Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Gummadisetti, S/O. Pitchaiah vs The Joint Collector on 30 December, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2004(1)ALD535, 2004(1)ALT565, 2004 A I H C 1090, (2004) 1 ANDH LT 565
Author: B. Sudershan Reddy
Bench: B. Sudershan Reddy, K.C. Bhanu
ORDER 1. The core issue in these two writ petitions arises in connection with the election to recognise majority trade union in Panyam Cements and Mineral Industries Ltd., (hereafter called 'Panyam Cements'), Cement Nagar, Kurnool District. Panyam Cements Employees Mazdoor Union (hereafter called 'Mazdoor Union') and Panyam Cements Employees Union (hereafter called 'Employees Union') are before this Court raising objection in the method and manner of inclusion and non-inclusion of certain categories of workers in the voters' list. Employees Union filed W.P.No.16250 of 2003 praying this Court for a direction to the Commissioner of Labour, Hyderabad, and Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Kunool, first and second respondents herein, to conduct election by secret ballot under code of discipline to determine the majority trade union in Panyam Cements pursuant to the memoranda dated 5-2-2003 and 21-3-2003. Be it noted that by the said memoranda, the two rival unions were called to attend the joint meeting before the Deputy Commissioner and Returning Officer along with necessary material to determine the majority union in Panyam Cements. Mazdoor Union filed W.P.No.23487 of 2003 challenging the letter of the Deputy Commissioner dated 30-10-2003 whereunder the Deputy Commissioner rejected the request of the Mazdoor Union to include four employees working in branch offices as well as forty-one badli workers in the voters' list. 2. As per the code of discipline, recognition of majority union for the purpose of negotiating with the management is done once in two years. In 1990, Employees Union was recognized as majority trade union for a period of two years. After 1993, no union was, however, recognized due to various reasons including the non-functioning of Panyam Cements. The factory started functioning in 2000. There was a settlement between the Mazdoor Union and the management of Panyam Cements regarding collection of electricity charges from the workers in occupation of factory quarters, canteen facilities, leave encashment, badli and casual employees etc. Be that as it is, the Deputy Commissioner, by communication dated 21-3-2003 requested the General Secretaries of both the unions to attend the joint meeting on 31-10-2003 along with records and renewal certificate of the union to enable the Retuning Orricer to conduct secret ballot election under code of discipline to determine majority union in Panyam Cements. On 31-10-2003, General Secretary of Employees Union alone attended the meeting, but no action was taken for conducting election. The Employees Union, therefore, filed W.P.No.16250 of 2003 alleging that as there is no recognized union for the purpose of collective bargaining, salaries of workers are not paid from October 2001 and that elections should be conducted to recognize the majority union in the factory. 3. On 26-3-2003, General Secretaries of Mazdoor Union as well as Employees Union attended the joint meeting in the chambers of the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Kurnool when it was agreed to take 1-2-2003 as the date of reckoning for preparation of voters' list. It was also agreed to exclude permanent wage board employees who are retired or promoted to managerial cadre after 1-2-2003. The minutes of the said meeting have some bearing and, therefore, need to be read in verbatim. MINUTES OF THE MEETING HELD ON 26/08/2003 IN THE CHAMBERS OF DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR; KURNOOL ZONE; KURNOOL REGARDING CODE OF DISCIPLINE (RECOGNITION OF UNION/CONDUCT OF VERIFICATION) TO DETERMINE THE MAJORITY UNION IN M/s.PANYAM CEMENTS AND MINERAL INDSUTRIES LTD., CEMENT NAGAR; KURNOOL DISTRICT 4. Sri Ch.Ramalingeswara Rao, General Secretary, Panyam Cements Mineral Industries Hind Mazdoor Union, R.No.F.95 attended the meeting and produced the following documents. 1) Original Registration Certificate 2) Rules Copy 3) Latest Annual Return 5. The General Secretary of the above union agreed to take 01/02/2003 as date of reckoning for the preparation of voters list. The persons whose names are in the workers Muster Roll (Permanent Wage Board Employees) as on 01/02/2003 and subsequently promoted to managerial cadre, persons who retired after 01/02/2003 are not eligible to vote. 6. The General Secretary of the Panyam Cements Employees Union Sri M.Venkataramaiah attended the meeting and submitted the original registration certificate. The General Secretary of the Panyam Cements Employees Union also agreed to take 01/02/2003 as date of reckoning. 7. The next step in the election process was verification of members of each union to determine majority before conducting secret ballot. Both the unions agreed that secret ballot is best method for the purpose of election and, therefore, a valid code of discipline should be followed. A draft voters' list was prepared. Both the unions raised certain objections regarding the same. These objections related to inclusion of four (4) employees, security staff in the factory, inclusion of employees working in the branches and inclusion of forty-one (41) badli workers working in the factory. Considering these objections as well as the right of these employees to vote in the election, by proceedings/letter bearing No.B1/821/2003, dated 30-10-2003, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order on the three objections as follows. OBJECTION No.1: Vote to Security Staff who are working in the Factory: The Management representative stated that all the security staff are permanent Wage Board employees. Both the unions requested to include security staff in the voters list. Accordingly their request is considered and the security staff are included in the voters list. OBJECTION No.2: Employees working in the Branches: The Panyam Cements Hind Mazdoor Union raised an objection and requested to allow 4 people who are working in Branch Offices both at Hyderabad and Kurnool and who are permanent Wage Board employees. In this regard the management representative stated that the Muster of the 4 employees are maintaining at Hyderabad office and they are taking their salaries at Hyderabad office only and they are not on the rolls of the factory. Basing on the above clarification the objection raised by the Panyam Cement Hind Mazdoor Union is rejected. OBJECTION No.3: Regarding Badli Workers: The Panyam Cements Hind Mazdoor Union raised an objection regarding 41 badli employees who are working for the last 15 to 20 years and getting Wage Board wages and requested to allow them to vote. In this regard the management submitted list of working days from 1999 to 2003 for all the 41 Badli workers which shows that none of the employee has not completed 240 days in any year from 1999 onwards. Further, at the time of Joint Meeting held on 26/08/2003 the unions accepted to take all permanent Wage Board employees as voters. Regarding the payment of wages the management is paying minimum rates of wages to the workers as per the Wage Board recommendations. With this it is not possible to consider the request of the unions in respect of all the 41 badli workers who have not completed 240 days in any year from 1999. Hence the objection is not considered. 8. The above letter of the Deputy Commissioner is assailed by the Mazdoor Union in .P.No.23487 of 2003. As can be seen, all the twenty-two security staff working in the factory were included in the voters' list as both the unions requested for their inclusion. Insofar as the inclusion of four employees of Panyam Cements working in the branch offices at Hyderabad and Kurnool, a reading of the impugned letter would show that Employees Union did not raise any objection. Even the anagement's representative has not raised objection. However, it was brought to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner that the muster roll of the four employees is maintained in Hyderabad office, that the employees are receiving salaries in Hyderabad and that they are not workers of the factory. These factors influenced the Deputy Commissioner to reject the request of the Mazdoor Union to include four employees in the voters' list. When Hyderabad and Kurnool branches are not separate establishments but are part of the factory meant to deal with incidental matters, I fail to understand the logic behind excluding these four employees. These four employees were employed by Panyam Cements and they were very much employees of the factory. It would be improper to deny these four employees the right to vote in the election. Learned counsel Sri G.Veera Reddy, does not seriously dispute this. 9. Insofar as non-inclusion of badli workers of the factory, learned counsel for Mazdoor Union (petitioner in W.P.No.23487 of 2003), Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, raised the following contentions challenging such non-inclusion. Badli workers are also workmen for the purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereafter called 'the I.D.Act') and the Trade Unions Act, 1926 (hereafter called 'the Trade Unions Act'). Therefore, it was not proper for the Deputy Commissioner to prevent badli workers from voting. Secondly, he would urge that when there was a settlement under Section 18(1) of the I.D.Act between the management of Panyam Cements and Mazdoor Union in 2000, it was also agreed between the parties to the settlement that badli workers will be engaged for a minimum of two days in a week on payment of daily wages and if they are engaged beyond two days they will be paid Rs.100/- per day depending upon the exigencies of work. This, according to the learned counsel, clinchingly shows that badli workers have also a right to vote in the election to recognize majority union. Unless and until badli workers are treated as workmen for the purpose of industrial law, the management could not have given the benefit of assured employment and payment of production wages to badli workers at the instance of Mazdoor Union because they are espousing the cause of all the workmen of Panyam Cements. Per contra, learned counsel Sri G.Veera Reddy, appearing for Employees Union, submits that badli workers are not workmen and they cannot be included in the voters' list. He would submit that when the joint meeting was convened on 26-8-2003, it was agreed between the two unions to include all the permanent wage board employees on muster roll as on 1-2-2003 alone in the voters' list. Therefore, Mazdoor Union cannot turn around and agitate the inclusion of badli workers in the voters' list. He would contend that the Deputy Commissioner came to a right conclusion in excluding forty-one badli workers from the voters' list as they are not permanent wage board employees. 10. The short question is whether badli workmen/employees are workmen for the purpose of the Trade Unions Act? Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act defines 'workman' as under. (s) 'workman' means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express of implied, and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with or, as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person - (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an Officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him functions, mainly of a managerial nature. 11. The definition of the workman is in two parts i.e., inclusive part and exclusive part. Every person employed in an industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, clerical and other types of works is a workman. As per the exclusive part, a person who is subject to the Air Force Act, the Army Act or the Navy Act, a person who is employed in police service and a person who is in managerial or administrative post or a person employed in supervisory capacity drawing wages exceeding Rs.2500/- per month are not workmen. A reading of the inclusive part of the definition 'workman' of the I.D. Act, would show that it does not make any distinction between the persons who are paid salaries as per the Cement Wage Board or the persons who are paid daily wages or persons who are badli workers. The term 'badli workers' is not defined in the I.D. Act. Nonetheless, it must be held that badli workers also fall within the definition of workman and badli workers are workmen for the purpose of the I.D. Act entitled to the benefits under all industrial laws. Section 2(ra) of the I.D.Act defines 'unfair labour practice' as any practice specified in the Fifth Schedule. Fifth Schedule to the I.D. Act enumerates a number of unfair labour practices on the part of workmen as well as on the part of the employer. Clause 4 of Part I of the Fifth Schedule reads as under. 4. To encourage or discourage membership in any trade union by discriminating against any workman, that is to say:- a. discharging or punishing a workman because he urged other workmen to join or organize a trade union; b. discharging or dismissing a workman for taking part in any strike (nor being a strike which is deemed to be an illegal strike under this Act); c. changing seniority rating of workmen because of trade union activity; d. refusing to promote workmen to higher posts on account of their trade union activities; e. giving unmerited promotions to certain workmen with a view to creating discord amongst other workmen, or to undermine the strength of their trade union; f. discharging office-bearers or active members of the trade union on account of their trade union activities. 12. In relation to the trade union, as can be seen from the above, any action on the part of the employer/workmen to discourage a workman from participating in a trade union activity is unfair labour practice. Badli workmen are workmen and, therefore, if any management disapproves a "trade union of badli workers" or discourages badli workers to join a trade union or denies voting right to badli workers, the same would amount to unfair labour practice. If the interpretation by Sri G. Veera Reddy is accepted, the same would give right to the management to deny trade union right. Such interpretation would be ex facie contrary to the intention of the legislation and cannot be countenanced. Therefore, badli workers under law cannot be excluded from voting. 13. 'Trade union' is defined in the Trade Unions Act as any combination whether temporary or permanent, formed primarily for the purpose of regulating relations between the workmen and employers or between workmen and the workmen or between employers and employers. 'Trade dispute' is defined in Section 2(g) of the Act as under. (g) "trade dispute" means any dispute between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, or between employers and employers which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment or the conditions of labour, of any person, and "workmen" means all persons employed in trade or industry whether or not in the employment of the employer with whom the trade dispute arises; Reading the definitions of 'trade union' and 'trade dispute' it must be held that any dispute inter alia between the employer and workmen connected with the employment or non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person would be a trade dispute and the term workman includes all persons employed in the trade or industry. Any dispute between the badli workers and the management is also a trade dispute. It is for this reason that when there was a settlement between the Mazdoor Union and Panyam Cements in June 2000, both the parties agreed on certain terms regarding assured employment to badli workers. In that view of the matter, learned counsel for the Mazdoor Union is right that badli workers cannot be excluded from participating in the election to recognize the majority trade union. If that interpretation is accepted, that would lead to badli workers to lurch in a helpless state of suspended animation. 14. The submission of learned counsel for the Employees Union that only permanent wage board employees can be included in the voters' list cannot be accepted. Similarly, the objection of the Deputy Commissioner that forty-one badli workers did not complete 240 days from 1999 onwards is misconceived. A person who is employed even for a day is a workman for the purpose of industrial law and no management can refuse the benefits allowed under law and the Constitution. After reading the minutes of the joint meeting dated 26-8-2003, which is extracted hereinabove, I am convinced that permanent wage board employees who retired and/or who were promoted to managerial cadre after 1-2-2003 are alone agreed to be excluded from the voters' list and not badli workers as contended by the counsel for Employees Union. 15. In the result, the writ petitions are disposed of in the following manner. i) the impugned proceedings bearing Rc.No.B1/821/2003, dated 30-10-2003 is set aside; ii) the four employees of Panyam Cements working at Hyderabad and Kurnool branches and forty-one badli employees working in the factory shall be included in the voters' list for the year 2003; iii) the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Returning Officer shall forthwith complete the election process by allotting election symbols and finalising the election date; and iv) there shall be no order as to costs. Case Note: Labour and Industrial right to vote Sections 2 and 18 (1) of Industrial Disputes Act, and Trade Unions Act trade union raising objection to manner of inclusion and non-inclusion of certain categories of workers in voter's list question raised on status of 'badli' workmen any action on part of employer to discourage workmen from participating in trade union activity considered as unfair labour practice 'badli' workmen are workmen falling within definition provided under Section 2 (s) of Industrial Disputes Act - held, 'badli' workers cannot be excluded under law from voting. JUDGMENT B. Sudershan Reddy, J.
16. The unsuccessful petitioner in W.P No. 23710 of 2003 is the appellant in this appeal preferred against the order made in the said writ petition wherein a learned single Judge of this Court upheld the order passed by the Joint Collector, Khammam, the respondent herein dated 1.11.2003 keeping the licence of the appellant herein under suspension pending enquiry.
17. The appellant is a wholesale kerosene dealer of the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL). That when a tanker bearing No. AP 31T 5549 was transporting 12 Kilo Litres (KLs) for public distribution system blue dyed kerosene oil belonging to the appellant herein drawn from Kondapalli terminal of the HPCL, the Regional Vigilance and Enforcement Officer intercepted the tanker. The lorry and the kerosene were seized and the matter was reported to the Joint Collector, Khammam. We do not propose to refer to the allegations in detail levelled against the appellant herein and his defence so as to avoid unnecessary prejudice to either of the parties since enquiry is to be held against the appellant pursuant to the show cause notice stated to have already been issued by the Joint Collector.
18. The Joint Collector, Khammam having received the auto-max message dated 11.10.2003 in which it is inter alia alleged that the dealer deliberately diverted PDS SK oil to M/S. Dowpati Chinnaiah and sons, HPC Dealer, Narsaraopet through the oil tanker bearing No. AP 31T 5549, without valid documents with a malafide intention to direct the PDS Kerosene oil into black market, passed the impugned order on 1.11.2003, the operative portion of which reads as follows:
"The material evidence available has been examined and this is a prima-Facie case of the intension of diverting PDS kerosene oil in to black market to gain illegal profits on the part of M/s Suguna Agencies, HPCL Kerosene Dealer and his men and it is clear violation of provisions of clause 26 and 28 of Andhra Pradesh Petroleum Products (L&RS) Order, 1980 and hence the licence No. 1/1997 held by M/s Suguna Agencies, HPCL Kerosene Dealer, Manuguru is suspended with immediate effect under clause 29(2) of the above order pending enquiry. M/s Ananda Rao Enterprises, K.Oil Wholesale dealer, Bhadrachalam is kept in charge for purchase and sale of Kerosene Oil intended to M/s Suguna Agencies, HPCL Kerosene Dealer, Manuguru.
The Mandal Revenue Officer, Manuguru is directed to take steps for taking possession of the ground stocks and handing over to the in charge Dealer under cover of Panchanama and report compliance".
19. It was contended before the learned single Judge that the appellant is not involved in diversion of kerosene oil meant for public distribution system as alleged and therefore, exercise of power under sub-clause (2) of Clause 29 of the Andhra Pradesh Petroleum Products (Licensing and Regulation of Supplies) Order, 1980 (for short 'the Control Order') is unwarranted. It was also contended that the impugned order passed by the Joint Collector is without any notice and hence the same is invalid.
20. The learned Judge having noticed the contentions held that the impugned order passed by the Joint Collector is traceable to the power under sub-clause (2) of Clause 28 of the Control Order which empowers the licensing authority to pass an order of interim suspension pending action under sub-clause (1) of Clause 28 of the Control Order for cancellation or suspension, as the case may be. The learned Judge also found that a mere mention of wrong provision in an order does not vitiate the order itself.
21. In this writ appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant, Sri A. Rajasekhar Reddy strenuously contended that even if the order passed by the Joint Collector is traceable to sub-clause (2) of Clause 28 of the Control Order, the same could not have been passed without initiating any action as against the appellant herein under sub-clause (1) of Clause 28 of the Control Order. The contention is that sub-clause (2) of Clause 28 confers jurisdiction upon the licensing authority to pass an order of interim suspension of the licence or registration certification, provided action had already been initiated and pending against the licensee under sub-clause (1) of Clause 28 of the Control Order. It was submitted that admittedly as on 1.11.2003, no action has been initiated against the appellant herein under sub-clause (1) of Clause 28 and therefore, the impugned order of suspension is ultra vires.
22. That a plain reading of sub-clause (2) of Clause 28 does not support the contention put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant. Sub-clause (1) of Clause 28 authorises the licensing authority to cancel or suspend for such period as may be specified the licence, registration certificate/supply card on the ground that the licensee has contravened, attempted or abetted the contravention of any of the licence conditions issued under the Control Order. Sub-clause (2) of Clause 28 enables the licensing authority for reasons to be recorded in writing to order an interim suspension of the licence pending the action as under sub-clause (1) of Clause 28. That a plain reading of sub-clauses (1) and (2) of Clause 28 makes it abundantly clear that the licensing authority may for the reasons recorded in writing place the authorization or the registration certificate under suspension pending enquiry under sub-clause (1) of Clause 28. It means that simultaneous action can be contemplated under sub-clause (1) of Clause 28 and as well as an order of suspension of the licence in exercise of the power under sub-clause (2) of Clause 28 of the Control Order. It is true as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that unless an action is contemplated or envisaged under sub-clause (1) of Clause 28, the licence or registration certificate, as the case may be cannot be kept under suspension. An enquiry must be contemplated against the licensee and then alone, an order of suspension could be made in exercise of power under sub-clause (2) of Clause 28. But we find it difficult to accept the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that first action must be initiated under sub-clause (1) of Clause 28 by putting the licensee on notice and only thereafter, an order of suspension could be made in exercise of the power under sub-clause (2) of Clause 28. What is required is contemplation of action against the licensee under sub-clause (1) of Clause 28. An appropriate decision can be taken by the licensing authority simultaneously to take action under sub-clause (1) of Clause 28 and as well as the action under sub-clause (2) of Clause 28.
However, Sri Rajasekhar Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in A. Srirama Murthy Vs. Joint Collector, Visakhapatnam & Ors., 1999 (1) LS 89 in support of his submission that for invocation of power under Clause 28(2) of the Control Order, action is required to be initiated before the order of suspension is made. The Division Bench observed that "there is a power of suspension under the main provision contained under clause 28(1) of the Order, but the proviso controls the said provision warranting compliance of principles of natural justice of affording opportunity before invoking either the power of cancellation or suspension. Apart from the above power, there is a power for ordering interim suspension of the licence, under sub-clause (2) of Clause 28 of the Order. But, this is hedged with a condition of initiation of action and unless action has been initiated and pending, the power of ordering interim suspension under sub-clause (2) of Clause 28 of the Order cannot be invoked".
23. The observations made by the Division Bench have to be construed and understood in the proper perspective. The observations made by the Division Bench do not support the contention put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant that unless a show cause notice has been issued prior to passing of the order under sub-clause (1) of Clause 28, no action could be initiated or order be passed under sub-clause (2) of Clause 28 of the Control Order. All that the Division Bench observed is that the law requires initiation of action and the same should be pending as on the date of passing of the interim suspension under sub-clause (2) of Clause 28 of the Control Order. It means that an action can be initiated both under sub-clause (1) of Clause 28 and as well as under sub-clause (2) of Clause 28 simultaneously. The very expression used in the impugned order that "pending enquiry interim suspension of the licence has been made" itself suggests that action has been conceived and initiated against the appellant herein under sub-clause (1) of Clause 28. The same is followed by a show cause notice to which the appellant had already submitted its explanation. Mere fact that a show cause notice has been prepared and sent subsequent to the order of suspension would not make the order of suspension a void one.
24. In Commissioner of C.S., Hyd & Ors Vs. Radha Automobiles, Hyd, 1990 (2) LS 30 another Division Bench of this Court observed that "a bare look at sub-clause (2) of Clause 28 would show that this sub-clause can be resorted to only pending action as contemplated in sub-clause (1). Again no action till today, has been initiated against the respondent under sub-clause (1) of Clause 28. Therefore, Clause 28 could also not be resorted to". Even the said judgment upon which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant does not support the contention urged by him. In our considered opinion, it would be enough if action has been initiated as contemplated in sub-clause (1) of Clause 28 which enables the licensing authority to pass appropriate order of suspension in exercise of the power under sub-clause (2) of Clause 28. Both can simultaneously be made.
The decision in W.A No. 614 of 2001 dated 19.6.2001 is of no help to resolve the question raised by the learned counsel for the appellant in this appeal. In the said order, the Division Bench observed that there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that suspension of licence has civil consequences, and therefore, authority before passing any such order suspending the licence should comply with the mandatory requirements contained in Clause 28 of the Control Order. For all the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any legal infirmity in the order passed by the learned single Judge requiring our interference.
25. We make it clear that it shall always be open to the licensing authority to initiate action simultaneously both under sub-clause (1) and as well as sub-clause (2) of Clause 28 of the Control Order. However, we may hasten to add that unless an action is contemplated or conceived against the licensee under sub-clause (1) of Clause 28, no order could be made under sub-clause (2) of Clause 28 of the Control Order.
26. We do not find any merit in the writ appeal and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed.
27. In the view we have taken, the decision rendered by the learned single Judge in W.P Nos. 10512, 10517 and 11946 of 1997 dated 9.1.2003 is overruled. It is needless to observe that the enquiry initiated against the appellant under sub-clause (1) of Clause 28 shall go on strictly in accordance with law uninfluenced by any of the observations made in this order and as well as the observations made by the learned single Judge. The licensing authority is required to provide an adequate opportunity to the appellant herein and if necessary permit him to lead evidence in support of his case, both documentary as well as oral. The objections preferred and the evidence made available by the appellant shall be taken into consideration before an appropriate decision is taken by the licensing authority under sub-clause (1) of Clause 28 of the Control Order. The proceedings in this regard shall be completed within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order.