Kerala High Court
Ramachandran vs Omanakuttan on 8 October, 2002
Author: K. Padmanabhan Nair
Bench: K. Padmanabhan Nair
ORDER K. Padmanabhan Nair, J.
1. The respondent in O.P. (Election) 36 of 2000 on the file of the Munsiff of Mavelikkara is the revision petitioner. The revision petitioner and the respondent were candidates from Ward No. 1 of Chunakara Grama Panchayat at the three tier Panchayat election held on 28.9.2000. The revision petitioner was declared elected by a margin of 29 votes. The respondent filed the Original Petition for setting aside the election of the revision petitioner and also for a declaration that he is elected to Ward No. 1 of Chunakara Grama Panchayat. The learned Munsiff, who is designated for dealing with the Election O.P., accepted the contentions of disqualification and declared the election of the revision petitioner as null and void. But the further relief of declaration that the respondent shall be declared elected was refused. The appeal filed by the revision petitioner as A.S. (Election) 7 of 2002 before the District Court, Alappuzha was also dismissed.
2. The short facts necessary for the disposal of the revision are as follows: The revision petitioner and respondent were candidates to the three tier election to Ward No. 1 of Chunakara Grama Panchayat of Mavelikkara Taluk. The due date for filing nomination was on 1.9.2000 and the scrutiny of the nomination papers took place on 2.9.2000. The nomination filed by the revision petitioner as well as the respondent were accepted and the election was held on 27.9.2000 and the results were declared on 28.9.2000. The revision petitioner was declared elected by a margin of 29 votes, The respondent filed the petition to declare the election of the revision, petitioner as void on the ground that the revision petitioner was disqualified to contest as a candidate in an election to Panchayat, either Village or Block or Jilla as per the provisions of the Panchayat Raj Act on the two grounds enumerated below:-
i) The revision petitioner defaulted paying amounts borrowed from MavelikkaraPrimary Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. ("Co-operative Bank" for short) and since he failed to repay the amount, his property given as security was brought to sale and the same notice was published on 13.5.2000. It is averred that the debts due to this Co-operative Bank is to be treated as a debt due by the revision petitioner to the Government. According to the respondent, as on the date of nomination and also on the date of declaration of the result, the revision petitioner was disqualified in view of the fact that he is a defaulter to the Government.
ii) The revision petitioner was a member of the previous Panchayat Committee and he was having his own two bed room residential building. It is a terraced one. It was alleged that the building was constructed about six years prior to the date of his nomination and he is residing in that building with family. But, exerting under influence as the member of the Panchayat Committee, the building was not assessed to building lax and thereby caused Joss to the local authority.
3. The revision petitioner resisted the application. It was contended that the Original Petition filed is defective as there were violations of the provisions contained in Sections 102 and 103 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act. It was also contended that there was violation of the mandatory provisions contained in Section 89(2) of the Act. It was contended that the revision petitioner was not a defaulter in payment of dues to the Government was false. It was contended that the Co-operative Bank will not be "Government" as contended by the respondent. Further, it was contended that he was not a defaulter to that Co-operative Bank. The allegation that he caused loss to the Panchayat by not assessing the building constructed by him to local municipal tax is denied. It was contended that he was not a defaulter to the local authority. So, he prayed for a dismissal of the Original Petition.
4. The learned Munsiff after considering the pleadings and evidence found that the Original Petition framed Was not defective. The learned Munsiff also found that the revision petitioner was a defaulter, from whom amounts were due to the Government and also to the local municipal authority and set aside the results of the election. The Election Appeal filed challenging the said decision was also dismissed by the learned District Judge. Those concurrent findings of fact are under challenge in this revision.
5. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner has vehemently argued that the findings of the Courts below that the revision petitioner caused loss to the Panchayat and also he is a defaulter to the Government are illegal and perverse. It is argued that even accepting the entire case put forward by the respondent, that will not amount to a disqualification enumerated under Section 34 of the Act. According to the revision petitioner, there is absolutely no legal or acceptable evidence before Court to bring the case of the petitioner within the mischief of Section 34(1)(j) of the Act.
6. The learned counsel for the respondent has argued that both the Courts have concurrently found that the revision petitioner is in arrears of amounts due to the Government and also to the Panchayat. It is argued that this is a finding of fact which this Court shall not interfere in exercise of the powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
7. Section 34(1) of the Act deals with the grounds of disqualification of a candidate. Going by the allegations in the pleadings and the evidence, the disqualification attributed against the revision petitioner is one falling under Section 34(1)(j) of the Act. It reads as follows:-
"34. Disqualification of candidates.- (1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as and for being a member of a Panchayat at any level, if he-
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
(j) is in arrears of any kind due by him to the Government or the Panchayat concerned (otherwise than in a fiduciary capacity) upto and inclusive of the previous year in respect of which a bill or notice has been duly served upon him and the time, if any, specified therein for payment has expired;"
There is no ambiguity in the Section. To bring the case within the mischief of Section 34(1)(j) of the Act, the person attributing disqualification has to prove that his opponent is a defaulter.
8. I shall first consider how far the contention of the respondent that the revision petitioner is disqualified since he had caused loss to the local authority concerned is correct. The case of the respondent was that originally the revision petitioner was residing in his family house. But before six years, he started construction of a concrete building of his own and he shifted his residence from the family house by name Pankavil and started residence in a temporary shed which was numbered as 502 of previous Ward No. II of Chunakkara Panchayat. The allegation is that the revision petitioner completed the construction of the terraced building six years ago and shifted his residence to that newly constructed building. It is also alleged that the revision petitioner was a member of the former Panchayal Committee and using that position, he exerted undue influence on the staff of the Panchayat and deliberately avoided the assessment of the building which was newly constructed. But it is admitted that the building was assigned a number as 389 of Ward No. 1. So, the allegation is that even though the construction of the building was over six years prior to the date of election, by using the power as a member of the Panchayat Committee, the building was not assessed to local authority tax and thereby caused loss to the local authority: A plain reading of Section 34(1)(j) shows that it is not a matter covered by that section. Even if the entire case put forward by the respondent is accepted as such, it can be only said that the revision petitioner is a man of no principle and he played fraud on the local authority. But, that is not a ground for setting aside the result of the election. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the revision petitioner owns any building. On the other hand, the evidence adduced shows that the building stands in the name of his wife. There is also no evidence to show that at any point of time any demand by way of bill or notice was duly served on the revision petitioner and after the expiry of the time fixed in the notice, he did not pay the amount covered by that bill. A reading of Section 34(1)(j) of the Act makes it crystal clear that a disqualification can be attributed only if there was a demand by way of bill or notice in respect of any arrears due to the Panchayat and there is failure on the part of the defaulter to pay the amount within the time stated in the notice. So, even if it is established that the revision petitioner was a defaulter, that is not sufficient to set aside an election. There must be evidence to show that notice or bill was served on him and the defaulter did not pay that amount. As I have already stated, the respondent had no such case. While considering a similar provision in Bombay Village Panchayat Act (3 of 1959), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the decision reported in Chandkhan v. W.N. Gound (AIR 1973 Bombay 1) held as follows:-
"Only non-payment of fees or taxes levied under Section 124 within the period specified in the bill in respect of which a bill has been duly served on a person was alone to result in his disqualification under Section 14(h). Though, therefore, the amount charged for a writ of demand is designated as fees by Section 129, those are not categories of fees for non-payment of which a disqualification for being member of a Panchayat under Section 14(h) can be incurred, because no bill in respect of that is ever contemplated to be presented under Section 129(1)".
In view of the absence of evidence of service of bill or notice and failure to pay the amount covered by the bill or notice, no disqualification can be attributed on the revision petitioner. As already stated, the only ground alleged is that in view of the undue influence exerted by the revision petitioner, the local authority did not assess the rental value of the building. That is not a ground to set aside an election. Both the Courts have not considered these aspects. As rightly pointed put by the counsel for the revision petitioner, when the qualification of a candidate for election under a particular statute is considered, the provision must be strictly construed. In the absence of service of any demand by way of bill or notice and failure to pay the same within the time fixed therein, the finding of the Courts below that the revision petitioner is a defaulter on the ground that he has caused loss to the local authority by not assessing the building to tax is illegal and unsustainable and liable to be set aside. I do so.
9. The next point to be considered is whether any amount is in arrears from the revision petitioner to the Government. The specific case put forward by the contesting respondent in the Original Petition is that the revision petitioner along with his father Karuthakunju availed a loan from the Co-operative Bank. Since he committed default in payment, the Bank after issuing proper notice brought the property offered as security to sale. It is also alleged that a public notice was published by the sale officer in the Mathrubhumi daily dated 15.6.2000 and a copy of the same was affixed in the property also. It is averred that the petitioner paid a portion of the debt, thereby averted the sale. According to the respondent, on the date of nomination, on the date of scrutiny and also on the date of polling the revision petitioner was a defaulter.
10. Exts. X1 to X5 produced in this case clearly establishes that the revision petitioner along with his father availed loan by executing Gehan from the Co-operative Bank, a primary Co-operative Bank registered as per the provisions of the Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural Development Act and since the revision petitioner committed default, a notice as contemplated under Rule 8(c) framed under Section 20 of the Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural Development Act was issued to the revision petitioner and his father demanding payment of an amount of Rs. 63,893/- as per notice dated 12.1.2000 and the notice was received by him. The notice was also served by affixture and by publication in Mathrubhumi Daily. Thereafter the properties covered by the mortgage were brought to sale on 14.3.2000 and the sale was averted by the revision petitioner by depositing a portion of the amount. The case of the revision petitioner is that he was not the actual loanee; but the loan was availed by his father and he had signed the Gehan only because his father is aged. The revision petitioner relies on the evidence of PWs. 1 and 2 in support of his argument. PW1 is the Sale Officer. He made an attempt to prove that the properties covered by the Gehan belong to the father of the revision petitioner. But, he had to admit that the notice issued contains the name of the revision petitioner also and the properties were proclaimed for sale on 14.3.2000 and on that day, an amount of Rs. 8,000/- was paid. So, the sale was postponed. He had also admitted that the revision petitioner was a defaulter. An attempt was made by the revision petitioner during cross-examination of PW1 to prove that the money advanced was not public money. PW1 deposed that the revision petitioner was made a party to the loan transaction only because of the convenience for recovering the same. He even went to the extent of speaking that the revision petitioner is not a debtor to the Co-operative Bank. -But during re-examination he had admitted that proceedings were initiated against the father as well as the revision petitioner. PW2 is the Secretary of the Co-operative Bank. He deposed that the entire arrears was paid on 15.12.2000 and the documents were returned to Karuthakunju. He deposed that because Karuthakunju was very old and unable to come to the Bank the revision petitioner has also signed the Gehan for receiving the money. But, PW2 was forced to admit that the revision petitioner is the second applicant in the loan application. Eventhough during cross examination by the revision petitioner PW2 deposed that the revision petitioner signed the Gehan so as to receive the money for and on behalf of Karuthakunju, subsequently he had admitted that the liability of Karuthakunju and revision petitioner is joint and several. The evidence of PWs. 1 and 2 shows that they deliberately gave false evidence to save the revision petitioner. The evidence given by PWs. 1 and 2 are against the interest of the Bank.
Even their evidence show that the revision petitioner along with his father borrowed money from the Bank and they committed default. In spite of proper demand they failed to repay the amount covered by the notice and hence the properties were brought to sale. The evidence of PW. 2 also clearly shows that the arrears were paid only on 15.12.2000. So, the fact that amounts were due to the Bank and there was wilful default on the part of the revision petitioner to pay the arrears due to the Bank in spite of a void notice demanding repayment of the same as on the date of nomination, date of scrutiny, date of polling and also on the date of declaring the election is established the case of the respondent.
11. The only other point remains to be considered in this case is whether the amount due to the Bank is arrears due by the revision petitioner to the Government. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner has vehemently argued that while considering a disqualification imposed under Section 34(1)(j) of the Act the provisions has to be strictly construed and the Court will have to consider whether he is a defaulter as defined under the Act. According to the revision petitioner, for considering that matter the Court cannot look into any other Act and then came to a conclusion. It is argued that even if the entire case put forward by the respondent is accepted as such, it would only show that amounts were due to a Co-operative Society and Co-operative Society is not a State. It is argued that when statute says that arrears due to State alone will attract a disqualification, only the amounts due to the State and State alone can be taken into account and not to any other institution. It is argued that in Bhaskaran v. Addt. Secretary (1987 (2) KLT 903), a Full Bench of this Court after elaborately considering the law on the point has come to the conclusion that a society is not an imprint of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution. It is argued that a Co-operative Society is not a public body. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent has argued that in Shri. Anadi Mukla Sadguru S.M.V.S.J.M.S. v. V.R. Rudrani (AIR 1989 SC 1607), the Apex Court has taken a different view. It is argued by the counsel for the respondent himself that for the purpose of resolving the issue involved in this case it is not at all necessary to consider whether a Co-operative Society is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. It is contended that the only point to be considered is whether a loan to the Society involved in this case is a loan due to the State. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner argued that a perusal of the provisions of the Act will show that the Bank is a primary Co-operative Society formed under the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act. It is submitted that there are various enactments under which loan can be directly availed from the Government. It is pointed out that if a person avails a loan under the Kerala Agriculturist Loans Act, that is an amount due to the Government. It is also submitted that any amount due under the Kerala Land Development Act, 1964 is also an amount due to the Government. But arrears due to a Co-operative Bank like the one involved in this case cannot be considered as arrears due to the State.
12. The learned counsel relied on the decision reported in Abdid Shakur v. Rikhab Chand (AIR 1958 SC 52), in which the Apex Court has considered whether a Mohatmin (Manager) of Madrarsa Durgah Khwaja Sahib Abkari under Act 36 of 1955 is holding office of profit under the Government of India. The Apex Court had considered the difference between the provisions contained in Articles 102(1)(a) and 58(1) of the Constitution of India and found that he is not holding office of profit. In Ram Padarath v. Mishri (AIR 1961 SC 480) the Apex Court considered the disqualification contained in S. 7(d) of Representation of People Act, 1951 and found that a person who has entered into a contract for the purpose of service undertaken by the Government is not holding an office of profit. The Apex Court while interpreting the meaning of the word "service and contract" held as follows:-
"It may sound technical, but in dealing with a statutory provision which imposes a disqualification on a citizen it would be unreasonable to take merely a broad and general view and ignore the essential points of distinction on the ground that they are technical".
That was again considered by the Apex Court in Madhukar v. Jaswant (AIR 1976 SC 2283), in which the Apex Court considered whether a Medical Practitioner working as a panel doctor appointed under the Employees' State Insurance Scheme is holding an "office of profit" under the State Government. It was found that he is not holding an office of profit. In Satrucharla v. Vyricherla P.K. Dev ((1992) 4 SCC 404) the question arose whether a teacher working in a school run by Integrated Tribal Development Agency, a registered society, by its Project Officer, who is also District Collector, is holding an office of profit. The matter was again considered in Thampanoor Ravi v. Charupara Ravi (1999 (3) KLT 487 (SC)). The Apex Court held that while dealing with an election petition the High Court has no jurisdiction to decide a question as to whether a person is an undischarged insolvent or not. In Kartar Singh Bhadana v. Hari Singh Nalwa ((2001) 4 SCC 661) the Supreme Court had considered whether a mining lease granted by Government to a partnership firm to which the candidate was a partner to win minerals from specified area is disqualified because he had entered into a contract with the Government. The Apex Court found that it is not a disqualification. In Pradyut Bordoloi v. Swapan Roy ((2001) 2 SCC 19), the Supreme Court after discussing a number of earlier decisions considered the meaning of the word "holding office of profit". In Pradyut Bordoloi's case (supra) the allegation was regarding disqualification of a candidate for holding the post, of Clerk in Coal India Ltd., a company having 100% share holding of the Government. In that case also the Supreme Court held that he is not holding the office of profit. But while considering the meaning of the words "office of profit", the Apex Court held as follows:-
"The phrase "office of profit" is not defined in the Constitution. Posed with the perplexed problem whether a person holds an office under the Government, the first and foremost question to be asked is: Whether the Government has power to appoint and remove the person on and from the office? If the answer is in the negative, no further inquiry is called for, the basic determinative test having failed. If the answer be a positive one, further probe has to goon finding answers to questions framed in Shivamurth case viz., (1) whether the Government makes the appointment; (2) whether the Government has the right to remove or dismiss the holder; (3) whether the Government pays the remuneration; (4) what are the functions of the holder? Does he perform them for the Government; and (5) does the Government exercise any control over the performance of those functions? In Guru Gobinda Basil case the Supreme Court pointed out several factors entering into the determination of the question which are (i) the appointing authority, (ii) the authority vested with power to terminate the appointment, (iii) the authority which determines the remuneration, (iv) the source from which the remuneration is paid, and (v) the authority vested with power to control the manner in which the duties of the. office are discharged and to give directions in that behalf. But all these factors need not coexist. Mere absence of one of the factors may not negate the overall test. It has to be searched for as to how many of the factors pointed out in Guru Govinda Basu case do exist? The totality of the facts and circumstances reviewed in the light of the provisions of the relevant Act, if any, would lead to an inference being drawn if the office held is under the Government. The inquiskive overview-eye would finally query: On account of holding of such office would the Government be in a position to so influence him as to interfere with his independence in functioning as a Member of Legislative Assembly and/or would his holding of the two offices one under the Government and the other being a Member of Legislative Assembly, involve a conflict of interests inter se? This is how the issue has to be approached and resolved".
13. The counsel appearing for the revision petitioner submitted that even an employee working in a fully Government owned company like Coal India Ltd. and E.S.I. Corporation were found not working under the Government. It is argued that when the enactment says 'dues to the Government', it must be due to the Government and Government alone and not to any other society or company. It is submitted that the very Act itself shows that the Bank was constituted under the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, which cannot be considered as a Government establishment. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents relying on those decisions submitted that the real question to be considered in this case is that from which source the money advanced by the Bank comes. It is submitted that the source from which the money comes is very important.
14. The Kerala State Co-operative (Agricultural and Rural Development Banks) Act was brought into existence in 1984. Prior to that, there was the Kerala Cooperative Land Mortgage Banks Act and those Banks were disbursing loans mainly for the purpose of repayment of old debts. The amounts advanced were very small. Because of the changed circumstances, the Government felt the need for introducing a new Act or making extensive amendments to the Act. The procedure followed for disbursement of the loans was cumbersome. Since extensive amendments were required, the new Act was introduced repealing the Kerala Co-operative Land Mortgage Banks Act. The Act was intended for changing the following facts:-
(1) change in the nomenclature of the Bank;
(2) quick disposal of loan applications;
(3) easy and effective measures for recovery;
(4) liberalisation of security conditions;
(5) new activities such as forestry, dairy, piggery, poultry, fisheries, etc., as also incidental activities like processing, marketing, storage and transportation;
(6) better credit support to the beneficiaries of land reforms;
(7) finance for Electricity Board and other corporate bodies.
Originally there was no provision to advance loan for the non-farm activities or for rural development activities. National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development (NABARD) came forward to extend refinance facilities. So, the Act was again amended in the year 1990. It is true that it was constituted under the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act. The words "Co-operative Society", "Gehan", "primary bank" and "State" is also defined. Section 2(j) defines "State" as State of Kerala. Section 3 deals with issue of debentures by Board. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 deals with issuing debentures on the strength of guarantee by the Government. It provides that if in respect of loans guaranteed by the Government and granted to any person or to any body of persons, whether incorporated or not, and whether or not established by or under any law for the time being in force, if such a body is approved by the Government, the Board may, with the previous permission of the Trustee, issue debentures on the strength of such Government guarantee and without the security of Gehan or mortgages or hypothecation and other assets. Section 4 confers power to the Banks to borrow money by issue of bonds or by way of loans. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, the Board may, with the prior approval of the Government and subject to the regulations made under the Act, borrow money by issue of bonds. A reading of Section 4(1) makes it very clear that in the matter of issuing bonds the operation of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act is exclusively taken away and such bonds can be issued only with the prior approval of the Government. Section 4(3) again provides that notwithstanding-anything contained in the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, the Board may borrow money way of loans from the Government, the National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development, the Reserve Bank of India or such other financial institutions as may be approved by the Trustee. Section 4(3) reads as follows:-
"(3). Notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (21 of 1969) the Board may borrow money by way of loans from the Government, the National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development, the Reserve Bank of Indiaor such other financial institutions as may be approved by the Trustee".
Section 6 deals with guarantee by Government on principal of and interest on debentures, bonds and loans. Section 8 deals with the persons or institutions to whom and also the purposes for which the loans can be advanced. Section 9 deals with security for loans. Section 9(1) provides that loans can be advanced on the strength of security of lands, other fixed assets, etc. But, the first proviso to Section 9(1) gives power to the Banks to advance loans without any security of land provided the Government gives guarantee. It reads as follow s:-
"Provided that the Agricultural and Rural Development Bank and the primary banks may, for such purposes and for such periods as may be specified by the Government by special of general order, advance loans without such security of land but on the specific guarantee of the Government for the repayment of the principal and payment of interest thereon".
So, Section 9(1) makes it very clear that if the Government guarantees without obtaining any security, loan can be advanced either to an individual or institution. Sub-section (2) of Section 9 is also very relevant. It reads as follows:-
"(2), Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Agricultural and Rural Development Bank or a Primary Bank may, under any Land Development Scheme prepared and approved under the provisions of the Kerala Land Development Act, 1964 (17 of 1964), grant or advance loans to any person or a group of persons with or without security of land for carrying out the work specified in the scheme, subject to such terms and conditions as are agreed upon between the Government and the Agricultural and Rural Development Bank or the Primary Bank, as the case may be".
Sub-section (2) of Section 9 provides for giving loans for any land development scheme prepared and approved under the provisions of the Kerala Land Development Act. The Kerala Land Development Act is enacted for the purpose of advancing amounts to the parties especially for maintaining padasekharams etc. So, under Sub-section (2) of Section 9 in addition to the loans that may be advanced under the Kerala Land Development Act, the Bank is also advancing loan in terms of the agreement entered into between the Government and the Agricultural and Rural Development Bank. So, it is clear that the source from which the Bank obtains money is Government, National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development (NABARD), Reserve Bank of India, etc. There is a provision in the Act by which the Government can stand as a guarantor. So, the Government will be in the position of a co-obligant. So, it is very clear that the money comes from the Government is being distributed through this Bank, that too not in accordance with the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. It is very important to note that some important sections of this Act starts with a non-obstante clause by which the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act are specifically excluded. So, a close analysis of the Kerala State Co-operative (Agricultural and Rural Development Banks) Act shows that the source from which the loan advanced by the Bank comes from the Government. If a lonee commits default, the Government is the ultimate loser. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner has vehemently argued that that position may be correct if a loan was obtained by a person on the guarantee given by the Government. It is argued that in this case loan was not obtained on the guarantee given by the Government, but by executing a Gehan. I am of the view that while considering whether the amount is due to the Government or not, the same cannot be determined with reference to an individual case. There are cases in which a person can obtain loan by executing Gehan. There are also provisions to obtain loan on the guarantee by the Government. Therefore a close analysis of the various provisions of the Kerala State Co-operative (Agricultural and Rural Development Banks) Act leads to an irresistible conclusion that though the Bank is constituted under the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, it is disbursing amounts which comes from the Government. So, the money which the revision petitioner along with his father availed from the Bank is a money due to the Government. That fell in arrears. In spite of the demand notice, that was not paid. So, the properties were brought to sale. The revision petitioner along with his father averted the sale by depositing a portion of the amount. So, the finding of the Courts below that the revision petitioner was in arrears to the Government as he committed default in payment of the amounts in spite of receipt of notice from the Bank is correct and does not call for any interference. I confirm the same.
In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed.