Delhi High Court
H. Singh vs Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi on 24 May, 1996
Equivalent citations: 63(1996)DLT97, 1996(38)DRJ40
JUDGMENT M.K. Sharma, J.
(1) The petitioner in this writ petition has sought for a direction to the respondents to allow the petitioner to function as the Principal of the Guru Harkishan Public School, Punjabi Bagh, New Delhi as the suspension of the petitioner stood revoked in terms of letter dated 10.4.1996 issued by the respondent No.3 and/or ensure compliance of the aforesaid order dated 10.4.1996.
(2) The petitioner was promoted as the Principal of the Guru Harkishan Public School, Punjabi Bagh in the month of September, 1992. The appointment of the petitioner as the Principal of the said school was approved and confirmed by the Governing Body of the School after she was selected by the Promotion Committee.
(3) However, through letter dated 12.3.1996 the petitioner was put under suspension from the Principalship of the school as she was found guilty of certain charges. In the said letter it was further stated that the decision to suspend the petitioner was taken at a meeting of the Governing Body of the school and that a detailed charge sheet would follow.
(4) Section 8 of the Delhi School Education Act deals with the power and jurisdiction of the Managing Committee of a recognised Private School. The relevant provisions are extracted below: "8.Terms and conditions of service of employees of recognised private schools (4) Where the managing committee of a recognised private school intends to suspend any of its employees, such intention shall be communicated to the Director and no such suspension shall be made except with the prior approval of the Director. Provided that the managing committee may suspend an employee with immediate effect and without the prior approval of the Director if it is satisfied that such immediate suspension is necessary by reason of the gross misconduct, within the meaning of the Code of Conduct prescribed under section 2, of the employee; Provided Further that no such immediate suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of fifteen days from the date of suspension unless it has been communicated to the Director and approved by him before the expiry of the said period. (5) Where the intention to suspend, or the immediate suspension of, an employee is communicated to the Director, he may if he is satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such suspension, accord his approval to such suspension."
(5) It is pertinent to state at this stage that the Supreme Court in Frank Anthony Public School Employees Association Vs. Union of India and others; has held that the aforesaid provisions in respect of power of suspension and extent thereof are also applicable to unaided minority institution like the present school. The following paragraphs from the said decision are extracted below:- "THUS,Sections 8(1), 8(3), 8(4) and 8(5) do not encroach upon any right of minorities to administer their educational institutions. Section 8(2), however, must, in view of the authorities, be held to interfere with such right and, therefore, inapplicable to minority institutions. Section 9 is again innocuous since Section 14 which applies to unaided minority schools is virtually on the same lines as Section 9. We have already considered Section 11 while dealing with Section 8(3). We must, therefore, hold that Section 11 which makes the provisions of Chapter Iv inapplicable to unaided minority schools is discriminatory not only because it makes Section 10 inapplicable to minority institutions, but also because it makes Sections 8(1), 8(3), 8(5), 9 and Ii inapplicable to unaided minority institutions. That the Parliament did not understand Sections 8 to Ii as offending the fundamental right guaranteed to the minorities under Article 30(1) is evident from the fact that Chapter Iv applies to aided minority institutions and it cannot for a moment be suggested that surrender of the right under Article 30(1) is the price which the aided minority institutions have to pay to obtain aid from the Government. 21. The result of our discussion is that Section 12 of the Delhi School Education Act which makes the provisions of Chapter Iv inapplicable to unaided minority institutions is discriminatory and void except to the extent that it makes Section 8(2) inapplicable to unaided minority institutions. We, therefore, grant a declaration to that effect and direct the Union of India and the Delhi Administration and its officers, to enforce the provisions of Chapter Iv (except Section 8(2)) in the manner provided in the Chapter in the case of- the Frank Anthony Public School. The management of the school is directed not to give effect to the orders of suspension passed against the members of the staff."
(6) In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it is settled that the aforesaid provisions of Section 8(4) and 8(5) of the Delhi School Education Act are applicable also in the case of the Guru Harkishan Public School.
(7) The issue therefore, which arises for my consideration in the present case is whether the provisions of Section 8(4) and 8(5) were complied with in the present case while suspending the petitioner by the Governing Body and if not, to what relief, the petitioner is entitled to. .
(8) Section 8(4) of the Delhi School Education Act requires the Managing Committee of a recognised Private School to communicate to the Director and to obtain prior approval before suspending any of its employees. However, the proviso enables the Managing Committee to suspend an employee with immediate effect and without the prior approval of the Director if it is satisfied that such immediate suspension is necessary by reason of the gross misconduct of the employee, within the meaning of the Code of Conduct. Such immediate suspension however, will cease to have effect after 15 days if the approval of the Director is not obtained in the meanwhile. Section 8(5) authorises the Director to accord his approval of the order of suspension of an employee if he is satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for suspension. Section 8(5) therefore, is to be read alongwith Section 8(4) of the Act and cannot be said to be an independent power and not at all related to Section 8(4) of the Act as sought to be argued by the learned counsel for respondents No.4 & 5. With regard to the provisions of Section 8(4) of the Act, the Supreme Court in Frank Anthony's case (supra) has said thus: "THE management has the right to order immediate suspension of an employee in case of gross misconduct but in order to prevent an abuse of power by the management a safeguard is provided to the employee that approval should be obtained within 15 days. The Director is also bound to accord his approval if there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such suspension."
(9) In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law, let us now examine the legality and validity of the order of suspension passed in the present case against the petitioner by the Governing Body of the School. The counsel for the petitioner stated that not only the aforesaid provisions were not complied with by the Governing Body of the School in the case of the petitioner but the said body has also failed to carry out the directions issued by the Director of Education on 10.4.1996 to reinstate the petitioner immediately. The counsel for respondents No.4 & 5 on the other hand, submitted that the Director was not justified in not according approval of the decision of the Governing Body of School suspending the petitioner from service, inasmuch as, under Section 8(5) of the Act the Director was bound to accord approval to the said decision as was held in the decision of Frank Anthony's case (supra). He specifically referred to paragraph 19 of the said judgment.
(10) The order of suspension was issued to the petitioner on 12.3.1996. Admittedly prior to the issuance of the aforesaid order approval of the Director was not taken for suspending the petitioner as required under Section 8(4) of the Act. The counsel for the respondents also failed to produce before me any evidence to show that even within 15 days from the date of the aforesaid suspension approval for suspending the petitioner was obtained as required under proviso to Section 8(4) of the Act when it is a case of immediate suspension. On the other hand, the letter issued on behalf of the Director to the Manager of the School on 10.4.1996 makes it clear that no approval of the order of suspension was obtained from the Director of Education as required under Section 8(4) of the Act. On that count, as it appears the Director ordered that the order of suspension stood revoked.
(11) The submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that the Director was bound to give approval to the decision of the Governing Body is also not tenable as the Director has the power and jurisdiction also not to approve a decision of suspension, if the same does not comply with the provisions of Section 8(4) and also if he is satisfied that there is no adequate and reasonable ground for suspension in a particular case. However, in the present case we are concerned with-the First type of a case i.e. non- compliance of the provisions of Section 8(4). The letter dated 10.4.1996 refers to a letter only of 29.3.1996, which is much beyond the period of 15 days prescribed under the proviso to Section 8(4) of the Act.
(12) Consequently, the Director rightly refused to give approval to the order of suspension passed against the petitioner and also in revoking the order of suspension and also in directing for her reinstatement. As the said order of the Director has also not been complied with by respondents No.4 & 5, in my opinion, necessary directions are required to be issued to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner forthwith in the post of the Principal of Guru Harkishan Public School, Punjabi Bagh, New Delhi. The petitioner shall also be entitled to be paid full salary and allowances as required to be paid to her as the Principal of the School treating her as if she was suspended only for 15 days from 12.3.1996 in terms of Section 8(4) of the Act.
(13) The writ petition stands allowed with the aforesaid direction. Costs assessed at Rs.2,000.00 to be paid to the petitioner by the respondents No.4 & 5. Dasti.