Himachal Pradesh High Court
________________________________________________________ vs Rajeev Chauhan & Anr on 4 June, 2025
Bench: Vivek Singh Thakur, Sandeep Sharma
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA.
LPA No. 86 of 2017
Judgment reserved on: 22.05.2025
Date of Decision: June __ , 2025
________________________________________________________
HP State Forest Corporation Ltd. & Anr.
........... Appellant
Versus
Rajeev Chauhan & Anr.
.....Respondents
_______________________________________________________
Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? 1 Yes.
For the Appellant : Mr. Durga Singh Kainthala,
Advocate.
For the respondents :
Mr. Nitin Thakur, Advocate, for
respondent No. 1
Mr. Balwinder Singh, Deputy
Advocate General, for respondent
No. 2.
________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, Judge (oral)
Instant Letters Patent Appeal arises from a dispute concerning the payment for forest produce sold by respondent No. 1, Rajeev Chauhan, to the Himachal Pradesh State Forest Corporation (hereinafter "appellant") under a regulatory statutory framework.
2. Himachal Pradesh Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Act, 1982 (hereinafter "Act"), provides for constitution of Advisory Committee to aid in price fixation. After receipt of advice from the Advisory Committee, State Government, in consultation with the Committee, fixes the price at which forest produce can be purchased. The price fixed by State Government remains in force till the end of financial year and as per Act, it must be published officially, either in 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 Gazette or in another prescribed manner. Most importantly, if Advisory Committee fails to provide its advice by 15 th February preceding the financial year starts, the State Government can fix the price independently, without Consulting Committee. As per the Act, State Government can purchase forest produce at mutually agreed prices between the parties in absence of a constituted Committee.
3. In nutshell, case as emerge from the pleadings adduced on record by the respective parties is that pursuant to Section 7 of the Act, the State Government issued notification dated 03.04.1991, prescribing a system to determine the price of forest produce sold by private owners. Afore notification ensured that forest owners were entitled to receive the higher of two rates: the royalty rate or the economic rate, whichever was greater.
4. The validity of afore notification dated 03.04.1991 came to be laid challenge before this Court by way of CWP No. 629 of 1991, titled as Ishwar Dutt & Others v. State of H.P & Others, which was decided vide judgment dated 18.12.1996. Division Bench of this Court, while upholding the validity of afore notification, ruled that economic system be adopted in accordance with the Act.
5. Person namely Mr. Ashok Pal Sen, who perforce had to sell his forest produce to State Forest Corporation, also filed a petition before this Court, being CWP No. 900 of 2000, titled as Ashok Pal Sen Vs. H.P.Sate Forest Corporation, seeking benefits under the very same notification dated 03.04.1991, for the reason that the State Government had not issued any notification under Section 7 of the Act, for the financial year 1994-95. Learned Single Judge, vide judgment 3 dated 05.01.2024, placing reliance upon the decision rendered in Ishwar Dutt (supra), allowed the petition by granting benefits under the very same notification and the petitioner was held entitled to the price of forest produce at a rate which was higher than the agreed rates, on the basis of royalty. Criteria adopted was that of economic basis. Though aforesaid decision was laid challenge by way of LPA No. 6 of 2004, titled as HP State Forest Corporation Vs. Ashok Pal Sen, but same was affirmed by Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, vide judgment dated 22.03.2004.
6. Forest Corporation, being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment passed by Hon'ble Division Bench, filed Civil Appeal No. 531 of 2005, titled as HP State Forest Corporation Vs. Ashok Pal Sen in the Hon'ble Apex Court, which came to be dismissed, vide judgment dated 02.12.2010 in a following manner:
"We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
We find no merit whatsoever in this appeal preferred by the Corporation against the impugned judgment. The impugned judgment merely followed the decision of another Division Bench in Ishwar Dutt and others vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others made in Civil Writ Petition No. 629 of 1991 dated 18.12.1996. The said judgment squarely applies to the facts on hand.
This appeal is accordingly dismissed. "
7. Forest Corporation also filed Review Petition (C) No. 1279 of 2011 in Civil Appeal No. 531 of 2005, which came to be dismissed by the Hon'ble Apex Court on 25.08.2011.
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8. Respondent No. 1, Rajeev Chauhan entered into an agreement dated 08.02.1995 with the Forest Corporation for sale of forest produce. Under the said agreement, respondent No. 1 was entitled to 50% of the basic rate calculated on royalty basis. Since no fresh notification under Sections 6 & 7 of the Act was issued by the respondent-State for the financial year, respondent No. 1 named hereinabove placed reliance upon the Notification of 1991. On 30.11.2011, the respondent No. 1 submitted a representation seeking parity with the relief granted in the Ashok Pal Sen (supra), requesting the corporation for release of payment, in terms of Notification of 1991. However, the Corporation rejected the request through communications dated 20.12.2011 and 21.03.2012 stating that the benefit granted in earlier case was person-specific and that the claim of respondent No. 1 was barred by limitation.
9. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid communications, respondent No. 1 approached this Court by way of CWP No. 2748 of 2014, titled as Rajeev Chauhan Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and ors., which came to be allowed, vide judgment dated 19.09.2016. In nutshell, learned Single Judge of this Court in judgment detailed hereinabove held as under:
"1. The statutory nature of the 1991 notification overrides the contractual terms between parties.
2. The legal relationship between private forest owners and the Corporation is governed by statute, not merely by private contract.5
3. The delay in claiming relief could not be a bar, as statutory obligations cannot be defeated by laches, especially in cases involving public law.
4. The judgments in Ishwar Dutt and Ashok Pal Sen were applicable to all similarly situated persons, and were not restricted to individual litigants, based on the doctrine of merger and binding effect of precedents under Article
141.
5. Denying the appellant similar relief as in afore cases is violated Article 14 of the Constitution."
10. In view of findings detailed hereinabove, learned Single Judge quashed the rejection letters dated 20.12.2011 and 21.03.2012 and directed the Corporation to calculate and disburse the payment to respondent No. 1 in terms of agreement dated 08.02.1995 on economic basis i.e. as per the Notification of 1991, within four weeks. Besides above, Court also held that respondent No. 1, Rajeev Chauhan, was held entitled to 60% per annum on the calculated amount, in line with the precedent in Ashok Pal Sen's case. In the afore background, appellants have approached this Court in the instant LPA, praying therein for the following main relief:
"(i) It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that the present appeal may kindly be allowed and the order of the learned Single Judge dated 19-09-2016 in the above CWP, may kindly be quashed and set aside in the interest of justice and fair play."
11. Precisely, the grouse of the appellant-Corporation, as has been highlighted in the grounds of appeal and further canvassed by Mr. D.S.Kainthala, learned counsel representing the petitioner, is that 6 learned Single Judge erroneously overlooked the fact that respondent No. 1 for the first time represented on 20.11.2011 and lastly on 02.02.2012 for extending the benefits as were rendered to the Ashok Pal Sen in his case by Hon'ble Apex Court, whereas agreement, upon which subsequently payment came to be made, was entered upon inter se parties in the year 1995. Mr. Kainthala, strenuously argued that claim being hopelessly time barred, ought not to have been allowed, rather should have been rejected on the ground of delay and laches. He further submitted that learned Single Judge has further erred by allowing the interest on the payment from the date, when the payment fell due ignoring the arguments that same has to be allowed from the date, when the petitioner has filed the petition. He further submitted that agreement executed between respondent No. 1, Rajeev Chauhan and appellant-Corporation in 1995 was governed by the Pricing Committee decision taken in its meeting held on 01.03.1994 and as such, decision to make the payment on the basis of notification dated 03.04.1991 is erroneous and cannot be sustained. He further submitted that impugned order, if implemented, shall have cascading impact in the similar claims being made by other similar situated persons. Lastly, Mr. Kainthala, submitted that learned Single Judge has not appreciated the law as well as facts on record and thus has arrived at a wrong conclusion.
12. To the contrary, Mr. Nitin Thakur, learned counsel for respondent No. 1, supported the impugned judgment. He submitted that all the grounds raised at the behest of the respondent No. 1 have 7 been duly answered by learned Single Judge and as such, present appeal being totally devoid of merit deserves dismissal.
13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record, this Court finds that it is not in dispute that validity of notification dated 03.04.1991, which regulated the manner in which payments were required to be made to the owners of the private forest, whose forest produce was purchased by HP State Forest Corporation, was upheld by Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, vide judgment dated 18.12.1996 passed in Ishwar Dutt (supra). It is also not in dispute that following the Ishwar Dutt judgment supra, the issue resurfaced in Ashok Pal Sen (supra) in CWP No. 900 of 2000 decided on 05.01.2024, wherein the High Court held that the petitioner therein, who sold forest produce during 1994-95, was entitled to payment based on Notification of 1991. Aforesaid judgment was upheld upto Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 531 of 2005. Though attempt was made at the behest of respondents to get aforesaid judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court reviewed, but such endeavour made by the appellant-Corporation did not yield desired result, rather Review Petition was dismissed on 25.08.2011.
14. Having taken note of fact that respondent No. 1 had entered into the agreement dated 08.02.1995 with the Corporation for the sale of forest produce and under the said agreement, respondent No. 1 was entitled to 50% of the basic rate calculated on royalty basis, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the learned Single Judge, while passing impugned judgment, especially when it is not in 8 dispute that no fresh Notification under Sections 6 & 7 of the Act was ever issued by the State for that financial year.
15. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of Act which itself provides that owner of the forest produce grown over private land shall be under an obligation to sell the same only to the State Government or its agent. As per Act, State/its agent is to compensate the owner by making payment of the forest produce. All such payments are regulated by and are required to be made in consonance with the statutory provisions. Most importantly, relationship between the parties is governed by and under the Statute and not the contract alone. Notification of 1991 categorically provides for grant of benefit of higher price to the owner of the produce and same is notwithstanding the agreement having entered into between the parties. Section 7 of the Act enables State to issue notification, prescribing a system to determine the price of forest produce sold by private owners. Notification is issued with a view that forest owners are provided higher of two rates, the royalty rate or the economic rate, which was greater. Since in the case at hand, no notification, in terms of Section 7 of the Act, was issued after 1999 and validity of afore notification was upheld in Ishwar Dutt and Ashok Pal Sen (supra), no illegality can be said to have been committed by learned Single Judge, while upholding the statutory nature of the 1991 Notification, which overrides the contractual terms agreed between the parties. Since notification in terms of Section 7 of the Act prescribes a system to determine the price of forest produce sold by private owners and after issuance of Notification of 1991, no such notification was ever issued. Department, 9 taking note of agreement dated 08.02.1995 entered into between the Appellant-Corporation and respondent No. 1 for sale of forest produce, ought to have placed reliance upon the Notification of 1991, which otherwise never came to be withdrawn or superseded. Statutory nature of 1991 Notification overrides the contractual term between the parties, if it is so, notification in question itself provides for grant of benefit of higher price to the owner of the produce and this is notwithstanding the agreement having entered into between the parties.
16. Deprivation of statutory claim is nothing but an infringement of a constitutional right. When the State deprives the citizens of their properties that too without adequate compensation, it is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Hon'ble Apex Court, in Tukaram Kana Joshi and others vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and others, (2013) 1 SCC 353, which has been otherwise relied upon by the learned Single Judge, categorically held and clarified that even after cessation of right of property as a fundamental right, acquiring the property of a citizen most certainly tantamounts to deprivation and such deprivation can take place only in accordance with "law".
17. As has been noticed hereinabove that Act itself provides for mutually binding reciprocal obligations upon the parties. (i) Owner of the forest produce grown over private land is under an obligation to sell the same only to the State Government or its agent; (ii) Equally the State/its agent is to compensate the owner by making payment of the produce. All such payments are regulated by and are required to be made in consonance with the statutory provisions. Significantly 10 relationship between the parties is governed by and under the Statute and not the contract alone. Section 7 of the Act provides for issuance of notification regulating the manner in which the payments are/were required to be made to the owner of the private forest, whose forest produce was purchased by HP State Corporation. As per judgment taken note hereinabove, right to property is not only to be considered as a constitutional or a statutory right, but also a human right. Since it is not in dispute that in terms of agreement dated 08.02.1995 respondent No. 1 sold forest produce to the appellant-Corporation, his rightful claim of payment cannot be permitted to be defeated on the ground as have been taken note in the instant proceedings. Though learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation repeatedly argued that agreement entered inter se appellant-Corporation and respondent No. 1 was governed by the decision of the Pricing Committee taken in its meeting held on 01.03.1994, but such decision never came to be placed on file. Even if it is presumed that Pricing Committee had taken some decision in its meeting held on 01.03.1994 that would not make any difference on account of fact that as per Section 7 of the Act, State Government shall prescribe a system to determine the price of forest produce sold by private owners and by way of afore notification, it shall also be ensured that forest owners are given higher of two rates, the royalty rate or the economic rate, which was greater.
18. In the case at hand, notification dated 03.04.1991, in terms of Section 7 of the Act, came to be issued for prescribing rate. Once the statutory Notification of 1991 was issued prescribing the rates, any decision, including that of the Pricing Committee meeting 11 held on 01.03.1994, could not override the rates fixed by the Notification dated 03.04.1991. Similarly, this Court is of the view that rightful claim of the respondent No.1 cannot be defeated on the ground of delay and laches, especially when, right to have payment flows from such notification dated 03.04.1991 issued by the respondent. Factum with regard to relationship inter se parties, which is otherwise governed by Statute/Subordinate Legislation in the shape of notification is not in dispute. Similarly, there is no dispute that forest produce came to be sold by respondent No. 1 to the appellant-Corporation, if it is so, Government/its agent is otherwise under an obligation to pay the amount to the owner of the forest produce in terms of notification dated 03.04.1991. Failure to comply with the statutory notifications, cannot come in the way of the rightful claimant, in having his produce sold at marketable rates. Most importantly, in the case at hand, acquisition of forest produce is by force of law, leaving the owner no choice but to perforce sell it to the State Government/its agent. There is a corresponding obligation cast upon the State/its agent to pay the amount in terms of the Statute, if it is so, State otherwise being welfare State cannot be permitted to defeat the rightful claim of the respondent No. 1, especially when factum with regard to sale of forest produce made by respondent No. 1 to appellant-Corporation is not in dispute.
19. Otherwise also, this Court finds that though till year 1991 there was no dispute with regard to mode and manner in which payment was to be paid qua forest produce sold to the appellant- Corporation. Since it is not in dispute that after 1991, neither new notification was issued in terms of Section 7 of the Act nor Notification 12 of 1991 was withdrawn, coupled with the fact that validity of Notification of 1991 was upheld in Ishwar Dutt and Ashok Pal Sen (supra) upto Hon'ble Apex Court, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the respondents, while allowing the petition filed by the respondent No. 1. It is not in dispute that in the year 1996 and 2000 itself this Court had settled the issue of rights and obligation of the State, but yet appellant-Corporation took the matter to Hon'ble Apex Court, which ultimately came to be decided on 02.12.2010 with the dismissal of Civil Appeal filed by the appellant-Corporation. Soon immediately after dismissal of Review Petition by the Hon'ble Apex Court on 25.08.2011, respondent No. 1 agitated the issue in terms of communication dated 30.11.2011, if it is so, otherwise claim put-forth by the respondent No. 1 cannot be said to be barred by delay and laches. Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court in catena of cases have held that claim for enforcement of the fundamental right cannot be refused solely on the ground of delay and laches.
20. Learned Deputy Advocate General placed heavy reliance upon State of Maharashtra v. Digamber¸(1995) 4 SCC 683, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court held that the claim being highly stale, deserves outright rejection. Learned Deputy Advocate General also invited attention of this court to the decision rendered by this Court in Shankar Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh, CWP No. 1966 of 2010, to argue that otherwise the appropriate remedy for the writ petitioner is to approach civil court by filing a civil suit and not by way of Civil Writ Petition.
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21. To the contrary, learned counsel for the writ petitioner supported the impugned judgment. While making this court peruse decision rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2020) 2 SCC 569, and Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2022) 7 SCC 508, learned counsel for the writ petitioner argued that plea of delay and laches cannot be raised in the case of continuing cause of action, especially in the matters of land acquisition.
22. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record vis-à-vis reasoning assigned in impugned judgment by learned Single Judge, there appears to be no illegality therein. Learned Single Judge of this court, having taken note of the fact that the forest produce of petitioner was purchased by the appellant-Corporation, proceeded to direct the appellant-Corporation to calculate the value of forest produce sold by respondent No. 1 in terms of agreement dated 08.02.1995 in accordance with notification dated 03.04.1991.
23. Since it is not in dispute that the land of the writ petitioner stands utilized for the construction of road, plea of delay and laches may not be applicable in view of Vidya Devi and Sukh Dutt Ratra, supra, wherein it has been held that delay and laches cannot be raised in case of continuing cause of action or when the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the court, it can condone the delay to do substantial justice. Hon'ble Apex Court in the decisions supra held that condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of 14 a case and it will depend upon the fundamental rights and remedy claimed and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their Constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. It would be apt to take note of following paras of Vidya Devi, supra:
"10.1. The Appellant was forcibly expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property 1, which could not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair compensation.
10.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right 2 in a welfare State, and a Constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Article 300 A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300 A, can be inferred in that Article.
To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, wherein this Court held that:
" 6. ... Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of "eminent domain" may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid." (emphasis supplied) In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, this Court held that:15
"21. If the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed." (emphasis supplied) In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U.P.& Ors., this Court recognized the right to property as a basic human right in the following words:
"30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property."Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist" was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists." (emphasis supplied) In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat this Court held as follows :
"48. ...In other words, Article 300A only limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation." (emphasis supplied) 10.3. In this case, the Appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without following due process of law, and depriving her payment of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967.
10.4. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her predecessors had "orally" consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant of her property by the State. 10.5. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors.8 wherein it was held that the 16 State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.
This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multifaceted dimension.
10.6. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, it would tantamount to "adverse" possession. The State being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens, as has been done in the present case.
10.7. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.
In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional Court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it.
In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors., this Court while dealing with a similar fact situation, held as follows :17
"There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the Appellants without any sanction of law. The Appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode." (emphasis supplied)"
24. Bare perusal of aforesaid judgments clearly reveals that plea of delay and laches is not available to the State, especially when it stands proved on record that the petitioner is suffering continuous loss coupled with the fact that he repeatedly requested the authorities to release the payment in terms of notification dated 03.04.1991.
25. Otherwise also, Hon'ble Apex Court in number of judgments has held that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party, who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. If the claim made by the person is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other words, where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate delay. Another argument advanced by learned counsel for the 18 appellant that judgment rendered in Ishwar Dutt and Ashok Pal Sen (supra) is personam in nature and the ratio of law laid down therein is applicable and confined only to those writ petitioner, is wholly tenable and deserves to be rejected being totally devoid of merit. Since Division of this Court as well as Hon'ble Apex Court in cases detailed hereinabove, tested the validity of notification dated 03.04.1991 issued by the appellant-Corporation under Section 7 of the Act, prescribing a system to determine the price of forest produce sold by private owners, coupled with the fact that respondent No. 1 also entered into the agreement dated 08.02.1995 with the Corporation for the sale of forest produce and payment qua the same was to be regulated by afore notification, this Court is not persuaded to agree with learned counsel for the appellant that judgment passed in afore cases have no application in the case at hand, rather same are fully binding and applicable in the case at hand.
26. Leaving everything aside, since Division Bench of this Court, while deciding Ashok Pal Sen (supra), wherein admittedly petitioner had sold forest produce during 1995 in terms of agreement dated 08.02.1995, held him entitled to payment based on the Notification of 1991, petitioner herein, who also entered into agreement dated 08.02.1995 with the Forest Corporation for sale of forest produce, rightly held him entitled to claim payment qua forest produce sold by him to the appellant-Corporation in terms of Notification dated 03.04.1991 i.e. economic criterion.
27. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein above as well as law taken into consideration, we do not find 19 any illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment passed by learned Single Judge, which is based upon proper appreciation of facts as well as law, as such, same is upheld. Accordingly, present appeal fails and dismissed alongwith pending applications, if any.
(Vivek Singh Thakur) Judge (Sandeep Sharma) Judge June , 2025 sunil