Allahabad High Court
Sunder Lal vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Anr. on 5 March, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2004(2)AWC1868, [2004(102)FLR181]
Author: Tarun Agarwala
Bench: Tarun Agarwala
JUDGMENT Tarun Agarwala, J.
1. The plaintiff was appointed as a rakshak in the Railways vide appointment letter dated 18,3.1966 issued by the Assistant Security Officer. The plaintiff was served with a charge-sheet on the basis of which an enquiry was initiated. The Inquiry Officer in his enquiry report found that the plaintiff was guilty of the charges framed against him. On the basis of the enquiry report, the Assistant Security Officer passed an order dated 12.9.1978, removing the plaintiff from the service. The plaintiff filed an appeal, which was also dismissed by the appellate authority. The plaintiff thereafter, filed a suit for a declaration praying that the order of removal dated 12.9.1978 is Illegal, inoperative and void and was hit by Article 311(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India. The plaintiff also prayed that he should be deemed to be in service with all consequential benefits. The defendant in their written statement contended that the enquiry was held after following the principles of natural Justice and all the documents which was asked by the plaintiff were duly supplied and that full opportunity was given to the plaintiff to lead evidence. The defendant further submitted that the order passed by the Assistant Security Officer removing the plaintiff in service was validly passed, inasmuch as he was the appointing authority.
2. The trial court after framing the issues dismissed the suit with costs holding that the order passed by the Assistant Security Officer removing the plaintiff from the service was a valid order and that there was no violation of Article 311(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India.
3. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, the plaintiff filed an appeal before the lower appellate court, which was partly decreed. The lower appellate court found that the Assistant Security Officer was the appointing authority and therefore, had validly passed the order of removal of service of the plaintiff. The appellate court further found that full opportunity of hearing was given to the plaintiff and that there was no violation of the principles of natural justice. The appellate court, however, found that the departmental appeal of the plaintiff was not decided by the appellate authority by a reasoned order and therefore, directed the appellate authority to pass a reasoned order.
4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision of the court below, the plaintiff has preferred the present second appeal. At time of the admission of the appeal, the following substantial question of law was framed, namely :
"Whether the order of termination was passed by the appointing authority?"
5. I have heard Sri Parmatma Rai, the learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Lal Ji Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties.
6. Sri Parmatma Rai, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the plaintiff was appointed by the Chief Security Officer and therefore, the appointing authority, namely, the Chief Security Officer could only remove the plaintiff from the service and, therefore, the order of removal passed by the Assistant Security Officer was invalid and against the provisions of the Rules. The arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant is devoid of any merit.
7. From a perusal of the appointment letter (paper No. 47C), which has been filed by the defendants before the court below, it is clear that the appointment letter issued in favour of the plaintiff was issued by the Assistant Security Officer.
8. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appointment letter was issued by the Chief Security Officer is therefore, incorrect. Since the appointment letter was issued by the Assistant Security Officer, he being the appointing authority was empowered to issue an order of removal of service of the plaintiff. In the present case, the order of removal was passed by the Assistant Security Officer. Thus, I hold that the Assistant Security Officer was the appointing authority of the plaintiff and was empowered to pass an order of removal of service of the plaintiff.
9. Sri Lal Ji Sinha, the learned senior counsel for the opposite parties has invited my attention to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Rajendra Singh, AIR 1993 SC 205, wherein the Supreme Court held that the power of appointment of a rakshak does not vest merely with the Chief Security Officer, but also gives power to the Assistant Security Officer to appoint a rakshak.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the appointment letter filed by the opposite party was not admitted by him and therefore, the said document cannot be taken into consideration. This contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is devoid of any merit. Section 139 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, provides that the entries in the records or other documents of a Railway Administration can be proved either by the production of the records or other documents or by the production of a copy of the entries certified by the Officer having custody of the records. In the present case, copy of the appointment letter, filed by the defendants, had been certified by the Assistant Security Officer himself and the said document has been duly proved.
11. In view of the aforesaid, there is no merit in the appeal and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.