Bombay High Court
Mohan Bagoji Gurkhe vs M/S Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd ... on 20 April, 2026
Author: G. S. Kulkarni
Bench: G. S. Kulkarni
2026:BHC-OS:10588-DB 23-IA-1404-2019F.DOC
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Digitally
signed by
KAWRE
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
KAWRE KIRAN
KIRAN KALYAN
KALYAN Date:
2026.04.24
19:13:54
+0530
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1404 OF 2019
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 235 OF 2016
Mohan Bagoji Gurkhe ...Applicant
In the matter between
Mohan Bagoji Gurkhe ...Petitioner
Versus
M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Ors. ...Respondents
_________
Ms. Gayatri Singh, Sr. Adv. a/w Ms. Hasanna Fernandez and Khalil Rehaman for
Applicant/Petitioner.
Mr. J. P. Cama, Sr. Adv. a/w Mr. Anand Pai, Mr. Rahul Sanghavi i/b M/s. Sanjay
Udeshi & Co., for Respondents.
__________
CORAM: G. S. KULKARNI &
AARTI SATHE, JJ.
DATE: 20 APRIL 2026
P.C.
1. By this interim application, the applicant - petitioner has prayed that respondent No.1 be directed to pay to the applicant the monthly retirement benefit under the Monthly Ex-Gratia Scheme ("MEGS") which the applicant claims to be entitled under the Service rules along with the arrears to be received by him, pursuant to his retirement on 31 October 2018.
2. At the outset, Ms. Gayatri Singh would submit that the prayers as made in this application stand squarely covered by the order dated 19 November 2025, passed by this Court in the case of Milind V. Ghate Vs. Bharat Petroleum Page 1 of 13 20 April 2026 Kiran Kawre ::: Uploaded on - 24/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:19:51 ::: 23-IA-1404-2019F.DOC Corporation Ltd and Others1.
3. We have heard Ms. Gayatri Singh, learned senior counsel for the applicant/petitioner and Mr. Cama, learned senior counsel for respondent No.1 on this interim application.
4. At the outset, the prayers as made in the application are required to be noted which read thus:
"(a) To direct the Respondent No.1 to pay to the Applicant, with immediate effect, the monthly retirement benefit under the Monthly Ex-Gratia Scheme (MEGS) of Respondent No.1, which the Applicant is entitled to receive pursuant to his retirement on 31.10.2018.
(b) To direct the Respondent No.1 to pay an additional interest of 12% for every month during which the MEGS has not been paid to the Applicant.
(c) To pass any other or further order or orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the Case."
5. We may observe that the aforesaid writ petition in which the present Interim Application is filed, seeks relief not in regard to any order of removal or termination of the petitioner, but on a minor penalty which was awarded to the petitioner in the inquiry proceedings initiated against him of a warning and a punishment of reduction in basic pay by three stages with cumulative effect vide order dated 8 June 2012 and 8 October 2014, which was continued by the Appellate Authority as also the Revisional Authority.
6. The fact remains that the petitioner was in the service of the respondent who superannuated on 31 October 2018, after about 35 years of service with the Respondent - BPCL. The applicant superannuated during the pendency of the 1 Interim Application No.1565 of 2022 in WP No.3070 of 2017 Page 2 of 13 20 April 2026 Kiran Kawre ::: Uploaded on - 24/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:19:51 ::: 23-IA-1404-2019F.DOC present writ petition.
7. The applicant's case is to the effect that on his superannuation, he had become entitled to the benefit of the Monthly Ex-Gratia Scheme ("MEGS"), available to the employees of the BPCL. The scheme contemplates that the management staff who joined on or before 31 March 2008, and who had completed a minimum 15 years of continuous service with the respondent - BPCL were eligible to receive the monthly benefit under the MEGS, provided their separation is on account of either death/retirement/permanent disablement/ early retirement on medical grounds etc.
8. In the case of the petitioner, it is not in dispute that prior to the superannuation, the petitioner made an application dated 1 October 2018 stating that he would be retiring from the service of the respondent - BPCL with effect from 31 October 2018, after completion of about 35 years of service and that he is eligible to receive the benefit of the MEGS on his retirement. However, such representation of the applicant was confronted with the insistence by the respondent - BPCL, that such benefit can be granted, only after the applicant executes an undertaking that the applicant is not having any litigation with the BPCL, and that in the absence of such undertaking, the applicant would not be entitled to the benefit of the MEGS. This entailed the applicant giving up his case in the aforesaid pending Writ Petition to which the applicant was not ready and willing to furnish an undertaking giving up his case in the present writ petition. The applicant having taken the position that the entitlement of the applicant to Page 3 of 13 20 April 2026 Kiran Kawre ::: Uploaded on - 24/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:19:51 ::: 23-IA-1404-2019F.DOC the benefits of the MEGS is independent, and that it is the applicant's constitutional right to pursue the legal remedy, being resorted in pursuing the writ petition cannot be taken away by the respondent seeking such undertaking. This more particularly when the applicant has lawfully retired/superannuated from the service of the respondent. Further, the cause being pursued in the writ petition being a challenge to the punishment imposed on the applicant had nothing to do with the MEGS.
9. Thus, the short issue is as to whether the applicant would be disentitled to the benefit of the MEGS, merely because the applicant did not furnish such undertaking.
10. In this regard, on behalf of the applicant our attention is drawn to the basic conditions of eligibility for the petitioner's entitlement of the Monthly Ex-Gratia Scheme i.e., an employee having put in more than 15 years of service and having superannuated, being the two basic conditions for the employee becoming eligible for the benefit under the MEGS.
11. Our attention is also drawn by Mr. Cama to paragraph 5 of the scheme which is titled "How to Apply" under which inter alia an application is required to be submitted before the retirement, which the petitioner had submitted, and secondly, an undertaking being required to be furnished in form at Annexure (V). The relevant paragraph of the scheme is required to be noted which reads thus:
"5. HOW TO APPLY :
a. The eligible ex-employee/spouse of deceased employee shall submit an Page 4 of 13 20 April 2026 Kiran Kawre ::: Uploaded on - 24/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:19:51 ::: 23-IA-1404-2019F.DOC application as per the prescribed format (Annexure 1, to be filled by the ex-
employee and Annexure 11 to be filled by spouse of the deceased employee) alongwith all relevant documents as indicated in the application form to Regional HRS/Mumbai/Kochi Refinery (HR) from where the ex-employee had/has separated. Such completed application should be submitted on or before 31/1/2009. A list of addresses of Regional HRS/ Refinery (HR) along with contact Nos. is enclosed as Annexure II b. To facilitate processing of Ex-Gratia payment, ex-employee / spouse are requested to submit their bank details as per Annexure IV. c. In the unfortunate event of death of an ex-employee who was receiving Ex- Gratia payment under the Scheme, his spouse needs to apply in the format given as per Annexure II mentioned above.
d. The ex-employees/surviving spouse, who are eligible for Ex-Gratia shall be required to execute an undertaking as per Annexure V to the effect that (i) this benefit is being given not because of any right or entitlement, but entirely as an Ex-Gratia (II) he / she will not enter into any litigation individually/collectively in this regard and/or any other service related matters before any Court of Law/Forum/Authority; (iii) if any case pertaining to Burmah Shell pension Scheme and/or Superannuation Scheme/ any service related matter is pending before any Court of Law/Forum/Authority, if he/she was a party to any such case shall withdraw the same forthwith. The eligibility of such applicant shall be verified and application will be processed only after withdrawal of such case/petition or litigation before any Court of Law/Forum/Authority where the applicant is a sole/joint petitioner."
(emphasis supplied)
12. Thus, an undertaking sought from the applicant is in terms of paragraph 5(d) of the scheme (supra), the effect of furnishing such undertaking is of the applicant required to give up his legal right to pursue the litigation namely, the aforesaid writ petition, in which the applicant is pursuing his contentions against the minor punishment of a warning and stoppage of increments imposed on him. From the perusal of the scheme, it appears that there is no dispute that the petitioner otherwise was eligible for the benefit of the Monthly Ex-Gratia Scheme, which is certainly, something to do with the post retirement benefit conferred on the retired employees, akin to the entitlement to a monthly pension, affecting the very livelihood and survival of the retired employee. Thus, clauses of Page 5 of 13 20 April 2026 Kiran Kawre ::: Uploaded on - 24/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:19:51 ::: 23-IA-1404-2019F.DOC the scheme are required to be considered by the respondents and interpreted so as to benefit of the employees, more particularly when the employees like the applicant having discharged long years of service with the respondent - BPCL and having superannuated. This more particularly, when the benefit was being conferred under such scheme in lieu of pension.
13. Mr. Cama would also submit that as the petitioner has not furnished undertaking i.e., the applicant not taking a position that he would give up his legal rights to pursue the aforesaid writ petition which according to the applicant has nothing to do with the implementation of the scheme. We examine whether to foist such undertaking on the applicant would be the correct approach, on the part of the respondents and for such reason denying the benefit of the MEGS to the applicant.
14. We find substance in the contentions as urged on behalf of the applicant that in identical facts and circumstances in the case of Milind V. Ghate (supra), this Court had passed an order dated 19 November 2025 *, granting benefit under such scheme which is stated to have been accepted by the respondent - BPCL. It is significant to note that as to what had transpired in the present proceedings was noted in the said order, when this Court in passing the orders in Milind V. Ghate (supra) referred to an order passed in the aforesaid Writ Petition filed by the applicant by a coordinate Bench of this Court in Notice of Motion No.148 of 2018, the Court recorded a statement made on behalf of the respondent - BPCL, * Interim Application No.1565 of 2022 in Writ Petition No.3070 of 2017 Page 6 of 13 20 April 2026 Kiran Kawre ::: Uploaded on - 24/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:19:51 ::: 23-IA-1404-2019F.DOC no undertaking in terms of clause (3) of the proforma of the undertaking would be insisted upon and that the applicant (petitioner herein) would be paid his legal retiral dues. The observation as made by this Court in Milind V. Ghate (supra) referring to the orders passed in the present proceedings are required to be noted which read thus:
"5. Mr. Mihir Desai, learned Senior Counsel for the Applicant has placed reliance on the orders passed by this Court on Notice of Motion No. 148 of 2018 in Writ Petition No. 235 of 2016 in the case of Mohan Bagoji Gurkhe Vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd and Others *. The said order is required to be noted and the same reads thus:-
"P.C. The learned counsel Mr. Pai appearing for respondent states that no undertaking in terms of Clause 3 of the proforma of the undertaking would be insisted upon and that the petitioner would be paid his legal retiral dues. The statement is accepted. In view of the said statement of Shri. Pai, grievance of the petitioner in respect of the undertaking does not survive. The calculation of the retiral dues would be without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in that regard.
2 The learned counsel Shri. Pai tenders an affidavit-in-reply insofar as the relief sought vide prayer clause (a) & (b) are concerned, the learned senior counsel Ms. Gayatri Singh appearing for the applicant/original petitioner seeks time to consider the said affidavit in reply. Hence, at her request, adjourned to 29/11/2018."
6. Mr. Desai has contended that no prejudice whatsoever would be caused to BPCL if the requirement of furnishing such an undertaking is dispensed with, as was done in the case of Mohan Bagoji Gurkhe (supra). He submits that in the present case, the dispute purely pertains only to the issue of promotion, and in the present matter, the Applicant has neither challenged the Ex Gratia Scheme nor raised any grievance concerning the benefits extended thereunder to employees who has rendered long years of service, as the Applicant, who have now retired from the services of the BPCL."
15. Mr. Cama would submit that however the undertaking as noted by the Court in the aforesaid order was in the context of legal retirement dues and that the benefit of the MEGS is not the same as the retirement dues, and therefore, such order would not be applicable, although referred in the order passed in * present case Page 7 of 13 20 April 2026 Kiran Kawre ::: Uploaded on - 24/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:19:51 ::: 23-IA-1404-2019F.DOC Milind V. Ghate (supra). Mr. Cama would also submit that considering the decision of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in V.G.K. Naidu v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Kochi Refineries Ltd. & Another 2, this Court ought not to pass an order granting the benefit of the MEGS to the applicant.
16. We do not agree with such contentions as urged by Mr. Cama. In our opinion, the applicant is entitled to the benefits of the MEGS for the reasons, we discuss hereafter.
17. In such context, we may at the outset observe that the order dated 19 November 2025 passed in Milind V. Ghate (supra) case which is on an identical case, was accepted by the respondent and the benefit of the MEGS was granted to Milind V. Ghate. In the present case, there is no distinguishing factor so as to deny the benefit of the MEGS to the applicant. The applicant in our opinion hence is entitled to the benefit of the MEGS being similarly situated.
18. Both the aforesaid contentions as urged by Mr. Cama that the order passed by this Court in Milind V. Ghate's case, which has recorded reasons for such entitlement being conferred on several counts, would not be applicable in the present facts is totally untenable. In regard to the implementation of the Ex- Gratia scheme, it cannot be countenanced that its implementation can be discriminatory/arbitrary, its implementation needs to satisfy all norms of fairness and non-discrimination as guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. This more particularly when it confers post retirement benefits. In our opinion, 2 [2017 SCC OnLine Ker 2588] Page 8 of 13 20 April 2026 Kiran Kawre ::: Uploaded on - 24/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:19:51 ::: 23-IA-1404-2019F.DOC certainly the present application would stand covered by by the orders passed by this Court in Milind V. Ghate (supra). The relevant extract of such order is required to be noted which read thus:
"8. Mr. Cama, learned Senior Counsel along with Mr. Pai appearing for BPCL- Respondent Nos. 1 to 3, would submit that the Petitioner's insistence that BPCL should dispense with the requirement of furnishing the undertaking would, in fact, run contrary to the decision of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in V.G.K. Naidu v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Kochi Refineries Ltd. & Another [2017 SCC OnLine Ker 2588]. According to Mr Cama, similar issues were raised for consideration of the Court and the Court had accordingly held that the furnishing of such undertaking or withdrawal of the pending litigation is sine qua non for the employee to take benefit of the said scheme. Mr. Cama further submitted that the Applicant has already received Provident Fund, Gratuity, and Leave Encashment, aggregating to approximately Rs 2.29 crores. In these circumstances, the Applicant's attempt to now raise a grievance and seek the benefit of the Ex Gratia Scheme, without complying with its mandatory conditions, is not an appropriate or bona fide approach. Accordingly, Mr. Cama contended that the present application deserves to be dismissed.
9. Mr. Cama has submitted that although the aforesaid interim order was passed in this Court in Mohan Gurkhe (supra) it was in relation to the service conditions and not in relation to the Ex Gratia. However this is seriously disputed by Mr. Desai.
10. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. We have also perused the record. At the outset, we may observe that the litigation pursued by the Applicant in the Writ Petition per se pertains to the issue of promotion i.e. the Petitioner asserting his legal rights in respect of his claim for promotion and/or the alleged denial thereof. The Petition does not, in any manner assail or concerns the Ex Gratia Scheme or the benefits that would otherwise be available to an employee under the said scheme on superannuation. Thus this is not a case where the Petitioner, on the one hand, is asserting or taking any position contrary to the Ex Gratia scheme and, on the other hand, intends to take benefit of the scheme, which is possibly contended.
11. In our opinion, it would be too hard and harsh to take a view that any litigation even if it does not concern the Ex Gratia scheme being bonafide pursued by any employee which is initiated prior to superannuation the BPCL in the present facts can foist the same to be withdrawn by the Applicant as a condition precedent to take the benefit of the Ex Gratia scheme. This would infact run contrary to the object of the Ex Gratia scheme.
12. In the present case, the Applicant has voluntarily retired after serving 37 years. In the case of the other employees, who superannuated like the applicant, who were similarly placed, were granted the benefit of Ex Gratia scheme. However, merely because the Petitioner has raised the issue of promotion in the present proceedings, this Petition being denied the benefit of the Ex Gratia scheme by calling upon the Petitioner to file an undertaking to withdraw this Petition would, in our opinion, amount to a position whereby the legal rights of the Applicant guaranteed not only under the Rules and Regulations of service Page 9 of 13 20 April 2026 Kiran Kawre ::: Uploaded on - 24/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:19:51 ::: 23-IA-1404-2019F.DOC but also under the Constitution would be effectively denied. The BPCL cannot adopt such harsh position as to require employees to withdraw any pending litigation,without applying its mind to the nature or subject matter of such pending litigation to permit the Applicant to avail the benefit of the Ex Gratia Scheme. It may be that the Scheme is an Ex Gratia Scheme. However, that does not mean it can be implemented in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner, particularly in light of Rule 38, as noted above, which does per se not mandate the filing of any such undertaking. Rule 38 only provides that the relevant documents required to avail of the benefits under the Scheme shall be provided by the administration. Thus the administration cannot override the Applicant's entitlement under the Ex Gratia Scheme, which is a vital consideration for BPCL.
13. We may also observe, as noted above, that the Petitioner was conscious, even prior to his retirement, that the requirement of such an undertaking was required to be dispensed with, and accordingly, the Applicant had submitted an application dated 16th December 2021(supra). We also note that BPCL had accorded such benefits in the case of Mohan Gurkhe (supra) pursuant to the orders passed by this Court on 19th October 2018. However, we are informed that there is some dispute and that the said employee has, in fact, not yet been granted the benefits of the Scheme. Be that as it may, nothing has been pointed out on behalf of BPCL to suggest that the orders dated 19th October 2018 passed by this Court in the said case have been set aside or are invalid as of date. We are hence not resting solely on the order dated 19th October 2018 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mohan Gurkhe (supra) as such order was passed on concession of the BPCL. As regards BPCL's reliance on the decision of the Kerala High Court in V.G.K. Naidu (supra), we find that it is of no assistance considering our independent reasoning.
14. As observed in the said decision, even assuming that the Scheme is Ex Gratia, it cannot be countenanced that its implementation can be arbitrary. The administration of the Scheme, particularly by a public sector undertaking, must satisfy all norms of fairness as guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India when it confers benefits to similarly placed employees, it is not the case of the BPCL that the Applicant for any other reason is disqualified except on the issue of such undertaking not being filed. Moreover, Paragraph 37 of the said decision demonstrates that the Court did not accept the Petitioner's case in such context. Thus, this is not a case where the Applicant, on the one hand, has challenged the Scheme and, on the other, is simultaneously seeking benefits under it. The BPCL cannot take a plea that for extension for grant of Ex Gratia benefit otherwise any kind of litigation which is unconnected with the scheme would be required to be withdrawn. This would be too far fetched. We find that the grant of benefit under the Ex-Gracia scheme is in fact nothing to do or would have any relevance in regard to the issue of promotion. It may only vary the quantum of the Ex Gratia in the event the Applicant is to succeed in the writ petition. This would not, by itself, disqualify the Petitioner from receiving the Ex Gratia benefits. In the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the clear opinion that the present Interim Application needs to be allowed. It is accordingly allowed in terms of prayer clause (a)."
(emphasis supplied)
19. We are also not impressed with Mr. Cama's submission relying on the decision of the Kerala High Court, as in our clear opinion, in the present facts it Page 10 of 13 20 April 2026 Kiran Kawre ::: Uploaded on - 24/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:19:51 ::: 23-IA-1404-2019F.DOC does not assist the respondent - BPCL. Moreover, this Court has already taken a view referring to such order being already distinguished in passing orders in Milind V. Ghate (supra). Mr. Cama nonetheless has a new argument when he submits that the said decision of the Kerala High Court needs to be applied in the present case by referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in proceedings in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Limited Vs. Union of India and Another 3, when the Supreme Court in paragraph 22 observed thus:
"22. The Court must have the requisite territorial jurisdiction. An order passed on a writ petition questioning the constitutionality of a parliamentary Act, whether interim or final keeping in view the provisions contained in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, will have effect throughout the territory of India subject of course to the applicability of the Act."
Certainly this is not a case where the Kerala High Court was dealing with constitutionality of a Parliamentary Act and proceedings of the nature as commented in paragraph 22 (supra) of the decision.
20. In fact, this Court has taken a clear view in Milind V. Ghate (supra) which has been accepted by the respondent - BPCL, and hence, there cannot be a different yardstick between similarly placed employees, so as to negate the doctrine of equality conferred under Article 14 read with Article 21 of the Constitution. Once the Court has considered the said scheme and accordingly interpreted the same in Milind V. Ghate (supra), the benefit of the scheme is required to be granted to the applicant in the present case who is similarly situated.
3 (2004) 6 SCC 254 Page 11 of 13 20 April 2026 Kiran Kawre ::: Uploaded on - 24/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:19:51 ::: 23-IA-1404-2019F.DOC
21. Mr. Cama's contention that the relief sought by the applicant for grant of MEGS ought not to be granted on the ground that it would be a relief alien to the proceedings of the aforesaid writ petition does not impress us. This for the reason that merely on account of the applicant pursuing the aforesaid Writ Petition, the applicant is being denied benefit of MEGS, for want of an undertaking that he would not pursue the present petition. Thus, the relief sought in the interim application, in our opinion, is not only a relief incidental to and arising in the course of the applicant's employment, but is also a cause underlying the issue being asserted by the applicant in the writ petition. However, we are also of the opinion that in matters in regard to such post-retirement benefits being conferred, a narrow or pedantic view cannot be taken to deny such benefits to an employee, who otherwise is entitled to the same and who has rendered long years of service to the employer, namely, respondent - BPCL. The scheme itself is a token of recognition of such long service, being entitled to the employees who have superannuated. Thus, the applicant on his superannuation, was certainly entitled to the benefit without an undertaking being required to be furnished, that he would not pursue the petition. In the facts of the present case, insisting on such undertaking from the applicant would be contrary to the legal Constitutional right to seek remedies before a Court of law, for redressal of any injustice. It would be a proposition opposed to the rule of law that in the facts of the case, if such undertaking is insisted or foisted on the applicant, so as to deprive the applicant who has superannuated, of the benefits of the MEGS, which is akin to a benefit of pension, supporting the very livelihood of the employee post retirement. Denial Page 12 of 13 20 April 2026 Kiran Kawre ::: Uploaded on - 24/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:19:51 ::: 23-IA-1404-2019F.DOC of MEGS in the present case would result in a painful infringement of the applicant's fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 read with Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
22. We are thus in complete agreement with the contention as urged on behalf of the applicant that the present application would stand squarely covered by the orders passed by this Court in Milind V. Ghate (supra).
23. In the aforesaid circumstances, the present Interim Application would be required to be allowed. It is accordingly allowed in terms of prayer clauses (a) and
(b).
24. No costs.
(AARTI SATHE, J.) (G. S. KULKARNI, J.) Page 13 of 13 20 April 2026 Kiran Kawre ::: Uploaded on - 24/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:19:51 :::