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[Cites 11, Cited by 12]

Supreme Court of India

Sanganer Dal And Flour Mill vs F.C.I. And Ors on 22 October, 1991

Equivalent citations: 1992 AIR 481, 1991 SCR SUPL. (1) 542, AIR 1992 SUPREME COURT 481, 1992 (1) SCC 145, 1992 AIR SCW 72, (1991) 5 JT 355 (SC), 1991 (5) JT 355, 1992 (1) UJ (SC) 471, (1992) 1 ORISSA LR 1, (1992) 1 BANKLJ 196, (1992) 1 BANKCAS 187, (1991) 3 CURCC 710

Author: K. Ramaswamy

Bench: K. Ramaswamy, Yogeshwar Dayal

           PETITIONER:
SANGANER DAL AND FLOUR MILL

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
F.C.I. AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/10/1991

BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
YOGESHWAR DAYAL (J)

CITATION:
 1992 AIR  481		  1991 SCR  Supl. (1) 542
 1992 SCC  (1) 145	  JT 1991 (5)	355
 1991 SCALE  (2)983


ACT:
     Indian Partnership Act, 1932---Section 19(2)(a)--Appli-
cation	 of-Contract   by  one	 panner--No   objection	  by
others--Arbitration  clause of the contract binding  on	 the
firm and reference of dispute for arbitration u/s.20,  Arbi-
tration Act, 1940--Proper.



HEADNOTE:
     The  appellant--a	partnership firm consisted  of	nine
partners.  One	Satya  Narain was one of  the  partners.  He
submitted  a tender to the respondents on July 25,  1973  on
behalf of the firm offering to supply 1000 quintals of	Gram
Dal at the rate of Rs.185/- per bag. Tender was accepted  by
the  respondents.  The	appellant committed  breach  of	 the
contract and as a result, the respondents filed an  applica-
tion  under sec. 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 before	 the
District Court for making reference for arbitration in terms
of the contract.
     The  application  was allowed and the dispute  was	 re-
ferred for arbitration.
     Against  the  order  of the Addl.	District  Judge,  an
appeal	was filed before the High Court and the	 High  Court
confirmed the order of the Additional District Judge.
     This  appeal  by special leave under Art.	136  of	 the
Constitution  is  against the order of the High	 Court.	 The
appellant contended that by operation of Sec.19(2)(a) of the
Partnership Act, 1932, there was no implied authority  given
to one of the partners to refer the dispute relating to	 the
business  of  the  firm for arbitration	 and  therefore	 the
reference made by the court, pursuant to a contract  entered
into  by one of its partner, Satya Narain on behalf  of	 the
firm,  was without jurisdiction and that the  original	con-
tract  did  not contain arbitration clause.  In	 a  separate
letter	with a rubber stamp (facsimile) of the firm, one  of
the partners agreed for reference to arbitration and  there-
fore the reference did not bind the other partners.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court,
543
    HELD: 1. The operation of Secs. 18 & 19(1) is subject to
the   exceptions engrafted in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 19.	Sec.
19(2)(a) provides that in the absence of any usage or custom
of trade to the contrary, the implied authority of a partner
does  not  empower him to submit a dispute relating  to	 the
business of the firm to arbitration. [545B-C]
    2.	None of the partners have entered into	the  witness
box  to	 deny the validity of the contract  nor	 raised	 any
objection  that they had not authorised the  partner  (Satya
Narain) to enter into the contract nor that they were  bound
by any acts done by him. When the partner signed the tender,
at  that time no other partners raised	objection  regarding
the  signing of the tender by the partner on behalf  of	 the
firm. In view of these facts it is clear that they  ratified
the contract. [544 E-F]
    3. The firm had entered into a binding contract with the
corporation  and contract contained the	 arbitration  clause
which binds the partners.
[544 G]
    4.	The contract engrafts an arbitration clause  and  in
terms thereof the dispute is to be referred to the  arbitra-
tion.  Therefore, the reference made by the  Addl.  District
Judge  under Sec. 20 of time Arbitration Act is	 within	 the
jurisdiction and in terms of the contract. [545 D]
    Gopal  Das v. Brij Nath & Ors., AIR 1926 Allahabad	238;
Firm  Radhakishan  Chunnilal v. Firm Ashamal  Ishardas,	 AIR
1926 Lahore 92; Rajendra Prasad v. Pannalal Champalal & Ors,
AIR  1932 Calcutta 343; Mansabdar Khan v. M.T. Allah Devi  &
Or3'.,	AIR 1934 Lahore 485; Sohanlal v. Firm Madhoram	Ban-
warilal, AIR 1952 Punjab 240; and M/s. Alazappa Cotton Mills
v.  Indo  Burma	 Trading Corporation, AIR  1976	 Madras	 79,
referred to.



JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1677 of 1984.

From the Judgment and Order dated 7.7.1983 of the Rajasthan High Court in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 6 of 1983.

S.K. Jain, Mrs. Pratibha Jain and Sudhanshu Atreya for the Appellant.

C.K. Sucharita, Y. Prabhakara Rao (N.P.) and Ganpathi Iyer Gopalkrishnan for the Respondents.

544

The following Order of the Court was delivered:

This appeal by special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution is against the order of the High Court of Rajasthan dated July 7, 1983. The appellant a partnership firm consists of nine partners of which Satya Narain is one of the partners. On July 2.5, 1973 Satya Narain submitted a tender to the respondents offering to supply 1000 quintals of Gram Dal at the rate of Rs. 185/- per bag. This was accepted by the respondents by letter dated August 28, 1973 followed by confirmation letter by the firm on August 31, 1973. It is the case of the respondents that the appellant committed breach of the contract and as a result, the re- spondents filed an application under sec. 20 of the Arbitra- tion Act, 1940 (for short as the 'Act') before the District Court for making reference for arbitration in terms of the contract. The Addi. District Judge after considering the evidence and the objections allowed the application and referred the dispute for arbitration. Against that order, the appeal was filed and the High Court confirmed the order of the Addi. District Judge.
The contention raised by Sri Sushil Kumar Jain, learned counsel for the appellant is that by operation of Sec. 19(2)(a) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (for short as the 'Partnership Act') there is no implied authority given to one of the partners to refer the dispute relating to the business of the firm for arbitration and therefore the reference made by the court, pursuant to a contract entered into by Satya Narain on behalf of the firm, is without jurisdiction. The High Court found as a fact that none of the partners have entered into the witness box to deny the validity of the contract nor raised any objection that they had not authorised Satya Narain to enter into the contract nor that they were bound by any acts done by him. It is also found that Satya Narain signed the tender and at that time no other .partners raised objection regarding the signing of the tender by Satya Narain on behalf of the firm. In view of these facts it is clear that they ratified the contract. It is also further to be noted that. in terms of the contract, the corporation had appropriated the security deposit made by the appellant-firm and that was not objected to at any time. This itself would fortify. the conclusion that the firm had entered into a binding contract with the corpora- tion and contract contained the arbitration clause which binds the partners. The contention raised that the contract is void and that in terms of the contract, making a refer- ence is without jurisdiction bears no substance.
The High Court found that Satya Narain has implied power to con duct business on behalf of the partnership firm and the implied authority 545 binds all the partners. Sec. 18 of the Partnership Act postulates that "subject to the provisions of the Act a partner is the agent of the firm for the purposes of the business of the firm". Sec. 19(1) adumbrates that "subject to the provisions of Sec. 22 the act of the partners which is done to carry on in the usual way the business of the kind carried on by the firm, binds the firm". Thus, Satya Narain has implied authority to enter into the contract with the corporation to supply the Dal of 1000 quintals at the contracted rate which is the usual course of the business of the appellant. But it is settled law that the operation of Sees. 18 & 19(1) is subject to the exceptions engrafted in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 19. Sec. 19(2)(a) provides that in the absence of any usage or custom of trade to the contrary, the implied authority of a partner does not empower him to submit a dispute relating to the business of the firm to arbitration. Satya Narain has power to do business on behalf of the firm and in exercise thereof he entered into the contract with the corporation during the usual control of business to supply the Dal. Then crucial question is whether a valid contract which was not repudiated as per law, binds the other partners? Our answer is yes. It is not in dispute that the contract engrafts an arbitration clause and in terms thereof the dispute is to be referred to the arbitra- tion. Therefore, the reference made by the Addi. District Judge under Sec. 20 of the Arbitration Act is perfectly within the jurisdiction and in terms of the contract. It is not the case of the partners that the firm is not carrying on the business of the supply of Dal and that Satya Narain, as found by the Trial Court, was authorised to do business on behalf of the firm.
Under those circumstances, the reference is clearly valid. We do not find any illegality to interfere with the order of the High Court.
In this view, the decisions in Gopal Das v. Bail Nath & Ors., AIR 1926 Allahabad 238; Finn Radhakishan Chunnilal v. Finn Ashamal lshardas, AIR 1926 Lahore 91; Rajendra Prasad v. Pannalal Champalal & Ors. AIR 1932 Calcutta 343; Mansab- dar Khan v.M.T. Allah Devi & Ors., AIR 1934 Lahore 48S; Sohanlal v. Finn Madhoram Banwarilal, AIR 19S2 Punjab 240; and M/s Alazappa Cotton Mills v. Indo Bunna Trading Corpora- tion, AIR 1976 Madras 79; cited by learned counsel are of little assistance to the appellant. In M/s Alazappa Cotton Mills case the original contract does not contain arbitra- tion clause. In a separate letter with a rubber stamp (facsimile) of the firm one of the partners agreed for reference to arbitration. On those facts it was held that the reference does not bind the other partners. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Since we do not call upon the respondents to argue, there will be no order as to costs.
V.P.R.						      Appeal
dismissed.
546