. 281;
13. The principles laid down in these cases are as follows:- "The High Court 'in revision can set aside the order of acquittal, at the instance of private party, though the State may not have thought it fit to appeal, but this power could be exercised only in cases, when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or error in law, and there is a flagrant miscarriage of justice, or where the material evidence has been completely overlooked or totally misread by the trial Court. The revisional jurisdiction is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private party, against an order of acquittal, but it could be exercised in exceptional cases, where the interest of public justice required interference, for the correction of a manifest irregularity, or for the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. The revisional jurisdiction confers an extra-ordinary discretionary powers to the superior Court to be exercised in aid of justice, to set right grave injustice and to see that justice is done in accordance with the recognised rules of criminal jurisprudence, and that subordinate Courts do not exceed that jurisdiction or abuse the powers conferred on them by law. As a general rule, this power does not contemplate interference, with the conclusion of facts in the absence of serious legal infirmity and failure of justice".
14. In the light of the above proposition of law laid down by this Court and the Apex Court, this Court has to consider as to whether the instant case falls under any of the parameter mentioned earlier. A thorough study of the records of the case would, in my view, reveal that this case, warrants interference to set right the grave injustice, since the entire judgment is the product of complete misreading of the evidence, and the vital material pieces of evidence, which are in abundance have been totally overlooked. In the earlier paragraphs, while I discuss about the various grounds of acquittal mentioned in the judgment, I have given full details, reflecting the misreading of the evidence by the trial Court.
15. Now, let me discuss the materials of vital importance which were totally ignored and overlooked by the trial Court, while rendering the judgment, as mentioned below:-
(i) The occurrence took place at 7.30 P.M. Immediately thereafter the deceased was taken to the hospital, where P.W.8- Doctor declared that the deceased was dead. The death intimation was immediately sent by Doctor- P.W.8 to Mannargudi Police Inspector. In the meantime, P.W.1 went to Paravakottai, and gave a complaint to P.W.11, Sub Inspector of Police, at 10.00 P.M. On telephone message from P.W.11 the Inspector of Police, Mannargudi, P.W.12, came to the spot and examined the witnesses. The F.I.R. reached the Magistrate at 12 midnight. The inquest was held in between 6.00 A.M. and 8.30 A.M. on 5-12-1989. All the eye witnesses were examined in inquest. Inquest report, as well as statement of witnesses reached the Magistrate at 3.00 P.M. on 5-12-1989 itself. There is no discussion on this in the judgment.
(ii) P.Ws.2 and 3, who were standing in front of the shop, saw the occurrence and tried to pacify the accused, who picked up quarrel with the deceased. After the accused stabbhed the deceased, P.Ws.2 and 3 tried to catch the accused, but he took to his heels. P.Ws.4 and 5 are the neighbours, who also saw the occurrence. They are independent witnesses and are not admittedly inimical towards the accused. The evidence of these eye witnesses P.Ws.2 to 5 was not discussed by the trial Court.
(iii) P.Ws.8 and 9 are the Doctors. P.W.8 would speak about the examination of the deceased, when he was brought to the hospital. Immediately, the death intimation was sent, and the same had reached the Mannargudi Police Station without any delay. P.W.12 would also admit this. P.W.9, the Doctor who conducted Post- mortem, would say that the death would have occurred due to the injury on the vital organ. According to him, corresponding injuries to the injury on the chest would be necessarily fatal. He also found that the injury infiltrated heart. P.W.9 also would state that the food must have been taken only fifteen minutes prior to the death. He found only one injury on the chest. He also would say that M.O.I pitchuva knife recovered from the accused, could have caused the chest injury. The occurrence took place on 4-12-1989. On coming to know that the accused surrendered before the Court, P.W.12 filed an application for police custody on 9-12-1989. As per the Court orders, he took custody on 14-12-1989. On the next day, in pursuance of the confession, M.O.I- bloodstained pitchuva knife was recovered. On the forensic examination, the blood found on the pitchuva knife was found to be of human. M.Os.2 and 5, the bloodstained earth and the shirt of the deceased also contained human blood, with the same group.
(iv) P.Ws.1 to 5 would state that street light was burning at the time of occurrence. Apart from the street light, there was a electric bulb burning inside the cycle shop also. In the observation mahazar -Ex.P.2, P.W.12, mentioned all these things. This was prepared at 10.45 A.M. on 4-12-1989. From the spot, bloodstained earth was seized. The recovery of weapon and the confession were spoken to by P.Ws.6 and 10.
(v) P.W.11 - Sub-Inspector of Police would state that he recorded the statement from P.W.1 and prepared printed F.I.R.- Ex.P11, and sent the same to the Court immediately. He sent telephonic message to P.W12. Then, he came to the spot along with the Inspector of Police, who assisted the investigation upto 11.00 P.M. He left the place at 11.00 P.M., in search of the accused. He only came back on 8-12-1989. P.Ws.10 and 12 would speak about the recovery of Exs.P8 and P9, the registers maintained in the cycle shop of the deceased. P.W.1 also would state about that. The entries in Exs.P8 and P9, and the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 12, would reveal that the accused was in dues to be paid to the deceased towards the hire charges.
16. The materials discussed above has never been considered and discussed by the trial Court. Not only that, as pointed out in earlier paragraphs, the trial Court has misread the evidence, and totally ignored the vital pieces of evidence, resulting in the gross miscarriage of justice. It is quite shocking to see as to how these important pieces of materials were totally missed by the trial Court. This shows the casual approach adopted by the trial Court, while delivering judgment. This casualness does not stop here, inasmuch as the State did not feel it necessary to file an appeal against acquittal, leaving the responsibility to the old father of the victim boy to knock at the doors of this Court.
17. It is painful to note that what is exhibited in the Judgment of Court below is a total lack of capacity to weigh and analyse the records in the process of the application of law, to the facts in a given situation. The net result is that the judgment has led to grave miscarriage of justice.
18. At the risk of repetition, with great anguish, I would point out, the trial Court discussed and appreciated the various materials as if they are available on record, whereas the said materials are not at all available. I am at loss to understand, as to how the relevant evidence on record as mentioned above have been totally lost sight of, ignored and overlooked by the Court below. The reasonings given by the Court below are quite contrary to the weight of evidence, and totally erroneous, based upon fully conjectures and surmises. The accepted canons for appreciating evidence, have been thrown into the wind. The probative value of the evidence of eye witnesses has been entirely ignored. Thus, the entire Judgment of the trial Court is full of informities, and the entire approach in dealing with this case is patently illegal.
19. In a nutshell, I would say, the Judgment of the Court below is a standing example to show as to how a judgment could be written with total non-application of mind. With so much of agony and anguish, I wish to place on record a word of depreciation with reference to the judicial approach made in this case by the Sessions Court.
20. Of course this Court is quite aware of the fact, that there is a limitation to exercise the revisional power, while dealing with the application for reversal of the order of acquittal, as in Sub-section (3) of Section 401, Cr.P.C. The limitation is that on reversal of acquittal, further enquiry or retrial can only be directed. The acquittal cannot be converted into conviction. Once this Court comes to a conclusion, that the conclusions given by the trial Court are based upon surmises and conjectures, overlooking and ignoring the vital pieces of evidence, and when this Court feels that the cumulative effect of all the infirmities makes the judgment impeachable, and there is a miscarriage of justice, as found in this Court, then the interference would become imperative.
21. I do not propose to appreciate the ;evidence in this order, which has been overlooked by the trial Judgment, since I deem it fit to set aside the order of acquittal and to remand the matter for reconsideration of the entire evidence already recorded by the trial court. However, the learned trial Judge, while deciding the case afresh, shall not be influenced in any manner by any of the observations made in this order.
22. In the result, the judgment of the trial Court made in S.C.No. 63 of 1991, on 9-4-1992, acquitting the 1st respondent/accused is set aside, and the case is remitted back to the trial Court for fresh disposal on the basis of the evidence already available on record, and after hearing both parties concerned, in accordance with law. The trial Court is directed to dispose of this case as expeditiously as possible.
23. Before parting with this case, I am constrained to observe regarding the judicial duty cast upon the trial Judge, while rendering judgments. I had come across several judgments of this particular Judicial Officer, which uniformly reflect his non-application of mind. A Division Bench of this Court, to which I was a party, in C.A.No. 185 of 1987, while dealing with an appeal against the judgment of acquittal, in a murder case, dealt with by him, had observed as follows:-
"We are so anguished at the exoneration of the respondents, by the trial Court on grounds palpably unsound, which do not stand the test of scrutiny on reasonableness, even of the minimum standard, that we are constrained to hold, after exercising expected judicial restraint, this being an appeal against acquittal, that it appears that the judicial conscience of the learned trial Judge in the instant case, had apparently taken a holiday. We refrain from saying more, for the abundance of public confidence in the judicial system shall have to be preserved and not belittled. Therefore, we do not wish to comment on this further. But we would express our deep dis-satisfaction in the manner and the way, in which the Judgment has been written in this case by the Sessions Judge."
The case on hand is yet another Judgment, in which the judicial conscience of the trial Judge, has taken yet another holiday. "Justice is not only to be done, but also seem to be done". Judiciary has to ensure the preservation of the public confidence in the judicial system. If reluctance is shown in the least, in discharging such a holy duty, the confidence of the public will be lost in the Courts. When the onus is cast upon the Judges, to render justice, without fear or favour, the converse of it would amount to dereliction of judicial duty.
24. The great Tamil Saint - Thiruvalluvar said:
(If the King (Judge) acts according to the law, and protects the people, he will be regarded as a God.") ... Kural - The Great Book of Tiruvalluvar C. Rajagopalachari) Except in quoting the above, I do not wish to comment on the trial Judge, more on this.