Karnataka High Court
Sri R Rajappa vs Sri K Ashok Rai on 11 June, 2021
Author: H.B.Prabhakara Sastry
Bench: H.B. Prabhakara Sastry
®
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF JUNE, 2021
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE Dr. JUSTICE H.B. PRABHAKARA SASTRY
CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION No.1008 OF 2017
BETWEEN:
Sri. R. Rajappa
S/o. Late Ramaiah,
Aged about 46 years,
R/at No.149, Kudlu Village,
Water Tank Main Road,
Dr. Ambedkar Nagar,
1st Cross, Post-Madiwala,
Sarjapura Hobli,
Anekal Taluk,
Bangalore - 560 068.
..Petitioner
(By Sri. Kiran Kumar D.K., Advocate)
AND:
Sri. K. Ashok Rai
S/o. Sri. Vittal Rai
Aged about 62 years,
R/at Ashok Residency,
No.46, 80 feet Road,
Near IBB Petrol Bunk,
Koramangala 6th Block,
Bangalore - 560 095.
.. Respondent
(By Sri. K. Chadranath Ariga, Advocate)
****
Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017
2
This Criminal Revision Petition is filed under Section 397 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, praying to set aside the
impugned judgment and impugned orders in C.C.No.26605/2014
dated 01-07-2016 passed by the XIX Additional Metropolitan
Magistrate, at Bengaluru vide Annexure P; and the impugned
judgment and impugned order in Crl.Appeal No.786/2016 dated
01-09-2017 passed by the LIX Additional City Civil and Sessions
Judge, at Bengaluru, vide Annexure-Q, and may award the cost
of this petition, etc.
This Criminal Revision Petition having been heard through
video conferencing hearing and reserved on 04-06-2021,
coming on for pronouncement of Orders this day, the Court
made the following:
ORDER
The present petitioner as the accused was tried by the Court of the learned XIX Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Bangalore City (hereinafter for brevity referred to as the "Trial Court"), in C.C.No.26605/2014 for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as the "N.I. Act") and was convicted for the said offence by its judgment of conviction and order on sentence dated 01-07-2016.
Aggrieved by the same, the accused preferred a Criminal Appeal in the Court of the LIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore City (hereinafter for brevity referred to as the "Sessions Judge's Court") in Criminal Appeal No.786/2016. Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 3
The appeal was contested by the respondent who was the complainant in the Trial Court. The Sessions Judge's Court in its order dated 01-09-2017 dismissed the appeal, confirming the judgment of conviction and order on sentence passed by the Trial Court dated 01-07-2016 in C.C.No.26605/2014.
Aggrieved by the said judgment, the accused has preferred this revision petition.
2. The summary of the case of the complainant in the Trial Court was that, the accused had entered into an agreement with him to sell a landed property to an extent of 04 acres 01 gunta in Survey Nos.28 and 185 of Kudlu Village, Sarjapura Hobli, Anekal Taluk. In that regard, both of them had entered into an agreement dated 15-10-2010. As on the date of the agreement to sell, the sale consideration of a sum of `16.00 lakhs was paid to the accused as an advance amount. Subsequently, the accused failed to comply the terms of the agreement for sale. However, on repeated demands, the accused agreed to return the advance sale consideration amount received by him, in which direction, he issued a cheque bearing No.010343 dated 24-04-2013 for a sum of `16.00 lakhs, drawn on the Lakshmi Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 4 Vilas Bank, Koramangala Industrial Layout, Bangalore, in favour of the complainant and assured the complainant that the said cheque would be honoured, when presented for realisation. Accordingly, the complainant presented the said cheque through his banker for realisation, but the said cheque came to be dis- honoured and unpaid with the banker's endorsement "funds insufficient". The complainant got issued a legal notice dated 24-05-2013 to the accused, demanding the payment of the cheque amount. Though the notice sent through Registered Post Acknowledgment Due (RPAD) was received by the accused, but he did not pay the cheque amount, which constrained the complainant to institute a case against him in the Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.
3. The accused appeared in the Trial Court and contested the matter through his counsel.
4. To prove his case, the complainant got himself examined as PW-1 and got marked documents from Exs.P-1 to P-5. The accused got himself examined as DW-1, but did not mark any documents in his support.
Crl.R.P.No.1008/20175
The Trial Court after recording the evidence led before it and hearing both side, by its impugned judgment dated 01-07-2016 convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and sentenced him to pay a fine of `17,05,000/-, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months. Challenging the said judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court, the accused preferred an appeal in Criminal Appeal No.786/2016 before the learned Sessions Judge's Court, which, after hearing both side, by its impugned judgment dated 01-09-2017, dismissed the appeal filed by the accused, while confirming the impugned judgment of conviction and order on sentence passed by the Trial Court. Being aggrieved by the judgments of conviction and order on sentence, the accused has preferred this revision petition.
5. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner/accused and learned counsel for the respondent/complainant are appearing through video conference.
6. The Trial Court and Sessions Judge's Court's records were called for and the same are placed before this Court. Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 6
7. Heard the arguments from both side. Perused the materials placed before this Court including the Trial Court and Sessions Judge's Court's records.
8. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be henceforth referred to as per their rankings before the Trial Court.
9. After hearing the learned counsels for the parties, the only point that arise for my consideration in this revision petition is:
Whether the judgments under revision are perverse, illegal and erroneous, warranting interference at the hands of this Court?
10. It is not in dispute that, the complainant and accused were known to each other and that the accused was the drawer of the cheque at Exhibit P-1. It is also not in dispute that, the said cheque, when presented for realisation by the complainant through his banker, the same came to be unpaid and returned with the banker's endorsement "funds insufficient". To this extent, the evidence of the complainant as PW-1 has remained un-denied and un-disputed from the accused's side. Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 7
In the cross-examination of PW-1, the accused himself has stated that, he had issued two cheques to the complainant, however, it was under the alleged agreement between them dated 05-04-2007. Neither the complainant nor the accused has produced the copy of the alleged agreement dated 05-04-2007. Except making such a suggestion, the accused also has not produced any document to show that, the alleged cheque was not given to the complainant by virtue of the alleged non- performance of his promise under the agreement to sell dated 15-10-2010 which is at Exhibit P-5, but it was given under the alleged agreement dated 05-04-2007 only as a security. On the other hand, the accused as DW-1 himself has admitted about he entering into an agreement with the complainant as per Exhibit P-5 which is dated 15-10-2010. The evidence of PW-1 that the accused failed to comply with the terms of the said agreement dated 15-10-2010 also has not been denied in the cross- examination of PW-1 from the accused's side.
Furthermore, the accused who got himself examined as DW-1 admitted in his cross-examination that, he had entered into an agreement on 15th October 2010 with the complainant as per Exhibit P-5. Though he admitted that there is mentioning Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 8 in the agreement that, he has received a sum of `10.00 lakhs from the complainant under the said agreement, but he stated that, the said amount was not given to him. It was specifically asked to DW-1 in his cross-examination as to, how come he has signed the agreement without receiving the amount shown to have been paid to him under the said agreement, for which, the witness has only stated that, though he objected to the same but showing expiry of the limitation period to obtain permission from the Government, the complainant obtained his signature to the said agreement. The said reason given by the accused was not admitted by the complainant as he has denied the said reason in the further part of the very same cross-examination of DW-1. In such a situation, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that, no consideration was passed to the accused towards the cheque amount, cannot be accepted. This is also for the reason that, the very same DW-1 in his cross- examination has admitted a suggestion as true that after receiving a sum of `16.00 lakhs from the complainant, he had entered into an agreement of sale with the complainant having agreed to sell his lands. Thus, the said admission on the part of the accused as DW-1 that, he had signed the agreement Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 9 only after receiving a sum of `16.00 lakhs from the complainant would show that, the contention raised by him for the first time in this revision petition, is not tenable. Therefore, issuance of cheque at Exhibit P-1 of which accused is the drawer in favour of the complainant, remains an undisputed fact.
11. According to the complainant, after dishonour of the cheque, he got issued a legal notice to the complainant, demanding the payment of the cheque amount as per Exhibit P-3. A perusal of the said document would go to show that, the complainant referring to their agreement to sell dated 15-10-2010 has also stated that, the cheque for a sum of `16.00 lakhs issued by the accused to him towards the clearance of his liability towards the complainant has been dis-honoured. The complainant had demanded the said cheque amount together with interest thereupon @ `2% per month.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner/accused in his argument also has taken a contention that, the said notice was not served upon the accused. The complainant has produced two postal receipts at Exhibits P-3(a) and P-3(b) and the postal acknowledgement card at Exhibit P-4 to show that the notice Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 10 sent under Registered Post Acknowledgement Due (RPAD) has been duly served upon the accused. The postal acknowledgement card bears the postal seal and also bears the signature of the recipient of the postal article. DW-1 in his further cross-examination has admitted a suggestion as true that, the address shown in the postal acknowledgement card at Exhibit P-4 is his address only. The very same address is also shown in the legal notice at Exhibit P-3. Therefore, when the notice is sent to the correct and admitted address of the accused and under registered post and the postal acknowledgement card at Exhibit P-4 also shows that the same has been duly delivered to the addressee, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner/accused that the notice was not served upon the accused, is not acceptable.
Admittedly, neither any reply is given by the accused to the said notice at Exhibit P-3 nor he has paid the cheque amount, as demanded in the legal notice. These undisputed facts form a presumption in favour of the complainant about the existence of a legally enforceable debt in his favour under Section 139 of the N.I. Act. However, the said presumption is rebuttable.
Crl.R.P.No.1008/201711
13. In the process of rebutting the said presumption, the accused in the cross-examination of PW-1 has taken a contention that, the cheque was given to the complainant only as a security. However, the said suggestion made to that effect in his cross- examination was not admitted as true by the complainant (PW-1).
14. The accused had also taken a contention that, the amount mentioned in the said cheque is shown to have been drawn by the complainant himself, without paying the same to him. However, a suggestion made to PW-1 in his cross- examination to that effect was not admitted by the witness as true.
15. Added to the above, the accused in his evidence as DW-1 has also taken a contention that the amount shown in Exhibit P-1 was not paid to him by the complainant. However, the very same witness in his further cross-examination has admitted a suggestion as true that it is only after receiving a sum of `16.00 lakhs from the complainant, he has entered into an agreement with the complainant. Thus, as already observed above, the accused could not able to prove his Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 12 defence of the alleged non-passing of consideration in the cheque at Exhibit P-1. Therefore, the first attempt of the accused to rebut the presumption formed in favour of the complainant ends in failure.
16. The learned counsel for the petitioner/accused in his argument as a main ground in this revision petition, contended that, the cheque at Exhibit P-1 is materially altered, since the year shown in the cheque has been altered from "200..." to " 2 0 0 3'. He submitted that under Section 87 of the N.I. Act, it is a material alteration done by the complainant, as such, the accused is not liable to the complainant.
17. The accused has not taken a specific contention regarding the material alteration of the cheque, at the earliest point of time in the Trial Court, either as a defence in the cross- examination of PW-1 or in his evidence as DW-1, except taking a contention that, the date shown in the cheque was left blank by him and it was the complainant who filled the said date by himself. The said contention was not even suggested to PW-1 in his cross-examination, but the accused had taken that contention Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 13 in his evidence as DW-1. However, the complainant had denied the same in the cross-examination of DW-1.
18. Learned counsel for the respondent/complainant in his argument vehemently submitted that, there is no evidence to show that the said filling up of the date in the cheque was by the complainant and that it has resulted into a material alteration. He further submitted that, neither filling up of the date in cheque nor filling up of the year of issuance of the cheque with prior printing of the first three digits of the year would amount to material alteration.
In his support, learned counsel relied upon few judgments of various High Courts which are as below:-
[i] In the case of Seth Loonkaran Sethiya and others Vs. Mr. Ivan E. John and others reported in (1977) 1 Supreme Court Cases 379, a Full Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court, while answering the Question No.5 framed by it has discussed as to, what constitutes a 'material alteration' in paragraph Nos.23 and 24 of its judgment as follows:
23. Question 5: Before proceeding to determine this question, it would be well to advert to the legal position Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 14 bearing on the matter. As aptly stated in paragraph 1378 of Volume 12 of Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition) if an alteration (by erasure, interlineation, or otherwise) is made in a material part of a deed, after its execution, by or with the consent of any party to or person entitled under it, but without the consent of the party or parties liable under it, the deed is rendered void from the time of the alteration so as to prevent the person who has made or authorised the alteration, and those claiming under him, from putting the deed in suit to enforce against any party bound by it, who did not consent to the alteration, any obligation, convenant, or promise thereby undertaken or made.
24. A material alteration, according to this authoritative work, is one which varies the rights, liabilities, or legal position of the parties as ascertained by the deed in its original state, or otherwise varies the legal effect of the instrument as originally expressed, or reduces to certainty some provision which was originally unascertained and as such void, or which may otherwise prejudice the party bound by the deed as originally executed."
[ii] In the case of Seth Dhanoomal Parsaram Vs. P. Kuppuraj and another reported in 1976 SCC OnLine Mad 66, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court with respect to the contention of material alteration taken up as defence in the matter, proceeded to observe in para-7 of its judgment as below:
"7. The next contention of the learned counsel, which as we said was a feeble one, is that there were material alterations in the promissory notes Exhibits A-3 and A-4. The principle underlying material alteration is well-settled. It pre-supposes that there was a writing to which the executant of the negotiable instrument was a party and that writing was given the go-by by a conscious covert or overt act on the part Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 15 of the creditor resulting in a material alteration of the instrument. By establishing that a negotiable instrument has been altered in a superfluous sense will not suffice to prevent the creditor from instituting an action on such an altered instrument. The debtor complaining of material alteration should not rest content by establishing that there was a formal alteration which is innocuous and superfluous, but he should also further establish that there was a material alteration in the sense that what is sought to be put in Court was not the contract between the parties and was not what was intended between the parties at or about the time when it was executed. This is the underlying principle behind the concept of material alteration..."
[iii] In the case of Bhaskaran Chandrasekharan Vs. Radhakrishnan reported in 1998 SCC OnLine Ker 464, wherein also, the question involved was as to whether the insertion of a date on an un-dated cheque would amount to 'material alteration' within the meaning of Section 87 of the N.I. Act, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, after referring to Seth Loonkaran Sethiya's case (supra) at paragraph 17 of its judgment, was pleased to hold that, when a cheque was issued for a valid consideration with no dispute regarding the signature, amount and name, it cannot be said that, putting of date on the cheque by the payee, who is the holder of the cheque in-due- course would amount to 'material alteration' rendering the instrument void. In fact, there is no material alteration when a Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 16 cheque is duly issued with a blank date and when the payee has no objection with regard to the name, amount and signature. It can be presumed that, there is an implied consent of the drawer for putting the date as and when required by the beneficiary and get it encashed.
In para-18 of the same judgment, the Court further proceeded to observe that, in other words, when the date is put by the payee, or the drawer on the cheque, the presumptions under Section 118 of the N.I. Act would arise. The burden is, therefore, entirely on the drawer of the cheque to establish that the payee had no authority to put the date and encash the cheque.
[iv] This Court in the case of Shri Mahadevaiah Vs. Shri. Shivalingaiah reported in ILR 2018 KAR 2577 had an occasion to deal with the similar contention about an allegation of material alteration in the Promissory Note at Exhibit P-1 therein, which, according to the accused, was effected by the complainant and going to the root of the said document, nullified the validity of the same. It was agitated that the said material alteration was made in the Negotiable Instrument without the consent of the Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 17 other party. In that context, this Court with respect to Section 87 of the N.I. Act, was pleased to observe at para-13 of its judgment as below:
"13. A reading of the said section go to show that if the party to the said Negotiable instrument has not given his consent for such material alteration or such material alteration was made, otherwise than in order to carry out the common intention of the original parties, in such event, that negotiable instrument is void as against the person who has not consented for such alteration. Thus ipso facto the material alteration in negotiable instrument does not make it void within itself. If the person producing and relying on that negotiable instrument satisfies the court that the person against whom the negotiable instrument is being enforced had his consent for such alteration or that the said alteration was made in order to carry out the common intention, then, such negotiable instrument would be still valid and binds the other party also."
It was also held in the very same judgment that, if the alteration is made contemporaneously when the document came to be executed or if it is made at some subsequent period with the privity of the parties charged therein and in the absence of any fraud, the instrument would still be valid and enforceable.
19. In the instant case, the accused as DW-1 in his examination-in-chief has taken a contention that, the date column in the cheque at Exhibit P-1 was left blank by him and the same was filled by the complainant. Except this, he has not at all stated as to, whether he did not have his consent for the Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 18 complainant filling up the date or whether he had precluded the complainant from filling the date in the instrument without his knowledge or consent. Therefore, even assuming that, it is the complainant who has filled the date, still, the drawer of the instrument, by giving such an un-dated cheque to the complainant, has impliedly permitted the complainant to fill the date in the Negotiable Instrument (cheque) by himself.
As observed, in the instant case, the accused nowhere has stated that he had any objection for the complainant filling up the date in the cheque. It is on a similar point, the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Bhaskaran Chandrasekharan's case (supra) was pleased to observe that, when a cheque is issued for a valid consideration with no dispute regarding the signature, amount and name, it cannot be said that, putting a date on the cheque by the payee who is the holder of the cheque in-due-course would amount to material alteration rendering the instrument void.
20. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner/accused is also that, the original pre-printed date on the cheque in the year column which was "200 _" has stood Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 19 altered by the complainant as "2 0 0 3", which does not bear the correction authentication signature of the drawer, as such, the cheque has become invalid.
21. In the case of M/s. Guru Finance Corporation (R) Vs. Sri.S.T. Murthy in Criminal Appeal No.661/2010, this Court in its judgment dated 21-12-2018 had to deal with the question as to whether scratching the pre-printed year in the cheque which was showing "..../.../19..." and writing the year as "2007" invalidates the cheque. Though the question of alleged material alteration was not the question discussed in the said judgment, however, this Court has held that the said cancellation of the pre-printed year denoting the previous decade and mentioning the current year of issuance of the cheque which was of the subsequent decade (in that case from "19..." to "2007") would not take away the enforceability of the cheque.
22. In the instant case, if the pre-printed year of the cheque were to be used without effecting any change in the year, it should have been used on or before the year 2009 but not thereafter. However, the cheque is said to have been given in the year 2013, as such, the year on the cheque is also shown Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 20 as '2 0 0 3' by overwriting the digit '1' against '0' at tens' place. Thus, the cheque is shown to have been issued in the year 2013. The evidence of the parties, more particularly of PW-1 would go to show that, the said cheque was issued by the accused subsequent to the accused committing default in performing his part of the obligation under the agreement at Exhibit P-5. Admittedly, the said agreement is dated 15-10-2010. As such, if at all a cheque was required to be issued subsequent to the date of the agreement, it has to be only on or after the year 2010, for which purpose also, the cheque with the pre-printed three digits as "200_" should have been necessarily altered to show the correct year of issuance of the cheque. No doubt it is an alteration, but had it been a material alteration, the banker while dishonouring the cheque would have, apart from showing the reason of insufficiency of funds in the account of the drawer, would also have mentioned the reason of "alteration require drawer's authentication". It is for the reason that the cheque return memo which is at Exhibit P-2 in its Code No.'1', though mentions the reason for return as "funds insufficient", the Code No.'12' of the very same exhibit for return mentions "alterations require drawer's authentication". Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 21 Since the banker has not considered the cheque as materially altered, the pre-printed single digit of the year has been altered to put the cheque in use in the current year which was '2013' appears to have confined the reason for returning of the cheque only for the other reason of insufficiency of funds in the account of the drawer. Had really the petitioner/accused intended to establish that there was material alteration in the cheque at Exhibit P-1, nothing had prevented him from summoning his banker and examining him as his witness, which also the accused did not do. Therefore, when the cheque in question is shown to have been issued subsequent to the alleged breach of the agreement dated 15-10-2010 at Exhibit P-5 by the accused and the cheque is of the subsequent date of the agreement and also when the banker, while dishonouring the cheque, has not stated that, there is any material alteration in the instrument, it cannot be held that the cheque was invalid and ineligible for its consideration by the banker due to the alleged material alteration.
23. Since the Trial Court and the learned Sessions Judge's Court, after analysing the evidence led before them by the parties in their proper perspective have arrived at a correct Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 22 finding and proceeded to convict the accused for the alleged offence, I do not find any illegality, perversity or impropriety in the said finding, warranting any interference at the hands of this Court.
However, the sentence ordered by the Trial Court which is further confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge's Court when verified, it can be found that the Trial Court, after convicting the accused for the alleged offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act has sentenced him to pay a fine of a sum of `17,05,000/- and in default to pay the fine amount, has ordered him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months. Out of the fine amount recoverable under Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a sum of `17,00,000/- is directed to be paid to the complainant and the remaining fine of a sum of `5,000/- is ordered to be forfeited to the State.
24. It is the sentencing policy that, the sentence ordered must be proportionate to the gravity of the proven guilt of the accused. It must not be either exorbitant or for namesake.
25. Thus, when the facts and circumstances of the instant case is considered, it can be seen that, admittedly, the Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 23 complainant is a real estate businessman and a hotelier. The accused in his deposition has shown his avocation as a coolie. He had agreed to sell his agricultural land to the complainant as per the agreement at Exhibit P-5 as could be made out from the said document. The said agreement does not quantify any damages, except stating that in case of any default the proposed purchaser had a right to take suitable legal action against the vendor and is entitled to recover the loss incurred by him. In such a circumstance, the quantum of fine imposed which is `1,05,000/- in addition to the cheque amount appears to be on a higher side. As such, in order to make the said sentence of fine proportionate to the gravity of the proven guilt against the accused, particularly in the light of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the said fine amount imposed requires to be reduced. It is for that limited purpose only, the present revision petition deserves to be allowed-in- part.
Accordingly I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER [i] The Criminal Revision Petition is allowed-in-part;Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 24
[ii] The judgment of conviction passed by the learned XIX Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Bangalore City, in C.C.No.26605/2014 dated 01-07-2016, convicting the accused/present petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which was further confirmed by the learned LIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore City, in Criminal Appeal No.786/2016 dated 01-09-2017, is confirmed;
iii] However, the order on sentence passed by the learned XIX Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Bangalore City, in C.C.No.26605/2014 dated 01-07-2016, sentencing the accused before it (petitioner herein) to pay a sum of `17,05,000/-, which was further confirmed by the learned LIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore City, in Criminal Appeal No.786/2016 dated 01-09-2017, is modified and the fine amount is reduced and confined to a sum of `16,40,000/-. Crl.R.P.No.1008/2017 25
Accordingly, the compensation ordered to be payable to the respondent/complainant under Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is also modified and reduced to a sum of `16,35,000/- by the accused/petitioner. The remaining fine of a sum of `5,000/- shall be forfeited to the State as ordered by the Trial Court;
[iv] The default sentence of six months simple imprisonment to be undergone by the accused/ petitioner in case of his default to pay the fine amount remains unaltered.
Registry to transmit a copy of this order to both the Trial Court as also to the Sessions Judge's Court along with their respective records immediately.
Sd/-
JUDGE BMV*