Allahabad High Court
Raju Singh @ Balwan Singh And Indal Singh ... vs State Of U.P. And Subhan Khan S/O Bahadur ... on 2 November, 2006
JUDGMENT Barkat Ali Zaidi, J.
1. Petitioners have come to Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with the request that the proceedings in S.T. No. 226 of 2005 under Section 307 I.P.C. Police Station Sumerpur, pending in the Court of Addl. Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2. Hamirpur be quashed.
2. The ground: on which this relief is sought, is three-fold:
(i) Out of four witnesses, whose statements have been recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. only two have supported the prosecution case while the other two (Rajendra alias Bhola and Durga Prasad) do not support the same.
(ii) That against injured Idris brother of the complainant, there are 17 criminal cases pending in the Courts and he is History sheeter while against the other person complainant Subhan, who is also said to have been accompanying him, there are three criminal cases pending in the Courts.
(iii) That a case of murder (Case Crime No. 499 of 2005) Police Station Sumerpur, of the father of the petitioners, who are brothers, is pending against the aforesaid two persons Idris and Subhan and the case in hand has been manipulated as a case of reprisal.
3. The Petitioners applied for being discharge of which application was rejected by the Trial Sessions Judge and the case is fixed for framing of charge. That is how this petition.
4. I have heard Sri V.S. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Sri Patanjali Mishra, learned A.G.A. for the State.
5. All the three grounds mentioned by the petitioners for termination of proceedings against them, are wholly without substance. They themselves admit that there are two witnesses who claim to have seen the incident and have testified about the involvement of the petitioners in the commission of the offence. How can it be said that two witnesses of fact besides the injured persons himself will not suffice for conviction. Even the testimony of a single witness is not un often sufficient for conviction. This is settled law and there can be no controversy about the same. It is surprising to hear such a plea, having been raised from the side of the petitioners.
6. As regards the criminal cases pending against the aforesaid two persons and one of them being a history sheeter, this is also no ground, at all, for assuming that they could not be assaulted like this and that their allegation is liable to be summarily rejected on this ground.
7. Similarly, the plea that a case of murder of the father of the petitioners is pending, will not be a ground to assume, that this case is wholly false.
8. The counsel for the petitioners has referred to the case of Shri Satish Mishra v. Delhi Administration and Anr. A.C.C. 1996, A.C.C. (33) S.C. 704. This was a case where the father was an accused of incest with his four year old daughter, and there was a long history of differences and disenchantments between the husband and wife. The circumstances of the case can be inferred from the following observations made in the case.
In the present case, learned Sessions Judge has missed certain germane aspects. Apart from the seemingly incredulous nature of the accusations against a father that he molested his infant child (who would have just passed her suckling stage then) the Sessions Judge ought not to have overlooked the following telling circumstances.
The complaint made by her with the New York police that her husband committed sexual offences against her 18 months old female child was investigated by the New York police and found the complaint bereft of truth hook, line and sinker. The present charge is that the appellant committed such offences against the same child at East Kailash, New Delhi some time during March to July, 1991. There is now no case of what happened in United States. The Sessions Judge should have noted that appellant's wife has not even remotely alleged in the complaint filed by her on 19.3.1993 before caw Cell, New Delhi that the appellant has done anything like that while he was in India. Even the other complaint petition (on which basis the F.I.R. was prepared) is totally silent about a case that appellant did anything against his daughter anywhere in India. When we perused the statement of Anita Mehra (second respondent) we felt no doubt that she has been brimming with acerbity towards the petitioner on account of other causes. She describes her marital life with petitioner as " extremely painful and unhappy for the very inception". She complains that petitioner has " a history of irrational outbursts of temper and violence". She accused him of being alcoholic and prone to inflicting severe physical violence on her from 1980 onwards.
Thus her attitude to the petitioner, even de hors the allegation involving the child, was vengeful. We take into account the assertion of the petitioner that the present story involving Nikita was concocted the second respondent to wreak her vengeance by embroiling him in serious criminal cases in India so that he could be nailed down here and prevent him from going back to U.S.A. There is another significant observation in the case which is as follows:
Over and above that, what would be the consequence of this nebulous allegation is allowed to proceed to the trial stage. We foresee that Nikita, the child witness, now eight years and four months old, must necessarily be subjected to cross questions involving sex and sex organs. The traumatic impact on the child when she would be confronted by volley of questions dealing with such a subject is a matter of concern to us. We cannot brush aside the submission of the appellant that such an ordeal would inflict devastating impairment on the development of child's personality,. Of course, if such a course is of any use to the cause of justice, we may have to bear with it as an inevitable course of action to be resorted to. But in this case, when the trial is going to be nothing but a frace, such a course of action should not be allowed to take place on account of the impending consequences befalling an innocent child.
The Court further said as follows in the final order:
After adverting to the above aspects and bestowing our anxious consideration we un-hesitatingly reach the conclusion that there is no sufficient ground to proceed to the trial in this case.
9. It will appear that it was because of the particular circumstances of the case that the Court came to conclusion that it would not be appropriate to proceed with the trial. Every case has its own features and circumstances and no general principal of law has been laid down, in this connection in the aforesaid case.
10. On this topic, this is what Earl of Helsbury, LC. said in Quinn v. Leathern 1901 A.C. 495, " now before discussing the case of Elen v. Flood (1898) A.C.I and what was decided therein, there are two observations of the general character which I wish to make and one is to repeat whatl ha ve very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be there these are not intended to the exposition of the whole Law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what is actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.
11. In Ambika quarry works v. State of Gujrat and Ors. , the S.C. observed as follows:
The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what logically follows from it
12. In Bhava Nagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. , the Supreme Court observed as follows:
It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision, the aforesaid case can, therefore, be of no help to the petitioners.
13. The result is that the petition cannot fructify and is accordingly dismissed.