Madras High Court
Punjab & Sind Bank vs M/S.Dewa Properties Limited
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on:18.09.2025 Pronounced on:12.12.2025
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.B.BALAJI
C.S. Nos.668 of 2004
and A.Nos.105 to 108 of 2022 and 5601 of 2013
Punjab & Sind Bank,
Rep. by its Zonal Manager,
Zonal Office, First Floor,
Spencer Towers,
No.770-A, Anna Salai,
Chennai – 600 002.
Plaintiff
Vs
M/s.Dewa Properties Limited,
nd
Situated at No.770A, 2 Floor,
Spencer Towers-1,
Anna Salai, Chennai – 600 002.
Defendant
PRAYER: Plaint filed under Order VII Rule 1 of CPC r/w Order IV Rule 1 of
the O.S. Rules, prays for a decree and judgment against the Defendant:
(a) to specifically enforce the performance of the Contract as per the Offer
letters dated 12.11.1980 & 19.09.1983 and the Acceptance letters dated
24.11.1980 & 19.04.1984 and execute and register the 99 years sale cum lease
deed in favour of the Plaintiff insofar as the Schedule property is concerned.
(b) To issue permanent injunction restraining the Defendants or their men,
agents, servants or subordinates or any other person from in any way interfering
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or disturbing, alienating by way of mortgage, sale or lease or demand rent or do
any other act in deviation to the terms of the Offer letters dated 12.11.1980 &
19.09.1983 and acceptance letters dated 24.11.1980 & 19.04.1984 in the
property morefully described in the Schedule which is under the possession and
custody of the Plaintiff.
(c) For the cost of the suit.
For Plaintiff : Mr.V.Raghavachari,
Senior Counsel for
M/s.M.Arunkumar for
M/s.Sampath Kumar Associates
For Defendant : Mr.Roshan Balasubramanian
**********
JUDGEMENT
The plaintiff Bank has filed the suit for specific performance of the offer letters dated 12.11.1980 and 19.09.1983 and acceptance letters dated 24.11.1980 and 19.04.1984, by executing and registering a 99 year sale cum lease deed in favour of the plaintiff and also for a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant or anyone claiming through or under them, from in any manner interfering or disturbing, alienating by way of mortgage, sale, lease or demand rent in deviation to the offer letters and acceptance letters referred herein above. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 15/12/2025 03:47:57 pm )
2. The plaint in brief:
The plaintiff is a wholly owned Government of India undertaking, carrying on banking business, having its Head Office at New Delhi and zonal office at Chennai. The plaintiff and the defendant vide contract comprising offer and acceptance letters, purchased the premises measuring 6,521 sq.ft. in the ground floor, 6,616 sq.ft. in the first floor and 200 sq.ft. in the basement floor situated at Spencer Towers 1- at No. 770-A, Anna Salai, for possession and usage for 99 years.
3. The plaintiff contends that the plaintiff has paid a sum of Rs.51,39,538.20/- and has taken possession of the premises on 25.11.1980. According to the plaintiff, the ground floor has been purchased for 99 years at the rate of Rs.395/- per sq.ft. and the first floor and the basement have been purchased for the same period of 99 years at the rate of Rs.295/- per sq. ft. As regards the total agreed consideration to be paid for the above arrangement, the plaintiff claims that he has paid Rs.35,00,000/- on 24.11.1980 and the balance was to be paid at the time of execution and registration of the lease deed, but, however, according to the plaintiff, the balance amount was also paid by the plaintiff, but the defendant did not come forward to execute a sale cum lease deed for 99 years. The plaintiff also states that a nominal amount of Rs.6,000/- https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 15/12/2025 03:47:57 pm ) per annum was agreed to be paid as annual lease amount for 99 years and that the plaintiff has been paying the same.
4. Contending that, the defendant, formerly known as Spencer Estates Limited, having been amalgamated with Music World Entertainments, did not come forward to execute/register a sale cum lease deed and also did not dispute the plaintiff’s ownership, possession and title, for a very long period but suddenly disputed the plaintiff’s ownership and deviated from the contract, the plaintiff was compelled to pursue a suit for specific performance. The plaintiff further claims that they have paid a huge amount of Rs.51,39,538.20/- for purchase of the demised premises for 99 years and the said amount does not carry any interest as per the letter of offer and acceptance. Therefore, the money cannot be treated as a deposit, but only as a consideration paid in view of the above.The plaintiff also claims that they are claiming depreciation on the above cost from the date of purchase.
5. As regards the delay in approaching the Court, the plaintiff contends that they have performed their part of the contract and the defendant had also put the plaintiff in possession and subsequently, the plaintiff has been in total enjoyment of the property. Therefore, until such time the defendant disputed the https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 15/12/2025 03:47:57 pm ) arrangement, there was no necessity for the plaintiff to approach the Court. The plaintiff also contends that that the huge consideration parted with by the plaintiff was a premium for possessing the premises for a period of 99 years, without requirement of any liability to pay monthly rents. The plaintiff also claims that the plaintiff is paying property taxes and other charges and taxes to the Government and the defendants are therefore bound to enforce the contract as per the letter of offer and acceptance. The plaintiff also contends that the defendant has filed a Rent Control Original Petition for enhancement of rent, suppressing the 99-year contract/lease. Therefore, since the defendant has disputed the claim of sale, the plaintiff has no other alternative but to seek specific performance. The plaintiff also contends that the plaintiff has already been in possession for 30 years out of 99 years and if the contract is not specifically performed, then the plaintiff would be put to grave loss and cannot be compensated in terms of money.
6.Written Statement in brief:-
The defendant attacks the maintainability of the suit on the grounds that it is barred by Limitation and that there has been no concluded contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. There has not even been any mutually agreed lease deed or agreement between the parties at any point. The defendant has totally denied that the letter of offer and acceptance being for lease cum https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 15/12/2025 03:47:57 pm ) purchase for 99 years. There was no purchase agreement involved in the negotiations and it was always a tenancy/lease agreement that was contemplated and contracted between the parties, for which negotiations had also taken place.
7. The defendant further claims that, in RCOP No.1109 of 2001, the plaintiff has admitted tenancy under the agreement. The defendant denies the claim of the plaintiff and contends that only a sum of Rs.46.5 lakhs have been paid, which has also been admitted by the plaintiff themselves in their counter statement filed in RCOP No.1109 of 2001. The plaintiff admits that the balance amount that was agreed to be paid at the time of execution and registration of the lease deed and it would dislodge their claims of having entered into an agreement for purchase. Referring to the requirement to pay a sum of Rs.6,000/- as annual rent, the defendant contends that such a condition would not have found place if the contract was really one for sale.
8. The plaintiff cannot claim any ownership or title to the demised premises. It is also contended by the defendant that a meeting was held on 21.01.1983 between the representatives of the plaintiffs and the defendant and subsequent to the said meeting, the defendant also preferred a 99-year lease agreement and provided a draft of the same to the plaintiff, for the plaintiff to https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 15/12/2025 03:47:57 pm ) approve and finalise. However, the plaintiff never came back on the said draft provided by the defendant.
9. As regards the explanation for belatedly approaching the Court, it is contended that both the parties proceeded only on the basis that the plaintiff was a lessee. Therefore, the plaintiff has falsely claimed that the defendant has deviated from the original understanding and has filed the petition to fix fair rent and only with such intention, the suit has been filed belatedly and there is also no cause of action available to the plaintiff to seek the reliefs as prayed for.
10. This Court on 22.11.2007 has framed the following issues:
1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree to enforce the contract as per the offer letter dated 12.11.1980 and 19.9.1983 and the acceptance letter dated 24.11.1980 and 19.04.1984 and to execute and register the 99 years sale cum lease deed by the defendnt in favour of the plaintiff in respect of plaint scheduled property as prayed for?
2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get an order of permenent injunction as prayed for?
3. Whether the plaintiff has admitted their tenancy under the defendant in R.C.O.P. No.1109 of 2001 on the file of XI Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai?
4.Whether the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property in the capacity of lessee or purchser?
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5. Whether the plaintiff had approved the draft lease in pursuance to the meeting held between them on 21.01.1983?
6. Whether the suit is barred by Limitation?
7. Whether the plaintiff has cause of action to file the suit?
8.Whether the suit has been valued properly for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction?
9. To what relief, the plaintiff is entitled?
11. On the side of the plaintiff one Mr.N.K.Sekar, examined as P.W.1 and marked Exhibits P1 to P20. On the side of the defendant, Mrs.V.Prabha, examined as D.W.1 and there is no documents marked on the side of the defendant.
12. I have carefully considered the arguments advanced by Mr.V.Raghavachari, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff and Mr.Roshan Balasubramanian, learned counsel for the defendant.
13. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions:
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1. Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla vs Bibijan and others, reported in (2009) 5 SCC 462;
2. Panchanan dhara and others vs Monmathanathmaity (dead) through Lrs.
and another, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 340;
3. Commissioner of Income tax vs Anderson wright and Co, reported in 1990 SCC Online Cal 331; and
4. The New India Assurance Company Limited, regional office : 770- A annasalai, Chennai-600 002 vs M/s.Dewa properties Ltd., No. 770-A spencer Tower, Anna Salai, Chennai-600 002, reported in 2015 SCC Online Mad 3443.
5.Nathulal Vs. Poolchand, reported in (2020) 3 SCC 31.
14. The learned counsel for the defendant has relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions:
1. Myawati Vs. Kaushalya Devi, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 1;
2. Vidhyadhar Vs. Manikrao, reported in (1999) 3 SCC 573;
3. Union of India Vs. Hotel Excelsior Ltd., reported in [ILR (2013) 1 Delhi 157];
4. Nagindas Ramdas Vs. DalpatramIcharam, reported in [(1974) 1 SCC 242];
5. Mohammad Ahmad Vs. Atma Ram Chauhan, reported in (2011) 7 SCC 755;
6. Ouseph Varghese Vs. Joseph Alley, reported in (1969) 2 SCC 539;
7. PadmakumariVs.Dassayam, reported in (2015) 8 SCC 695;
8. M Ramalingam Vs. K. Vijaykumar, reported in (2013) 3 MWN (Civil) 490;
9. Bachhaj Nahar Vs. NilmaMandal, reported in [(2008) 17 SCC 491];
10. Ramzan Vs.Hussaini, reported in (1990) 1 SCC 104;
11. Kota Sivaram Prasad Vs. Nagandla Veera Brahman, reported in 2011 SCC Online AP 650];
12. Laxmi Prasad Vs. Seth Ramadayal, reported in [(2008) (1) M.P.L.J 532];
13. Sewa International Vs. Kalawati Mathrani& Others, reported in 2015 SCCOnline Del 11946;
14. Fatehji& Co. Vs. L. M. Nagpal, reported in (2015) 8 SCC 390;
15. Ram Kumar Agarwal Vs. Thawar Das, reported in (1999) 7 SCC 303; and
16. KumariAnandanv. Dr. T Balamukunda Rao, reported in [(2002) 3 CTC 462] https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 15/12/2025 03:47:57 pm )
15. Issues 3, 4 and 5 are taken up together. I have already discussed the nature of the contract between the parties while deciding the revision petitions in CRP. Nos.3186 & 3187 of 2025 and therefore, reiterating the conclusions arrived at there, there is no agreement to sell the suit property to the petitioner Bank. The parties clearly contemplated a long lease, for which the petitioner Bank had agreed to pay upfront rentals in advance. In addition to such upfront payments, the petitioner Bank also agreed to pay an annual lease amount of Rs.6,000/- during the subsistence of the lease. In such circumstances, it is not open to the plaintiff to unilaterally treat the 99-year old lease agreement as a sale cum lease deed, entitling the plaintiff to purchase the property. Mere fact that the plaintiff had paid an amount of Rs.395/- per sq.ft for the ground floor and Rs.295/- per sq.ft for the first floor would not entitle the Bank to treat the transaction as a sale agreement.
16. Admittedly, the complex had been gutted down by fire and the landlords were looking out for funds to re-construct the building. Under such circumstances, the parties have negotiated for payment of such rates per sq.ft and when the petitioner Bank has agreed to such rates, it is not open to the petitioner Bank to contend that these rates were far in excess of the prevailing lease rents on the said date. Nothing prevented the plaintiff from moving the https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 15/12/2025 03:47:57 pm ) Rent Control Court to seek fixation of fair rent, if the petitioner felt that they had been put to an undue advantage in the entire process.
17. Therefore, in the light of the pleading and evidence on record, there is nothing brought out by the plaintiff that the parties had contracted for sale of the suit properties. The plaintiff, by his own admission, has accepted that the Bank is only a tenant in the suit property. Irrespective of whatever amounts for consideration that have been paid by the plaintiff under the agreement, the character of the agreement cannot stand converted to one as sale and it would always remain as a lease transaction.
18. Mr.V.Raghavachari, learned Senior Counsel referring to the fair rent petition filed by the defendant would contend that the defendant has self-styled a sum of Rs.4,71,000/- to be the annual rental value and there is absolutely no evidence on the side of the defendant to substantiate the same either before the Rent Control Courts or before this Court in the above suit. Though the arguments of Mr.V.Raghavachari, learned Senior Counsel appears to be attractive, the explanation that has been offered by the defendant is that the amount of Rs.6,000/- was factored only taking into account the initial deposit of Rs.46,50,000/- and to offset the deficit in interest on the said deposit amount https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 15/12/2025 03:47:57 pm ) paid by the plaintiff Bank, on an annual basis. In any event, I do not see, these facts in any manner improving the plaintiff's case.
19. It is the argument of Mr.V.Raghavachari, learned Senior Counsel that the payments advanced by the plaintiff Bank was in fact capital payments/assets and therefore, the agreement, though styled as a 99-year-old lease, will have to be treated as a contract for sale. In this regard, he has also placed the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In R.K.Palshikar (HUF),Commissioner of Income Tax, Assam and Member for the Board of Agricultural Income Tax, Assam's case and the decision of this Court in M.Subbiah Nadar's case (referred herein supra). In all these decisions, the issue before the Court was whether one-time payment of lease rental can be treated as a payment on capital account. Consistently, the Courts have held that the real test would be whether the payment in lumpsum or even in instalment was towards consideration paid by the tenant for being let into the possession of the property. None of these decisions lay down the proposition that lumpsum payments made by the tenant would entitle the tenant to seek execution of sale deed in his favour. The Courts were only dealing with the manner in which such income was to be taxed and nothing more. Therefore, these decisions are of no avail to the plaintiff Bank, especially in the light of the findings arrived at earlier that the transaction is only a lease transaction and not an intended sale transaction. https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 15/12/2025 03:47:57 pm )
20. Mr.V.Raghavachari, learned Senior Counsel also relied the decision in Nathulal'scase (referred herein supra), where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in order to invoke protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, viz., part performance, there must be a contract to transfer, for a consideration, in pursuance of which the transferee has taken possession of the subject property or part thereof and continues to be in possession in part performance of the contract and that the transferee has done some act in furtherance of the contract and is ready and willing to perform his obligations under the said contract. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that only if these conditions are fulfilled, then the transfer has been completed in the manner prescribed and only then, therefore, the transferor would be de-barred from enforcing against the transferee, any right in respect of the property in possession of the transferee, other than as expressly provided by the terms of the contract. The said decision also cannot be taken advantage of by the plaintiff Bank since the plaintiff has not even pleaded regarding the pending obligations on its part. It is one of the fundamental and mandatory pre-requisites of invoking part performance.
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21. 'Sale' is defined under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and unless, the agreement between the parties fulfills all the conditions of Section 54, the transaction cannot be one for sale as contended by the plaintiff Bank. Firstly, as already discussed, the contract does not anywhere mention the word sale or purchase and admittedly, the object of the deed is only for a long lease and nothing more.
22. Yet another argument was advanced by the learned counsel for the defendant Mr.Roshan Balasubramanian, was that the petitioner themselves have admitted the existence of lease and landlord/tenant relationship and they estopped from leading or taking up a pleading otherwise. In this regard, I have perused the Ex.P12, which is the counter affidavit filed by the plaintiff in the petition filed by the defendant for fixation of fair rent before the Small Causes Court. Ex.P12 was filed much prior to the filing of the suit, where the plaintiff clearly admits the obligation of plaintiff Bank to pay lease of amount of Rs.6,000/-, besides also referring to the defendant only as a landlord or lessor and also admitting the 99 year old contract for lease. Even in the plaint, I find that there is reference and admission in the fair rent proceedings as well that the contract for 99 years. A sale cannot be for a limited period of time and a sale has to be an absolute deed of conveyance and when the plaintiff Bank styles the transaction as a contract for 99 years, it is not open to them to seek for a relief to https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 15/12/2025 03:47:57 pm ) enforce the said agreement, as if it was a sale agreement, entitling the Bank to purchase the suit property.
23. Issues 3, 4 and 5 are answered against the plaintiff.
24. Issues 1, 2 and 7 are taken up together. Even assuming that the contract is only for lease, still the requirements of Section 16(c) of the Act, do not stand diluted and the plaintiff has not exhibited readiness and willingness as required under the Specific Relief Act, entitling the plaintiff to discretionary as well as equitable relief of Specific Relief Act. Moreover, the relief that has been sought for by plaintiff is for a decree for specific performance of a lease cum sale agreement. It is contended by Mr.Roshan Balasubramanian, learned counsel for the defendant that in terms of Explanation 2 to Section 16(c) of the Court, the Court cannot even grant a different relief from what has been pleaded. Reliance is placed on in Bachhaj Nahar's case (referred herein supra) in this regard. I find force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the defendant. Even assuming that it is only a lease transaction, the plaintiff, by its own conduct of not even paying the annual admitted lease rent of Rs.6,000/- regularly and paying it in one lumpsum for 22 years, that too after initiation of https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 15/12/2025 03:47:57 pm ) proceedings before the Rent Control Court, would only expose the lack of readiness and willingness on the plaintiff's part.
25. Coming to the evidence adduced by the parties, P.W.1 in his cross examination admits to the agreement to pay Rs.6,000/- per annum and asserts that it was paid upto 2002 and later, it was paid in one lumpsum. He also admits that the period of the lease deed is only 99 years. Mere payment of Municipality Taxes would not automatically imply that the plaintiff is the owner or to be owner of the suit property. The plaintiff Bank seeks enforcement of the contract for 99 years. It is in effect, the suit for specific performance of an agreement for a long lease for 99 years. It is therefore necessary for the plaintiff to establish readiness and willingness in this regard, before becoming entitled to the equitable relief of specific performance. The total sale consideration is Rs.51,39,538.20, but examining whether the plaintiff has paid the entire sale consideration as claimed, excepting for the following payments viz., Rs.35 lakhs vide Ex.P4, Rs.11,18,005/- vide Ex.P6, Rs.1,21,533.20 vide Ex.P8, the plaintiff has not made any further payments. The total payments advanced by the plaintiff is only a sum of Rs.46,50,000/-. The plaint itself is totally silent with regard to the balance consideration even as set out by the plaintiff; there is not a single averment in the plaint that the plaintiff is ready and willing to pay the balance sale consideration.
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26. Section 16(c) requires the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance not only to plead but also prove “readiness and willingness”. This requirement therefore compels the plaintiff to plead that he is ready and willing to pay the balance sale consideration, if any due and payable to the defendant. There is no plea in the plaint, in this regard. Equally, there is also no evidence adduced by the plaintiff in the witness box as regards the balance consideration which still remains unpaid. The plaintiff also has to necessarily comply with Form 47 and 48 of the Code of Procedure and examining the facts of the present case, the plaintiff has also not complied with, the mandate of Forms 47 and 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
27. Mr.V.Raghavachari, learned Senior Counsel would point out to the evidence of P.W.1 in cross examination to contend that the defendant has not filed any documents to show that they have received only 46.5 lakhs as against Rs.51,39,538.20/-. He would also submit that the defendant has not taken any steps to compel the plaintiff to execute the lease deed which is also admitted to by D.W.1. Regarding readiness and willingness, it is the submission of Mr.V.Raghavachari, learned Senior Counsel that the first offer letter was given on 12.11.1980 which was accepted by the plaintiff on 24.11.1980 and on the very next day a sum of Rs.35 lakhs was paid. Even in respect of basement area, https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 15/12/2025 03:47:57 pm ) the offer letter was given 19.09.1983 and it was accepted by the plaintiff Bank on 19.04.1984. He relied on the property tax payments made by the Bank to fortify his submissions that if the Bank was only a tenant, the Bank would not have paid the property tax and water taxes.
28. As regards the reliance placed on the evidence and admissions made by the respective parties, in a suit for specific performance, the burden of pleading and proving readiness and willingness is always on the plaintiff. When it is the plaintiff’s case that the total sale consideration of Rs.51,39,538.20/-, the plaintiff cannot expect the defendants to produce evidence to show that they have received only Rs.46.5 lakhs. As already seen and discussed above, from the plaintiff’s own admissions and assertions, they have paid only a sum of Rs.46.5 lakhs. Therefore, it is for the plaintiff to have established that their entire payment of Rs.51,39,538.20/- has been paid and having failed to discharge the said burden, they cannot expect the suit to be decreed based on the holes in the defendant’s evidence. In the same light, when the plaintiff has not fulfilled all obligations and has also not been shown to be ready and willing, the plaintiff cannot even plead the doctrine of part performance. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nathulal's case (referred herein supra), is of no avail to the plaintiff.
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29. Even with regard to the payment of property taxes, the mere fact that there is an agreement between the parties that the tenant would have to pay the property taxes, it will not convert the nature of transaction from a lease to sale. In view of the above, the plaintiff has not made out readiness and willingness as mandated under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, leave alone Forms 47 and 48 of CPC. Consequently, the plaintiff is not entitled to discretionary relief. Issues 1, 2 & 7 are answered.
30. Issue 6:- coming to the issue of limitation, it is contended by Mr.Roshan Balasubramanian, learned counsel for the defendant that the parties had contemplated execution of a lease deed for 99 years, upon payment of balance consideration. According to the plaintiff, through not admitted, the balance consideration was paid on 20.08.1983. Thus, it is the contention of Mr.Roshan Balasubramanian, that the starting point of limitation would be 20.08.1983 and suit would be time barred by 20.08.1996. He would further state that the first part of Article 54 would apply, since the parties had contemplated a time period and hence the plaintiff cannot fall back on the second part and contend that the suit has been filed on noticing refusal and within three years from such time of refusal being noticed by the plaintiff, to bring the suit within a period of limitation. Even as contended by Mr.Roshan Balasubramanian, the parties only contemplated execution of lease deed within https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 15/12/2025 03:47:57 pm ) a period of three years on payment of the agreed consideration. It is the specific argument of the learned counsel that the plaintiff has not paid the entire consideration. As rightly contended by Mr.V.Raghavachari, there was never a demand made by the defendant for payment of the balance lease consideration. Therefore, in such circumstances, the event that was fixed for performance of the contract never arose and in fact, the Bank was also put into possession of the premise property and they have been operating from the suit property as well. In such circumstances, I do not see how the plaint can be dismissed as being barred by limitation, applying part 1 of Article 54 of the Limitation Act. The issue is answered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
31. With regard to the issue of the suit being not valued property for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction, I do not find that the suit has been improperly valued, since the plaintiff has valued the suit for a sum of Rs.51,39,538.20 and has paid the applicable Court fee payable in respect of suits filed before the Original Side of this Court. Hence, the suit is not liable to be dismissed on the ground of improper valuation. Issue No.8 is answered in favour of the plaintiff.
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32. Applications 105 of 2022 to mark additional documents, A.No.106 of 2022 to recall P.W.1, A.No.107 of 2022 for re-opening defendant’s evidence have been taken out by the plaintiff and A.No.108 of 2022 are filed to reject the plaint. These applications have also been heard along with the suit. Since the suit is being decided on merits and after elaborate trial, I do not deem it necessary to decide the application for rejection of the plaint. Insofar as the request of the plaintiff to recall P.W1 and reopen the defendant’s evidence, in order to mark various documents, the learned Senior Counsel Mr.V.Raghavachari and Mr.Roshan Balasubramanian, addressed arguments on the documents that are sought to be marked. I find that none of these documents are material to decide the lis between the parties.
33. All the documents are in fact, much earlier to the offer and acceptance letter and further some of these documents were already sought to be marked in A.No.6787 of 2018 which was dismissed by this Court and the same has also become final. In the light of the above, whatever understanding the parties may have had before the final offer and acceptance letter came to be executed, it would stand superseded by the subsequent contract and therefore, any amount of reliance on the earlier correspondence or conduct of the parties will not take the plaintiff anywhere. Hence, there is absolutely no necessity to permit re-call or re-opening the evidence in order to exhibit various documents https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 15/12/2025 03:47:57 pm ) that are now sought to be marked and consequently, all the Original Applications are dismissed. As regards the A.No.5601 of 2013, based on the undertaking given by the defendant/landlord, the eviction petition will not be proceeded with, the RCOP proceedings have come to a grinding halt. In view of the dismissal of the suit for specific performance, it is open to the respondent to pursue the RCOP and the said Application in A.No.5601 of 2013, is accordingly closed.
34. In the light of the above, having found that the plaintiff is only a tenant and there is no contract for sale and the plaintiff has not been ready and willing to perform his part of contract, therefore the plaintiff is dis-entitled to the equitable and discretionary relief of specific performance. In fine, the suit is dismissed with costs.
12.12.2025 rkp Index : Yes / No Internet : Yes / No Witnesses examined on the side of the plaintiff:
P.W.1. - Mr.N.K.Sekar https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 15/12/2025 03:47:57 pm ) Exhibits produced on the side of the plaintiff:
S.No. Exhibits Date
Description
1. P-1 12.11.1980 Letter sent by the
defendant to the
Plaintiff
(marked subject to
objection raised by
the learned counsel
for the defendant)
2. P-2 12.11.1980 Letter sent by the
defendant to the
plaintiff
(marked subject to
objection raised by
the learned counsel
for the defendant)
3. P-3 2411.1980 The letter of
acceptance
4 P-4 24.11.1980 The true copy of
payment debit note
5 P-5 09.03.1981 Letter showing
possession taken by
the bank on
25.11.1980
6 P-6 20.08.1983 Letter for payment
of balance amount
with escalationon
of interest.
7 P-7 19.09.1983 Letter for allotment
of space in
basement
8 P-8 19.04.1984 Letter for payment
of cost for
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basement and
interest.
(marked subject to
objection raised by
the learned counsel
for the defendant)
9 P-9 28.11.1987 True copy of the
letter demanding
execution and
registeration of
lease deed
10 P-10 04.06.2001 The copy of
petition in RCOP
No.1109 of 2001
11 P-11 30.07.2001 The summon dated
30.07.2001 in
RCOP. No.1109 of
2001
12 P-12 14.12.2001 The copy of the
counter statement
in RCOP. No.1109
of 2001
13 P-13 24.10.2002 The letter sent by
the defendant to
plaintiff
14 P-14 04.01.2003 The carbon copy of
letter informing the
payment made
towards the revised
property tax, water
tax.
15 P-15 23.09.2003 The letter issued by
defendant to
plaintiff
16 P-16 03.10.2003 The receipts given
for property tax
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 15/12/2025 03:47:57 pm )
paid by the Bank
17 P-17 29.11.2003 The letter
(marked subject to
objection raised by
the learned counsel
for the defendant)
18 P-18 05.12.2003 The copy of the
letter
(marked subject to
objection raised by
the learned counsel
for the defendant)
19 P-19 13.12.2003 The letter
(marked subject to
objection raised by
the learned counsel
for the defendant)
20 P-20 -- The ture copy of
the balance sheet
Witnesses examined on the side of the defendant:
D.W.1-Mrs.V.Prabha Documents marked on the side of the defendant:
Nil.
12.12.2025 rkp https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 15/12/2025 03:47:57 pm ) P.B.BALAJI, J., rkp Pre-delivery order in C.S. Nos.668 of 2004 and A.Nos.105 to 108 of 2022 and 5601 of 2013 12.12.2025 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 15/12/2025 03:47:57 pm )