Allahabad High Court
Virendra Goel vs U.O.I. Thru. Directorate Of ... on 22 January, 2020
Author: Dinesh Kumar Singh
Bench: Dinesh Kumar Singh
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH A.F.R. Court No. 13 Case :- U/S 482/378/407 No. - 61 of 2020 Applicant :- Virendra Goel Opposite Party :- U.O.I. Thru. Directorate Of Enforcement, P.M.L. Act Counsel for Applicant :- Anuuj Taandon,Purnendu Chakravarty Counsel for Opposite Party :- A.S.G.,Shiv P. Shukla Hon'ble Dinesh Kumar Singh,J.
1. This petition under Sections 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been filed, impugning the order dated 12th November, 2019 passed by the Sessions Judge/Special Judge, PMLA, Lucknow on applications filed by the petitioner and other co-accused for allowing them to furnish bonds to the satisfaction of the PMLA Court in Complaint Case No. 9 of 2017 instead of taking them in custody and dealing with their bail applications etc.
2. The petitioner and other co-accused had been summoned for 29.01.2018 by the Court for appearance and participation in trial for offences under Section ¾ of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the ''PML Act'). The petitioner and other co-accused did not appear in person on 29.01.2018 in compliance of summoning order before the Court, however, their counsels appeared on the date fixed, and sought sometime to file applications necessary for putting appearance and furnishing bonds etc. on the ground that the petitioner and other co-accused were already released on bail in schedule offence(s), and they had not misused the liberty.
It was further contended that the Enforcement Directorate did not arrest the petitioner during the investigation under Section 19 PML Act. It was also contended that the trial of schedule offence(s) as well as offence(s) under PML Act should be jointly conducted by the Court as provided under the provisions of Section 44(1)(C) PML Act. The Special Court, however, vide order dated 29th January, 2018 did not grant any relief, as prayed for, and issued non-bailable warrants against the petitioner and other accused.
3. The petitioner, instead of appearing before the Special Court, approached this Court by way of filing Petition No. 509 of 2018 under Section 482 CrPC, praying therein that the proceedings of Complaint Case No. 9 of 2017 initiated by the Enforcement Directorate before the Special Judge, PMLA/Sessions Judge, Lucknow be quashed, and secondly that the petitioner should be directed to furnish personal bond to the satisfaction of the Court concerned in the aforesaid complaint case, and the Court be directed to accept the same. However, during the course of arguments, the first prayer was not pressed.
4. This Court, vide order dated 13th February, 2018, without expressing its opinion on merit of the case, disposed of the said 482 petition, providing the petitioner to move an application before the learned Special Judge, PMLA through counsel within a week under Section 88 CrPC read with Section 45 PML Act, and, it was provided that the learned Special Judge should deal with the application strictly in accordance with law.
It was further provided that till the decision on the said application, non-bailable warrant issued against the petitioner vide order dated 29th January, 2018 would not be given effect to.
5. Pursuant to the aforesaid opportunity granted by this Court, the petitioner and other co-accused moved applications before the Special Judge, PMLA, Lucknow, praying therein that the Special Court should accept the bonds or personal bonds under the provisions of Section 88 CrPC read with Section 45 PML Act.
6. The Sessions Judge/Special Judge, PMLA, vide impugned order dated 12th November, 2019 has dismissed the applications filed by the petitioner and other co-accused in the light of judgment dated 23rd March, 2006 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Criminal Misc. Application No.8810 of 1989 ''Babu Lal and others Vs. Smt. Momina Begum' and Criminal Misc. Application No.8811 of 1989 ''Parasnath Dubey and others Vs. State of U.P. and others'. This Court had issued Circular Letter No.33 of 2006 dated 7thAugust, 2006, circulating the judgment dated 23rd March, 2006 for its strict compliance. The relevant portion of the judgment dated 23rd March, 2006, which is contained in the Circular Letter No. 33 of 2006 dated 7th August, 2006 has been reproduced by the learned Special Judge in the impugned order.
7. The Division Bench of this Court, in the aforesaid judgment, had held that in cases which were governed by Sections 436 and 437 CrPC, the provisions of Section 88 CrPC would not be applicable for the reason that Section 436 and 437 CrPC are specific provisions which deal with particular kind of cases, whereas scope of Section 88 CrPC is much wider. The case, in which Section 436 CrPC is applicable, an accused has to appear before the Court, and thereafter, only the question of granting bail would arise. It had been further held that where summon or warrant to an accused was issued, the procedure under Section 436 and 437 CrPC would be necessarily followed, and summon or warrant, as the case may be, had to be executed and honoured.
8. The learned Special Judge, PMLA, in the impugned order has further held that the cases relating to schedule offence(s) and offence(s) under PML Act are mutually exclusive and, therefore, the benefit given in schedule offence(s) cannot be extended to the offence(s) of money laundering. The Special Judge has, thus, rejected the applications filed by the petitioner and other co-accused.
9. The proceedings of Complaint Case No. 9 of 2017 pending before the Special Judge, PMLA, Lucknow relates to a mega scam of several hundred crores known as National Rural Health Mission (hereinafter referred to as "NRHM") scam in Uttar Pradesh.
10 Allegation, against the petitioner and other co accused, is that they were involved a criminal conspiracy and in furtherance thereto they misappropriated an amount of Rs. 2.94 Crores approximately in supplying computers and peripherals by M/s HCL Infosystems Limited, Lucknow to NRHM.
11. The CBI had registered an FIR on 2nd January, 2012 under Sections 120-B and 409 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ''PC Act') against the petitioner and other co-accused. The FIR was registered by the CBI in compliance of the order dated 15th November, 2011 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 3611 (M/B) of 2011 (PIL) and connected Writ Petition No.2647 (M/B) of 2011 (PIL).
12. In sum and substance, allegations are that Mr. G.K. Batra, the then Managing Director, Shreetron India Limited, Lucknow, a subsidiary of U.P. Electronic Corporation Limited (a State Government Undertaking), Mr. Virendra Goel, the present accused, proprietor of M/s Axis Marketing, New Delhi, Mr. Neeraj Upadhyay, Proprietor of M/s Radhey Shyam Enterprises, Lucknow and Mr. Avichal Mishra, Executive of M/s HCL Infosystems Limited, Lucknow and other unknown persons entered into a criminal conspiracy and in furtherance thereto misappropriated an amount of Rs.2.94 Crores by showing undue favours to private firms.
13. In pursuance of the tendered notice, three firms viz. M/s HCL Infosystems Limited, Lucknow, M/s Axis Marketing, New Delhi and M/s Radhey Shyam Enterprises, Lucknow submitted their bids, which were opened on 7th August, 2009. The lowest bidder was M/s HCL Infosystems Limited, Lucknow and, thus, the work of supplying computers and peripherals was given to M/s HCL Infosystems Limited, Lucknow. Strangely enough, after getting the order for supplying the computers and peripherals, the HCL Infosystems Limited, Lucknow informed that supply would be made through M/s Axis Marketing, New Delhi and M/s Radhey Shyam Enterprises, Lucknow, and both the firms would supply 50% each of the items. Shreetron India Limited made the total payment of Rs.7.49 Crores to M/s Axis Marketing, New Delhi and M/s Radhey Shyam Enterprises, Lucknow. However, the said two firms made payment of only Rs.4.55 Crores to M/s HCL Infosystems Limited and they, caused a pecuniary loss of Rs.2.94 Crores to the NRHM scheme. These accused had misappropriated balance amount of Rs.2.94 Crores.
14. Investigation under the provisions of PML Act was undertaken by Enforcement Directorate vide order dated 14th April, 2012 to investigate the offence of money laundering with reference to predicate offence(s) initiated vide FIR dated 2nd January, 2012 registered by the CBI in which the CBI had filed charge-sheet against four accused.
15. The investigation under the PML Act pertained to generation of proceeds of crime by causing wrongful loss of Central Government funds allotted under the National Rural Health Mission Scheme in supply of 951 computers and peripherals through M/s Shreetron India Limited at an exorbitant price. The investigation under the PML Act has revealed that a sum of Rs.1,29,21,903/-, which is the ''proceeds of crime' in terms of Section 2(1)(u) o PML Act, was in possession of Mr. V.K. Batra, son of Late G.K. Batra, Mr. Virendra Goel, Smt. Nidhi Upadhyay, wife of Mr. Neeraj Upadhyay and Mr. Neeraj Upadhyay.
16. The assets acquired by the aforesaid persons from the "proceeds of crime" were attached vide order dated 15thJanuary, 2015.
17. After investigation, a complaint case was filed, which is Complaint Case No. 9 of 2017 pending before the Sessions Judge/Special Judge, PMLA, Lucknow.
18. Heard Mr. Purnendu Chakravarty, learned counsel representing the petitioner, as well as Mr. Shiv P. Shukla, learned counsel representing the respondents.
19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that Section 45 PML Act provides for release of an accused on bail or on his own bond. The release of any accused on bond has been incorporated under section 45 of the PML Act because if the accused would be on bail in the schedule offence(s) and, the complaint by the Enforcement Directorate is filed under the PML Act in respect of the same predicate offence, no purpose would be served in sending the accused in custody for offences under PML Act and, under these circumstances the accused should be released on bond. He has submitted that circumstance for release on bond under Section 45 PML Act would be that if the Enforcement Directorate did not arrest the accused under Section 19 PML Act during the course of investigation and in the predicate offence(s) accused is on bail, then the accused should be released on bond inasmuch as custody of the accused would not be required during trial and, therefore, no purpose would be served by sending the accused in jail and, then he would be required to apply for regular bail. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the following judgments in support of his contentions:-
i) Pankaj Jain Vs. Union of India and another, 2018 (5) SCC 743;
ii) Arun Sharma Vs. Union of India, 2016 SCC Online P&H 5954;
iii) Madhu Limaye and another Vs. Ved Murti and others, 1971 AIR 2486;
Besides, Nikesh Tarachand Shah Vs. Union of India and another (2018) 11 SCC Page-1.
20. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that as per Section 44 (1)(C) PML Act trials of cases in relation of predicate offence(s) and offence(s) under the PML Act are to be conducted by the same Court.
21. Per contra, Mr. Shiv P. Shukla, learned counsel appearing for the Enforcement Directorate, has submitted that the offence(s) under the PML Act are cognizable and non-bailable. He has submitted that a person, who is facing trial for non-bailable offence(s), cannot be released on furnishing bond. The learned counsel has further submitted that the judgment of the Punjab-Haryana High Court in Arun Sharma Vs. Union of India has been held to be not correctly decided by the Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of Pankaj Jain Vs. Union of India and another (supra).
22. The learned counsel for the Enforcement Directorate has further submitted that Section 88 CrPC confers discretion on the Presiding Officer of the Court. Section 88 CrPC does not confer any enforceable right to an accused that he must be released on furnishing bond. The predicate/schedule offence(s) and offence(s) under the PML Act are mutually exclusive. An accused does not become entitled automatically to be released on furnishing bond if the Court has granted him bail in schedule offence(s). Further Section 44 PML Act provides for transfer of trial of case under predicate offence to the Court of Special Judge on an application by the prosecution. It does not give any right to the accused to ask for transfer of the case under predicate offence(s) before the Special Judge. It is for the prosecution to decide whether it would be appropriate, convenient and in the interest of justice that the trial of schedule offence(s) and offence(s) under PML Act should be held by the same Court or not. The learned counsel has further submitted that the fact that the petitioner had been granted bail in the predicate offences by the concerned Court, and he was not arrested under Section 19 PML Act during the course of investigation would be the circumstances to be considered while deciding the bail application, but these factors do not confer a right to an accused to be released on furnishing bond or he should be allowed to furnish bond.
23. I have considered the submissions advanced by the counsels representing the respective parties and perused the record.
24. The question, which falls for consideration, is whether an accused facing trial for offences under the provisions of Section ¾ PML Act is entitled to be released on furnishing bond under Section 45 PML Act read with Section 88 Code of Criminal Procedure if he has been granted bail in the predicate/schedule offence(s) and, he was not arrested under Section 19 PML Act during the course of investigation by the Enforcement Directorate. Section 45 PML Act provides that the offences under the PML Act are cognizable and non-bailable.
25. The Supreme Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah Vs. Union of India's case (supra) had struck down the two conditions mentioned in section 45 for grant of bail i.e. the Public Prosecutor has to be given an opportunity to oppose an application for release on bail and the Court must be satisfied where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence(s) and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Para-54 of the aforesaid judgment, on reproduction, reads as under:-
"54. Regard being had to the above, we declare Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, insofar as it imposes two further conditions for release on bail, to be unconstitutional as it violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. All the matters before us in which bail has been denied, because of the presence of the twin conditions contained in Section 45, will now go back to the respective courts, which denied bail. All such orders are set aside, and the cases remanded to the respective courts to be heard on merits, without application of the twin conditions contained in Section 45 of the 2002 Act. Considering that the persons are languishing in jail and that personal liberty is involved, all these matters are to be taken up at the earliest by the respective courts for fresh decision. The writ petitions and the appeals are disposed of accordingly."
The aforesaid decision has no bearing to the controversy involved in the present case.
26. Section 45 PML Act of post decision in Nikesh Tarachand Shah reads as under:-
"45. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable.--(1) [Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no person accused of an offence 107 [under this Act] shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless--]
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail:
Provided that a person, who, is under the age of sixteen years, or is a woman or is sick or infirm [or is accused either on his own or along with other co-accused of money-laundering a sum of less than one crore rupees], may be released on bail, if the Special Court so directs:
Provided further that the Special Court shall not take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 4 except upon a complaint in writing made by--
(i) the Director; or
(ii) any officer of the Central Government or a State Government authorised in writing in this behalf by the Central Government by a general or special order made in this behalf by that Government.
[(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other provision of this Act, no police officer shall investigate into an offence under this Act unless specifically authorised, by the Central Government by a general or special order, and, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed.] (2) The limitation on granting of bail specified in [* * *] sub-section (1) is in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.
[Explanation.--For the removal of doubts, it is clarified that the expression "Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable" shall mean and shall be deemed to have always meant that all offences under this Act shall be cognizable offences and non-bailable offences notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and accordingly the officers authorised under this Act are empowered to arrest an accused without warrant, subject to the fulfilment of conditions under Section 19 and subject to the conditions enshrined under this section.]"
27. Section 46 PML Act provides that the provisions of CrPC, including the provisions as to the bails or bonds, shall apply to the proceedings before Special Court and for the purposes of such provisions, the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Session. Section 65 PML Act further provides that the provisions of CrPC shall apply in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, in arrest, search, seizure, attachment, confiscation, investigation and prosecution and all other proceedings under this Act. Thus, from a conjoint reading of Section 45, 46 and 65 PML Act, it is clear that the provisions of the CrPC would be applicable in the proceedings before the Special Court, including the provisions of bails or bonds and also would be applicable in respect of arrest, search, seizure, attachment, confiscation, investigation and prosecution and all other proceedings under this Act. Thus, the provisions of CrPC have been made applicable even in respect of granting bail or furnishing bond, as the case may be. The application of an accused in the case relating to PML Act has to be considered in accordance with the provisions contained in this regard in the CrPC. Section 88 CrPC reads as under:-
"Section 88. Power to take bond for appearance. When any person for whose appearance or arrest the officer presiding in any Court is empowered to issue a summons or warrant, is present in such Court, such officer may require such person to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for his appearance in such Court, or any other Court to which the case may be transferred for trial."
28. The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider Section 91 of CrPC, 1898 similar to provisions of Section 88 new Code of 1973 in Madhu Limaye and another Vs. Ved Murti and others (supra) 1970 (3) SCC 739. The following observations were made in context of Section 91:-
".....................In fact section 91 applies to a person who is present in Court and is free because it speaks of his being bound over, to appear on another day before the Court. That shows that the person must be a "free agent" whether to appear or not. If the person is already under arrest and in custody, as were the petitioners, their appearances depended not on their own volition, but on the volition of the person, who had his custody............. ."
29. The Punjab-Haryana High Court in Arun Sharma Vs. Union of India, relying on the said observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Limaye and another, has held that in a situation where the accused were not arrested under Section 19 of the PML Act during the course of investigation and were not produced in custody for taking cognizance, Section 88 CrPC shall apply upon appearance of the accused person on their own volition before the trial Court to furnish bonds for their appearance.
30. A person, who has been issued summon or warrant to appear before the Court, cannot be said to be a ''free agent'. The Supreme Court in Pankaj Jain Vs. Union of India and another (supra) has dealt with the judgment of the Punjab-Haryana High Court in paras-27 to 29, and in para-29 it has held as under:-
"29. In the Punjab & Haryana case, the High Court has relied on judgment of this Court in Madhu Limaye v. Ved Murti [Madhu Limaye v. Ved Murti, (1970) 3 SCC 739] and held that Section 88 shall be applicable since accused were not arrested under Section 19 of PMLA during investigation and were not taken into custody for taking cognizance. What the Punjab & Haryana High Court missed, is that this Court in the same paragraph had observed "that shows that the person must be a free agent whether to appear or not". When the accused was issued warrant of arrest to appear in the court and proceeding under Sections 82 and 83 CrPC has been initiated, he cannot be held to be a free agent to appear or not to appear in the court. We thus are of the view that the Punjab & Haryana High Court has not correctly applied Section 88 in the aforesaid case."
31. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment has also held that the words used in Section 88 confer a discretion on the Court concerned whether to accept bond from the accused or from a person appearing in the Court or not. This Section does not confer any right on the accused to enforce for accepting the bond. Thus, since the judgment of the Punjab-Haryana High Court in Arun Sharma, (supra) does not lay down correct law, the petitioner ca not claim benefit of the same. A person accused of the offences under Section 3/4 PML Act, has been issued summon or warrant to appear before the Court, is not a ''free agent', and mere fact that he has been granted bail by the Court in predicate/schedule offence(s), and he was not arrested by the Enforcement Directorate under Section 19 during the course of investigation are only factors to be considered at the time of considering the bail application of the accused by the PMLA Court, but it would not be correct to say that he is a "free agent" and, therefore, his bond should be accepted and he is not required to apply for regular bail.
32. Provisions to bail and bond are provided in Chapter-XXXIII of the Cr.P.C. The special provisions contained in Chapter-XXXIII of the Code cannot be made to rendered otiose by interpreting general provision of Section 88 of the Code. When a person is accused of cognizable and non-bailable offence, his bail application has to be dealt with the provisions contained in Chapter XIII of the Code. The Supreme Court in Pankaj Jain Vs. Union of India (supra) in paras-24 and 25 has approvingly quoted the judgments of Delhi High Court in Sanjay Chandra Vs. CBI, 2011 OnLine Del 2365 and Patna High Court in Anand Deo Singh Vs. State of Bihar, 2000 SCC OnLine Pat 311, which are reproduced hereunder:-
"24. Another judgment of the Delhi High Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI [SanjayChandra v. CBI, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 2365] decided on 23-5-2011 supports the submission raised by the learned Additional Solicitor General that power under Section 88 CrPC, the word "may" used in Section 88 CrPC is not mandatory and is a matter of judicial discretion. Paras 20, 21 and 22 of the judgment are to the following effect: (SCC OnLine Del) "20. Learned Shri Ram Jethmalani and learned Shri K.T.S. Tulsi, Senior Advocates appearing for accused Sanjay Chandra, learned Shri Mukul Rohatgi, Senior Advocate appearing for accused Vinod Goenka, learned Shri Soli Sorabjee and learned Shri Ranjit Kumar, Senior Advocates appearing for accused Gautam Doshi, learned Shri Rajiv Nayar, Senior Advocate appearing for accused Hari Nair and learned Shri Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Senior Advocate appearing for accused Surendra Pipara, at the outset, have contended that the order of learned Special Judge dated 20-4-2011 rejecting the bail of the petitioners is violative of the mandate of Section 88 CrPC. It is contended that admittedly the petitioners were neither arrested during investigation nor were they produced in custody along with the charge-sheet as envisaged under Section 170 CrPC. Therefore, the trial court was supposed to release the petitioners on bail by seeking bonds with or without sureties in view of Section 88 CrPC. Thus, it is urged that on this count alone, the petitioners are entitled to bail.
21. The interpretation sought to be given by the petitioners is misconceived and based upon incorrect reading of Section 88 CrPC, which is reproduced thus:
''88. Power to take bond for appearance.--When any person for whose appearance or arrest the officer presiding in any court is empowered to issue a summons or warrant, is present in such court, such officer may require such person to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for his appearance in such court, or any other court to which the case may be transferred for trial.'
22. On reading of the above, it is obvious that Section 88 CrPC empowers the court to seek bond for appearance from any person present in the court in exercise of its judicial discretion. The section also provides that aforesaid power is not unrestricted and it can be exercised only against such persons for whose appearance or arrest the court is empowered to issue summons or warrants. The words used in the section are "may require such person to execute a bond" and any person present in the court. The user of word "may" signifies that Section 88 CrPC is not mandatory and it is a matter of judicial discretion of the court. The word "any person" signifies that the power of the court defined under Section 88 CrPC is not accused specific only, but it can be exercised against other category of persons such as the witness whose presence the court may deem necessary for the purpose of inquiry or trial. Careful reading of Section 88 CrPC makes it evident that it is a general provision defining the power of the court, but it does not provide how and in what manner this discretionary power is to be exercised. The petitioners are accused of having committed non-bailable offences. Therefore, their case for bail falls within Section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is the specific provision dealing with grant of bail to an accused in cases of non-bailable offences. Thus, on conjoint reading of Sections 88 and 437 CrPC, it is obvious that Section 88 CrPC is not an independent section and it is subject to Section 437 CrPC. Therefore, I do not find merit in the contention that order of the learned Special Judge refusing bail to the petitioners is illegal being violative of Section 88 CrPC."
25. Another judgment which is relevant in this context is the judgment of the Patna High Court in Anand Deo Singh v. State of Bihar [Anand Deo Singh v. State of Bihar, 2000 SCC OnLine Pat 311 : (2000) 2 PLJR 686] . The Patna High Court had the occasion to consider Section 88 CrPC where in para 18, following has been held: (SCC OnLine Pat) "18. In my considered view, Section 88 of the Code is an enabling provision, which vests a discretion in the Magistrate to exercise power under the said section asking the person to execute a bond for appearance only in bailable cases or in trivial cases and it cannot be resorted to in cases of serious offences. Section 436 of the Code itself provides that bond may be asked for only in cases of bailable offences."
33. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I do not find that the learned Special Judge has committed any error in passing the impugned order and rejecting the applications of the petitioner and other co-accused for releasing them on furnishing bonds. The accused are not ''free agents' as they were issued summon for appearance on 29th January, 2018 and when they did not appear, they had been issued non-bailable warrants vide order dated 29th November, 2018. The accused are trying to delay the trial and, therefore, it is provided that the Special Judge, PMLA, Lucknow should take all necessary steps for their appearance before the Court and early conclusion of the trial.
34. This petition stands dismissed.
35. Let a copy of this order be transmitted to the Sessions Judge/Special Judge, PMLA, Lucknow forthwith.
[D.K. Singh,J.] Order Date:22.01.2020 MVS/-