Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Kaptan And Ors vs State (2026:Rj-Jp:5068) on 31 January, 2026
[2026:RJ-JP:5068]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 419/1989
1. Kaptan S/o Ram Ratan,
2. Bijendra S/o Ram Ratan,
3. Asha S/o Shobha Ram,
4. Jassu S/o Ganpat,
5. Babu S/o Indra,
6. Bhagwan Singh S/o Ram Ratan,
7. Ganpat S/o Balwant,
8. Nekram S/o Indra
All B/c Gujar, R/o Ochha Ka Pura, Mazra Jalalpur, PS Maniya,
District Dholpur.
(At present in District Jail, Dholpur)
----Appellants
Versus
State of Rajasthan
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Sarwat Alam, Adv. with Mr. Gaurang Agarwal, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rajesh Choudhary, GA-cum-AAG with Mr. Vivek Choudhary, PP HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR UPMAN Judgment 31/01/2026
1. The instant criminal appeal under Section 374 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the appellants herein challenging judgment dated 20.11.1989 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dholpur in Sessions Case No.82/1986 whereby the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under:-
Accused :- Kaptan, Bijendra, Asha, Jassu & Babu Offence under Sentence Default Sentence Section 307 IPC Five years' RI with fine Six months' RI of Rs.1,000/-
(Uploaded on 13/02/2026 at 01:12:45 PM) (Downloaded on 13/02/2026 at 05:37:27 PM) [2026:RJ-JP:5068] (2 of 9) [CRLA-419/1989] 307/149 IPC Five years' RI with fine Six months' RI of Rs.1,000/-
324 IPC Two years' RI with fine Three months' RI of Rs.1,000/-
324/149 IPC Two years' RI with fine Three months' RI of Rs.1,000/-
323/149 IPC One year's RI with fine Three months' RI of Rs.1,000/-
148 IPC Six months' RI with fine Two months' RI of Rs.500/-
447 IPC One month's RI with fine One month's RI of Rs.100/-
Accused :- Bhagwan Singh, Ganpat & Nekram Offence under Sentence Default Sentence Section 307/149 IPC Five years' RI with fine Six months' RI of Rs.1,000/-
324/149 IPC Two years' RI with fine Three months' RI of Rs.1,000/-
323 IPC One year RI with fine of Three months' RI Rs.1,000/-
323/149 IPC One year's RI with fine Three months' RI of Rs.1,000/-
148 IPC Six months' RI with fine Two months' RI of Rs.500/-
447 IPC One month's RI with fine One month's RI of Rs.100/-
2. The brief facts of the case, as emerging from the record, are that the injured Ramji Lal (PW-3) submitted a parcha bayan to the police at Sadar Hospital, Dholpur, stating that on 19.07.1985 at about 8:00 a.m., he, along with Puran and Prem Singh, had gone to their agricultural field for the purpose of cultivation. While they were engaged in agricultural work, the accused-appellants arrived at the spot armed with bhalas and lathis and assaulted them. In the said incident, a total of eight persons sustained injuries, both (Uploaded on 13/02/2026 at 01:12:45 PM) (Downloaded on 13/02/2026 at 05:37:27 PM) [2026:RJ-JP:5068] (3 of 9) [CRLA-419/1989] simple and grievous in nature. On the basis of said parcha bayan, FIR No.70/1985 came to registered against the appellants at Police Station Mania, District Dholpur for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 324, 307, 323 & 447 of the IPC.
3. After completion of investigation, Police filed charge-sheet against the appellants for the aforesaid offences. Thereafter, the learned trial Court framed charges against the appellants. The appellants denied the charges and claimed trial.
4. During the course of trial, the prosecution examined 16 witnesses and exhibited various documents. Thereafter, statements of the appellants were recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. In defence, one witness was examined and some documents were examined. Upon conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Court vide impugned judgment dated 20.11.1989 convicted and sentenced the accused-appellants as above. Hence, this appeal.
5. During the pendency of this appeal, appellant Nos.1 to 3, 6 & 7 have expired. Thus, the present appeal qua the appellant Nos.1 to 3, 6 & 7 stands dismissed as abated.
6. At the outset, learned counsel for the accused-appellants submits that the finding of conviction is not under challenge. However, it is prayed that the appellants be extended the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, inasmuch as the incident dates back to 1985, the appellants are now senior citizens, and the appeal has been pending since 1989. It is further submitted that the appellants have not been convicted previously. Learned counsel also contends that cross-cases were registered between (Uploaded on 13/02/2026 at 01:12:45 PM) (Downloaded on 13/02/2026 at 05:37:27 PM) [2026:RJ-JP:5068] (4 of 9) [CRLA-419/1989] the parties, and in the same incident, the appellants had also sustained injuries, for which no explanation has been offered by the prosecution. It is contended that these circumstances were not properly appreciated by the learned trial Court in the impugned judgment of conviction.
7. Learned counsel for the accused-appellants further submits that the sentence awarded to the accused-appellants was suspended by this Court vide order dated 24.11.1989, and accordingly, they were released on bail.
8. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor opposes the appeal and submits that looking to the overall facts and circumstances of the case and the well reasoned speaking judgment passed by the learned trial Court, the accused- appellants are not entitled to any indulgence from this Court.
9. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case.
10. Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is reproduced hereinbelow for the sake of ready-reference:-
"4. Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct.--
(1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear (Uploaded on 13/02/2026 at 01:12:45 PM) (Downloaded on 13/02/2026 at 05:37:27 PM) [2026:RJ-JP:5068] (5 of 9) [CRLA-419/1989] and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:
Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond.
(2) Before making any order under sub-section (1), the court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case. (3)....................................................................... (4).......................................................................... (5)... ......................................................................"
11. In Arvind Mohan Sinha versus Amulya Kumar Biswas (1974) 4 SCC, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:-
"The Probation of Offenders Act is a reformative measure and its object is to reclaim amateur offenders who, if spared the indignity of incarceration, can be usefully rehabilitated in society. In recalcitrant cases, punishment has to be deterrent so that others similarly minded may warn themselves of the hazards of taking to a career of crime. But the novice who strays into the path of crime ought, in the interest of society, be treated as being socially sick. Crimes are not always rooted in criminal tendencies and their origin may lie in psychological factors induced by hunger, want and poverty. The Probation of Offenders act recognises the importance of environmental influence in the commission of crimes and prescribes a remedy whereby the offender can be reformed and rehabilitated in society."
12. In Brij Lal versus State of Rajasthan RLW 2022 Raj 945, a Coordinate Bench of this Court observed as under:-
(Uploaded on 13/02/2026 at 01:12:45 PM) (Downloaded on 13/02/2026 at 05:37:27 PM) [2026:RJ-JP:5068] (6 of 9) [CRLA-419/1989] "Under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act nature of offence is one of the major-criteria for determining whether benefit of this provision should be given to the concerned offender or not. His age would be another relevant factor and the circumstance in which the offence was committed may be 3rd important consideration... "
13. In Mohd. Hashim versus State of U.P. & Ors., reported in (2017) 2 SCC 198, while reiterating the ratio decidendi, laid down in Dalbir Singh versus State of Haryana, reported in (2000) 5 SCC 82, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:
"... The Court has further opined that though the discretion as been vested in the court to decide when and how the court should form such opinion, yet the provision itself provides sufficient indication that releasing the convicted person on probation of good conduct must appear to the Court to be expedient..."
14. In Lakhvir Singh and Ors. versus The State of Punjab and Ors., reported in (2021) 2 SCC 763, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, with regard to the application of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 vis-a-vis those Acts wherein a minimum sentence of imprisonment has been prescribed by the legislature, observed as under:-
"Even though, Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the PC Act') prescribes a minimum sentence of imprisonment for not less than 1 year, an exception was carved out keeping in mind the application of the Act. In Ishar Das (supra), this Court noted that if the object of the legislature was that the Act does not apply to all cases where a minimum sentence of imprisonment is (Uploaded on 13/02/2026 at 01:12:45 PM) (Downloaded on 13/02/2026 at 05:37:27 PM) [2026:RJ-JP:5068] (7 of 9) [CRLA-419/1989] prescribed, there was no reason to specifically provide an exception for Section 5(2) of the PC Act. The fact that Section 18 of the Act does not include any other such offences where a mandatory minimum sentence has been prescribed suggests that the Act may be invoked in such other offences. A more nuanced interpretation on this aspect was given in CCE v.
Bahubali (1979) 2 SCC 279. It was opined that the Act may not apply in cases where a specific law enacted after 1958 prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence, and the law contains a non-obstante clause. Thus, the benefits of the Act did not apply in case of mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by special legislation enacted after the Act.5 It is in this context, it was observed in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vikram Das (Supra) that the court cannot award a sentence less than the mandatory sentence prescribed by the statute. We are of the view that the corollary to the aforesaid legal decisions ends with a conclusion that the benefit of probation under the said Act is not excluded by the provisions of the mandatory minimum sentence Under Section 397 of Indian Penal Code, the offence in the present case. In fact, the observation made in Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab ILR (1981) P & H 1 are in the same context."
15. In Surinder Singh versus State (Union territory of Chandigarh) reported in (2021) 20 SCC 24, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:
"37. Adverting to the facts of the case, in hand, we are of the considered view that at this stage, the sentence awarded to the appellant is no longer in degree to the crime which he has committed. Remitting the appellant to the rigours of imprisonment at this juncture of his life would not serve the ends of justice due to following mitigating factors:
(Uploaded on 13/02/2026 at 01:12:45 PM) (Downloaded on 13/02/2026 at 05:37:27 PM) [2026:RJ-JP:5068] (8 of 9) [CRLA-419/1989] 37.1. No motive or element of planning has been proved by the prosecution in the present case which indicates the possibility that the offence could have been committed on impulse by the appellant. Hence, the culpability of the offender in such situations is less than that which is ascribed in premeditated offences as the commission of planned illegal acts denotes an attack on societal values with greater commitment and continuity in comparison to spontaneous illegal acts.
37.2. Even though the factum of injury may not have a direct bearing on a conviction under Section 307IPC, the same may be considered by a court at the time of sentencing. No doubt, the offence committed by the appellant squarely falls within the four corners of Section 307IPC, but fortunately neither the complainant nor any other person was hurt by the untoward act of the appellant.
37.3. The appellant has already undergone a sentence of 3 months and 19 days. Additionally, despite the occurrence taking place in 1999, there is no indication that the appellant has been involved in any untoward activity before or after the incident. This highlights the appellant's good character and indicates that the incident can be interpreted as an isolated lapse of judgment.
Further, the appellant's clean post-incident behaviour suggests that he is a rational individual who is capable of responding to the social censure associated with the offence. Hence, the passage of a long time period coupled with a clean record, both before and after the incident is definitely a factor that calls for mitigation of sentence".
16. The incident dates back to the year 1985, and the present appeal has been pending since 1989. It is noted that appellant Nos. 4, 5, and 8 are senior citizens, and there is no material on record to indicate that any of the accused- appellants have previous convictions. Furthermore, cross-
(Uploaded on 13/02/2026 at 01:12:45 PM) (Downloaded on 13/02/2026 at 05:37:27 PM) [2026:RJ-JP:5068] (9 of 9) [CRLA-419/1989] cases were registered between the parties, and the appellants also sustained injuries in the incident. Thus, this Court, after taking into due consideration the legislative intent of the Act and the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arvind Mohan (supra), Mohd. Hashim (supra) and in Lakhvir Singh, and by this Court in Brij Lal (supra), deems it appropriate to extend the benefit of probation to the accused- appellant Nos.4, 5 & 8.
17. Resultantly, the instant Criminal Appeal is partly allowed. While maintaining the conviction of the accused-appellant Nos.4, 5 & 8 for the aforesaid offences, as recorded by the learned trial Court in the impugned judgment, this Court interferes only with the sentence part of the said judgment, and directs that the appellant Nos.4, 5 & 8 shall be released on probation, under Section 4 of the Act, upon furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/-and two sureties in the sum of Rs.25,000/-each to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court on or before 31.03.2026 with a further undertaking that they shall maintain peace and good behaviour for a period of two years and shall not repeat the offence. The appellant Nos.4, 5 & 8 are on bail. They need not surrender. Their bail bonds stand discharged accordingly. All pending applications stand disposed of.
18. Record of the learned trial Court be sent back forthwith.
(ANIL KUMAR UPMAN),J Manoj Solanki/1 (Uploaded on 13/02/2026 at 01:12:45 PM) (Downloaded on 13/02/2026 at 05:37:28 PM) Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)