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[Cites 12, Cited by 1]

Central Information Commission

Anjanish Pandey vs Chief Commissioner Of Income Tax (Cca), ... on 3 January, 2023

Author: Saroj Punhani

Bench: Saroj Punhani

                                के   ीय सूचना आयोग
                         Central Information Commission
                             बाबागंगनाथमाग , मुिनरका
                          Baba Gangnath Marg, Munirka
                          नई द ली, New Delhi - 110067


File No : CIC/CCITD/A/2021/134398

Anjanish Pandey                                           ......अपीलकता /Appellant


                                        VERSUS
                                         बनाम
CPIO,
Directorate of Income Tax
(Systems), RTI Cell, ARA Centre,
Ground Floor, E-2,
Jhandewalan Extension,
New Delhi-110055                                        .... ितवादीगण /Respondent

Date of Hearing                     :   29/09/2022
Date of Decision                    :   27/12/2022

INFORMATION COMMISSIONER :              Saroj Punhani

Relevant facts emerging from appeal:

RTI application filed on            :   16/04/2021
CPIO replied on                     :   20/05/2021
First appeal filed on               :   Nil
First Appellate Authority's order   :   12/07/2021
2nd Appeal/Complaint dated          :   18/08/2021

Information sought

:

The Appellant filed an online RTI application dated 16.04.2021 seeking the following information:
"I draw your attention to the information available in the income Lax website which states the documents and information to be submitted with the pan application, 1 An association of person (other than trust) or body of individuals formed in India shall submit the following documents with pan application form. A) Copy of the Agreement or B) Copy of certificate of registration number issued by charity commissioner or Registrar of cooperative society or any other competent authority, C) Any other document originating from any central government or state government department establishing identity and address of such persons.

With regard to the aforementioned details, I the petitioner hereby seek information pertaining to my housing society of which I am one of the flat owners. Details appended below.

Details of the document/Inspection/Samples required

1.Information if all the statutory documents as required for obtaining a pan by a AOP registered with cooperative society (competent authority) has been obtained by your department.

2.All Documents and file notings submitted to obtain the PAN AADAP9473C."

The CPIO denied information to the appellant on 20.05.2021 under Section 8(1)(e) & 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, 2005.

Being dissatisfied, the appellant filed a First Appeal dated NIL. FAA's order dated 12.07.2021 upheld the reply of CPIO.

Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied, the appellant approached the Commission with the instant Second Appeal.

Relevant Facts emerging during Hearing:

The following were present:-
Appellant: Present through audio conference.
Respondent: Ramesh Jha, DDIT & CPIO present through audio conference.
The Appellant reiterated the contents of the Second Appeal stating as under inter alia:
"I as a flat owner of C 503 Purva Skywood apartment had applied to provide copy and information pertaining to the documents applied for obtaining the PAN in the name of M/s Purva Skywood Apartment Owners Association by our housing Society.
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It is being brought to my notice that PAN card bearing no:(AADAW473Cl has been issued to the housing society called (M/s Purva Skywood Apartment owners association) by the designated authority /organization under 'association of person' category without obtaining the mandated documents as specified under Rule 114 (4) of the Income Tax Act xxx • The details sought by me is related to tax filing by housing society (M/s Purva Skywood Apartment Owners Association), which exists for maintenance of Purva Skywood Apartment, where all owners have equal rights and some of the owners take responsibility every year take various roles of President, Treasurer, Secretary for running maintenance of Apartment complex on all the owners behalf, so the information requested is not of personal nature.
• Further it is to be noted that maintenance of Purva Skywood is public activity, where public equates to all the owners of Purvg Skywood Apartment.
• The details sought by me are of a public activity, hence it is on; public record which has travelled through the auditor's office am reached your office."
The CPIO did not object to the contention of the Appellant that he is also one of the owners in the averred association but objected to the disclosure of information stating that extant Income Tax Rules suggest that the Association's information is personal information. He further reiterated the contents of the written submissions filed by him as under:
"After rejecting the RTI, later, a letter received from Property Manager of M/s PURVA SKYWOOD APARTMENT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, PAN No AADAP9473C dated 16.06.2021 stating therein that the information sought by the applicant in our case has no relationship to any public activity or to any larger public interest. In the view of the same, it is requested that applicant's request in this regard may be rejected and the information sought for may not be disclosed. From the perusal of the report submitted by the CPIO, the RTI application was rightly rejected u/s 8(1)(e) & 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.
PAN Data and details related thereto are held by the Income Tax Department in a fiduciary capacity and therefore it cannot be provided to any other person except the PAN holder. In the instant case PAN holder M/s PURVA SKYWOOD APARTMENT OWNERS' ASSOCIATION has objected to sharing any details with the applicant. Section 2(n) of the RTI Act defines " Third Party" and reads as under:-
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" Section 2(n):- " Third Party" means a person other than the citizen making a request for information and includes a public authority_ From the aforesaid definition it is clear that any person other than the citizen making a request for information can be termed as "third party". Therefore, M/s PURVA SKYWOOD APARTMENT OWNERS' ASSOCIATION being a entity other than RTI applicant definitely comes within the definition of "third party". Moreover M/s PURVA SKYWOOD APARTMENT OWNERS ASSOCIATION has denied its consent also by expressly objection to share any information."
Decision:
The Commission having heard the parties observes that the fact that the Appellant is one of the owners in the averred Association is not a disputed fact and it has also considered the objection of the Association to the disclosure of the information which is that it is not a public undertaking or an autonomous body and that there is no larger public interest in such disclosure. Now, based on a perusal of the facts on record while addressing the applicability of Section 8(1)(j) and 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act, relies on certain observations of a Division Bench of the Commission in Appeal No. CIC/BS/A/2016/001091-BJ-Final dated 05.01.2018 as under:
"The Commission took note of the issue regarding the "personal information" held by an individual in its personal capacity and the personal information held by the entities/corporations/trusts in their private capacity. In this context, a reference was drawn on the Hon'ble Delhi High Court decision in Naresh Trehan vs. Rakesh Kumar Gupta and Ors.( 2015) 216 DLT 156 wherein it was held:
'20. It has been contended by the petitioners that the expression "personal information" must also extend to information relating to corporate entities. Inasmuch as they may also fall within the definition of expression "person" under the General Clauses Act, 1897 as well as under the Income Tax Act, 1961. However, I am unable to accept this contention for the reason that the expression "personal information" as used in clause (j) of Section 8(1) of the Act has to be read in the context of information relating to an individual. A plain reading of the aforesaid clause would indicate that the expression "personal information" is linked with "invasion of privacy of the individual". The use of the word "the" before the word "individual" immediately links the same with the expression "personal information".
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21. Black's law dictionary, sixth edition, inter alia, defines the word "personal" as under:- "The word "personal" means appertaining to the person; belonging to an individual; limited to the person; having the nature or partaking of the qualities of human beings, or of movable property."
22. A perusal of the above definition also indicates that the ordinary usage of the word "personal" is in the context of an individual human being and not a corporate entity. The U.S. Supreme Court has also interpreted the expression "personal" to be used in the context of an individual human being and not a corporate entity. In the case of Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T Inc: 2011 US LEXIS 1899 the US Supreme Court considered the meaning of the expression "personal privacy" in the context of the Freedom of Information Act, which required Federal Agencies to make certain records and documents publically available on request. Such disclosure was exempt if the records "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy". The U.S. Supreme Court held that the expression "Personal" used in the aforesaid context could not be extended to corporations because the word "personal"

ordinarily refers to individuals. The Court held that the expression "personal" must be given its ordinary meaning. The relevant extract of the said judgment is as under: "Person" is a defined term in the statute;

"personal" is not. When a statute does not define a term, we typically "give the phrase its ordinary meaning," [Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S., 559 U.S. 133, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 176 L. Ed. 2d 1, 8 (2010)]. "Personal" ordinarily refers to individuals. We do not usually speak of personal characteristics, personal effects, personal correspondence, personal influence, or personal tragedy as referring to corporations or other artificial entities. This is not to say that corporations do not have correspondence, influence, or tragedies of their own, only that we do not use the word "personal" to describe them. Certainly, if the chief executive officer of a corporation approached the chief financial officer and said, "I have something personal to tell you," we would not assume the CEO was about to discuss company business. Responding to a request for information, an individual might say, "that's personal." A company spokesman, when asked for information about the company, would not. In fact, we often use the word "personal" to mean precisely the opposite of business related: We speak of personal expenses and business 5 expenses, personal life and work life, personal opinion and a company's view."

23. In my view, the aforesaid red reasoning would also be applicable to the expression "personal" used in Section 8(1)(j) of the Act. The expression 'individual' must be construed in an expansive sense and would include a body of individuals. The said exemption would be available even to unincorporated entities as also private, closely held undertaking which are in substance alter egos of their shareholders. However, the expression individual cannot be used as a synonym for the expression 'person'. Under the General Clauses Act, 1897 a person is defined to "include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not". Thus, whereas a person would include an individual as well as incorporated entities and artificial persons, the expression 'individual' cannot be interpreted to include such entities. The context in which, the expression "personal information" is used would also exclude it application to large widely held corporations. While, confidential information of a corporation is exempt from disclosure under Section 8(1) (d) of the Act, there is no scope to exclude other information relating to such corporations under Section 8(1)(j) of the Act as the concept of a personal information cannot in ordinary language be understood to mean information pertaining to a public corporation."

Moreover, the Commission also examined the nature of fiduciary relationship involved in the instant matter whereby the Respondent denied the information of ITRs under Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI act,2005. The Commission referred to the Hon'ble Supreme Court decision in CBSE v. Aditya Bandhopadhyay (2011) 8 SCC 497 wherein it was held as under:

22. '.... But the words 'information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship' are used in section 8(1)(e) of RTI Act in its normal and well recognized sense, that is to refer to persons who act in a fiduciary capacity, with reference to a specific beneficiary or beneficiaries who are to be expected to be protected or benefited by the actions of the fiduciary - a trustee with reference to the beneficiary of the trust, a guardian with reference to a minor/physically/infirm/mentally challenged, a parent with reference to a child, a lawyer or a chartered accountant with reference to a client, a doctor or nurse with reference to a patient, an agent with reference 6 to a principal, a partner with reference to another partner, a director of a company with reference to a share-holder, an executor with reference to a legatee, a receiver with reference to the parties to a lis, an employer with reference to the confidential information relating to the employee, and an employee with reference to business dealings/transaction of the employer.' Furthermore, the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in Rajendra Vasantlal Shah vs. Central Information Commissioner and Ors. AIR 2011 Guj 70 had observed that any statutory body/Institution/association meant to serve public good cannot claim to be working in a fiduciary capacity, and held as under:
'8.4. Respondent No. 4 is a religious charitable Trust, functioning under the Scheme formulated by the District Court, having considerable public importance and registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act, as a religious charitable Trust. Considering its nature and activities, emerging from the objects of the Trust, it can be stated that disclosure of such information is in relation to any public interest of activity. The Trust is engaged, in public activities, disclosure of its statements and accounts of income-tax returns and assessments orders cannot be withheld under Section 8(1)(e) or (j)of the R.T.I. Act.' Further, in a recent case involving the similar factual matrix vide File No. CIC/DGITS/A/2021/604597, this bench made the following observation inter alia which is found relevant here:
"Similarly, it is also clarified that the Commission is not going into the merits of any argument of larger public interest touted by the Appellant in the records and the arguments of the Appellant or rebuttal of the Association about the functioning of the association, veracity of its day-to-day activities; finances, audit status whatsoever are extraneous considerations in the facts of the instant case. For further clarity, reference of 'public good' mentioned in one of the dicta (Rajendra Vasantlal Shah vs. Central Information Commissioner and Ors. AIR 2011 Guj 70) relied upon in the division bench decision (supra) of the Commission is only for the purpose of adding perspective in the instant matter as it relates to a resident seeking the income tax records of the 'association' of his own residential society. In other words, the only take away from the aspect of 'public good' in the instant case is that the members of the averred association should least of all have access to the information of the association."
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Adverting to the foregoing discussion, it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that there is no invasion of privacy of any individual in the disclosure of the information sought for in the instant RTI Application, similarly, there is no fiduciary relationship between the association and the Respondent office, therefore the invocation of Section 8(1)(j) and 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act by the CPIO is rejected in the matter.
Having observed as above, the Commission directs the CPIO to revisit the RTI Application and provide the available information as sought for therein to the Appellant within 15 days from the date of receipt of this order. A compliance report to this effect shall be duly sent to the Commission by the CPIO immediately thereafter.
The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
Saroj Punhani (सरोज पुनहािन) हािन) Information Commissioner (सूचना आयु ) Authenticated true copy (अिभ मािणत स#यािपत ित) (C.A. Joseph) Dy. Registrar 011-26179548/ [email protected] सी. ए. जोसेफ, उप-पंजीयक दनांक / 8