Delhi High Court
Kuldip Gandotra vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 7 October, 2005
Equivalent citations: (2006)IILLJ51DEL, 2006(2)SLJ299(DELHI)
Author: Sanjiv Khanna
Bench: Mukundakam Sharma, Sanjiv Khanna
JUDGMENT Sanjiv Khanna, J.
1. The petitioner Mr. Kuldip Gandotra has filed the present writ petition against the order dated September 13, 1993 passed by the Rashtriya Pariyojna Nirman Nigam (hereinafter referred to as respondent No. 2, in short) accepting his request for voluntary retirement and stating that he shall be relieved from the service on September 22, 1993. It is a case of the petitioner that the order dated September 13, 1993 was received by him on September 18, 1993 but before the said date he had on September 14, 1993 withdrawn his application and retracted his request for voluntary retirement.
2. In nutshell the case of the petitioner is that before the acceptance of his offer to go on voluntary retirement by the respondent No. 2, the petitioner was competent to withdraw his offer and in fact he had withdrawn his offer to go on voluntary retirement and, therefore, the acceptance communicated and received by him on September 18, 1993 is illegal and void ab initio as no concluded contract came into existence.
3. To appreciate the controversy, certain facts may be noted.
4. The petitioner was employed as an Executive Engineer with the respondent No. 2 and was posted in Delhi.
5. By an order dated April 30, 1993, the petitioner was transferred to unit of the respondent No. 2 at Tripura. Against this transfer, representations were made by the petitioner on medical and health grounds and also on the ground that the said transfer was contrary to the policy of the respondent No. 2. These representations were rejected and the respondent No. 2 did not accept the request of the petitioner to cancel the order of transfer to Tripura.
6. In the meanwhile, the respondent No. 2 floated a Voluntary Retirement Scheme and the petitioner claims that in view of the changed atmosphere and as he was disturbed and upset by the transfer order, he made a request for voluntary retirement under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme by his letter dated August 30, 1993.
7. It is further submitted that after the petitioner made the aforesaid application for voluntary retirement, the Management of respondent No. 2 with ulterior motive issued a charge sheet with the object of ultimately withholding his retirement benefits. The charge sheet was for violation of the transfer order dated April 30, 1993 from Delhi to Tripura and the allegation was that the petitioner had willfully absented himself from duty.
8. After issue of the chargesheet, the petitioner vide his letter dated September 13, 1993, which was delivered to the Management of respondent No. 2 on September 14, 1993 withdrew his consent or offer to go on voluntary retirement. It is also stated in this letter that in view of the charge sheet served upon the petitioner, he had become ineligible to apply for voluntary retirement in terms of the aforesaid scheme.
9. It is the case of the petitioner that till he submitted his letter dated September 13, 1993 to the management on September 14, 1993, his offer for voluntary retirement had not been accepted and in any case he had not received any communication from the respondent No. 2 accepting his offer for voluntary retirement. Therefore, the petitioner was competent to withdraw his offer for voluntary retirement as provided under the Contract Act, 1872.
10. It is further stated that the letter of the respondent accepting the petitioner's offer for voluntary retirement though dated September 13, 1993 was actually received by the petitioner on September 18, 1993, i.e. after the petitioner had already withdrawn his offer to go on voluntary retirement and, therefore, is of no consequence. The petitioner has further submitted that the respondent No. 2 had failed to make payment of his salary and being hard pressed for money he received amount of Rs. 2 1,42,026/- and Rs. 1013/- on September 24, 1993 under th voluntary retirement scheme but after specifically stating that the said payments were being received under protest.
11. The petitioner filed the present writ petition in this Court on September 21, 1993 challenging the order dated September 13, 1993 accepting his offer for voluntary retirement. It is, therefore, apparent that the writ petition was filed in this Court even before he had received payment of Rs. 1,42,026/- and Rs. 1,013/- under protest from the respondent No. 2 on September 24, 1993. The writ petition came up for hearing on September 22, 1993 and this Court was pleased to issue notice for November 5, 1993 and on the interim application it was directed that any action taken by the respondents would be subject to the outcome of the writ petition. Thereafter, on September 24, 1993 the respondent No. 2 made payment of Rs. 1,42,026/- and Rs. 1013/- by two separate cheques which was accepted by the petitioner under protest.
12. On July 20, 1994 when the matter came up for hearing, the Division Bench noticed that the mounts payable under the voluntary retirement scheme had been received and kept back by the petitioner and, therefore, the Division Bench declined to interfere and dismissed the writ petition.
13. Aggrieved, the petitioner approached and filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. The said leave was granted and by an order dated March 31, 1999, the order made by this Court dated July 20, 1994 dismissing the writ petition was set side, with a direction to this Court to dispose of the matter on merits after taking into consideration the pleadings and issues raised therein.
14. Pursuant to the order passed by the Supreme Court, the matter was renotified and notice was issued to the respondent No. 2 who appeared but did not in spite of repeated opportunities file affidavit in response. As a result vide Order dated February 7, 2003, the right of the respondent No. 2 to file counter affidavit was closed and forfeited. However, opportunity was granted to it to produce the records at the time of hearing of the Writ Petition.
15. When the matter was being heard by us, vide order dated July 15, 2005 the respondent No. 2 was directed to produce the original records. However, the said records were not produced on the next date and the matter was renotified for August 17, 2005 to give another opportunity to the respondent No. 2 to produce the records. Even on August 17, 2005, the digital records relating to the application for voluntary retirement submitted by the petitioner and the office nothings, including proof of the date of dispatch of the letter dated September 13, 1993 received by the petitioner on September 18, 1993 accepting the offer of voluntary retirement, were not produced. However, the office orders/chart relating to calculation of the amounts payable to the petitioner on voluntary retirement were produced. The said order/chart clearly shows that the petitioner while accepting the payments of Rs. 1,42,026/- and Rs. 1013/- had specifically recorded that the said payments were being received under protest.
16. The main thrust of the argument raised by the respondent No. 2 is that the petitioner has accepted the amounts payable under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme and, therefore, the principle of estoppel is applicable. The petitioner cannot now be permitted and allowed to question the order dated September 13, 1993 accepting his application for voluntary retirement. In this regard reliance is placed upon three judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Bank of India and Ors. v. Pale Ram Dhania , Punjab National Bank v. Virender Kumar Goyal and Ors. , Punjab and Sind Bank v. S. Ranveer Singh Bava .
17. In view of the controversy and issues raised before us, two questions are required to. be decided. Firstly, whether the acceptance of the application for voluntary retirement by the petitioner was legal and valid and what is the effect of withdrawal of the application of voluntary retirement and; secondly, what is the. effect of the petitioner receiving the payments due and payable under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme under protest.
18. Regarding the first question, it will be appropriate to refer to the decision of the. Supreme Court in case of Bank of India and Ors. v. O.P. Swarnakar and Ors. . In the said case the Supreme Court examined Voluntary Retirement Schemes that had been floated by several banks and held that though the issue involved related to service jurisprudence, the principles of offer and acceptance under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 would be applicable. Distinction was made between "invitation to treat" and an, "offer/proposal". Scheme for voluntary retirement was held to be akin to "invitation inviting offers" and request of an employee seeking voluntary retirement was treated as a mere' 'offer'', that does not take effect till acceptance by the competent authority. It was further held that acceptance was required to be communicated to the employee.
19. Accordingly, the scheme for voluntary retirement would merely constitute an "invitation to treat" and not an "offer". Therefore, when an employee makes an application seeking voluntary retirement it becomes a proposal by an employee to an employer expressing his willingness to go on voluntary retirement. The said offer fructifies into a concluded contract, not when an offer/proposal is made but when the employer accepts the offer and communicates it to the employee.
20. As per Clause 5.3 of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme in the present case, the management /, e. the respondent No. 2 had full discretion to accept and reject the request of voluntary retirement once made by an employee depending upon the exigencies of work and organisational requirement. Thus, when the petitioner applied for voluntary retirement on August 30, 1993, he made an offer, which the respondent No. 2 had option to accept or reject.
21. It will be appropriate here to refer to some of the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872, which are reproduced below:
Section 2.- In this Act the following words and expressions are used in the following senses, unless a contrary intention appears from the context:
(a) When one person signifies to another his willingness to do or to abstain from doing anything, with a view to obtaining the assent of that other to such act or abstinence, he is said to make a proposal.
(b) When the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his assent thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted. A proposal, when accepted, becomes a promise;
(c) The person making the proposal is called the 'promisor', and the person accepting the proposal is called the 'promisee', Section 3. Communication, acceptance and revocation of proposals.- The communication of proposals, the acceptance of proposals, and the revocation of proposals and acceptances, respectively, are deemed to be made by any act or omission of the party proposing, accepting or revoking, by which he intends to communicate such proposal, acceptance or revocation, or which has the effect of communicating it.
Section 4. Communication when complete. -The communication of a proposal is complete when it comes to the knowledge of the person to whom it is made.
The communication of an acceptance is complete, as against the proposer, when it is put in a course of transmission to him so as to be out of the power of the acceptor;
as against the acceptor, when it comes to the knowledge of the proposer.
The communication of a revocation is complete, as against the person who makes it, when it is put into a course of transmission to the person to whom it is made, so as to be out of the power of the person who makes it;
as against the person to whom it is made, when it comes to his knowledge.
Section 5. Revocation of Proposals and acceptance. - A proposal may be revoked at any time before the communication of its acceptance is complete as against the proposer, but not afterwards.
An acceptance may be revoked at any time before the communication of the acceptance is complete as against the acceptor, but not afterwards.
Section 6. Revocation how made. - A proposal is revoked -
by the communication of notice of revocation by the proposer to the other party;
by the lapse of the time prescribed in such proposal for its acceptance, or, if no time is so prescribed, by the lapse of a reasonable time, without communication of the acceptance;
by the failure of the acceptor to fulfill a condition precedent to acceptance; or by the death or insanity of the proposer, if the fact of his death or insanity comes to the knowledge of the acceptor before acceptance.
22. "Acceptance" under the Contract Act, 1872 requires the promiseto signify his assent. There should be therefore expression of assent by the promiseto the terms of the offer. Acceptance is not complete unless communicated to the offeror/promisor. It has no legal effect till it is communicated and mere intention to accept an offer does not create a valid and a binding contract. Acceptance, therefore, means acceptance that has been communicated to the offeror/promisor. This I external manifestation of 'assent' and communication of acceptance to the offeror/promisor is mandatory.
23. Thus, there are following stages for formation of a legally binding contract:
(a) The 'promisor' must make an offer to the 'promisee'.
(b) The 'promisee' may accept the offer or, reject it. However, mere mental acceptance is not sufficient in law. Acceptance is complete only when it is communicated to the offerer.
(c) The 'promisor' is competent to revoke his offer at any time before the acceptance by the 'promisee' is communicated to him. The offer becomes irrevocable after communication of the acceptance.
24. As per Sections 4 to 6 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, an offer/ proposal may be revoked at any time before the communication of acceptance is complete as against the promisor (employee) but not afterwards. Offer of voluntary retirement can be revoked at any time by an employee before the communication of acceptance against him is complete. The petitioner was therefore entitled to, in terms of the judgment in the case of O.P. Swarankar (supra), withdraw his proposal/offer of voluntary retirement on or before communication of acceptance of the said proposal was complete.
25. It is an admitted case of both the parties that the letter of the petitioner withdrawing his offer for voluntary retirement was received in the office of the respondent No. 2 on September 14, 2003. The letter was personally delivered in the office of the respondent No. 2 and therefore, the offer was revoked on the said date. We have to, therefore, examine if on or before September 14, 1993 when the offer of voluntary retirement was revoked by the petitioner, whether the acceptance of the proposal for voluntary retirement had been communicated to the petitioner.
26. It is an admitted case of both the parties that the letter accepting voluntary retirement is dated September 13, 1993. However, the petitioner states that the said letter was only received by him on September 18, 1993. If the letter dated September 13, 1993 was personally delivered by hand to the petitioner, September 18, 1993 would be the. relevant date of communication of the acceptance and before that date the petitioner was competent and entitled under law to withdraw his proposal/offer. Admittedly in the present matter the proposal was withdrawn, before September 18, 1993, i.e. on September' 14, 1993.
27. However, the position would be different in case the letter dated September 13, 1993 was sent by post, in which case the date: of posting of the letter would be the date of communication of the acceptance.
28. It appears from the pleadings of the petitioner that the letter dated September 13, 1993 of the respondent No. 2 was received by post. The date of posting of the said letter is within the knowledge of the respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2, as already stated above, has not filed any affidavit before this Court stating on oath the date on which the letter dated September 13, 1993 was posted. The original records or any document regarding the date on which the letter dated September 13, 1993 was posted, have also not been produced before this Court. Thus, there is no evidence or material before us to establish and prove that acceptance was communicated to the petitioner before the proposal/offer was withdrawn by him on September 14, 1993.
29. There is another reason why the petitioner deserves to succeed on this issue. In the case of Shambhu Murari Sinha v. Project and Development India and Anr. , it has been held that offer for voluntary retirement can be withdrawn at any time by an employee till he is relieved from service. In the said case an employee had submitted application seeking voluntary retirement on October 18, 1995 which was accepted on July 13, 1997 and the said acceptance was also duly communicated. However, the employee in the said case was to continue in service till September 26, 1997, when he was to be relieved. Before the relieving date the employee changed his mind and submitted a letter on August 7, 1997 withdrawing his letter dated October 18, 1995 by which he had sought voluntary retirement. The Supreme Court held that the employee had to continue in service till September 26, 1997 and this would be the "effective date" and before the said date the employee had the right to withdraw his option to go on voluntary retirement. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court relied upon earlier decisions in the case of Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra ; Balram Gupta v. Union of India ; J.N. Srivastava v. Union of India ; and Power Financial Corporation Limited v. Pramod Kumar Bhatia 1997 (4) SCC 820 : 1997-II-LLJ-819 in which it has been held that a resignation which has already been accepted can be withdrawn before the "effective date". In the case of J.N. Srivastava (supra), it has been held as follows 1999-I-LLJ-546at p. 547:
3. ... It is now well settled that even if the voluntary retirement notice is moved by an employee and gets accepted by the authority within the time fixed, before the date of retirement is reached, the employee has locus poenitentiae to withdraw the proposal for voluntary retirement. The said view has been taken by a Bench of this Court in the case of Balram Gupta v. Union of India. (1987-II-LLJ-541 (SC))....
30. The said judgments were considered along with other judgments in the case of O. P. Swaranakar (supra) and it was held in 2003-I-LLJ-819 at p. 843:
24. ... It may be that therein there did not exist a clause to the effect that once an option to voluntary retirement is accepted, the employee cannot withdraw the same, but the law laid down therein would apply herein also....
31. As per the scheme for voluntary retirement applicable to the present case there was no restriction or prohibition on an employee that prevented him from withdrawing his application for voluntary retirement after submitting the same or after acceptance before the effective date. The order/letter dated September 13, 1993 by which the application of the petitioner to go on voluntary retirement was accepted, states that the petitioner was to be relieved on September 22, 1993 (AN). Therefore, voluntary retirement was to become effective from September 22, 1993 and in view of the above judgments, the petitioner had locus poenitentiae to withdraw his proposal/offer for voluntary retirement as relationship of employer and employee was to come to an end on September 22, 1993. Admittedly, before the said date, the petitioner had withdrawn his offer to go on voluntary retirement on September 14, 1993.
32. In view of the above findings, the first issue/question is decided in favor of the. petitioner.
33. This brings us to the second issue, whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the petitioner having received the payment under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme is estopped and barred from challenging the acceptance of voluntary retirement.
34. For estoppel by conduct to apply has to satisfy some basic conditions have to be satisfied. The first three elements as mentioned in the case of Seton. Laing Co. v. Lafone reported in 1887 (19) QBD 68, are as under:
Firstly, where a man makes a fraudulent misrepresentation and another man acts upon it to its true detriment; Secondly, another may be where a man makes a false statement negligently though without fraud and another person acts upon it; And thirdly, there may be circumstances under which, where a misrepresentation is made without fraud and without negligence, there may be an estoppel.
35. The fourth element requires that there should be a statement made, which should have induced the other party to do an act which otherwise he would have abstained from doing though the said statement in some situations I may not be, characterised, as misrepresentation [refer : Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 3706 : 2001 (2) SCC 41 and Chandra Prakash Tiwari and Ors. v. Shakuntala Shukla and Ors. ]. In these judgments, the Supreme Court examined the principle of estoppel by conduct or estoppel by matter in pais. Reference was also made to some decisions of the High Court of Australia wherein it is mentioned that the question of estoppel arises only when the representor wishes to disavow the assumption contained in his earlier representation and it is in these circumstances that Courts examine whether it would be unjust or unequitable to allow the representor to resile from his statement. It has been held by the Supreme Court that what is required to be examined is whether the party asserting estoppel was induced to act to its detriment. It has been further held that the defense by way of estoppel by conduct is available when there is precise and unambiguous representation by the representor.
36. In the case of Chandra Prakash Tiwari (supra), the Supreme Court noticed the decisions in the case of Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla and Madan Lal v. State of J&K wherein a clear distinction is made between candidates who went through the selection process without protest and on being unsuccessful challenged the same and cases where the candidates had participated in the selection process under protest. In the latter case, principle of estoppel was held to be not applicable. The principle of estoppel has been again examined by the Supreme Court in the case of B.L. Sreedhar and Ors. v. K.M. Munireddy (dead) and Ors. . Relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:
13. Estoppel is a rule of evidence and the general rule is enacted in Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "the Evidence Act") which lays down that when one person has by his declaration, act or omission caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon that belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative to deny the truth of that thing.
37. In the case of Dr. Karan Singh v. State of J&K and Ors. , the doctrine of estoppel, waiver and abandonment were examined by referring to various: judgments of the Supreme Court and English judgments. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced below:
19. The Division Bench in the impugned, judgment, as earlier noticed, has held that' "either there was relinquishment of right or waiver voluntarily". Before we examine the facts to decide this issue, reference may be made to certain decisions on the aspects of estoppel, abandonment and waiver. The leading case on estoppel is that of Pickard v. Sears 1837 (6) Ad & El 469 wherein LORD DENMAN, C.J. In delivering judgment, inter alia, said: (ER p. 181) His title having been once established, the property could only be divested by gift or sale; of which no specific act was even surmised.
But the rule of law is clear, that, where one by his words or conduct willfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief so as to alter his own previous position, the former is concluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time," (See BIGELOW on ESTOPPEL, pp.606, 607).
20. In Mitra Sen Singh v. Janki Kaur AIR 1924 PC 213 with regard to estoppel, it was stated:
There is no peculiarity in the law of India as distinguished from that of England which would justify such an application. The law of India is compendiously set forth in Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, Act 1 of 1872. It will save a long statement by simply stating that section, which is as follows:
When one person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative to deny the truth of that thing.
21. In Dhiyan Singh v. Jugal Kishore this Court stated:
11. Now it can be conceded that before an estoppel can arise, there must be, first a representation of an existing fact as distinct from a mere promise defuturo made by one party to the other; second, that the other party, believing it, must have been induced to act on the faith of it; and third, that he must have so acted to his detriment.
22. In Gyarsi Bai v. Dhansukh Lal the principles were reiterated in the following words:
To invoke the doctrine of estoppel three conditions must be satisfied: (1) representation by a person to another, (2) the other shall have acted upon the said representation, and (3) such action shall have been detrimental to the interests of the person to whom the representation has been made.
38. It is clear from the facts stated above that the petitioner had filed this Writ Petition even before the payments were made on September 24, 2003. In fact, notice was issued in the Writ Petition and the interim order was passed directing that any action taken by the respondent would be subject to the outcome of the Writ Petition. The payments were accepted under protest. It cannot therefore be said that there was any representation made by the petitioner either by way of statement, declaration, act or omission to cause or permit the respondent No. 2 to believe a thing to be true and act upon the basis of conduct of the petitioner. It is also not a case in which the representor, i. e. the petitioner, wants to back out of his statement or representation and deny the truth of what he had said. The respondent No. 2 has been always aware of the position and the stand taken by the petitioner but went ahead and made payments under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, which were accepted by the petitioner under protest.
39. In the case of Chairman and MD, NTPC Ltd. v. Reshmi Constructions, Builders and Contractors , the Supreme Court was concerned with a case in which no due certificate had been issued by a contractor for securing payment under the final bill but thereafter invoked arbitration Clause in respect of new claims. The maxim Necessitus non habit legem (necessity knows no law) was invoked by the Supreme Court holding, inter alia, that sometimes a person may succumb to pressure of the other party who is in a much higher position. The expression "without prejudice" was also examined and it was held that the said expression means a declaration by a party that the act or omission on its part do not cause rights or privileges of the party to be waived or lost. The principle of estoppel by accepting benefits was also referred to and it was held that the said principle would not apply in a manner to violate principles of right, equity and good conscience.
40. Relevant facts in this regard have' already been stated above. The petitioner had filed the writ petition in this Court on September 21, 1993 and an interim order was passed on September 22, 1993 that any action taken by the respondent would be subject to the decision of the writ petition. The payment under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme by the two cheques was only made on September 24, 1993 after the writ petition had been filed and the said payments were accepted by the petitioner under protest.
41. In view of the facts stated above, we do not think that principle of estoppel by conduct is applicable. The respondents were fully aware and conscious of the fact that the petitioner was disputing the acceptance of the voluntary retirement and a writ petition had been filed by the petitioner challenging the acceptance as he had withdrawn his offer. With open eyes and fully conscious of the stand of the petitioner, the respondent No. 2 proceeded to make payment of various amounts payable under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme to the petitioner. It is, therefore, not a case in which the respondent No. 2 was forced to change its position and made to believe a particular set of facts on the basis of representation/statement made by the petitioner, which now the petitioner wants to deny and back out. The respondent No. 2 was conscious and aware that there was a dispute already pending relating to the voluntary retirement application and its acceptance. The respondent No. 2 was also aware and conscious of the fact that the petitioner was receiving payments under protest and it was not a case of unconditional acceptance. We, therefore, do not think that in these circumstances the doctrine of estoppel by conduct is applicable or should be applied.
42. Having decided the above two issues, the question that arises for consideration is what relief should be granted to the petitioner. As a result of our findings, the petitioner continued to be an employee of the respondent No. 2 till he superannuated and accordingly will be entitled to all pay and allowances till the date of his retirement and thereafter retiral benefits. [See Punjab National Bank v. Virender Kumar Gael (supra) and J.N. Srivastava v. Union of India (supra)]. The respondent No. 2 will normally be liable to pay both pay and allowances and the retirement benefits unless departmental proceedings are initiated against the petitioner under and subject to the applicable Rules these can be withheld. At the same time the petitioner is liable to return the two payments received by him of Rs. 1,42,026/- and Rs. 1013/-, total Rs. 1,43,039/-, to the respondent No. 2. The said amount has been used and utilised by him since September 24, 1994.
43. Keeping in view the above facts we direct the petitioner to refund this amount of Rs. 1,43,0397- within six weeks from the date ' of this judgment with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from September 24, 1993 till payment. In case the petitioner fails to make the said payment within six weeks, he will be liable . to pay interest at 9% per annum from September 24, 1993 till payment. After the petitioner makes the aforesaid payment along with interest, the respondent No. 2 will be liable to pay arrears of salary and allowances and other retirement benefits/to the petitioner along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum calculated on pro rata basis from the date amounts became due and payable till the date of actual payment.
44. We may, however, clarify that we have, not examined and gone into the question whether the respondent No, 2 can initiate and start departmental proceeding and withhold pay and allowances of the petitioner. It is open to the respondent No. 2 to take action in accordance with law and for the petitioner to question and challenge the same, if so advised and necessary.
45. With the above observations, the present Writ Petition is disposed of. However in the circumstances there will be no order as to cost.
46. Writ petition disposed of.