Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Bansi Lal vs Delhi Development Authority on 16 March, 2009
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI T.A. 04/2008 With T.A. No. 105/2007 New Delhi, this the 16th day of March, 2009 HONBLE MR. L.K. JOSHI, VICE CHAIRMAN (A) HONBLE MRS. MEERA CHHIBBER, MEMBER (J) TA-04/2008 1. Babu Ram Jha working as Carpenter in DDA, Vikas Sadan, New Delhi. 2. Hanif Mohd. working as Carpenter in DDA, Vikas Sadan, New Delhi. 3. Abdul Asis working as Carpenter in DDA, Vikas Sadan, New Delhi. 4. Om Parkash working as Plumber in DDA, Vikas Sadan, New Delhi. 5. Ghasi Ram working as Fitter in DDA, Vikas Sadan, New Delhi. 6. Narain Singh working as Painter in DDA, Vikas Sadan, New Delhi. 7. Anokhay Lal working as Painter in DDA, Vikas Sadan, New Delhi. 8. Jai Prakash working as Carpenter in DDA, Vikas Sadan, New Delhi. 9. Pyare Lal working as Fitter in DDA, Vikas Sadan, New Delhi. By Advocate: Shri Yogesh Sharma. Versus 1. The Delhi Development Authority Through Vice Chairman, Vikas Sadan, New Delhi. 2. The Commissioner (P), Delhi Development Authority, Vikas Sadan, New Delhi. ..Respondents By Advocate: Shri Arun Birbal. TA No. 105/2007 1. Bansi Lal S/o Late Sri Chattar Singh (Working under: Executive Engineer, Divn: ED-2, DDA, East Delhi, Dilshad Garden) R/o V-78, Seelampur-IIIrd Shahdara, Delhi-53. 2. Naval Kishore S/o Late Sri. Murli (Working under: Executive Engineer, Divn: ND-2, DDA, Motia Khan, Delhi) R/o Village: Ganauli, Distt: Ghaziabad (UP). ..Petitioners By Advocate: Shri Yogesh Sharma Versus Delhi Development Authority, Through: Its Chairman, Vikas Sadan, INA Market, New Delhi. Respondents By Advocate: Shri Arun Birbal. ORDER
By Honble Mrs. Meera Chhibber, Member (J) In both these TAs facts as well as counsel are common with the exception that in TA No.105/2007 it is stated by the petitioners that persons who were junior to them have been given the higher pay scales with effect from retrospective date by the Industrial Tribunal, therefore, they are also entitled for the same benefits. For the sake of narrating facts, TA No.04/2008 is being taken as a lead case.
2. It is submitted by the petitioners that they were engaged on daily wage basis against the skilled posts of carpenter, plumber, fitter, painter, masons etc. on different dates from 1976 to 1979. However, they were subsequently absorbed on work charged basis in the lower pay scale of Rs.210-270 whereas, they ought to have been absorbed in the skilled grade of Rs.260-400.
3. It is submitted by the applicants that similarly situated persons had raised industrial dispute for this purpose and the Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal gave its award on 14.8.1996 whereby the Management was directed to absorb the similarly situated persons as Mason Grade-I in the pay scale of Rs.260-400 with effect from the date they were regularised as Assistant Mason. The Management was also directed to pay arrears within 3 months failing which they would be entitled to 12% interest per annum on same. Respondents challenged the said award by filing C.W. No. 6503/1998 but that was also dismissed vide order dated 26.9.2002. Accordingly, the order was implemented by the respondents and pay of the similarly situated persons were fixed in the grade of Rs.260-400 vide order dated 23.4.2003.
4. When petitioners came to know about it, they also gave representations to the respondents for granting the same relief to them as well. However, since no reply was forthcoming, they filed Civil Writ Petition No.2800-8/2006 before the Honble High Court of Delhi which was disposed off on 28.2.2006 by directing the respondents to take a decision on the representation of the petitioners dated 25.8.2005 by passing a reasoned and speaking order. Liberty was also given to the petitioners to assail the same, in case they are still aggrieved by the orders to be passed by the respondents. Pursuant to the directions, respondents passed order dated 12.4.2006 but rejected the claim of the petitioners on the ground that award was only in favour of Amar Singh and Raj Pal which cannot be followed in all other cases.
5. It is in these circumstances, that petitioners had filed the 2nd Civil Writ Petition No.10705-13/2006 and CW No.2056-57/2004 which was subsequently transferred to this Tribunal vide order dated 11.12.2007 in view of Notification issued by the Central Government dated 25.7.2007.
6. Counsel for the petitioners strenuously argued that once relief has been given to the similarly situated persons by the Tribunal, it cannot be denied to the petitioners. He has relied on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of K.C. Sharma and Others Vs. Union of India and Others reported in 1998 (1) AISLJ 54 and Inder Pal Yadav Vs. U.O.I. reported in 1985 SSC (2) 648.
7. Respondents on the other hand have opposed both the TAs on the ground that petitioners cannot seek advantage of the award of the Industrial Tribunal given in favour of 2 persons only. They have explained that the petitioners were initially taken on daily wages basis on account of temporary exigency of work, without competing with other candidates and undergoing the rigorous norms as laid down by Recruitment Regulations. They were getting only minimum wages as notified by the Delhi Administration from time to time. Respondents have denied that petitioners were appointed against skilled post on daily wage as alleged. On the contrary they have stated petitioners were not holding any post. However, since they had worked with the respondents for few years, their services were regularised by taking them on work charged establishment which was accepted by them without any protest, therefore, petitioners cannot be allowed to rake up this issue after such a long delay.
8. Even otherwise they have explained that all the petitioners were appointed against the available work charged establishment as back as in 1976 to 1979 e.g. Shri Babu Ram Jha was appointed on work charged establishment as Assistant Carpenter in the scale of Rs.210-290 w.e.f. 16.11.1976 on the basis of family planning incentive scheme. Shri Hanif Mohammad was appointed as Assistant Carpenter on work-charged establishment w.ef. 18.11.1976 in the scale of Rs.210-290 on the basis of family planning incentive scheme. Shri Abdul Aziz was appointed on work charged establishment as Assistant Carpenter in the scale of Rs.210-290 w.e.f. 12.1.1977. Shri Om Prakash was appointed as Assistant Plumber on work-charged establishment in the scale of Rs.210-290 w.e.f. 19.5.1979 on purely temporary basis. Shri Ghasi Ram was appointed on work-charged establishment as a Fitter in the scale of Rs.210-290 w.e.f. 1.2.1976. Shri Narayan Singh was appointed as Assistant Painter on work-charged establishment in the scale of Rs.210-290 w.e.f. 22.12.1976 on the basis of family planning incentive scheme. Shri Anokhey Lal was appointed as Assistant Painter on work-charged establishment in the scale of Rs.210-290 w.e.f. 27.11.1976 on the basis of Family Planning incentive scheme. Shri Jai Prakash was appointed as Assistant Carpenter on work-charged establishment in the scale of Rs.210-290 w.e.f. 12.11.1976. Shri Pyare Lal was appointed as Assistant Fitter on work-charged establishment w.e.f. 20.12.1976 in the scale of Rs.210-290. They have thus submitted that regularization was done as per the then prevailing policy and they were regularised in a uniform manner. They never challenged it and have woken up after 30 years, therefore, this OA is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.
9. Moreover, if the relief, as prayed for by the petitioners is granted, it would create chaos as all other persons who were regularised along with petitioners would also come to the court, even though till date they have not chosen to come to the court specially because petitioners herein are not the senior most.
10. Respondents have further submitted that petitioners cannot claim parity with Shri Net Ram and Mangelal because Shri Net Ram was appointed on work charged establishment as Assistant Fitter in March, 1976 and was later on promoted to the post of Fitter on the basis of family planning incentive scheme after passing the trade test. Similarly Shri Mange Lal was also appointed as Assistant Fitter on 17.3.1976 in the scale of Rs.210-290 on work charged establishment but was subsequently promoted to the post of Fitter in the scale of Rs.260-350 in November, 1976. Simply because those two persons were promoted, the petitioners cannot seek promotion automatically. They have thus stated that petitioners cannot be placed in the pay scale of Rs.260-400. Nor can petitioners claim to be similarly situated as claimants in I.D. No.1/88 because petitioners chose to accept their appointment without demur, whereas those persons went to the Tribunal. Petitioners cannot not now claim parity after remaining silent for over 30 years. Moreover, order passed by the Industrial Tribunal was not a judgment in rem. In the present case there are disputed questions of facts, therefore, it is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. In any case, if petitioners want benefit of the award given by the Industrial Tribunal, they must raise their claim before the said Tribunal.
11. Petitioners gave their representation for the Ist time on 25.8.2005 and had never raised any objection or protest before the said date. Even this representation was given after 9 years, from the date award was passed by the Industrial Tribunal, therefore, petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.
12. They have specifically stated that petitioners were not appointed as Carpenters, Plumbers, Fitters, Painters, Masons etc., as alleged by them but they were engaged on daily wage basis. They have thus prayed that the petitions may be dismissed.
13. No rejoinder has been filed in these cases.
14. As far as TA No.105/2007 is concerned, petitioner No.1 has stated he was appointed on 16.12.1969 as First Class Mason. However, he was appointed in the establishment on 5.12.1973 as Assistant Mason. One Shri Amar Singh was also appointed on 24.12.1976 as Assistant Mason. In the seniority list petitioner No.1 is shown at Sl.No.7 and petitioner No.2 is at Sl.No. 9 whereas said Shri Amar Singh is shown at Sl.No.30. They have submitted since Amar Singh has been allowed to be absorbed in scale of Rs.260-400, therefore, the same benefit should be given to the petitioners also. All other facts and submissions are same, as mentioned above.
15. We have heard both the counsel and perused the pleadings. Admittedly, all the petitioners were absorbed in the posts carrying pay scale of Rs.210-290 as back as in 1976 or 1977 etc. If petitioners were aggrieved by their absorption in the lower posts as alleged by them, they ought to have raised objection at that relevant time. Admittedly, none of the petitioners raised any objections at that time. On the contrary, they accepted their absorption as Assistant Carpenter, Assistant Plumber or Assistant Painter or Assistant Fitter meaning thereby that they had acquiesced to the situation.
16. The first representation was given by the petitioners on 25.8.2005, i.e., after 29 to 30 years after they were absorbed and 9 years even after the award was passed by the Industrial Tribunal in ID No.1/88 because award was passed on 14.8.1996 in case of Amar Singh and Raj Singh. Petitioners have not at all explained why they woke up after 30 years. The only explanation given is that since Amar Singh and Raj Singh were placed in the pay scale of Rs.260-400, therefore, petitioners also sought the same relief. However, the fact remains that dispute was raised by those two persons as back as in 1988 and they had protested their absorption, while petitioners had accepted their absorption in the scale of Rs.210-290, therefore, petitioners cannot compare themselves with Amar Singh and Raj Singh. Moreover, Industrial Tribunal cases are decided on the basis of evidence which is led before it. Perusal of the award shows, in case of Amar Singh and Raj Singh management had conceded that they had joined the post of Mason Grade-I w.e.f. 9.6.1973 and 3.1.1976 whereas in the instant case respondents have categorically denied that they were appointed against any skilled post. On the contrary respondents have stated petitioners were working on daily wage basis, therefore, it is a disputed question of fact. Petitioners have not placed on record any document to show that they were working against any skilled posts and have not even bothered to rebut the averments made by the respondents, therefore, in law they are deemed to have been accepted. In these circumstances, the relief as claimed for cannot be granted.
17. Respondents have specifically stated that the petitioners were engaged initially without competing with others meaning thereby they were not appointed against any post in accordance with rules but were engaged purely on daily wage basis as per exigency of work, therefore, in the absence of any proof, it cannot be accepted that petitioners were initially appointed against skilled posts of Carpenter, Plumber, Fitter, Painter or Mason, as alleged by them.
18. Apart from it from the representations given by petitioners, we find they have been given further promotion also because on page 44 Shri Babu Ram has stated he is presently Carpenter. It is not known when the said petitioner has been promoted but the fact remains that they have accepted further promotions also. Petitioners have not annexed any seniority list so we do not know how many persons are above the petitioners. If the relief, as prayed for is granted, it would create further anomaly as next step would be petitioners would claim seniority above those seniors, thus it would create further complications, therefore, the relief, as claimed, cannot be granted in a mechanical manner simply on the ground that it has been granted to 2 other persons.
19. Moreover, it is most important to mention here that though in the counter-affidavit respondents have not stated so but in the written arguments they have stated the scale of Rs.260-400 as sought by the petitioners belongs to a promotional post. This is very important fact because if it is correct then applicants in any case could not have been regularised against the post which was to be filled by way of promotion. It goes without saying that petitioners could have been asborbed only at the initial entry point and not against promotional post because in that case right of those who were eligible to be promoted would have been affected. Since it was a very crucial point, we had directed the respondents to produce the Recruitment Rules of Assistant Carpenter and other categories as well as Carpenter and other categories but in spite of our directions, no such Recruitment Rules have been produced either by the petitioners or by the respondents.
20. We are definite that for deciding the issue in hand, it would be relevant to see the above Recruitment Rules also. Moreover, respondents have also stated that petitioners are not the senior most meaning thereby that if relief, as prayed for is granted to the petitioners, it would affect their seniors who have not been impleaded as parties and would lead to further litigation, therefore, both the TAs are liable to be dismissed on the grounds as discussed above.
21. We would be failing in our duty if we do not deal with the judgments relied upon by the counsel for the petitioners. It is correct that in K.C. Sharmas case (Supra) Honble Supreme Court had held that application filed by similarly situated persons should not be rejected on the ground of limitation but it is relevant to know in what context it was so held. The facts in K.C. Sharmas case were that the appellants therein were guards in the Northern Railway who had retired between 1980 to 1988. They were aggrieved by Notification dated December 5, 1988 whereby Rule 2544 of Indian Railway Establishment Code (IREC) was amended for the purpose of calculating average emoluments and the maximum limit in respect of running allowance was reduced from 75% to 45% w.e.f. 1.1.1973 to March 31, 1979 and to 55% from Ist April, 1979 onwards.
22. Their OA was dismissed on the ground of limitation in spite of the fact that Notification dated 5.12.1988 was already held to be invalid by the Full Bench of the Tribunal as the said Notification had given retrospective effect to the amendment of Rule 2544 of IREC.
23. It goes without saying that since Notification by which petitioners were aggrieved was already held to be invalid by the Full Bench inasmuch as it had given retrospective effect to the amendment, therefore, naturally petitioners would have become entitled to the same benefits. It was in those circumstances that Honble Supreme Court had held that case of similarly situated persons should not have been rejected on the ground of limitation and rightly so because once Notification itself is held to be invalid being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, it would be invalid for one and all. By no stretch of imagination it could have been stated that it would be invalid for only those who had approached the court. In such circumstances since it would be judgment in rem the benefit of same would be available to all similarly situated persons. No one can dispute the above preposition of law but the question is whether the ratio of above judgment would be applicable in the present set of facts. The answer is No. In the instant case no question of law was decided by the Industrial Tribunal. On the contrary the said case was decided because management had conceded the claim of petitioners therein that they were initially appointed against the skilled posts, whereas in the present case facts are disputed by the respondents, therefore, the award given by Tribunal in the case of Amar Singh and Another cannot be used as a precedence for seeking the same relief by petitioners without proving the claim set by them. At this juncture it would be relevant to quote the relevant para from the order passed by Industrial Tribunal which for ready reference reads as under:-
9. The contention of the workmen is that Amar Singh joined the management as Meson Grade-I w.e.f. 9.6.73 and Raj Pal joined the same post on 3.1.1976. The above facts are admitted to MW-1 in his examination in chief itself. It is undisputed that management instead of regularizing them as Mason Grade-I regularised them as work charged Assistant Mason. It is also undisputed that the scale of Mason Grade-I is Rs.260-400 while that of work charged Assistant Mason is Rs.210-270. There is no explanation from the side of management that when workmen joined the management as Mason Grade-I as to why they were regularised or absorbed as work charged Assistant Mason and the said order of management is apparently wrong and I accordingly direct the management to absorb Amar Singh as Mason Grade-I and Shri Raj Pal Singh also as Mason Grade-I with effect from dates they were regularised as Assistant Mason and in the pay scale of Rs.260-400. The management shall comply with the above directions within three months of the present award becoming enforceable. The management shall also pay arrears of the pay to the workmen within this period otherwise they will be entitled to claim 12% interest per annum on the same. Issue is decided accordingly. Award is passed accordingly.
24. From above it is clear that the order was passed without dealing with any of the questions as raised in this case. On the contrary because management had conceded that those petitioners were initially engaged against skilled posts, therefore, it cannot be termed as judgment in rem. Judement in rem has been explained by Honble Supreme Court in Satrucharla Vijaya Rama Raju Vs. Nimmaka Jaya Raju and Others reported in 2006 (1) SCC 212. In the said case it was held by Honble Supreme Court as follows:-
A judgment in rem is one which declares, defines or otherwise determines the status of a person or of a thing, that is to say, the jural relation of the person or thing to the world generally.
25. It is now settled law that when a particular point of law is not consciously determined by the court, that does not form part of ratio deci dendi nor is binding (See Mittal Engineering Works (p) Ltd. Vs. Collector of Central Excise, Meerut reported in 1997 (1) SCC 203 and Arnit Das Vs. State of Bihar reported in 2000 (5) SCC 488).
26. In Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta Vs. M/s Alnoori Tobacco Products and Another reported in 2004 (6) SCC SCALE 232 it has further been held as follows:-
12. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark on lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.
..
14. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
27. It has also been held by Honble Supreme Court in the case of Ramdas and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2007 (2) SCC 170 as follows:-
It is settled law that however similar the circumstances, facts in one case cannot be used as a precedent to determine the conclusion on the facts in another.
28. In view of above, it is clear that a judgment becomes binding only if a question of law has been decided and reliance cannot be placed on other orders blindly without finding out whether the facts of case are same as relied upon case or are different. In other words, each case has to be decided on the facts available on record.
29. According to us petitioners case would be fully governed by the latest judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Nadia District Primary School council and Another Vs. Sristidhar Biswas and Others reported in AISLJ 2008 (1) SC 93.
30. In this case the facts are that a panel for appointment of primary teachers was formed in the year 1980 in which 1965 candidates were included. This was challenged by the respondents in the year 1989 on the ground that preference ought to have been given to trained candidates as per Rule 3 (d) of the Recruitment Rules. On the question of delay they had submitted they were awaiting decision in similar case. Honble High Court condoned the delay and allowed the Writ Petition by observing that they were similarly situated persons as Sirazul Haque Mallick and 107 others. Accordingly, learned Single Judge directed the District Council to give appointment to the 55 petitioners. The matter was carried to the Division Bench on the ground that relief could not have been given to the petitioners therein as they had approached the court after delay and life of panel had exhausted. Moreover order in Haques case was passed due to the concession given by them, therefore, it could not have been used as a precedent. However, the appeal was rejected, therefore, District School Council carried the matter to the Honble Supreme Court. It was held as under by the Honble Supreme Court:-
The Court only gives the benefit to the persons, who are vigilant about their rights and not to those who sit on fence. Mallick's case was decided in 1982, in 1989 Dibakar Pal filed the petition and thereafter in 1989 respondents herein filed the writ petition. Therefore petition filed by Dibakar Pal challenging the panel of 1980 itself was hopelessly belated. Likewise the present writ petition filed by the respondents herein. The explanation that the respondents waited for the judgment in Mallick's case or Dibakar's case, is hardly relevant. In this connection, learned counsel invited our attention to a recent decision of this Court in Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam and Anr. Vs. Jaswant Singh and Anr. [JT 2006 (10) 500]. In that case, referring to various decisions of this Court, it was observed that those who sit on the fence and wait for a favourable order and thereafter wake up to take up the matter, are not entitled to any relief. In para 13 of the judgment, this Court concluded as follows:
"In view of the statement of law as summarized above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or while away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the Court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussion on the financial management of the Nigam. Why the Court should come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence."
In the present case, the panel was prepared in 1980 and the petitioners approached the court in 1989 after the decision in Dibakar Pal's case. Such persons should not be given any benefit by the Court when they allowed more than nine years to elapse. Delay is very significant in matters of granting relief and Courts cannot come to the rescue of the persons who are not vigilant of their rights. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court condoning the delay of nine years cannot be countenanced.
31. It was further held that in Sirazul Haque Mallick's case it was clearly mentioned that this will not be treated as a precedent. Despite this, Sirazul Haque Mallick's judgment has been used subsequently in Dibakar Pal's case and Dibakar Pal's judgment has been followed in the present Sristidhar Biswas's case. This clearly goes to show that both Division Bench did not apply their mind to the clear observation in Sirazul Haque Mallick's case that this case shall not be treated as a precedent. Sirazul Haque Mallick's case never examined the validity of the panel. It was only on account of the concession the matter was decided and it was clearly qualified that it shall not be treated as a precedent. We fail to understand how can Sirazul Haque Mallick's case be treated to be a blank cheque for passing appointment orders in subsequent writ petitions in the case of Dibakar Pal and Sristidhar Biswas (impugned order in the present case) despite the fact that in Sirazul Haque Mallick's case, the Division Bench presided by the Chief Justice Desai (as he then was) clearly clarified that the order is passed on concession. Such order on concession followed with clarification that it shall not be treated as precedent, cannot be taken as binding precedent to be followed. We do not want to comment further, but we must make it very clear that any order passed on concession does not lay down the law and it cannot be followed as a precedent. But regretfully the Single Judge and the Division Bench subsequently have taken it to be a law and followed the precedent giving relief to the persons leaving behind large number of persons who were on the panel and who were not parties before the Court. The Court should keep restrain before passing order saddling State Government with financial burden. A panel of 1980 was kept alive up to 2004 without realizing that by this time many more aspirants are waiting in queue. That was not the correct approach and we cannot countenance such action.
32. Reference was also made to the following judgments:
(a) Mittal Engineering Works (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Meerut reported in (1997) 1 SCC 203 wherein it was observed as follows:
" A decision cannot be relied upon in support of a proposition that it did not decide."
and (b) Arnit Das v. State of Bihar reported in (2000) 5 SCC 488 wherein it was held as follows:
"When a particular point of law is not consciously determined by the Court, that does not form part of ratio decidendi and is not binding."
33. In view of above, it was held by Honble Supreme Court that the judgment given in Mallick's case is not binding as it does not decide the law. It cannot be treated as binding precedent. Ultimately the judgment of Honble High Court was set aside by the Honble Supreme Court by observing that the view taken in the present case (Sristidhar Biswas's case), relying on the judgments of Sirazul Haque Mallick and Dibakar Pal, cannot be upheld as the judgment given in Sirazul Haque Mallick's case was on concession and it was clearly mentioned that it shall not be treated as a precedent.
34. From above it is clear that Honble Supreme Court in nutshell has clearly held as follows:-
(i) Order based on concession cannot form a precedent.
(ii) Court can consider the grievance of those who are awake to their rights and not of those who sit on the fence and wait for decision in some other case.
(iii) Financial burden on state has to be kept in mind while passing orders.
(iv) Delay cannot be condoned merely because relief is given to some others after a long delay.
35. In above backdrop, if we test the facts of the present case, we find it is fully covered by the above judgment because here also petitioners were absorbed in the year 1976-77 which was accepted by them without any protest. The Ist representation was given by them only in the year 2005 i.e. after about 29 years from the date they were absorbed and 9 years after the relief was given to others by the Tribunal meaning thereby that they were sitting on the fence awaiting the outcome of other case.
36. Moreover, in the instant case, petitioners have sought benefit of I.D. No.1/88 but perusal of the award shows Management had conceded the claim in the said case. There was no dispute on facts in the said case whereas there are disputed questions of facts in the instant case which have not been proved by the petitioners, therefore, the facts of present case according to us are fully covered by the above judgment.
37. In view of above discussion, we find no good grounds to interfere in the case. The TAs being devoid of any merit is dismissed. No costs.
Let a copy of this order be placed in the other TA file also.
(MRS. MEERA CHHIBBER) (L.K. JOSHI)
MEMBER (J) VICE CHAIRMAN (A)
Rakesh