Delhi District Court
Harpreet Kaur vs Gaurav Pant on 6 October, 2025
DLND010097132024 Page 1 of 27
Cr Revision 06/2025
Harpreeti Kaur
Vs.
Gaurav Pant
IN THE COURT OF ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-05
NEW DELHI DISTRICT : PATIALA HOUSE COURTS :
NEW DELHI
CRIMINAL REVISION NO. 06 OF 2025
IN THE MATTER OF:
Ms. Harpreet Kaur Chadha
W/o Mr. Samrat Dhawan,
R/o WZ-69, Meenakshi Garden,
New Delhi-110027
... Complainant/Revisionist
Versus
Mr. Gaurav Pant
R/o B-196, B Block,
Sainik Nagar, Uttam Nagar,
New Delhi-110059
... Accused/Respondent
CRIMINAL REVISION UNDER SECTION s. 438, 440 & 441 BNSS
Date of institution : 08.01.2025
Date when judgment reserved : 22.09.2025
Date of Judgment : 06.10.2025
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
1. This revision petition is filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (corresponding to Section 438 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), by the DLND010097132024 Page 2 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025 Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant applicant/revisionist, Ms. Harpreet Kaur Chadha, assailing the order dated 24.05.2024 passed by Learned Metropolitan Magistrate-02, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, in Complaint Case No. 7438/2023 titled "Harpreet Kaur Chadha v. Gaurav Pant & Ors." The revisionist seeks to set aside the impugned order, which rejected her application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for directing the registration of a First Information Report (FIR) and instead took cognizance under Section 200 Cr.P.C., postponing the issuance of process pending a limited inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. through the police to verify the allegations. The revisionist prays for directions to the Station House Officer (SHO)/Investigating Officer (IO) of Police Station Vasant Kunj (North) to register an FIR for alleged cognizable offences under Sections 403, 405/406, 415/416/420, 463/465, and 468 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, involving cheating, criminal breach of trust, forgery, and related crimes. The delay in filing the revision petition is condoned in view of the application for condonation of delay.
FACTS
2. The revisionist, a senior government servant with over 22 years of service, was employed as a Court Master in the office of the Chairperson, Lokpal of India, at the time of the alleged offences [having previously served with the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)]. She alleges that in early 2021, the proposed accused, Mr. Gaurav Pant, approached her within the high-security premises of the Lokpal office, representing himself as an authorized agent of Ashoka Travels and Tours for facilitating Leave Travel Allowance/Concession (LTA/LTC) benefits.
DLND010097132024 Page 3 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant
3. The revisionist claims she was induced to rely on his representations due to:
3.1. his regular ingress and egress in secure government zones, verifiable via CCTV footage;
3.2. positive feedback from over 50 NHRC employees who had availed similar services through him since 2016, as evidenced by a detailed list annexed to the complaint 3.3. his persistent follow-ups within the premises, creating an impression of authenticity.
4. Opting for LTC for the second time in her career, the revisionist agreed to book travel to Andaman & Nicobar Islands for herself and family, transferring Rs. 1,70,000 to the proposed accused's personal bank account rather than directly to Ashoka Travels and Tours. Further, Rs. 30,000/-
was given to proposed accused in cash. She alleges that no valid tickets or services were provided, resulting in misappropriation of funds and commission of cognizable offences primarily because the tickets were of lesser amount, then as mentioned on them. Upon realization, she filed a complaint at Police Station Vasant Kunj (North) on 23.12.2022, seeking FIR registration, followed by multiple reminders via physical visits, written, and oral communications until April/May 2023. No FIR was registered, prompting her to file an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the Learned Magistrate. The police submitted an ATR opining that no cognizable offence was made out, citing the documentary nature of evidence, known identities of parties, and absence of immediate need for full investigation. The Learned Magistrate, vide the impugned order, dismissed the Section 156(3) application, took cognizance under DLND010097132024 Page 4 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025 Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant Section 200 Cr.P.C. to ascertain grounds for proceeding, postponing issuance of process. Aggrieved by this, the revisionist has invoked revisional jurisdiction, reiterating the factual matrix and alleging ongoing harm to her body, mind, reputation, and property.
IMPUGNED ORDER
5. The impugned order dated 24.05.2024, as per the certified copy annexed to the revision petition, is reproduced verbatim below for reference:
".....3. The complainant alleged that she was working as court Master in Lokpal of India, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi, at the time of commission of offence in 2021. The alleged Gaurav Pant who was working as an agent in M/s Ashok Tour & Travels r/o Sainik Nagar, Uttam Nagar approached to the complainant for availing of Leave Travel Concession (LTC) in 2021 & accordingly she planned to avail in the beginning of 2021. The other employees of Lokpal office have also availed LTC through alleged Graurav Pant so there was no reason to doubt. Thereafter, Gaurav Pant facilitated her LTC request by booking air tickets in Indigo Flight and accommodation for her & her family. The complainant paid Rs. 1,20,000/- & 50,000 by cheque and 30,000 cash & total amount Rs. 2,00,000/- was paid. After arrival from LTC tour when she filed re-imbursement-application & dealing by Gaurav hand asked for travel certificate which was handed Pant (Travel Certificate was issued by Air India).
However, her reimbursement was rejected as during audit scruitiny the concerned branch at Lokpal raised the issue of exaggerated claim raised/taken by the complainant and told that Gaurav Pant in not an authorized representative to book LTC-80 for central employees. The alleged Gaurav Pant provided her air tickets on extraordinarily high price as the base fare was not 28,700/- per head and it was merely 16,318. Thereafter, a show cause notice was issued to her & disciplinary action was initiated against her. The complainant has also sent legal notice to the alleged on 22 nd August 2022 but no response was given by the alleged.
4 ATR was filed by IO.
5. Heard. Perused. Considered.
6. Ld. counsel has submitted that there has been misappropriation of the complainant funds by the accused person as after doing due diligence by the complainant, complainant had entrusted her money in good faith to the DLND010097132024 Page 5 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025 Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant accused for the purpose of availing LTC 80. Ld. counsel has submitted that FIR registration is necessary as the evidence disclosed cognizable offence and investigation should be carried out by the investigating agency.
7. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the Judgment of M/S Skipper Beverages Pet. Ltd. Vs. State (2002 Crl.LJNOC 333(Delhi) has held that;
"Section 156 empower Magistrate to direct police to register case and initiate investigation, but his power has to be exercised judiciously and not in mechanical manner. Those cases where the allegations are not very serious and Mahesh the complainant himself is in the possession of evidence to prove allegation, there should be no need to pass order under 156".
7. The Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad in the Judgment of Sukwasi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008 Crl.LJ 472) has held that merely because complainı discloses a cognizable offence, application under section 156(3) CrPC is not bound to be allowed. It is held that, "Application under section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 are now coming in torrents. Provisions under section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 should be used sparingly. They should not be used unless there is extraordinary like something unusual or miscarriage of justice, which warrants a direction the police to register a case. Such applications should not be allowed because the law provides them with an alternative remedy of filing a complaint, therefore recourse should not normally be permitted for availing the Mahesh provisions of section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The reference is, therefore answered in the manner that it is not incumbent upon a Magistrate to allow an application under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and there is no such legal mandate the may or may not allow the application in his discretion."
8. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Ravinder Kumar Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) Anr. [2013 VIII AD(Delhi) 403] has held that:-
"4. Section 156(3) empowers the Magistrate to refer and direct süthe police to investigate the cognizable offence. It is however not necessary to refer every complaint filed under Section 200 to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
5. Remedy under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C is a discretionary one as the provision proceeds with the word"may", The Magistrate is required to exercise his mind while doing so and pass orders only if he is satisfied that the information reveals commission of cognizable offence/ offences and also about necessity of police investigation for digging out of evidence neither in possession of the complainant nor can be procured without the assistance of the police. The complainant, as a matter of right, cannot insist that the complaint case filed by him/her should be directed in every eventually to the police for investigation".DLND010097132024 Page 6 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025
Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant
9. In view of the above discussed facts & circumstances of the case, as alleged by applicant/complainant in her application and considering the nature of offences alleged to have heen committed and in the light of above discussed judgment, this Court is of humble opinion that this is not a fit case for invoking powers under Section 156(3) of Cr.PC and for directing the SHO concerned to register an FIR and conduct investigation for the following reasons:
That the identity of the accused persons are already within the knowledge of the complainant.
The nature of offence is such that all the evidence, if any, are documentary in nature All the incriminating facts are already with in the knowledge of the complainant and there is no requirement of any custodial interrogation of the accused as visible at the stage of filing.
Furthermore, in case police aid is required at any stage, the same can be sought in terms of Section 202 Cr.P.C.
All other material documents, copy of which have been placed on record are in possession of complainant.
10. Accordingly, the court is of the view that there is no need of getting a FIR registered, rather documents are sufficient to take cognizance u/s 200 Cr.PC. Complainant is at liberty to lead her pre-summoning evidence."
(emphasis supplied) GROUNDS OF REVISION
6. The revisionist challenges the impugned order on multiple grounds, as detailed in the petition and as submitted by Ld. Counsel for the revisionist during the course of arguments:
6.1. The order is ex facie patently incorrect, improper, illegal, and vitiated by brazen irregularities, disregarding judicial precedents mandating FIR registration for cognizable offences, as per various court judgments.
6.2. It fails to appreciate the gravity and heinous nature of the offences, which are writ large from the record.DLND010097132024 Page 7 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025
Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant 6.3. The Learned Magistrate confined the analysis to culpability under Sections 403 and 405/406 IPC, ignoring other limbs of offences under Sections 415/416/420/463/465/468 IPC. 6.4. There is no discussion or consideration of the high-gravity offences under the aforesaid sections, rendering the order inadvertent, perfunctory, irrational, and illogical. 6.5. The reasons in paragraph 9 are devoid of cogent reasoning, being "template reasons" without application of mind, as deprecated by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Aeiforia Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Continental Carbon India Pvt. Ltd. (CRL.M.C. 5260/2024, decided on 19.07.2024), which issued general instructions against such practices. 6.6. The reasons are flawed and unsustainable: (i) The assumption that accused identities are known is fallacious, ignoring conspiracy allegations involving multiple persons with the prime accused; (ii) Documentary evidence does not negate the need for interrogation of conniving accused; (iii) Incriminating facts being within the complainant's knowledge is irrelevant and denigrated by courts, including the Allahabad High Court in Mukesh Kharwar v. State of U.P. (2024 AHC 149752, decided on 10.10.2024), holding that FIR direction cannot be refused merely on this ground; (iv) Police aid under Section 202 Cr.P.C. is contingent, while cognizable offences warrant immediate FIR to prevent impunity and harm to victims; (v) Assumption of material documents in complainant's possession reflects pre- conceived notions.
DLND010097132024 Page 8 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant 6.7. The factual matrix, including the revisionist's inducement based on the proposed accused's representations, access to secure zones, feedback from listed NHRC employees, payments made, and non-cooperation evident from the ATR, mandates FIR registration and investigation.
Scope of Revision under section 438 BNSS (397 Cr.P.C 1973)
7. Prior to adjudicating the case on its merits, it is essential to delineate the scope and extent of these proceedings as well as the authority vested in this court under section 438 BNSS.
8. Section 438 BNSS read as under:
"438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.
(1)The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation.-All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of section 439. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.
(3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them."
9. The wording of the section is verbatim the same as of section 397 Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.
10. A plain reading of Section 438 of the BNSS clearly indicates that DLND010097132024 Page 9 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025 Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant Section 438(1) allows aggrieved parties to challenge the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding, sentence, or order issued by the trial court. Such challenges can be brought before a revisional court, namely the High Court or the Sessions Judge, as Section 438 confers concurrent jurisdiction upon both judicial authorities.
11. Section 438 (2) BNSS prohibits the revision powers under Section 438(1) BNSS from being used on interlocutory orders in appeals, enquiries, trials, or other proceedings. This creates an explicit legislative bar against revising such orders.
12. It is well settled law that scope of revisional jurisdiction is limited to the extent of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order passed by the Trial Court and jurisdiction under section 438 BNSS to be exercised for setting right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law cannot be equated with the power of Appellate Court.
13. As regards the scope of section 397 Cr.P.C (analogous to section 438 BNSS) in judgment titled as Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under:-
"8. ....Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law . There has to be a well- founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinize the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law......."
14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in 'New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Krishna Kumar Pandey', Crl. Appeal No.1852 of 2019 decided on 06.12.2019, made the following observations :
DLND010097132024 Page 10 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant "8. The scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court (or Sessions Court) under Section 397 Cr.P.C, is limited to the extent of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order passed by an inferior Court. The revisional Court is entitled to look into the regularity of any proceeding before an inferior Court. As reiterated by this Court in a number of cases, the purpose of this revisionsal power is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law."
15. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Sanjaysinh Ramarao Chavan Vs. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 held:
"14. .........Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial 0discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction".
(emphasis supplied)
16. Scope of revision has been explained in para 9 of judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi Taron Mohan Vs. State & Anr. 2021 SCC OnLine 312 which reads as under:
"9. The scope of interference in a revision petition is extremely narrow. It is well settled that Section 397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the Sessions Courts jurisdiction to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of any inferior court. It is also well settled that while considering the legality, propriety or correctness of a finding or a conclusion, normally the revising court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case. A court in revision considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence. "DLND010097132024 Page 11 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025
Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant
17. The precise purpose of Revision is to examine the correctness, legality and propriety of the order in question and to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. Needless to say, that the power of revision needs to be exercised fairly, rationally and judiciously in order to put right any manifest error of law or jurisdiction.
Analysis and Reasoning
18. Impugned order whether perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or whether the decision is based on no material or whether the material facts are wholly ignored or whether the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, requiring exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
19. Having perused the record, including the Impugned Order, ATRs, seized evidence, and submissions, this Court finds no merit in the revision petition. The primary ground for challenge--that police investigation is essential--does not withstand scrutiny. The discretion under Section 156(3)/175(3) BNSS must be exercised judiciously, with application of mind, and not mechanically. As laid down in Subhkaran Luharuka & Anr. v. State & Anr., 2010 (170) DLT 516, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court provided comprehensive guidelines for Magistrates dealing with applications under Section 156(3) CrPC (now Section 175(3) BNSS).
20. These guidelines emphasize:
(i)Ensuring the complainant approached the police under Section 154(1) and (3) CrPC (now Section 173 BNSS) before invoking the Magistrate's jurisdiction.DLND010097132024 Page 12 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025
Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant
(ii)The Magistrate forming an opinion on whether cognizable offences are disclosed, whether the matter falls within jurisdiction, and whether police investigation is necessary. A preliminary satisfaction is required, and cogent reasons must be recorded.
(iii)The Magistrate should ordinarily proceed under Chapter XV CrPC (now Chapter XV BNSS) by taking cognizance and recording evidence, postponing process if needed under Section 202 CrPC (now Section 225 BNSS).
(iv)Directions under Section 156(3) CrPC should only be issued if police investigation is essential for collecting evidence not in the complainant's possession or procurable without police aid, with reasons why Chapter XII CrPC (now Chapter XIII BNSS) is preferred over Chapter XV.
21. In the landmark judgment of Lalita Kumari v. State of UP, AIR 2014 SC 187, the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that registration of an FIR is mandatory for cognizable offences under Section 154 CrPC (now Section 173 BNSS), but permitted a preliminary inquiry in limited categories where the information does not clearly disclose a cognizable offence. However, this must be completed within seven days, and the police cannot evade registration arbitrarily.
22. This principle was nuanced in Ramdev Food Products Private Limited vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 2015 SC 1742, where a Three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that directions under Section 156(3) CrPC cannot be issued mechanically. The Magistrate must apply judicial mind, assess the credibility of information, and weigh the interest of justice before directing investigation:
DLND010097132024 Page 13 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant "...The direction under Section 156(3) is to be issued, only after application of mind by the Magistrate. When the Magistrate does not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to postpone instance of process and finds a case made out to proceed forthwith, direction under the said provision is issued. In other words, where on account of credibility of information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is considered appropriate to straightaway direct investigation, such a direction is issued. Cases where Magistrate takes cognizance and postpones issuance of process are cases where the Magistrate has yet to determine 'existence of sufficient ground to proceed....'"
23. Further, in Priyanka Srivastava & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2015) 6 SCC 287, the Hon'ble Supreme Court underscored the need for caution:
"...26. At this stage it is seemly to state that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes steps to harass their fellows citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same.
In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate... This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons... We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under Section 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an the application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made... We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari are being filed...."
24. Applying these principles to the present case, the Impugned Order reflects due application of mind. The circumstances do not justify DLND010097132024 Page 14 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025 Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant interference with the Impugned Order for the following reasons:
24.1. Critical Omission in Office Memorandum Reply: A pivotal circumstance reinforcing the impugned order is the revisionist's failure to mention in her reply to the departmental office memorandum (issued regarding her LTC claim) that the tickets were purportedly purchased through the proposed accused, Gaurav Pant. This omission is significant and demands clarification. If the transaction was legitimately routed through Gaurav Pant as an authorized agent, such a detail would naturally have been highlighted to exonerate herself departmentally. Its absence raises valid doubts about the transaction's nature and Gaurav Pant's role, potentially indicating an afterthought to mitigate departmental action. This supports the need for examination of complainant under Section 200 Cr.P.C. rather than outright FIR, as it underscores ambiguities that cannot be resolved at the threshold without verification, aligning with the Supreme Court's directive in Ramdev Food Products Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (supra).
Perusal of the office memorandum dated 29.04.2022 reveals that the petitioner had made the claim of Rs. 1,94,377/- towards LTC for visit to Port Blair from 23.02.2021 to 28.02.2021 along with her spouse and child. Out of said claimed amount, Rs. 1,87,954/- was claimed only as against the air fare from Delhi to Port Blair.
In the revision petition, it is categorically mentioned that the complainant/revisionist had made payment of Rs. 1,70,000/- in two tranches of Rs. 50,000/- and Rs. 1,20,000/- in February 2021 to the DLND010097132024 Page 15 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025 Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant proposed accused and had also given cash of Rs. 30,000/- to him which also included arranging for the stay in Hotel Coral Reef and Symphony in Andaman & Nicobar Islands. Thus, as per the petition, she made payment of Rs. 2 lakhs in total to the proposed accused of which Rs. 1,87,954/- was only the air fare from Delhi to Port Blair, which means, that accommodation from 23.02.2021 to 28.02.2021, i.e., for a period of five nights, was arranged by the proposed accused for a sum of only Rs. 12,000/-, which is quite unbelievable at this stage. However, if it is so, then the complainant/revisionist may, during her examination u/s 200 CrPC, make clarification in this regard and furnish the requisite bill issued by the said hotel indicating that in a meagre sum of Rs. 12,000/-, she and her family members stayed in the said hotel for five nights.
Further, as stated earlier, in reply to the said office memorandum, the complainant/revisionist nowhere stated that the air tickets were obtained or purchased through the proposed accused and not directly through Ashoka Travels. It may be noted that consequent to the said clarification by the petitioner, another office memorandum dated 06.06.2022 was issued by her office in which she was subsequently directed to provide the relevant documents regarding the payment made by her to M/s Ashoka Travels, which, as per her clarification dated 08.06.2022, she failed to furnish, for the reason that the payment was not made to M/s Ashoka Travels, rather the same was made to the proposed accused either in his personal account or in cash to him.
It may be noted that even in the clarifications submitted by DLND010097132024 Page 16 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025 Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant the complainant dated 08.06.2022, she did not mention that the payments were not made by her to Ashoka Travels, rather the same was made to the proposed accused in his personal account and in cash. The said reply dated 08.06.2022 of the complainant is reproduced as under:
DLND010097132024 Page 17 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant In view of the aforesaid replies/clarifications given by the complainant/petitioner, wherein there is no mention of the proposed accused, several clarifications are required from her during her examination u/s 200 CrPC so as to find out the truth behind the allegations made.
24.2. Payment Not Made Directly to Ashok Tours and Travels: It is undisputed that payments were not made directly to Ashoka Tours and Travels but to Gaurav Pant's personal account. As a senior government servant with extensive experience in official protocols, the revisionist must have been aware that standard procedures require payments to authorized agencies through proper channels, even via agents. Deviation from this norm--without evidence of Pant's authorization to receive funds (even cash)--
necessitates detailed explanation regarding how and why payments were routed thus. Clarifications on representations made by Pant, his relationship with Ashoka Travels, and verification steps taken by the revisionist are essential. These matters warrant examination of complainant u/s 200 CrPC and inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C., as they involve factual disputes unsuitable for pre- cognizance resolution under Section 156(3) CrPC. 24.3. Need for Examination of Complainant: The revisionist's assertions that the offences are prima facie made out overlook these ambiguities, which precisely require her examination in court. Under oath, she must elucidate:
a) reasons for indirect payments;
b) Gaurav Pant's representations on authority to receive DLND010097132024 Page 18 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025 Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant payment in his personal account on behalf of Ashoka;
c) omission to mention the name of Gaurav Pant in the office memorandum reply;
d) Details of payment made for a accommodation during the trip and if it was availed through proposed accused, then bills/invoices thereof;
e) Why cash payment was made to proposed accused, and whether complainant was aware that Ashoka Travels is a govt. Agency which will not deal in cash and whether receipt of the cash was obtained.
Such clarifications will emerge only during examination of complainant u/s 200 CrPC.
24.4. Whether Complaint filed to Avoid Departmental Action: The Learned Magistrate, satisfied prima facie of cognizable elements but mindful of timing vis-à-vis the office memorandum, rightly opted for verification under Section 202. This does not vitiate the order; dual purposes (seeking justice and departmental explanation) can coexist, but bonafides require testing, as per Mukesh Kharwar v. State of U.P. (supra), which, while cautioning against refusal solely on known facts, permits discretion where other grounds like potential abuse exist--applicable here due to the noted omissions. 24.5. Power Under Section 202 Cr.P.C.: The Learned Magistrate, discerning the need for limited probe into financial transactions and credentials, is empowered under Section 202 Cr.P.C. to direct police inquiry before issuing process, distinguishing it from full investigation under Section 156(3), as clarified by the Supreme DLND010097132024 Page 19 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025 Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant Court in Ramdev Food Products (supra). Directions under Section 156(3) cannot be mechanical.
25. For these reasons, the revision petition lacks merit.
26. It is reiterated that directions under Section 175(3) BNSS are not warranted merely because ingredients of a congizable offence may be prima facie disclosed. As per Subhkaran Luharuka & Anr. v. State & Anr. (2010 (170) DLT 516) and Priyanka Srivastava & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. ((2015) 6 SCC 287), such directions are exceptional, reserved for instances where evidence is beyond the complainant's reach without state agency assistance, and must reflect judicious application of mind to avoid mechanical invocation. In this case, the ingredients can be substantiated through existing materials, rendering any further police investigation superfluous at this juncture and aligning with the principle that Magistrates should prefer proceedings under Chapter XV BNSS unless compelling reasons dictate otherwise. As held in Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs. State of Maharashtra 2025 INSC 139, where the complainant holds evidence or can procure it without police aid, directions under Section 175(3) BNSS should not be issued mechanically. The learned Magistrate rightly noted that the matter does not involve complex facts requiring extensive police resources at this juncture.
27. Om Prakash (supra) deals with the interpretation of Section 156 Cr.P.C. and corresponding section of BNSS i.e. Section 175. Para 23 to para 35 of the said judgment dealing with the interpretation of the aforesaid provision, are reproduced as under:
"23.This Court in a plethora of its decisions, more particularly in the case of Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat reported in (2015) 6 SCC 439, has laid emphasis on the fact that the directions under Section 156(3) DLND010097132024 Page 20 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025 Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant should be issued only after application of mind by the Magistrate. Paragraph 22 of the said decision reads thus:-
"22. Thus, we answer the first question by holding that the direction Under Section 156(3) is to be issued, only after application of mind by the Magistrate. When the Magistrate does not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to postpone issuance of process and finds a case made out to proceed forthwith, direction under the said provision is issued. In other words, where on account of credibility of information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is considered appropriate to straightaway direct investigation, such a direction is issued. Cases where Magistrate takes cognizance and postpones issuance of process are cases where the Magistrate has yet to determine "existence of sufficient ground to proceed". Category of cases falling under Para 120.6 in Lalita Kumari (supra) may fall Under Section 202 Subject to these broad guidelines available from the scheme of the Code, exercise of discretion by the Magistrate is guided by interest of justice from case to case."
24. Thus, there are prerequisites to be followed by the complainant before approaching the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. which is a discretionary remedy as the provision proceeds with the word 'may'. The Magistrate is required to exercise his mind while doing so. He should pass orders only if he is satisfied that the information reveals commission of cognizable offences and also about the necessity of police investigation for digging out of evidence neither in possession of the complainant nor can be procured without the assistance of the police. It is, thus, not necessary that in every case where a complaint has been filed under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. the Magistrate should direct the Police to investigate the crime merely because an application has also been filed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. even though the evidence to be led by the complainant is in his possession or can be produced by summoning witnesses, with the assistance of the court or otherwise. The issue of jurisdiction also becomes important at that stage and cannot be ignored.
25. In fact, the Magistrate ought to direct investigation by the police only where the assistance of the Investigating Agency is necessary and the Court feels that the cause of justice is likely to suffer in the absence of investigation by the police. The Magistrate is not expected to mechanically direct investigation by the police without first examining whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, investigation by the State machinery is actually required or not. If the allegations made in the complaint are simple, where the Court can straightaway proceed to conduct the trial, the Magistrate is expected to record evidence and proceed further in the matter, instead of passing the buck to the Police under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C.
DLND010097132024 Page 21 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant of course, if the allegations made in the complaint require complex and complicated investigation which cannot be undertaken without active assistance and expertise of the State machinery, it would only be appropriate for the Magistrate to direct investigation by the police authorities. The Magistrate is, therefore, not supposed to act merely as a Post Office and needs to adopt a judicial approach while considering an application seeking investigation by the Police.
26. The incident is of the year 2012. This Court while admitting this appeal had stayed the investigation.
27. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that no case is made out to put the appellant/accused to trial for the alleged offence. Continuance of the investigation by the police will be nothing short of abuse of the process of law.
28. However, before we part with the matter, we deem it necessary to discuss the changes brought to the scheme of Section 156 of the Cr.P.C. by the enactment of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, "the BNSS").
29. Section 175 of the BNSS corresponds to Section 156 of the Cr.P.C. Sub-section (1) of Section 175 of the BNSS is in pari materia with sub- section 156(1) of the Cr.P.C. except for the proviso which empowers the Superintendent of Police to direct the Deputy Superintendent of Police to investigate a case if the nature or gravity of the case so requires. Sub-section (2) of Section 175 the BNSS is identical to Section 156(2) of the Cr.P.C. Section 175(3) of the BNSS empowers any Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance under Section 210 to order investigation in accordance with Section 175(1) and to this extent is in pari materia with Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. However, unlike Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., any Magistrate, before ordering investigation under Section 175(3) of the BNSS, is required to:
a. Consider the application, supported by an affidavit, made by the complainant to the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4) of the BNSS;
b. Conduct such inquiry as he thinks necessary; and c. Consider the submissions made by the police officer.
30. Sub-section (4) of Section 175 of the BNSS is a new addition to the scheme of investigation of cognizable cases when compared with the scheme previously existing in Section 156 of the Cr.P.C. It provides an additional safeguard to a public servant against whom an accusation of committing a cognizable offence arising in the course of discharge of his DLND010097132024 Page 22 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025 Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant official duty is made. The provision stipulates that any Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance under Section 210 of the BNSS may order investigation against a public servant upon receiving a complaint arising in course of the discharge of his official duty, only after complying with the following procedure:
a. Receiving a report containing facts and circumstances of the incident from the officer superior to the accused public servant; and b. Considering the assertions made by the accused public servant as regards the situation that led to the occurrence of the alleged incident.
31. A comparison of Section 175(3) of the BNSS with Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. indicates three prominent changes that have been introduced by the enactment of BNSS as follows:
a. First, the requirement of making an application to the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the officer in charge of a police station to lodge the FIR has been made mandatory, and the applicant making an application under Section 175(3) is required to furnish a copy of the application made to the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4), supported by an affidavit, while making the application to the Magistrate under Section 175(3).
b. Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to conduct such enquiry as he deems necessary before making an order directing registration of FIR.
c. Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider the submissions of the officer in charge of the police station as regards the refusal to register an FIR before issuing any directions under Section 175(3).
32. The introduction of these changes by the legislature can be attributed to the judicial evolution of Section 156 of the Cr.P.C. undertaken by a number of decisions of this Court. In the case of Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. reported in (2015) 6 SCC 287, this Court held that prior to making an application to the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., the applicant must necessarily make applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3). It was further observed by the Court that applications made under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. must necessarily be supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant. The reason given by the Court for introducing such a requirement was that applications under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. were being made in a routine manner and in a number of cases only with a view to cause harassment to the accused by registration of FIR. It was further observed that the requirement of supporting the complaint with an affidavit would ensure that the person making the application is conscious and also to DLND010097132024 Page 23 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025 Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant see that no false affidavit is made. Once an affidavit is found to be false, the applicant would be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This would deter him from casually invoking the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). The relevant observations made by the Court are reproduced hereinbelow:
"27. Regard being had to the aforesaid enunciation of law, it needs to be reiterated that the learned Magistrate has to remain vigilant with regard to the allegations made and the nature of allegations and not to issue directions without proper application of mind. He has also to bear in mind that sending the matter would be conducive to justice and then he may pass the requisite order. The present is a case where the accused persons are serving in high positions in the Bank. We are absolutely conscious that the position does not matter, for nobody is above the law. But, the learned Magistrate should take note of the allegations in entirety, the date of incident and whether any cognizable case is remotely made out. It is also to be noted that when a borrower of the financial institution covered under the Sarfaesi Act, invokes the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and also there is a separate procedure under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, an attitude of more care, caution and circumspection has to be adhered to.
28. Issuing a direction stating "as per the application" to lodge an FIR creates a very unhealthy situation in society and also reflects the erroneous approach of the learned Magistrate. It also encourages unscrupulous and unprincipled litigants, like Respondent 3, namely, Prakash Kumar Bajaj, to take adventurous steps with courts to bring the financial institutions on their knees. As the factual exposition would reveal, Respondent 3 had prosecuted the earlier authorities and after the matter is dealt with by the High Court in a writ petition recording a settlement, he does not withdraw the criminal case and waits for some kind of situation where he can take vengeance as if he is the emperor of all he surveys. It is interesting to note that during the tenure of Appellant 1, who is presently occupying the position of Vice President, neither was the loan taken, nor was the default made, nor was any action under the SARFAESI Act taken. However, the action under the SARFAESI Act was taken on the second time at the instance of the present Appellant 1. We are only stating about the devilish design of Respondent 3 to harass the appellants with the sole intent to avoid the payment of loan. When a citizen avails a loan from a financial institution, it is his obligation to pay back and not play truant or for that matter play possum. As we have noticed, he has been able to do such adventurous acts as he has the embedded conviction that he will not be taken to task because an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is a simple application to the court for issue of a direction to the investigating agency. We have been apprised that a carbon copy of a document is filed to show the DLND010097132024 Page 24 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025 Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant compliance with Section 154(3), indicating it has been sent to the Superintendent of Police concerned.
29. At this stage it is seemly to state that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the Code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellow citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same.
30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of the said Act or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores.
31. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit is so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari [(2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR."
(Emphasis supplied) DLND010097132024 Page 25 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025 Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant
33. In a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of Babu Venkatesh v. The State Of Karnataka reported in (2022) 5 SCC 639, the observations made in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) were referred to and it was held as follows:
"24. This Court has clearly held that, a stage has come where applications under Section 156(3)Cr.P.C. are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the complainant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.
25. This Court further held that, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also verify the veracity of the allegations. The Court has noted that, applications under Section 156(3)Cr.P.C. are filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility only to harass certain persons.
26. This Court has further held that, prior to the filing of a petition under Section 156(3)Cr.P.C., there have to be applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3)Cr.P.C.. This Court emphasises the necessity to file an affidavit so that the persons making the application should be conscious and not make false affidavit. With such a requirement, the persons would be deterred from causally invoking authority of the Magistrate, under Section 156(3)Cr.P.C.. Inasmuch as if the affidavit is found to be false, the person would be liable for prosecution in accordance with law."
(Emphasis supplied)
34. In light of the judicial interpretation and evolution of Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. by various decisions of this Court as discussed above, it becomes clear that the changes introduced by Section 175(3) of the BNSS to the existing scheme of Section 156(3) merely codify the procedural practices and safeguards which have been introduced by judicial decisions aimed at curbing the misuse of invocation of powers of a Magistrate by unscrupulous litigants for achieving ulterior motives.
35. Further, by requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the concerned police officer before proceeding to issue directions under Section 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs under Section 173. Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the concerned police officer also ensures that the 24 Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner."
DLND010097132024 Page 26 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant
28. Perusal of the aforesaid judgment reveals that it has reiterated the observations made in Ramdev Food Products (supra) and Priyanka Srivastava (supra), while categorically observing that Section 175 of BNSS has introduced changes to the existing scheme of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to codify the procedural practices and safeguards, which have been introduced by the judicial decisions aimed for curbing the misuse of invocation of powers of a Magistrate by unscrupulous litigants for achieving ulterior motives.
29. Seen in light of the aforesaid judgments, the Court do not find any illegality in the impugned order passed by the Ld. Magistrate, wherein the Ld. Magistrate has passed a reasoned order, while observing that the identity of the accused is known, the evidence is documentary in nature and is in possession of the complainant/revisionist and that police aid to collect evidence is not required at this stage, as the evidence is in the possession of complainant as well as on record.
30. Availability of Inquiry Under Section 225 BNSS if Needed: Even assuming arguendo that further inquiry is required, the learned Magistrate is not powerless. While taking cognizance, under Section 225 BNSS (in pari materia with Section 202 CrPC), the Magistrate may postpone process issuance and direct a limited inquiry by a police officer or other person to ascertain the truth of the complaint. This provision safeguards the Petitioner's interests without necessitating FIR registration ab initio. It ensures judicial oversight and prevents misuse of police machinery for fishing expeditions. Section 202 CrPC (now Section 225 BNSS) balances the need for inquiry with the avoidance of unnecessary harassment. Here, if during proceedings under Section 223 BNSS the learned Magistrate DLND010097132024 Page 27 of 27 Cr Revision 06/2025 Harpreeti Kaur Vs. Gaurav Pant finds gaps, such an inquiry can be ordered, rendering immediate police investigation redundant. It may be noted that the Ld. Magistrate has also clarified that in case police aid is required at any stage, section 202 CrPC can be resorted to at a later stage.
Final Order:
31. In conclusion, the Impugned Order reflects a reasoned application of mind, aligning with statutory provisions and judicial precedents. No police investigation is required at this stage, as evidence is accessible, and Section 225 BNSS/202 CrPC provides an adequate mechanism for any future investigation by police.
32. The Criminal Revision Petition is dismissed.
33. No order as to costs.
34. A copy of this order be sent to the learned Trial Court for information and necessary action, along with TCR, if any.
35. File be consigned to record room.
SAURABH Digitally signed by
Announced in the open Court PARTAP SAURABH PARTAP
SINGH LALER
SINGH
on 06th of October, 2025 LALER
Date: 2025.10.06
17:52:42 +0530
(Saurabh Partap Singh Laler)
ASJ-05 New Delhi
Patiala House Courts Delhi
06.10.2025