Punjab-Haryana High Court
Ram Singh And Ors. vs Joint Director Panchayats And Ors. on 22 December, 1989
Equivalent citations: (1991)99PLR29
JUDGMENT N.C. Jain, J.
1. This judgment of mine will dispose of Civil Writ Petitions No. 3526, 3634 to 3644, 3649, 3908 of 1987, 5210 and 5607 of 1989 as the point involved in all of them is the same. Both the counsel for the parties are agreed that the fact of the case be picked up from Civil Writ Petition No. 3634 of 1987.
2. The broad and the basic facts of the case as they emerge from the writ petition and the application for ejectment are that the Gram Panchayat, respondent No. 3 filed an application before the Divisional Deputy Director, Rural Development and Panchayats (exercing the powers of the Collector) (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Collector'), Patiala respondent No. 2, under Section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (hereinafter called 'the Act') on the ground that the land in dispute is 'Shamilat' according to Section 2(g) of the Act and that the petitioners were in unauthorised possession of the same and, therefore, liable to be ejected therefrom. The petitioners claimed that the land was not Shamilat Deh and that it was wrongly shown in the revenue record for the year 1980-81 as Shamilat Deh. The petitioners claimed to be in continuous possesion of the land through their predecessors in-interest from time immemorial, that is before 1949. The land was claimed to be Banjar Qadim Makbooza Malkan. It was further stated that the land was never used for the common purposes of the village community according to entries of the revenue record at the time of the commencement of the Act. The petitioners claimed that they were in possession as Makbooja Mushtarka Malkan for more than 12 years immediately before the commencement of the Act. It was further claimed that the land in dispute was Ghaggar Burdi and Darya Burdi and Ghaggar Baramdgi Darya Baramdgi. It was further the case of the petitioners in the written statement that the mutation after the consolidation of holdings was sanctioned in their favour vide mutation No. 2035 as mentioned in the Jamabandi for the year 1955-56. The authority of Inder Singh Administrator of the Gram Panchayat to file the application for the eviction was challenged on the ground that he was not authorised to file application for the eviction and that no document appointing him as Administrator was filed along with the application.
3. On the basis of above mentioned relevant pleadings in the application and the written statement, copies of which were produced before me at the time of the hearing and which have been marked as Annexures C-l and C-2, the parties led their evidence. After perusing the evidence, the authorities below while passing the order of eviction have by and large based their orders of eviction by recording the finding the gist which is given below :-
(i) that the land in dispute was owned by the Gram Panchayat as it is shown to be Shamilat in the revenue record ;
(ii) that the individual possession of the petitioners in the revenue record is shown after 1971 ;
(iii) that in the jamabandi for the year 1980-81 the petitioners have been shown to be Chakotedar meaning thereby that the petitioners were in possession of the land in dispute as tenants and, therefore, they could not challenge the ownership of Gram Panchayat;
(iv) that the petitioners did dot challenge the ownership of the Gram Panchayat under Section 11 of the Act. The land in dispute was allotted to the Gram Panchayat in lieu of the land which was Shamilat before consolidation of holdings ; and
(v) that the exemption of Burdigi Baramdgi was deleted from the Act in the year 1976.
4. Mr. Sarjit Singh, Senior Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioners in the first instance, has argued that under Rule 16 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Rules, 1964 a Sarpanch, could sue after obtaining authorisation from the Panchayat and that Inder Singh who has alleged himself to be the Administrator of the Gram Panchayat did not place any resolution whereby he was authorised to file an application for eviction of the petitioners. It has been further argued by the counsel that Inder Singh through whom the Gram Panchayat has filed the application for eviction did not place any order by which he was so appointed as Administrator of the Gram Panchayat and therefore, he could not file an application on behalf of the Gram Panchayat. The argument is devoid of any force. It has remained undisputed before this Court that the Gram Panchayat was superseded and an Administrator was appointed to run the affairs of the Gram Panchayat and as such the powers vested in the Gram Panchayat, could be exercised by the Administrator. Moreover, notification dated February 24, 1984 issued by the Punjab Government in its extra ordinary gazette notification of the aforesaid date was shown to this Court during the course of hearing. Since the Gram Panchayat was superseded by the Governor of Punjab and an officer was appointed to as the Administrator of the Gram Panchayat, the question of Inder Singh, Administrator, obtaining resolution from the Panchayat did not arise. Rule 16 of the Rules in the view of this Court would apply only if a Panchayat is in existence and duly constituted by a Sarpanch and other Panches. Wherever Panchayat has been superseded, Rule 16 would not apply in that case. Moreover this objection is only a technical one and the application for eviction cannot, in the view of this Court, be defeated on such a hypertechnical objection.
5. It has been next argued by the counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners had raised the question of title in their written statement and the moment the question of title was raised, the authorities under the Act had no jurisdiction to decide the application under Section 7 of the Act. According to the counsel, the written statement should have been treated to be a suit under Section 11 of the Act, and in the first instance, the question of ownership of the land should have been decided. In other words the contention of the counsel is that the authorities below should have stayed their hands till the question of title was decided. In support of the contention the learned counsel cited Gram Panchayat Deh Mauza Gharhi Brahman v. Kesho Narain and Anr., (1964)66 P.L.R. 518. Sunder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1973 P. L. J. 701. Tara Chand and Fateh Singh v. Gram Panchayat and Gram Sabha and Ors., 1979 P. L. J. 1, and the latest judicial pronouncement of this Court Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (1988-2) 94 P. L. R. 450. These authorities do not have even the slightest application to the facts of the instant case. There is no dispute with the proposition of law laid down in the afore-referred rulings that the question of title has to be decided before ordering the eviction. However, the argument, in my view, is devoid of force. In the first instance it has to be noticed that a perusal of the orders of the authorities below would show that this very precise argument was not pressed into service. The question of title, in fact, has not been raised in the written statement. It has nowhere been stated that the petitioners are the owners of the disputed land and that the Gram Panchayat is not the owner. The learned counsel read before me paragraph 3 of the written statement in reply to paragraph 3 of the application under Section 7 in order to show that the question of title was raised. Paragraph 3 of the written statement reads as under:-
"That para 3 as stated is wrong and hence denied. The respondent/defendants have interest, right title, use and occupation continuously of the suit land. The respondents are in possession of the suit land since 1949 uptill today continuously. Rather, the petitioner applicant has no interest, title or right in the suit land against the respondent."
After perusing the averments made in the written statement, reproduced above, this Court has reached a firm conclusion that the ownership of the Gram Panchayat has not been disputed and that the wording of Section 11 of the Act only has been reproduced without specifically denying that the Gram Panchayat was the owner of the disputed land. The reproduction of the wording of the section would not amount to raising the question of title claiming ouster of jurisdiction of the authority to order eviction. In the view of this Court, the only way to deny the ownership of the Gram Panchayat was that it should have been specifically averred in the written statement that the Gram Panchayat was not the owner and that the petitioners were the owners of the land. This having not been done, the question of the authorities converting the written statement into a suit or staying their hands would not arise.
6. While challenging the findings of the authorities to the effect that the land is Shamilat Deh, the learned counsel has raised primarily two points. It has been contended by him that the Gram Panchayat is not the owner of the land as it is not Shamilat Deh. He further argued that the land was Banjar Qadim and that the land was in the individual possession of She petitioners and, therefore, the same is not Shamilat.
7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the findings recorded and the entire evidence, this Court has reached the conclusion that there is no force in the above mentioned submissions. It is not disputed before this Court that none of the petitioners was in possession of the disputed land in the year 1952-33 and in the year 1960-61. It has further been not disputed before me that in the column of ownership in the Jamabandi for the year 1980-81. Annexure R. 2 the land in dispute has been shown to be owned by the Gram Panchayat. In the Jamabandi for the year 1960-61. Annexure R. 1 the land in dispute is recorded as Shamilat Deh. In view of the above mentioned entries in the Jamabandis, the land has been rightly found to be Shamilat Deh. It has been rightly held by the authorities below that the land is owned by the Gram Panchayat. It has been settled beyond any doubt in a number of judicial pronouncements that all clauses of Section 2(g) of the Act are independent of each other and recourse can be had to any one clause to the exclusion of other clauses. If the land falls in any one of the clause of Section 2(g) of the Act it is sufficient to being the same within the definition of word 'Shamilat Deh' and that no further reference to any other clause is necessary treating the land as Shamilat Deh. In this respect, reference can very well be made to the ratio of law laid down in Tej Ram and Ors. v. Gram Sabha Manakpur and Ors., 1976 P. L. J. 628. The petitioners have not been able to bring their case within any exception of Section 2(g) of the Act. The land has neither been shown to be Banjar Qadim nor the same has been shown to be in the individual possession by the petitioners after effecting partition before the year 1950. In view there of the finding regarding the ownership of the Gram Panchayat which is based upon revenue entries, is unassailable. Similarly, the findings of the authorities below that the question of ownership was not decided by the Additional District Magistrate between the District Industries Officer and the Gram Panchayat is equally not open to any exception. Moreover, the petitioners were not parties to the proceedings before the Additional District Magistrate. The point taken up in the written statement in reply to the application for eviction that the disputed land is not Shamilat Deh as it was subject to river action (Ghaggar Burdi and Darya Burdi and Ghaggar Baramdgi Darya Baramdgi) has rightly not been pressed into service during the course of arguments in view of the deletion of the relevant clause from the Act.
8. No other point was urged.
9. In the light of the observations made above, the writ petition has got no force and the same is consequently ordered to be dismissed with no order as to costs.