Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Nandan Singh Patwal vs Agriculture And Farmers Welfare on 12 March, 2026
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Item No. 69 O.A. No. 120/2023
Court No. IV
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench, New Delhi
O.A. No. 120/2023
Reserved on :- 10.02.2026
Pronounced on:- 12.03.2026
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J)
Hon'ble Dr. Anand S Khati, Member (A)
Nandan Singh Patwal
Sub: HRA/Gp. C/Aged-62 Yrs
S/o Late Sh. Prem Singh Patwal
House No. 68, Ramgarh Road,
Kahal Kweera, Bhowali District,
Nainital, UK-263132
...Applicant
(By Advocate: Mr. U Srivastava)
Versus
1. Indian Council of Agricultural Research
Through its Secretary
Krishi Bhawan, Dr. R P Road,
New Delhi.
2. The Director,
ICAR-National Bureau of Plant Genetic Resources,
Pusa Campus, New Delhi-110012.
3. The Assistant Administrative Officer,
ICAR-National Bureau of Plant Genetic Resources,
Pusa Campus, ND-110012
4. The Officer in Charge, NBPGR,
Regional Station, Bhowali-263132,
Distt -Nainital, Uttarakhand
SHILPI
SHILPI
GUPTA ...Respondents
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(By Advocate: Mr. Gagan Mathur)
+05'30'
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Item No. 69 O.A. No. 120/2023
Court No. IV
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J) :
Highlighting the facts of the case, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant was appointed as Junior Clerk on 09.11.1983 and deputed at IARI, Regional Station, Bhowali, which was taken over by National Bureau of Plant Genetic Research, Pusa Campus, New Delhi on 01.04.1986. As Government accommodation was not available at Bhowali despite processing of his case no quarter could be allotted, and in the meantime he was transferred to Srinagar in June 1999 where he joined in July 1999, thereafter on account of difficulties he sought and was granted transfer back to ICAR-NBPGR Regional Station, Bhowali in February 2000. Facing continued hardship due to non-availability of Government accommodation at Bhowali he applied through proper channel for House Building Advance for acquiring a house, which was duly sanctioned and released on 15.12.2004. Subsequently, vide office order dated 20.04.2011, the Director approved allotment of Type-III accommodation to the applicant as SHILPI per his seniority, which he received, but he submitted a SHILPI GUPTA 2026.03.16 GUPTA10:53:58 representation dated 03.05.2011 seeking cancellation of +05'30' 3 Item No. 69 O.A. No. 120/2023 Court No. IV the said allotment. The said representation, reads as under:
"Sub: Application for cancellation of Allotment of Type-Ill Govt. Residence to Shri N. S. Patwal, Assistant Administrative Officer.
Sir:
Please refer to letter· No. 32-129/86/Bhawali/Estate/ Part!Vol-1/123 dated April 20, 2011 of Assistant Administrative Officer, ICAR Bureau, New Delhi by which I was allotted Type-Ill Staff Quarter. In this context, I am requesting ·to cancel the aforesaid allotment as follows:
1. With the permission of the department, I have taken an advance of Rs.163500/- for construction of my own house after· purchasing a plot in Bhowali from the headquarters through bill no. 222 dated 18.01.2005 and approval of which was received vide letter no. 22-150/2004-05 dated 15.12.2004 (copy enclosed). House building advance is being deducted from the salary bills at Rs. 866/- (68/180 Inst.) per month.
2. In this way, even before the construction of staff quarters at this center, I had got my own house constructed. Now I am living there with my family. Now I don't need government accommodation inside the campus. Thus no possession has been taken. Therefore, it is requested that deduction of house rent/license fee should not be· recovered from my salary bills. Therefore, considering the above reasons, my allotment of government accommodation should be canceled after considering it sympathetically."
1.1. Learned counsel further submitted that the representation dated 03.05.2011 seeking cancellation of the allotted Type-III accommodation was duly processed at the appropriate level; however, no formal order of cancellation was ever issued.
1.2. Learned counsel further drew our attention to Annexure A-7 of the O.A, which reads as under:
SHILPI SHILPI GUPTA "Sub: Payment of balance amount of HRA regarding.
2026.03.16
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Item No. 69 O.A. No. 120/2023
Court No. IV
It is submitted that GOI MH & UA, DE's letter No. 12034/1/2019-Pol.lll dated 08.04.2018 and ICAR, Krishi Bhavan, New Delhi's letter No. GAC-21·16/2019 CDN dated 2 Aug. 2019 and As per the instructions of Director, ICAR- NBPGR Bureau Pusa Campus New Delhi's letter no. 32- 129/86/Bhowali/ Estate/2185 dated 30.Aug.2019 2019, the HRA of the officers and employees working in the Regional Center Bhawali has been implemented from 05.03.2019. Sir, in this regard the undersigned/applicant wants to inform that the applicant has received the payment of Rs.35,033/- out of Rs.3,41,054/- from the month of May, 2011 to August 2019. That means the balance amount of Rs.3,41,054- 35,033=3,06,021/- has been left to be paid.
Since the applicant was living in his own constructed residence/house by taking HBA/House Building Advance from Headquarter, ICAR-NBPGR Bureau, Pusa Campus, New Delhi before prior to the construction of the staff quarter. Therefore, never stayed in the allotted staff quarter, but the house rent allowance and license fee were being deducted continuously. For which a letter No. RSB/Staff Quarter/2011- 12/42 dated 03.05.2011 was also written to the Director earlier. Photocopy of the letter is attached for reference. Now that the facility of government accommodation was never availed by the applicant. Hence kindly provide the HRA/House Rent Allowance to the applicant by which the payment of remaining amount of Rs. 306021/- (Three lakhs six thousand & Twenty one only) could be received."
1.3. Learned counsel further submitted that by the impugned order, the applicant's legitimate claim for grant of HRA for the period from 01.05.2011 to 04.03.2019 has been arbitrarily and unjustifiably rejected.
1.4. Learned counsel for the applicant further submitted that in terms of the Office Memorandum dated 08.04.2019, and upon due approval, HRA was allowed in 2019 to incumbents who were not availing Government SHILPI accommodation without insisting upon production of a SHILPI GUPTA 2026.03.16 No Objection Certificate (NOC), and accordingly the GUPTA10:53:58 +05'30' respondents themselves released HRA to the applicant 5 Item No. 69 O.A. No. 120/2023 Court No. IV w.e.f. 05.03.2019 till his retirement on 31.08.2020;
however, despite the admitted position that the applicant had never occupied the allotted accommodation and had sought its cancellation as far back as 03.05.2011, his claim for HRA for the intervening period from 01.05.2011 to 04.03.2019 was denied, though he had repeatedly submitted representations and the matter was processed at the appropriate level, yet no relief was granted. In the aforesaid backdrop of admitted non-occupation of Government accommodation and discriminatory grant of HRA for the subsequent period without any change in circumstances, the applicant seeks the following reliefs by way of the present Original Application.
"8. (a) Directing the respondents to place the relevant records pertaining to the present O.A. before their Lordships for the proper adjudication in the matter in the interest of justice, and thereafter;
(b) Quash and setting aside the impugned order dt. 10.10.22 (Annexure A/1) declining the request of the applicant for releasing the HRA for the period from 01.05.11 to 04.03.19 on the premises that as per existing rule at that time, the govt.
accommodation was allotted to the applicant ignoring the facts that the applicant even without taking possession immediately requested for cancellation which request was processed at appropriate level however admittedly in the same circumstance HRA has been paid for the period from 05.03.19 to 31.08.20, up to superannuation, with all other consequential benefits i.e. the arrears thereof with interest @24% admissible to the applicant in accordance with the relevant rules and instructions on the subject.
(c) Any other fit & proper relief may also be granted to the applicant."
SHILPI 1.5. Concluding the arguments, learned counsel for the SHILPI GUPTA 2026.03.16 GUPTA10:53:58 applicant submitted that the present O.A. has been +05'30' 6 Item No. 69 O.A. No. 120/2023 Court No. IV necessitated solely due to the arbitrary denial of House Rent Allowance (HRA) for the period 01.05.2011 to 04.03.2019, despite the undisputed fact that the applicant never occupied the Government accommodation allotted to him on 20.04.2011 and had immediately sought its cancellation on 03.05.2011, which was duly processed. The applicant, having already constructed his own house through a House Building Advance sanctioned by the respondents themselves on 15.12.2004 and continuously repaid without default, was not in possession of any Government accommodation during the said period. The respondents themselves subsequently recognized this position and released HRA w.e.f. 05.03.2019 till his retirement on 31.08.2020, without any change in factual circumstances, thereby exposing the inconsistency and arbitrariness in denying HRA for the earlier intervening period. The impugned order dated 10.10.2022, rejecting his claim merely on the ground that accommodation had been allotted as per entitlement, ignoring that it was never occupied and stood sought to be cancelled, has caused grave prejudice to the applicant.
SHILPI 2. Opposing the grant of relief, learned counsel for the SHILPI GUPTA 2026.03.16 GUPTA10:53:58 respondents relied upon the averments made in the +05'30' 7 Item No. 69 O.A. No. 120/2023 Court No. IV counter affidavit, particularly the preliminary objections raised therein, and submitted that the issue involved in the present Original Application already stands adjudicated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (1984) 2 SCC 141, wherein the history, objectives and functions of the Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR), have been comprehensively discussed and analyzed; the relevant extract of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:
"9. A very brief resume of the history of ICAR commencing from its initial set up and its development into its · present position would show that as a matter of form, it is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act but substantially when set up it was an adjunct of the Government of India and has not undergone any noteworthy change. On the advent of provincial autonomy wider the Government of India Act, 1919, 'agriculture' and 'animal husbandry' came under the heading 'transferred subject' with the result that they came with the result that they came within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Provincial Government. Development of agriculture and research in agriculture became the responsibility of Provincial Government. Even then a Royal Commission on Agriculture was constituted in 1926 to enquire into the agricultural set up and the rural economy of the country and to make recommendations to consider what firm steps are necessary to be taken by the Central Government in this behalf The Commission in its report recommended the setting up of Imperial Council of Agricultural research. Acting upon this recommendation, Government of' India sent a telegram to the Secretary of State on April 24, 1929 informing the latter that the process of setting up of the Council is under way and that when set up Council would be a Society. On May 9, 1929, Secretary of the State approved the proposal of' the Government of' India subject to variations mentioned therein. By its resolution dated May 23, 1929, the Central Government directed that Imperial SHILPI Council of Agricultural Research should be registered SHILPI GUPTA 2026.03.16 as a Society under the Registration of Societies Act, XX1 of 1860. The resolution further provided that with GUPTA10:53:58 respect to the grant to be made to the Council to meet +05'30' the cost of' the staff, establishment, etc, the government 8 Item No. 69 O.A. No. 120/2023 Court No. IV of' India decided that for reasons for administrative convenience it should be in the same position as department of' the Government of' India Secretariat. The Imperial Council of' Agricultural Research was set up in June, 1929. A direction was also given that the research institutes were to be maintained by the Council. In their Counter Affidavit filed in the High Court of Delhi it was conceded in Para 27 that the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research should in future be an attached office and not the Department of the government not to be entirely manned by government staff and the Secretariat Staff of the Council was to be paid from the grant to be given by the Government for its administration and they would be Government servants ·and the Secretariat would be the Department of the Government of India, In July, 1929 Indian Council for Agricultural Research was registered as a society with its office in the · Secretariat as an attached office of the Secretariat."
2.1. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the present Original Application is hopelessly barred by limitation. He placed reliance upon the general policy of the ICAR Headquarters communicated vide letter No. 41(8)-Per.IV dated 14.01.2009, whereby directions were issued to allot all vacant Government accommodations to employees so as to avoid heavy financial losses to ICAR; in pursuance thereof, respondents No. 2 and 3 have been allotting houses to eligible employees and, in cases where an employee refuses to accept the accommodation offered, HRA is stopped. It was contended that since the house stood allotted to the applicant vide order dated 20.04.2011, he was not entitled to HRA for the period SHILPI SHILPI GUPTA from 01.05.2011 to 04.03.2019. It was further 2026.03.16 GUPTA10:53:58 emphasized that the entitlement to HRA, as granted +05'30' 9 Item No. 69 O.A. No. 120/2023 Court No. IV under the Office Memorandum dated 08.04.2019, is prospective in nature and cannot be applied retrospectively to the period in question.
3. In rejoinder, learned counsel for the applicant refuted the objections raised by the respondents and invited attention to the specific averments made in the counter affidavit, which read as under:
"4.14 That the contents of para 4.14 of the OA insofar they are mat1er of record, needs no reply. However, anything found contrary to the records is wrong and denied. It is pertinent to submit that the residential quarters were constructed and were available f accommodation w.e.f. May 2007. Thereafter, Typ III accommodation was allotted to Mr. NS Patwal vide letter no. 32-129/86/Bhowali/Estate/Part/V o 11123, dated 20.04.2011 in pursuance of the Council's order no. 41(8)/2008-Per. IV, date 14.01.2009 stating that the vacant quarters must b allotted as per seniority list and HRA can be paid only if the employee has applied for and has been denied government accommodation. The request was made by the applicant for cancellation of hi allotment vide letter no. RSB/Staff quarter/20 11 12/42, dated 03.05.2011. However, there is no record of the acceptance of his request by the competent authority and the quarter was allotted on his name till 04.03.2019 and the quarter stood allotted till 04.03.2019. It is also pertinent to submit here that the respondents has spent considerable amount of fund under the Non-Plan Works for the construction maintenance and upkeep of these residential quarter for their employees."
3.1. In response to the afore-quoted paragraph of the counter reply, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the contents of para 4.14 of the counter affidavit are wholly wrong, misconceived, misread, misquoted and misleading, and are therefore denied. He reiterated that the averments made in para 4.14 of the SHILPI SHILPI GUPTA 2026.03.16 Original Application are correct and stand substantiated GUPTA10:53:58 +05'30' by the detailed reply already furnished. It was 10 Item No. 69 O.A. No. 120/2023 Court No. IV emphasized that it is an admitted position that in the absence of Government accommodation the applicant was granted House Building Advance in December, 2004;
although quarters became available w.e.f. May, 2007, the same were allotted to him only on 20.04.2011, and instead of taking possession he immediately applied for cancellation, which was admittedly processed. In such circumstances, the applicant cannot be penalized or victimized for the inaction of the respondents, particularly in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.R. Shanrale v. Union of India, 1997 (1) SLJ 14 and Union of India v. Mohan Singh Rathore, 1996 (2) SLJ 439.
4. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the pleadings available on record.
5. ANALYSIS :
5.1. It is not in dispute that the applicant made an application for the surrender/cancellation of the government accommodation allotted to him vide his representation dated 03.05.2011. There is no formal office order on record either accepting or rejecting the said representation. The cancellation was sought on the SHILPI SHILPI GUPTA 2026.03.16 ground that he had availed House Building Advance and GUPTA10:53:58 +05'30' therefore no longer required official accommodation. It is 11 Item No. 69 O.A. No. 120/2023 Court No. IV also a matter of record that there was no communication from the applicant claiming HRA for the period from 01.05.2011 to 04.03.2019 until the first such request was made vide his communication dated 18.11.2019.
5.2 The allotment of government accommodation is made on the basis of seniority. In the present case, the applicant, being entitled as per his seniority, was offered government accommodation, which he refused on the grounds that he had already availed a House Building Advance. Thereafter, the applicant remained silent for several years and did not make any claim for HRA.
5.3. In The Divisional Engineer, G.L.P. Railway v.
Mahadeo Raghoo and Another, 1955 (1) SCR 134, it was held that an employee does not acquire an absolute right to House Rent Allowance (HRA). Consequently, there can be no question of the employee relinquishing any such right. The Court further observed as under:
"The short point to be decided in this case is whether the house rent allowance claimed by the 1st respondent came within the purview of the definition of "wages"
contained in the Act. There being no difference on questions of fact between the parties, the answer to the question raised must depend upon the construction to be placed upon the following material portion of the definition of "wages" in section 2(vi) of the Act:-
SHILPI SHILPI GUPTA 2026.03.16 'Wages' means all remuneration, capable of being expressed in terms of money, GUPTA10:53:58 +05'30' 12 Item No. 69 O.A. No. 120/2023 Court No. IV which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable, whether conditionally upon the regular attendance, good work or conduct or other behaviour of the person employed or otherwise, to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment, and includes any bonus or other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid which would be so payable and any sum payable to such person by reason of the termination of his employment, but does not include-
(a)the value of any house-accommodation, supply of light, water, medical Attendance or other amenity, or of any service excluded by general or special order of the State Government.............
Shorn of all verbiage, "wages" are remuneration payable by an employer to his employee for services rendered according to the terms of the contract between them. The question then arises, what are the terms of the contract between the parties. When the 1st respondent's employment under the railway administration represented by the appellant began, admittedly be was not entitled to any such house rent allowance. As already indicated, the scheme for payment of house rent allowance was introduced with effect from the 1st November 1947 when the rules were framed, admittedly under sub-section (2) of section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor- General.
Those rules were amended subsequently. We are here concerned with the amendment made by the Railway Board by its letter No. E47CPC/ 14 dated the 1st December 1947, particularly rule 3(i) which is in these terms:-
"The house rent allowance will not be admissible to those who occupy accommodation provided by Government or those to whom accommodation has been offered by Government but who have refused it".
It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the terms of the contract between the parties include the rule quoted above and that therefore the position in law is that there is no absolute right in the 1st respondent to claim the house rent allowance; in other words, it is contended that there is a condition precedent to the claim for house rent allowance being admissible, namely, that the employee should be posted at one of those places, like Bombay, Calcutta, Madras' etc., before the claim for house rent allowance could arise SHILPI and that there is a condition subsequent, namely, that SHILPI GUPTA 2026.03.16 the employee posted at any one of those places will GUPTA10:53:58 cease to be entitled to the - allowance if either the +05'30' Government provides accommodation to the employee in question or the employee-refuses to occupy the 13 Item No. 69 O.A. No. 120/2023 Court No. IV accommodation so offered to him. On the other hand, it has been argued on behalf of the 1st respondent that the employee's right to the allowance accrues as soon as he has fulfilled the terms of the contract of employment including regular attendance, good work or conduct and his other behaviour in terms of the definition of "wages" as contained in the Act. It was also argued on behalf of the 1st respondent that the terms of the definition have to be construed consistently with the provisions of sections 7 and 11 of the Act; that rule 3(i) quoted above is inconsistent with some of the terms of the definition of "wages" and the provisions of sections 7 and 11 and that in any event, if rule 3(i) aforesaid were to be considered as a part of the terms of the contract between the parties, section 23 of the Act prohibits an employee from entering into such a contract as has the effect of depriving him of his vested rights.
********* The answer to the question whether house rent allowance is "wages" may be in the affirmative if the rules framed by the department relating to the grant of house rent allowance make it compulsory for the employer to grant house rent allowance without anything more: in other words, if the house rent allowed had been granted without any conditions or with conditions, if any, which were unenforceable in law. But the statutory rules framed by the Government governing the grant of house rent allowance do not make it unconditional and absolute in terms. The house rent allowance in the first instance is not admissible to all the employees of a particular class. It is admissible only to such railway employees as are posted at specified places in order "to compensate railway servants in certain costlier cities for excessive rents paid by them over and above what they might normally be expected to pay"; nor is such an allowance "intended to be a source of profit" or to be "an allowance in lieu of free quarters", as specifically stated in the preamble to the letter No. E47CPC/14, dated 1st December 1947, issued by the Railway Board. The argument on behalf of the 1st respondent would have been valid if the rules in terms contemplated the grant of house rent allowance to every employee of a particular category but the rules do not make the grant in such absolute terms. The house rent allowance is admissible only so long as an employee is stationed at one of the specified places and has not been offered Government quarters. The rules distinctly provide that the allowance will not be ad- raissible to those who occupy Government SHILPI quarters or to those to whom such quarters have been offered but who have refused to take advantage of the SHILPI GUPTA 2026.03.16 offer.
GUPTA10:53:58 Once an employee of the description given above has +05'30' been offered suitable house accommodation and he has 14 Item No. 69 O.A. No. 120/2023 Court No. IV refused it, he ceases to be entitled to the house rent allowance and that allowance thus ceases to be "wages" within the meaning of the definition in the Act, because it is no more payable under the terms of the contract.
In our opinion, it is clear beyond all reasonable doubt that the rules which must be included in the terms of contract between the employer and the employee contemplate that an employee posted at one of the specified places would be entitled to house rent allowance; but that as soon as he is offered Government quarters for his accommodation, he ceases' to be so entitled., whether he actually occupies or does not occupy the quarters offered to him. Hence the grant of house rent allowance does not create an indefeasible right in the employee at all places wherever he may be posted and in all circumstances, irrespective of whether or not he has been offered Government quarters. But it has been argued on behalf of the respondent that such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the provisions of sections 7 and 1 1 of the Act. We do not see any such inconsistency. Section 7 of the Act deals with such deductions as may be made from the wages as defined in the Act, of an employee. Subsection (2) of section 7 categorically specifies the heads under which deductions may lawfully be made from wages. Clause
(d) of this sub-section has reference to "deductions for house accommodation supplied by the employer", and section 11 provides that such a deduction shall not be made unless the house accommodation has been accepted by the employee and shall not exceed the amount equivalent to the value of such accommodation. The definition of "wages" in the Act also excludes from its operation the value of house accommodation referred to in sections 7 and II as aforesaid. The legislature has used the expression "value of any house accommodation" in the definition of "wages" as denoting something which can be deducted from "wages". The one excludes the other. It is thus clear that the definition of "wages" under the Act cannot include the value of any house accommodation supplied by the employer to the employee; otherwise it would not be a legally permissible deduction from wages. It Is equally clear that house rent allowance which may in certain circumstances as aforesaid be included in "wages" is not the same thing as the value of any house accommodation referred to in the Act. That being so, SHILPI there is no validity in the argument advanced on behalf SHILPI GUPTA 2026.03.16 of the 1st respondent that rule 3(i) aforesaid is inconsistent with the provisions of sections 7 and 11 of GUPTA10:53:58 the Act."
+05'30' 15 Item No. 69 O.A. No. 120/2023 Court No. IV 5.4 In Director, Central Plantation Crops Research Institute, Kesaragod and Others v. M. Purushothaman and Others, Civil Appeal No. 885 of 1993, decided on 26th July 1994, AIR 1994 SC 2541, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
"7. We are also afraid that the Tribunal is not right in including the HRA in the definition of wages. The Fundamental Rule 9 (21) (a) which is applicable to the respondents-employees defines "pay" as follows :-
"9 (21) (a) Pay means the amount drawn monthly by a Government servant as-
(i) the pay, other than special pay granted in view of his personal qualifications, which has been sanctioned for a post held by him substantively or in an officiating capacity, or to which he is entitled by reason of his position in a cadre; and
(ii) overseas pay, special pay and personal pay; and
(iii) any other emoluments which may be specially classed as payby the President."
8. It is obvious from this definition that HRA is not part of "pay". Further, Fundamental Rule 44 defines "Compensatory Allowance" as follows :-
"F.R. 44. Compensatory allowance. Subject to the general rule that the amount of compensatory allowance should be so regulated that the allowance is not on the whole a source of profit to the recipient. the Central Government may grant such allowances to any Government servant under its control and may make rules prescribing their amounts and the conditions under which they may be drawn."
9. The HRA would be covered by the definition of Compensatory Allowance. It is compensation in lieu of SHILPI accommodations. This definition itself further makes it SHILPI GUPTA clear that compensatory allowance is not to be used as 2026.03.16 a source of profit. It is given only to compensate for the GUPTA10:53:58 amenities which are no available or provided to the +05'30' employee. The moment, therefore, the amenities are 16 Item No. 69 O.A. No. 120/2023 Court No. IV provided or offered, the employee should cease to be in receipt of the compensation which is given for want of it. We wish the Tribunal had perused the definition of "pay" and "compensatory allowance" given in the FundamentalRules before pronouncing that the HRA is a part of the wages or pay and, therefore, cannot be disturbed."
5.5 In D. Peri Reddy and Ors. v. Government of A.P., Finance and Planning, Hon'ble Telangana High Court, 1997 (1) ALT 721, it was held that the petitioners cannot claim the allowances sought as a matter of right, nor can they compel the respondents to pay such allowances by way of a writ of mandamus. However, this does not prevent the government from granting the allowances as a matter of policy if it so decides.
5.6 The ratio of the decisions of the Apex Court and the Hon'ble High Court is clear: House Rent Allowance (HRA) is intended to compensate for the non-availability of government accommodation. Once accommodation is offered, an employee cannot refuse it and still claim HRA, even on the grounds of having availed a housing loan advance, as it would allow profiting from both.
Importantly, following the change in policy effective 08.04.2019, HRA was prospectively granted, and the applicant was duly accorded the same.
SHILPI SHILPI GUPTA 2026.03.16 GUPTA10:53:58 +05'30' 17 Item No. 69 O.A. No. 120/2023 Court No. IV
6. CONCLUSION:
6.1. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the present O.A. is dismissed.
6.2. Pending M.A.(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. No costs.
(Dr. Anand S Khati) (Manish Garg)
Member (A) Member (J)
/SG/AS/
SHILPI
SHILPI
GUPTA
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