Delhi High Court - Orders
Saeed Ur Rehman Khairi vs Almas Arshai on 14 March, 2023
Author: Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora
Bench: Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora
$~15
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ RC.REV. 22/2023
SAEED UR REHMAN KHAIRI ..... Petitioner
Through: Ms. Bhavna Arora, Advocate.
versus
ALMAS ARSHAI ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Vijay K. Sehgal and Ms.
Punya Sehgal, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA
ORDER
% 14.03.2023
1. The present revision petition has been filed by the Petitioner, tenant assailing the order dated 28.09.2022 ('impugned eviction order') passed by the, ARC-01, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, ('Trial Court') in Eviction Petition No. 86/2021 whereby the Petitioner's application seeking leave to defend was dismissed and the impugned eviction order was passed in favour of the Respondent, landlady with respect to a portion of the basement measuring 15' x 30' forming part of property bearing no. 5311, Gali Chandni Wali, Bazar Ballimaran, Kucha Rehman, Chandni Chowk, Delhi- 110006 ('the tenanted premises').
2. The eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ('DRC Act') was filed by the Respondent on the ground of bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises for her son to enable him to expand his business of selling footwears through e-commerce websites, Flipkart and Amazon. It was stated that the tenanted premises are required for storage of goods sold by the landlady's son through the e-commerce platform. It was stated that the landlady's son is already using the remaining area of the basement for storage of the goods.
Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:RASHMI DABAS Signing Date:20.03.2023 18:02:142.1. The Trial Court noted that the sole ground raised in the leave to defend was a vague denial that the landlady does not have suitable alternative premises. The Trial Court, thus, held that in the facts of this case, the tenant herein had failed to raise any triable issue and therefore, refused to grant the leave to defend.
Submissions of the Petitioner, Tenant
3. The learned counsel for the Petitioner states that the Petitioner is using the tenanted premises as a godown for storing his goods. She states that the Petitioner has a shop located across the road and he stores the goods in the tenanted premises.
3.1. She states that the Respondent owns the entire property bearing no. 5311, Gali Chandni Wali, Bazar Ballimaran, Kucha Rehman, Chandni Chowk, Delhi- 110006 ('the subject property') comprising of the basement, ground floor and first floor. She states that admittedly, the adjoining area in the basement [admeasuring 8 x 30 sq. ft], which is attached with the entrance of the subject property is already in possession of the Respondent. In view of the same, she states that there is no bona fide requirement for the tenanted premises. In this regard, she relies upon the averments made at paragraph 6 of the application seeking leave to defend filed by the Petitioner.
3.2. She states that, in the present facts and circumstances, the Respondent has sought eviction for the purposes of 'additional accommodation'. She states that the Trial Court ought to have in ordinary course allowed the application seeking leave to defend filed by the Petitioner, as a matter of right, in cases where the eviction is sought by the landlord/landlady for the purposes of additional accommodation. In this regard, she relies on the judgment of Supreme Court in Santosh Devi Soni Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:RASHMI DABAS Signing Date:20.03.2023 18:02:14 v. Chand Kiran, (2001) 1 SCC 255 and S.M Mehra v. D.D Malik, (2001) 1 SCC 256.
Submissions of the Respondent, Landlady
4. In reply, the learned counsel for the Respondent states that, there is no dispute with respect to the landlord-tenant relationship between the parties and hence, the same stands admitted by the Petitioner. 4.1. He states that the present eviction petition has been filed by the Respondent on the ground of the bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises for her son to expand his business of sale of footwears through online-platforms. He states that the tenanted premises are required for the Respondent's son for keeping the stock of the footwears which are sold online.
4.2. He further states that the copy of the VAT registration certificate showing the existence of his business has already been placed on record before the Trial Court. He states that the said certificate reflects the subject property as the current place of business of the Respondent's son. 4.3. He states there is no error in the judgment of the Trial Court. He further states that the tenanted premises are lying locked and have not been used by the Petitioner, tenant for the last many years. Findings and Analysis
5. This Court has considered the submission of the parties and perused the paper book.
6. As pointed out by learned counsel for the Respondent and duly admitted by the Petitioner in the application seeking leave to defend, there is no dispute with respect to the ownership of the Respondent over the tenanted premises and also the existence of landlord-tenant relationship Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:RASHMI DABAS Signing Date:20.03.2023 18:02:14 between the parties. In this regard, the finding of the Trial Court reads as under:
"6. As regards the first issue, there is no denial on the part of the respondent regarding the existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the parties. He himself admits that he is an old tenant under the petitioner since 1994 and has been using the demised premiss as a godown ever since. In an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) DRCA, it is trite that a landlord is not required to prove his ownership in absolute terms as is required under the Transfer of Property Act. He/she is only required to show that he is more than a tenant, which has been established by the petitioner. Thus, in view of the pleadings of the parties, it has to be held that there exists a relationship of landlord and tenant between them."
(Emphasis supplied)
7. It is admitted on record that Respondent's son, along with his family resides in the subject property with the Respondent on the ground floor and the first floor.
8. There is no dispute raised by the Petitioner that the Respondent's son is carrying on the business of sale of footwear in the name and style of 'Shumael Enterprises', from the subject property. It is also common knowledge that for sellers using e-commerce platform to sell their goods, the warehouse facilities have to be maintained by the sellers. The Petitioner has not disputed the requirement of the Respondent's son for a warehouse, to keep his stock. It is also not disputed that the Respondent's son is using the adjacent area in the basement for storing the stock. 8.1. In these facts, the requirement of the tenanted premises for expanded capacity to keep stock of the goods sold on the e-commerce platforms has been rightly held by the Trial Court genuine. The expanded space is required by the son for the growth of his business and there is no error committed by the Trial Court in accepting the said plea.
Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:RASHMI DABAS Signing Date:20.03.2023 18:02:148.2. It is common knowledge that in a metropolitan city like Delhi where the real estate prices are astronomical and rentals are high, grown-up children are also dependent on their parents for requirement of accommodation, whether commercial or residential. In these circumstances, the plea of the Respondent, landlady that she requires tenanted premises for her dependent son has been correctly appreciated by the Trial Court.
8.3. In this regard, it would be relevant refer to the findings of the Trial Court which reads as under:
"7. Next is the bonafide requirement of the petitioner qua the tenanted premises and the lack of availability of any alternative suitable accommodations, for her stated needs. She has filed the present petition for expansion of her son's footwear online business so that he has adequate space to store his goods. The copy of VAT registration certificate showing existence of his business has been filed which reflects their residence as the current place of business. From the contents of the petition and supporting documents, the requirement of the petitioner appears to be bonafide and there is no reason to believe the same.
Xxx xxx xxx
9. On the other hand respondent has only vaguely denied petitioner's need and/or lack of availability of suitable alternative premises. He orally submits that there is enough space at the entrance of her house which can be used for the purported need.
In the case titled as "Ragavendra Kumar Vs Firm Prem Machinery, AIR 2000 SC 534, it was observed as under:-
"It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. In the case in hand the plaintiff-landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted."
10.Thus, while enjoying petitioner's property, respondent cannot ask her that she should adjust in some other place or utilize the space already available with her instead of seeking his eviction from the tenanted premises. It is the moral duty of the parent to help establish their child and make them financially independent. Petitioner has already disclosed that she needs the tenanted premises for her son's business and there is no alternative accommodation for the same. Except for making vague oral submissions, respondent has not been able to show that petitioner has any Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:RASHMI DABAS Signing Date:20.03.2023 18:02:14 other property which could be utilized for her purported needs. He has even failed to disclose the necessary details of her supposed alternative properties in his affidavit let alone establish them with some material which could warrant trial."
(Emphasis supplied)
9. The reliance placed by the Petitioner on the judgments of Supreme Court in Santosh Devi Soni (supra) and S.M Mehra (supra) to contend that the application seeking leave to defend filed by the tenant ought to have been allowed by the Trial Court in every cases of eviction sought for additional accommodation cannot be accepted by this Court. In this regard, it would be instructive to refer to the judgment of Supreme Court in Madan Lal Gupta v. Ravinder Kumar, (2001) 1 SCC 252, whereby it has been very categorically held that the decision of Santosh Devi Soni does not set down any principle of law and held that the question as to the extent of accommodation and the requirement of the landlord is dependent on the actual facts arising in the case. The relevant portion of the judgment in Madan Lal Gupta (supra) reads as under:
"1. In this petition the Petitioner is calling in question an order passed by the High Court in a revision petition arising out of a proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act. The Rent Controller refused to grant leave to contest the eviction petition filed by the respondent for his bona fide need. The question as to the extent of accommodation and thee requirement of the respondent is dependent on actual facts arising in the case. Inasmuch as the Rent Controller as well as the High Court have examined the matter and concluded against the petitioner, we fail to understand as to how we can interfere with the decision made by the High Court affirming the order of the Rent Controller."
2. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner sought to rely upon two decisions of this Court in Santosh Devi Soni v. Chand Kiran [(2001) 1 SCC at p. 255 : JT (2000) 3 SC 397] and Liaq Ahmed v. Habeeb-Ur- Rehman [(2000) 5 SCC 708 : JT (2000) 5 SC 611] . Neither of these two decisions set down any principle of law so as to call for interference by us. In these two cases on the facts arising in the case certain orders have been passed by this Court."
(Emphasis supplied) Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:RASHMI DABAS Signing Date:20.03.2023 18:02:14
10. It is also pertinent to mention that the Respondent has categorically stated that the Respondent, landlady does not possess any other suitable alternate accommodation, which has not been disputed by the Petitioner as noted by the Trial Court.
11. In the opinion of this Court, the findings of the Trial Court are well- reasoned and need not be interfered with. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Abid-ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30, the scope of revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is limited. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:
"23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the requirement for the tenanted premises as pleaded by the Respondent for expansion of the business of her son as held herein above is bona fide. And, in view of the judgment of Supreme Court in Madan Lal Gupta (supra), the grant of leave to defend cannot be allowed ipso facto only for the reason that the same is required for expansion.
13. It would be pertinent to note that this Court had enquired from the learned counsel for the Petitioner if the Petitioner requires extension of Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:RASHMI DABAS Signing Date:20.03.2023 18:02:14 time to vacate the tenanted premises. She, however, states on instructions from the Petitioner, who is present in Court, that he does not require extended time. The said stand taken by the Petitioner gives credence to the plea of the Respondent landlady that the Petitioner is not using the tenanted premises and the same is lying locked for past many years.
14. In view of the aforesaid findings and observations, this Court is satisfied that there is no infirmity in the findings of the Trial Court. Therefore, the present revision petition and the pending applications, if any, stand dismissed and the impugned eviction order dated 28.09.2022 is upheld. No order as to costs.
MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J MARCH 14, 2023/hp/kv Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:RASHMI DABAS Signing Date:20.03.2023 18:02:14