Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand Through Its ... vs Haryana Seeds Development Corporation ... on 8 June, 2022
Author: Ravi Ranjan
Bench: Chief Justice, Sujit Narayan Prasad
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.435 of 2019
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1. The State of Jharkhand through its Secretary Agriculture
Department having its office at Project Bhawan P.O., P.S.
Dhurwa, Dist. Ranchi.
2. Director Agriculture Department having its office at Project
Bhawan P.O., P.S. Dhurwa, Dist. Ranchi.
3. Certificate Officer, Bokaro, P.O., P.S. & Dist. Bokaro.
... ... Respondents/Appellants
Versus
Haryana Seeds Development Corporation Ltd., having its
office at Sector - 2, Panchkula, P.O., P.S. Panchkula, Dist
Haryana, through its authorized signatory Kehar Singh
Dabra, son of Sri Attar Singh Panchkula, P.O., P.S. & Dist.
Panchkula, Haryana.
... ... Petitioner/Respondent
With
L.P.A. No.185 of 2021
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1. The State of Jharkhand through its Secretary Agriculture
Department having its office at Project Bhawan P.O. & P.S.
Dhurwa, Dist. Ranchi.
2. Director Agriculture Department having its office at Project
Bhawan P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, Dist. Ranchi.
3. Certificate Officer, Dhanbad, P.O. & P.S. Dhanbad,
District-Dhanbad.
... ... Respondents/Appellants
Versus
Haryana Seeds Development Corporation Ltd., having its
office at Sector - 2, Panchkula, P.O. & P.S. Panchkula,
Dist. Haryana, through its authorized signatory Kehar
Singh Dabra, son of Sri Attar Singh Panchkula, P.O. & P.S.
Panchkula, Haryana.
... ... Petitioner/Respondent
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CORAM : HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
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For the Appellants : Mr. Sachin Kumar, A.A.G.-II
Mr. Deepak Kumar Dubey, A.C. to A.A.G-II
Ms. Surabhi, A.C. to A.A.G.-II
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ORAL JUDGMENT
Order No.11 : Dated 8th June, 2022 -2- I.A. No.2913 of 2021 in L.P.A. No.435 of 2019 This interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 211 days in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal.
2. Heard parties.
3. Having regard to the averments made in the application and submissions made on behalf of the parties, we are of the view that the appellants were prevented from sufficient cause in filing the appeal within the period of limitation. As such, the delay of 211 days in preferring the appeal is hereby condoned.
4. I.A. No. 2913 of 2021 stands allowed.
I.A. No.4422 of 2021 in L.P.A. No.185 of 2021
5. This interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal.
6. The office has reported that there is a delay of 474 days in filing the instant appeal but it appears that period of delay has not been mentioned in the interlocutory application.
7. Let learned counsel for the appellants make necessary correction in the interlocutory application by inserting period of delay in course of the day.
8. Having regard to the averments made in the application and submissions made on behalf of the parties, we are of the view that the appellants were prevented from sufficient cause in -3- filing the appeal within the period of limitation. As such, the delay of 474 days in preferring the appeal is hereby condoned.
9. I.A. No. 4422 of 2021 stands allowed.
L.P.A. No.435 of 2019 with L.P.A. No.185 of 2021
10. Both appeals arise out of common order dated 26.10.2018 passed in W.P.(C) No.6958 of 2013 and W.P.(C) No.6953 of 2013, as such, both the appeals have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common order.
11. The instant appeals, preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, are directed against the order/judgment dated 26.10.2018 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No.6958 of 2013 with W.P.(C) No.6953 of 2013 whereby and whereunder the notice dated 13.09.2013 impugned in W.P.(C) No.6953 of 2013 and notice dated 26.08.2013 impugned in W.P.(C) No.6958 of 2013, issued against the writ petitioners under the provisions of Bihar and Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act, 1914 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act, 1914) by which proceedings have been initiated for recovery of the amounts, have been quashed and set aside.
12. Brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ proceedings, which are required to be enumerated herein, read as under :-
It is the case of the writ petitioner that the seeds were supplied to the respondent State, bills were issued to them for -4- the supplies and payment was also made against the bills. In the meantime, the respondent -State alleged that the quality of the seeds was not up to the mark and passed an order on 02.03.2012 by which further payment to the petitioner was stopped and whatever amount which was paid to the petitioner against the bills, was directed to be recovered and the petitioner was also blacklisted by the aforesaid order.
It is the further case of the writ petitioner that pursuant to the aforesaid order dated 02.03.2012, a certificate proceeding was initiated against the writ petitioner in connection with the amount which has been received by the writ petitioner against the bills and for the seeds already supplied by the writ petitioner.
At the aforesaid stage, the writ petitioner filed both the writ petitions challenging the jurisdiction of the Certificate Officer taking the ground that the amount which is sought to be recovered, by way of Public Demand, is not a Public Demand and there is no agreement between the writ petitioner and the respondents so as to make the amount recoverable by way of Public Demand.
The further ground has been agitated to the effect that there is a dispute as to whether the quality of seeds supplied by the writ petitioner was up to the mark or not and such issue cannot be adjudicated by the Certificate Officer and it is for the State to file a suit for recovery of the amount, if so advised. -5-
The learned Single Judge, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and taking into consideration the definition of "Public Demand" as provided under Section 3(6) of the Act of 1914 as per which the demand is required to be covered by one or other entry of Schedule-I. As per Entry 4 of Schedule-I, it has been clearly stated that any money which is declared by any enactment for the time being in force to be a demand or public demand; or to be recoverable as arrears of a demand or public demand, or as a demand or public demand; or to be recoverable under the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act, 1868, can be recovered as a public demand under the said entry.
Learned Single Judge, as such, has come to conclusive finding that since there is no written agreement entered into between the parties and there is no such enactment which declares the amount involved in this case to be recoverable as a public demand and, as such, the notices impugned dated 13.09.2013 and 26.08.2013 have been quashed and set aside.
13. Mr. Sachin Kumar, learned Additional Advocate General-II appearing for the appellants in both the appeals, has submitted that the learned Single Judge, without appreciating the correct proposition of law regarding the definition of "Public Demand"
as provided under Section 3(6) of the Act, 1914, since has quashed the notices issued, therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from illegality and hence the same -6- is not sustainable.
The further ground has been taken that the learned Single Judge, while quashing the notices impugned, has not considered the fact about the recovery of public money and as such, on this ground also the order passed by learned Single Judge is not sustainable in the eyes of law.
14. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order.
15. The dispute, in the case in hand, is as to whether in absence of an agreement for the amount having not come under the fold of "Public Demand" as defined under Section 3(6) of the Act of 1914, can it be recovered by taking recourse of the provision of the Act, 1914?
16. This Court, in order to answer the aforesaid issue, deems it fit and proper to refer the provision of Section 3(6) of the Act of 1914, which reads as hereunder :-
"3(6). "Public demand" means any arrear of money mentioned or referred to in Schedule I, and includes any interest which may, by law, be chargeable thereon upto the date on which a certificate is signed under Part II."
It is evident from the definition of "Public Demand" as stipulated under Section 3(6) of the Act, 1914 which means any arrear of money mentioned or referred to in Schedule I, and includes any interest which may, by law, be chargeable thereon upto the date on which a certificate is signed under Part II. -7-
Schedule I Entry 4 and 8-A of Bihar and Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act, 1914 reads as under:-
"4. Any money which is declared by any enactment for the time being in force.-
(i) to be a demand or public demand; or
(ii) to be recoverable as arrears of a demand or public demand, or as a demand or public demand; or
(iii) to be recoverable under the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act, 1868 (Ben. Act VII of 1868).
8-A. Any outstanding loans and advances payable to State Government or to a Department or Official of the State Government by any body whatsoever."
"Public Demand" has been defined under Section 3(6) of the Act, 1914 and in order to be recoverable as "Public Demand", the demand is required to be covered by one or the other entry of Schedule I. It further appears from Entry 4 of Schedule I wherein it has clearly been stated that any money which has been declared to be a "Demand" or "Public Demand" or to be recoverable as arrears of a "Demand" or "Public Demand" or to be recoverable under the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act, 1868, as a "Public Demand" under the said entry.
It is, thus, evident that if the amount which is sought to be recovered by taking recourse of the Act, 1914, if not coming under the fold of Schedule I under Entry 4 thereof, such amount cannot be recovered by taking recourse of the provision of the Act, 1914.
Further, while making such recovery and by taking -8- recourse of the Act, 1914, there must be written agreement entered in between the parties.
17. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid legal position, has considered the factual aspect of the given case and found therefrom that the notices dated 13.09.2013 and 26.08.2013 have been issued in the background of the fact that in pursuance of the order of supply issued in favour of the writ petitioner, the seeds were supplied, bills were raised and the amount has also been paid but subsequent thereto, a dispute has been raised by the appellants about the quality of the seeds supplied.
The State-appellant, in consequence of the seeds having not up to the mark, has taken decision on 02.03.2012 by which further payment to the writ petitioner was stopped as also the decision was taken to recover the amount already paid and to blacklist the writ petitioner.
18. The fact, therefore, suggests that it is a case of supply of seeds which according to the State-appellant, has not been found up to the mark, however, the money which has been paid has been decided to be recovered by taking recourse of the provision of the Act, 1914.
It is, thus, evident from the factual aspect that the aforesaid amount if only comes under the fold of Section 3(6) of the Act, 1914, as under Entry 4 of Schedule I thereof, the said amount will be said to be "Public Demand" to be recoverable by -9- taking recourse of the provisions of the Act, 1914.
Further, if there is any agreement in between the parties that in case of failure on their part, such amount can be recovered, then also the recourse can be taken for recovery of the amount by resorting to the provisions of the Act, 1914.
19. This Court has not found from the Entry 4 as contained under Schedule I the nature of the amount to be considered as a "Public Demand" within the meaning of Section 3(6) of the Act, 1914.
Further, this Court has also not found from the record that the parties have entered into an agreement to the effect that in case of any deficiency in supply of materials, the amount will be recovered.
20. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the amount having not come under the fold of the "Public Demand", the same cannot be allowed to be recovered by taking recourse of the provisions of the Act, 1914.
21. This Court, having discussed the factual aspect as also the legal position, has gone across the order passed by the learned Single Judge, wherefrom it is evident that the learned Single Judge has considered the definition of "Public Demand"
as under Section 3(6) of the Act, 1914 as also has verified as to whether the amount sought to be recovered is coming under Entry 4 of Schedule I and Section 8-A of the Act, 1914.
22. The learned Single Judge, having come to the conclusion
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that the amount sought to be recovered by taking recourse of the provision of the Act, 1914 since is not coming under the fold of the "Public Demand" as also there is no agreement entered in between the parties, has considered the notices dated 13.09.2013 and 26.08.2013 issued against the writ petitioner for recovery of the amount to be contrary to the statutory provision and, as such, interfered with the same by quashing and setting it aside which, according to our considered view, cannot be said to suffer from error.
23. This Court, therefore, is of the considered view that on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove, the finding/outcome recorded by the learned Single Judge requires no interference.
24. Accordingly, both the appeals fail and are dismissed.
25. Consequent thereto, I.A. No.4421 of 2021 (stay petition) stands disposed of.
(Dr. Ravi Ranjan, C.J.) (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) Birendra/ A.F.R.