Bangalore District Court
Venu.V vs M/S Shruti Souharda Credit ... on 18 December, 2025
1 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT
KABC010041412024
IN THE COURT OF LXIX ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL
AND SESSIONS JUDGE (CCH 70)
Present:
Smt. Shirin Javeed Ansari, B.A.,LL.B (Hon`s) LL.M.,
LXIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru. (CCH70)
Dated this the 18th day of December, 2025
Crl.A.No.277/2024
Appellant: Sri Venu.V.
s/o late Venkatesh
Aged about 46 years
R/at. No.410, 12th Cross,
3rd Main, Upper Palace Orchards
Sadashivanagar
Bangalore-560 080
(Sri G.V.Dayananda, Advocate for
appellant)
-V/s-
Respondent: M/s.Shruti Souharda Credit Co-Op Ltd.
No.68, Shushruti Nagara
Andrahalli Main Road
Peenya II Stage
Bangalore-560 091
represented by its Manager
and Authorised Signatory
Smt.B.L.Meenakshi
2 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT
(Sri G.Nataraja, Advocate for
respondent)
JUDGMENT
This Criminal Appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 20-01-2024 passed by the learned XL Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, in C.C. No.12728/2019, convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
2. By the impugned judgment, the Trial Court has sentenced the appellant to pay a fine of ₹65,00,000/-, and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. Out of the fine amount, a sum of ₹64,90,000/- has been directed to be paid to the complainant as compensation under Section 357(1) Cr.P.C., and the balance sum of ₹10,000/- is directed to be remitted to the State. Further, the complainant is held entitled to interest at 9% per annum on the cheque amount from the date of judgment till realization.
3. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment and 3 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT conviction, the accused has preferred the present appeal under Sec.374(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 seeking to set aside the same.
4. The accused in CC No.12728/2019 before the trial court has preferred the instant appeal against the complainant. The appellant and respondent are hereby assigned with their original ranks before the trial court i.e., the appellant as accused and respondent as complainant in CC No.12728/2019 in the instant discussion for the purpose of brevity and convenience to avoid the confusion and perplexity.
5. Brief facts of the case are as follows:-
"The prosecution case before the Trial Court, in substance, was that the complainant is a Souharda Credit Co-Operative Society; the father of the appellant had availed a cash credit loan initially for ₹75,00,000/-, which was later enhanced/extended; the appellant stood as guarantor; and in discharge of the legally enforceable liability, the appellant issued Cheque No.533627 dated 12- 12-2018 for ₹50,00,000/-, drawn on ICICI Bank, R.T. 4 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT Nagar Branch, in favour of the complainant.
The cheque, when presented, was dishonoured with the endorsement "Funds Insufficient". A statutory notice dated 31-12-2018 was issued and served. Despite service, payment was not made within the statutory period, resulting in the complaint.
The complainant examined its Manager as PW-1 and produced Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-98. The appellant examined himself as DW-1 and produced Ex.D-1 to Ex.D-38.
Upon appreciation, the learned Magistrate held that the complainant had proved issuance, dishonour, notice, and non-payment; that the statutory presumptions operated; that the defence failed to probabilise any contrary inference; and accordingly convicted the appellant, sentencing him to pay a fine of ₹65,00,000/-, and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. Out of the fine amount, a sum of ₹64,90,000/-
has been directed to be paid to the complainant as compensation under Section 357(1) Cr.P.C., and the balance sum of ₹10,000/- is directed to be remitted to the 5 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT State. Further, the complainant is held entitled to interest at 9% per annum on the cheque amount from the date of judgment till realization."
6. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment passed by the trial court, the appellant being accused before the trial court has preferred the instant appeal against the respondent who was the complainant before the trial court on the following:
GROUNDS OF APPLEAL
a) The impugned judgment and order of conviction passed by the court below is highly arbitrary and illegal and same is not based on material facts and the same is opposed to the evidence and exhibits available on record.
b) The defense of the respondent that he had not borrowed any money nor executed On Demand Pro Note marked as Ex. P-13 the signatures found on EX P11-loan application and Ex P 12 surety declaration and Ex P-14 Agreement is not the signatures of accused or his father, in the promissory note it is not MENTIONED THE 6 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT RATE OF INTEREST OR LOAN A/C Number OR WHICH ACCOUNT. Ex P13 IS ONLY PRONOTE date 21-6-2014 but case filed on 13-1-2019 P13 is not on demand AND PROMISSORY NOTE. The case of the respondent is that cash has not given to accused but the trial court did not took serious note of it even court has failed to observe no rate interest said in the Ex P13.
c) The trial Court failed to note that the
appellant that he has not offered any
immovable property bearing Sy No.
185/2B2, Kodigehalli Village vide loan a/c No. ANB-PCL 0000003 of the year 2014 for a sum of Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty lakhs Only) since property was not available at all. Sy No. 185/2/B2 land converted from Agril to non agricultural O.M B.D.ALN/SR (N) 73/89-90 dated 22-
7-1993 notice under Section 26 of the Urban Land ceiling cat 1976 and obtained permission from Competent authority as per ref No. VLC(V) 26/3934 dt 23-12-92 Spl DC VLC Bangalore Sold to many intending purchasers in the year in 1994 itself.
7 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT
d) The trial Court failed to note on the alleged date of sanctions of loan or on the date of application the property Sy No. 185/2B2, Kodigehalli Village land converted from Agril to non agricultural O.M B.D.ALN/SR (N) 73/89-90 dated 22-7-1993 and sold in the year 1994 hence same is not at all available because appellant produced and got marked Ex D-1 to Ex D-15 the sale deeds and encumbrance certificates showing the accused sold the property by conversion of land formed sites and sold in the same in the year 1993/1994 the society without verifying the documents how loan was sanctioned is not proved but lower court put blame on Appellant/accused that he suppressed the same in obtaining loan on non existing property in order negative the conduct of appellant the trial Court came conclusion and prejudice the mind of court is not fair.
e) The trial court did not give any reasons that it is the duty of the society before sanction of loan society has to take original sale deed, encumbrance etc., in order to satisfy that the property offered is existing on the 8 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT date of sanction of loan application Ex P11- dated 21-5-2014 the finding given by the lower court in page 17 line No. 8 is un- imaginable it is a financial institution to look into documents before sanction of loan the society has not taken any original sale deed or encumbrance of Sy No. 185/2B2, Kodigehalli Village, yelahanka Hobli, The society has not at all sanctioned any loan to accused on the aforesaid land.
f) The trial Court did not take serious note that the legal notice was not served on the accused which is marked as Ex P6.
g) The trial court did not take serious note and did not notice regarding Bank statement marked as Ex P19 which is WORD FORMAT when application was filed by appellant to furnish the copy of Ex P-19 furnished in excel format marked as Ex P-
29 which does not tally with Ex P-19 because of the rate of interest 17% property mortgaged House document,
account opening dated 21-6-2014 ie. on the date of loan application Ex P-11 Ex 19 or 29 account ledger.
9 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENTIn Ex 19 address of complaint shown but in Ex P 29 no address shown.
In Ex P 19 ledger statement printed on 10- 06-19 Ex P23 printed on 10-10-22 Ex P-
19 from and to dates is not mentioned in Ex P-23 from 31-3-2011 to 28-9-2022.
As per Ex-P-19 sanctioned amount of a sum of Rs.75 Lakha but as per Ex P-29 is 2 Crore 75 lakhs Ex-P-19 rate of interest 17% in Ex P-29 rate of interest is 13%.
h) The trial Court did not take serious note and did not notice Ex P16 Postal confirmation of Equitable mortgage 21-6- 2014.
i) The trial Court failed to note seriously that Ex P-26 Memorandum of Deposit of title deeds dated 18-6-2014 advance a sum of rs.20,00,000/- repayable in 120 monthly installments but alleged loan sanctioned for a sum of Rs.75,00,000/-in the schedule B or Ex P26 DETAILS OF TITLE DEED DEPOSITED FOR THE PURPOSE OF CREATING EQUITABLE MORTGAGE "Copy of the official memorandum for sanction of conversion of 1 acre land Copy 10 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT of sale deed, Copy of mother deed, Copy of Encumbrances from 1-4-1974 to 26-9-
2011 but according to version of society/respondent the loan sanctioned on 21-6-2014 on the date of loan application and promissory note, the property of Sy No. 185/282, Kodigehalli Village, yelahanka Hobli, not at all existing nor the Venkatesh owner of the land without looking the documents society alleged that it has sanctioned loan for non available property on the date of loan application or sanction of loan instead of court giving finding in favor of appellant lower court held that it is the duty of accused to inform the same to the society.
j) The trial Court did not take serious note and fails to notice that DWI in examination chief that said Ex- P4 cheque was given to Shushruthi Saudarda Sahakara Bank Niyamita when the loan was borrowed and said loan closed but the said cheque was handed over to the complainant by Shushruthi Saudarda Sahakara Bank Niyamita but court held that in defense evidence the accused produced Ex Di to Ex 11 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT D-38 are not relevant but court mentioned in judgment in page No. 18 para 22 as Ex-
P 15 to Ex P-38 which is wrongly mentioned in judgment instead of D 15 to D 38.
k) The trial Court did not look into cross examination of PW 1 by accused advocate suggested that Ex P4 is filled by bank it can be presumed that complainant misused the Ex p4 given for security purpose for earlier loan Shushruthi Saudarda Sahakar Bank Niyamita and misused in filing the present case in order to enrich at the cost of accused to make wrongful loss to accused therefore the appellant got marked Ex D 13 to Ex-D-38.
l) The trial Court come to wrong finding that cheque was dishonored for insufficient funds but fails to understand under what circumstances the said in the possession of complainant it is the case of appellant that cheque was given to Shushruthi Saudarda Sahakar Bank Niyamita without return to appellant.
m) The trial lower Court did not look into Ex 12 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT D37 and D 38 copy of Index in Cr No. 313/2022 with regard to cancellation of license granted to complainant and not to carry any business in India the business of the complainant is closed and not functioning and president and other director are arrested and sent to JC this itself shown the modus operandi to respondent business is in the nature e of cheating the public.
o) The trial court erred in awarding 9% interest on cheque amount from the date of the order i.e., 20.01.2024, there is no claim of interest or prayer in the complaint, such order of interest is suo-
moto which is not correct and
unimaginable.
On these and other allied grounds, the
appellant/accused pray before this court to call for entire records from the trial court, set aside the impugned judgment conviction and sentence passed by Trial Court in CC No.12728/2019 dated 20.1.2024 and acquit the accused from the alleged offence by allowing this appeal in the interest of justice and equity.
13 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT
7. When the case was posted for arguments, there was no representation on both sides. Hence, matter reserved for judgment with liberty to both sides to file their written arguments. Accordingly, both sides had filed their written arguments.
8. The memorandum of appeal contains multiple grounds (more particularly Grounds 17 to 34 furnished before this Court) asserting that the Trial Court's approach is arbitrary, that the documentary evidence regarding loan transaction is unreliable, and that the cheque is said to have reached the complainant through another entity and was allegedly misused.
9. However, it is a matter of record that after filing the appeal, the appellant has not prosecuted it. The appellant has remained absent; the learned counsel has not advanced oral arguments; and no written arguments have been filed even after opportunities.
10. Nevertheless, this Court cannot, in law, dispose of a criminal appeal merely for default. The appellate court is duty-bound to consider the correctness, legality, and 14 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT propriety of the conviction and sentence on the basis of the record. The principle is settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bani Singh and Others v. State of U.P., (1996) 4 SCC 720, that the appellate court must decide the appeal on merits even if the appellant or counsel is absent, after perusing the record and the judgment under appeal.
11. Therefore, notwithstanding the non-appearance and non-argument, this Court has independently examined the Trial Court record as extracted in the impugned judgment, the evidence and exhibits referred therein, and the grounds raised in appeal, so that the adjudication remains rooted in law and not in mere procedural default.
12. On the basis of the materials available on record following points arise for my consideration:
1) Whether the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 20-01-2024 in C.C. No.12728/2019 calls for interference by this Court, either on facts or on law?
2) What order?
13. My findings to the above points are as under: 15 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT
Point No.1: In the Negative Point No.2: As per final order for the following:
REASONS
14. Point No.1:- At the outset, it is to be remembered that proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are not an empty formality. The statute has designed a calibrated mechanism: issuance of cheque towards debt or liability; presentation; dishonour; issuance of demand notice; and failure to pay within the statutory period. Once these foundational facts are established, the law introduces presumptions to ensure credibility of negotiable instruments.
15. The Trial Court has framed the core point-- whether the cheque was issued towards a legally enforceable debt and whether the statutory ingredients were complied with--and has returned an affirmative finding. This Court must examine whether that finding is perverse, illegal, or unsupported by record.
16. From the narration in the impugned judgment, 16 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT it is evident that the complainant relied upon Ex.P-4 (cheque), Ex.P-5 (bank memo / dishonour endorsement), Ex.P-6 (legal notice), and Ex.P-8 (proof of service/track record). The Trial Court has expressly held that the chronology satisfies limitation under Sections 138 and 142 of the Act. The dates spoken to therein--cheque dated 12- 12-2018, dishonour endorsement, notice dated 31-12- 2018, complaint filed on 13-02-2019--were treated as within time. There is no material before this Court, even in the appeal grounds, demonstrating that the complaint is barred by limitation.
17. The appellant has pleaded as Ground No.22 that the legal notice was not served. However, the Trial Court has referred to Ex.P-8 and has specifically recorded that the demand notice has been served. In appeal, a bald assertion of non-service cannot dislodge a recorded finding unless the appellant demonstrates, from the postal material, that service is not proved or that the statutory presumption of service stands rebutted. In the present appeal, there is no such demonstration by argument or 17 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT material.
18. More importantly, once the complainant produces postal/track proof and the Trial Court records service, the appellate court will not unsettle the finding on a mere ipse dixit. Even otherwise, the law recognises that refusal, unclaimed, or due intimation can constitute deemed service depending upon the facts; and the drawer cannot, by strategic avoidance, defeat the statutory consequence. The appellant has not prosecuted the appeal to bring any convincing material to rebut service.
19. The central axis of Section 138 litigation is the statutory presumption under Sections 118 and 139. The Trial Court has referred to Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee, (2001) 6 SCC 16, and Rangappa v. Mohan, AIR 2010 SC 1898, in support of the proposition that once cheque issuance and signature are proved/admitted, the presumption operates that the cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability, subject to rebuttal by the accused on the standard of preponderance of probabilities.
18 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT
20. In Rangappa v. Mohan, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained the nature of the reverse onus clause, the regulatory character of the offence, and that the accused may rebut even by relying upon complainant's materials, without necessarily leading independent evidence. This is precisely why, in an appeal, the court must examine whether the accused succeeded in raising a probable defence.
21. The defence projected before the Trial Court, as seen from the impugned judgment, is twofold: first, that the cheque was allegedly issued as security and not towards discharge; and second, that the cheque was issued to another institution (Shushruthi Souharda Sahakara Bank Niyamita) and was allegedly misused by the complainant.
22. So far as the "security cheque" argument is concerned, the Trial Court relied upon Sripati Singh (since deceased) v. State of Jharkhand, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1002, holding that a cheque issued as security is not a worthless piece of paper, and if liability remains 19 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT unpaid by the due date, the cheque matures for presentation; dishonour attracts Section 138. This Court finds that the reliance is apposite: the critical inquiry is not the label "security", but whether on the date of presentation, a legally enforceable liability existed. If such liability exists, Section 138 is attracted.
23. The Trial Court has also observed that the loan transaction and suretyship were supported by multiple documents--membership application, loan application, surety declaration, agreements, sanction communication and account statements. Specifically, the impugned judgment refers to Ex.P-10 (membership application), Ex.P- 11 (loan application), Ex.P-12 (surety declaration), Ex.P-15 and Ex.P-16 (sanction-related documents) and account statements such as Ex.P-19 and Ex.P-78.
24. The appellant's denial of signatures and denial of documents has been noticed by the Trial Court as sweeping and untrustworthy. The Trial Court has recorded that the accused even denied his photograph in Ex.P-10. While an accused is entitled to take all lawful defences, a 20 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT defence that is purely of "blank denial" without coherent probabilistic foundation often fails to rebut presumptions-- especially when contemporaneous transactional documents exist.
25. The appellant has argued in the grounds that Ex.P-13 promissory note does not mention rate of interest, loan account number, etc., and therefore debt is not proved. This Court is of the view that such objections, even if assumed, do not by themselves demolish the statutory presumption arising from the cheque. A cheque is not contingent upon the promissory note alone. Where the complainant produces a body of documents showing relationship, membership, sanction, suretyship, and account statements indicating outstanding liability, the absence of some particulars in a single document cannot, ipso facto, create a probable defence sufficient to rebut Sections 118 and 139.
26. The appellant also contends that the society sanctioned loan on a "non-existing property" and that the land was converted and sold as sites in 1993-94, which is 21 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT sought to be demonstrated through Ex.D-1 to Ex.D-15. The Trial Court has considered this contention and has noted that the complainant produced Ex.P-26 (mortgage-related document/deed). It further observed that if the property had been alienated earlier, the duty of disclosure--at least at the level of factual truth--lay with the borrower/guarantor, and that such dispute regarding collateral does not eclipse Section 138 proceedings.
27. This Court adds the following: proceedings under Section 138 are not designed to convert the criminal court into a forum for exhaustive adjudication of title disputes over mortgaged property. The offence is anchored to dishonour of cheque issued towards an enforceable liability. Even assuming the society's due diligence was imperfect, that does not, by itself, erase the liability arising out of the transaction, unless the accused shows that the underlying liability itself is legally unenforceable or that no debt existed. On the record as reflected in the impugned judgment, the accused has not established such a conclusion.
22 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT
28. The appellant's Grounds 23 and allied grounds allege discrepancies between Ex.P-19 (ledger statement in word format) and Ex.P-29 (excel format), such as variation in rate of interest, sanctioned amount, and differing date ranges. These are matters which could have been meaningfully argued to test whether the complainant's account statement is reliable. However, in an appeal, this Court cannot substitute speculation for proof. The Trial Court has relied on Ex.P-19 and Ex.P-78 to hold that the outstanding exceeded the cheque amount. The appellant, having failed to prosecute the appeal, has not demonstrated how these discrepancies--assuming they exist--rise to the level of creating a probable defence that there was no enforceable liability at all corresponding to the cheque.
29. It is also significant that the Trial Court recorded a suggestion in cross-examination of PW-1 (in Kannada) indicating that the accused and his father had taken loan from the society, and that blank cheques were obtained. Even if that suggestion is used as a defence, it 23 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT inadvertently concedes the existence of a loan relationship. Once the loan relationship is conceded, the presumption that the cheque relates to liability becomes stronger unless rebutted by cogent probabilistic material.
30. The appellant has relied upon Ex.D-37 and Ex.D-38 relating to criminal proceedings and alleged cancellation of licence and allegations against the complainant society. Even if such proceedings exist, they do not automatically render the cheque transaction unenforceable. Section 138 concerns the drawer's liability on the cheque. Allegations of wrongdoing by the complainant may constitute separate causes, but they are not, in themselves, a lawful rebuttal of Sections 118 and 139 unless they demonstrate that the cheque was not issued towards debt or that the complainant is not the holder in due course/holder, etc., on facts. The Trial Court has found these defence documents not relevant to dislodge the core ingredients of Section 138. This Court finds no legal infirmity in that approach.
31. The appellant's Ground 30/32 challenges the 24 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT award of interest at 9% per annum as "suo motu" and without pleading. The Trial Court has awarded interest while directing compensation. Appellate scrutiny here must be cautious. In cheque dishonour cases, courts frequently mould compensation to serve restorative justice, and the power under Section 357 Cr.P.C. read with sentencing principles permits the court to direct appropriate compensation. Further, several decisions recognise that compensation can include an element that accounts for delay and deprivation of money.
32. The Trial Court has recorded reliance on a decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Crl. Rev. Petition No.1273/2015 dated 12-04-2016 for award of 9% interest. In the absence of contrary submissions and in the presence of prolonged pendency (the Trial Court noting about four years), this Court does not find the award of interest to be so arbitrary or perverse as to warrant appellate interference. Interest at 9% per annum is not, on its face, unconscionable or punitive; it is rationally connected to the compensatory objective. 25 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT
33. Coming to sentence: the fine of ₹65,00,000/- on a cheque amount of ₹50,00,000/- reflects not only compensation but also reasonable costs/interest component. Out of it, ₹64,90,000/- is directed as compensation and ₹10,000/- to the State. This structure aligns with the legislative policy that, in Section 138 matters, the complainant must be suitably compensated and the credibility of commercial instruments preserved. The default sentence of six months is also within the bounds typically imposed for enforcement of fine/compensation, and the Trial Court has relied on principles traceable to Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh, (1988) 4 SCC 551 and Suganthi Suresh Kumar v. Jagdeeshan, (2002) 2 SCC 420 concerning enforcement of compensation through default sentence.
34. Most importantly, appellate interference is not warranted merely because another view is possible. The appellate court interferes when findings are perverse, manifestly illegal, or wholly unsupported by evidence. Here, the Trial Court's reasoning, as evident from the impugned 26 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT judgment, is built upon statutory presumptions, documentary evidence, and the accused's failure to rebut the presumption with a probable defence.
35. This Court also cannot be oblivious to the appellant's conduct in the appeal. While the appeal cannot be dismissed for default, the appellant's failure to prosecute deprives the court of assistance to demonstrate specific perversities. The court has, therefore, independently assessed the grounds, but the grounds-- without evidentiary support and without arguments--do not rise above assertions.
36. In sum, this Court is satisfied that the complainant proved the statutory ingredients of Section 138, that the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 operated, and that the accused failed to rebut it on a balance of probabilities. The conviction is thus legally sustainable.
37. Consequently, the point for consideration is answered in the negative, and the appeal deserves dismissal, confirming the conviction and sentence. 27 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT Therefore, Point No.1 is answered in the Negative.
38. Point No.2: In view of the reasons mentioned above and the findings arrived at on Point No.1, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER The Criminal Appeal filed under under Sec.374(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by the appellant/accused is hereby dismissed.
The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20.01.2024 passed by the learned XL Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, in C.C. No.12728/2019, convicting accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and sentencing him to pay fine of Rs.65,00,000/- with default sentence, directing compensation of Rs.64,90,000/-, remittance of Rs.10,000/- to the state and awarding interest at 9% p.a. on the cheque amount from the date of the judgment till realization is hereby Confirmed.
The trial court records shall be returned along with a copy of this judgment forthwith.28 Crl.Apl.No.277/2024 JUDGMENT
The appellant shall comply with the sentence and directions forthwith, subject to law.
(Dictated to Stenographer Grade-I directly on computer, typed by him, revised and corrected by me and then pronounced in open court on this the 18th day of December, 2025) SHIRIN JAVEED Digitally signed by SHIRIN JAVEED ANSARI ANSARI Date: 2026.01.08 13:11:28 +0530 (Shirin Javeed Ansari) LXIX Addl.C.C. & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru.