Delhi District Court
Shri Satjit Singh vs Smt. Savitri Devi (Deceased on 11 January, 2007
IN THE COURT OF SHRI M.C.GARG, ADDL. RENT CONTROL TRIBUNAL
DELHI
RCA No. 189/2001
In the matter of :
Shri Satjit Singh
S/o Shri Dharam Singh
(Since deceased)
represented by
Mrs. Kishu Singh
W/o Late Shri Satjit Singh,
R/o 8, Hailey Road, New Delhi ....Appellant
Versus
1. Smt. Savitri Devi (deceased
represented by S/shri Anand Kumar Seth
and Shri Gopal Seth,
Respondent Nos. 3 and 4,
8, Hailey Road, New Delhi
2. Shri Girdhari Lal Seth (Deceased)
Represented by Sh. Anadn Kumar Seth
And Sh. Goptal Seth( Respondent No. 3 and 4)
8, Hailey Road, New Delhi
3. Shri Anand Kumar Seth S/o Late Shri Girdhari Lal Seth
8, Hailey Road, New Delhi
4. Shri Goptal Seth S/o Late Shri Girdhari Lal Seth
8, Hailey Road, New Delhi
5. Sh. Ravijit Singh S/o Late Shri Satjit Singh (Since deceased)
and represented by legal heirs
6. Sh. Minijit Singh S/o Late Shri Satjit Singh
7. Sh. Badal Singh S/o Late Shri Satjit Singh
8. Sh. Chikoo Singh S/o Late Shri Satjit Singh
9. Ms. Amber D/o Late Shri Satjit Singh
All R/o 8, Hailey Road, New Delhi .......Respondents.
ORDER
1. This appeal has been filed by the deceased tenant represented by his wife Mrs. Kishu Singh. The appellant also impleaded respondents no. 5 to 9 the children of 1 Shri Satjit Singh subsequently. They are being represented by Smt. Kishu Singh their mother who has no adverse interest to them. Respondents no. 1 to 4 are the landlords
2. The appellant is aggrieved from the judgment/order dated 08.2.2001 delivered in eviction suit no. E-234/83 by the Addl. Rent Controller Delhi allowing the petition of the respondent/landlord u/s 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act and passing an eviction order in respect of the suit property which was let out to Late Shri Satjit Singh the tenant for residential purposes.
3. The brief facts are that a suit for eviction was filed by late Shri Girdhari Lal Seth, Late Smt. Savitri Devi and Shri Anand Kumar Seth, the owner and landlord of the suit property u/s 14(1)(h) and u/s 14(1)(k) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. In this appeal, the appellant is only concerned with the order passed u/s 14(1)(h) and of the Delhi Rent Control Act .
4. In the eviction petition the respondents besides making averments that the suit property part of the property bearing no. 8 Hailey Road, New Delhi was also let out to Shri Satjit Singh for residential purpose and also made the following allegations to substantiate their petition u/s 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control i.e. 18(a)(iii) That the respondent has built and has acquired vacant possession of the premises bearing no. 64, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi. The premises were let for residential purposes and are used as such by the respondent".
5. The suit was contested by the tenant Smt. Kishu Singh who filed the written statement after the death of late Shri Satjit Singh. She simply denied the allegations of the respondent and stated that the premises are used for residential cum commercial 2 purpose. In their replication respondents reiterated the averments made in the petition and denied the averments of the appellant.
6. Before the evidence was led, the respondent called upon the appellant to answer interrogatories. In answer to the interrogatories the tenant admitted that the property bearing no. 64, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi was lastly let out in 1972 vide affidavit Ex. AW6/21.
7. In the evidence the respondents, besides examining official witnesses AW-1 Shri H.C. Sharma, AW-2 Shri Mange Ram, PW-4 Shri Kartar Singh and PW-5 Shri B.L. Nirvan to prove the ownership of the petitioners qua the suit property and the ownership of the tenant Shri Satjit Singh qua the property bearing no. 64, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi also examined PW6 Shri Gopal Sethi who in his examination in chief stated as under:-
"Tenant Satjit Singh has built and acquired vacant possession of property bearing no. 64 Sunder Nagar, New Delhi which was a residential property. Satjit Singh had in fact filed a suit for declaration and copy of plaint is already Ex. AW3/1. Order passed in the said case is already Ex. AW3/2. Property in question was purchased by my mother in 1964. In 1972 Satjit Singh let out the property no. 64 Sunder Nagar as admitted by him as answer to interrogatories delivered to him during pendency of the present case. Thus, in 1972 Satjit Singh was in possession of property and had thus, acquired vacant possession of the same as admitted by him. I have checked the record of L&DO of 64 Sunder Nagar, New Delhi and as per lease deed said property is purely residential property. Affidavit of Satjit Singh filed in present case in answer to interrogation is Ex. PW6/21. My petitioner is correct."
8. In his cross-examination he deposed as under:
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"I am one of the petitioner. Originally the petition was filed by my father as attorney and for himself as well as for my mother and my brother as attorney. The detail of demised premises is mentioned in the eviction petition as well as is correctly shown in the site plan. AS on date three tenants/occupants in property no. 8, Hailey Road, My mother had purchased the above said property from Guru Nanak Vidya Bhandar Trust. As on date myself and my brother are the owner of 8, Hailey Road, Delhi it is correct that prior to purchase of this property Guru Nanak Bhandar Trust was the owner. It is wrong to suggest that the property was not purchased by my mother. The petition was filed because the respondent had a acquired vacant possession of residential property No. 64- Sunder Nagar, New Delhi and on the ground that the respondent has carried out unauthorized construction. I am not sure when these unauthorized constructed were erected long time back. It is wrong to suggest that the unauthorized construction was existing when the respondent was inducted as a tenant. My father came to know about these illegal constructions in 69 or 70."
9. The appellant Smt. Kishu Singh appeared as RW1. Regarding acquisition of 64, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi she made the following statement: -
"My husband had another property bearing no. 64 Sunder Nagar, New Delhi but it was in the name of his brother Sardar Surjeet Singh. I do not know if the property is still with his heirs. Most probably it was sold."
10. In her statement she did not stated that the suit property was used for residential cum commercial purposes or that it was let out for residential cum commercial purposes. Rather her statement shows that the property was being used for residential purposes.
11. Shri Daljit Singh who appeared as RW3; with respect to the acquisition of 64, Sunder Nagar made the following statement:
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"My father acquired a property number 64, Sunder Nagar in the name of his brother Surjit Singh in the year 1952. Subsequently, there was litigation in respect of the suit property between my father and his brother.
Subsequently in July 1983 the property was let out to M.s Narang Motors Pvt. Ltd. Not readable"
12. As regard the purpose of letting he stated, that he and other LRS of late Shri Satjit Singh used to reside in the suit property.
13. The trial court in its judgment while allowing the petition u/s 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act made the following observations:
"The petitioner in para 18(a) (iii) of the petition specifically averred that the respondent(s) had built and had acquired vacant possession of the premises bearing No. 64, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi. The respondent(s) in the written statement made a simple denial of the said averment. PW5 B.L. Nirwan in his evidence produced the record of the property No. 64, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi and deposed that Perpetual Lease in respect of the said property was in the name of Satjit Singh interestingly the said witness was not challenged by the respondent(s) in his cross-examination on the said evidence. The petitioner (s) on his part also examined AW3 R.C. Sharma from the Record Room Civil who proved the certified copy of the plaint filed by the respondent Satjit Singh presented on 13.3.1968 bearing suit No. 1803/68 Ex. AW3/2, a perusal whereof in para 4 of the plaint shows that the respondent Satjit Singh was the plaintiff in that suit and it was his case that the property bearing No. 64, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi was acquired Benami by him in the name of his brother Sardar Surjit Singh who was arrayed as the defendant and that it was the case of the plaintiff therein that he had spent the money for the purchase of the said property vide Perpetual Lease dated 17.1.1952 and that he had spent the money on its construction. The said care was decreed in favour of the plaintiff Satjit Singh vide judgment dated 08.1.1969, the certified copy of which is Ex. AW3/1. That apart it is in the evidence of MW3 Daljit Singh it has come that his father had acquired the property No. 64, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi in the name of his brother in the year 1952 and he also admitted that there was a litigation 5 between his father and his uncle in regard to the said premises He also deposed that the said premises at Sunder Nagar was sold in the year 1983 to M/s Narang Motels Pvt. Ltd. PW1 Mrs. Kishu Singh when confronted with that aspect also admitted that her husband owned the property 64, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi in the name of his brother Sardar Surjit Singh and she also deposed that the premises had been sold but showed ignorance as to any litigation between her husband and his brother Sardar Surjit Singh and she deposed that she was not aware as to when it was sold.
Now the argument of Shri Gambhir, Ld. Counsel for the respondent(s) that the petitioner (s) have not led by evidence as to when deceased Satjit Singh was inducted as a tenant into the premises and that the petitioner has not led any evidence to show that the premises was acquired after the commencement of the tenancy does not cut much ice. It hardly needs mentioned that the said facts were within the knowledge of the respondent(s) and they not only deliberately chose to conceal the fact as to when Satjit Singh was inducted into the premises but it is also manifest that the respondent(s) have been shifting their stand during the proceedings. The fact as to when the premises at 64, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi was acquired is evidenced by the Perpetual Lease dated 17.1.1952. The fact as to when and in what stages the premises were constructed were given in the knowledge of the respondent(s), an adverse inference must be taken against them. The inference that follows is that the property was acquired in 1952 and then constructed after the commencement of the tenancy. In any case it is also pertinent to mention that during the proceedings in answer to the interrogations sought by the petitioner(s) under order 11 rule 1 of the CPC, the respondent Satjit Singh file an affidavit Ex. PW6/21 in the court on 29.5.1979. In para 10 of the said affidavit the deponent Satjit Singh denied acquiring the vacant possession of the premises No. 64, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi but in para 11 of the same affidavit he deposed that the said premises was lastly let out in the year 1972. It is in evidence that the suit premises was purchased by the petitioner(s) by virtue of Sale Deed dated 18.9.1964 from Guru Nanak Vidhya Bhandar Trust (a society registered under the Societies Registration Act) Indeed as per Section 108 & 109 of the Transfer of Property Act on the purchase of the property by the petitioner(s) there was no renewal of the tenancy of the respondent(s) nor it could be the 6 case of the commencement of fresh tenancy and the Lease would relate back to the day when the tenant was inducted into the premises. Since the respondent has chosen to conceal material facts as to when the other property at Sunder Nagar was constructed the only inference that follows is that after the commencement of the tenancy the said house was available to the respondent(s) for the residence and lastly the vacant possession was available with the respondent Satjit Singh in 1972 when it was let out. The mere fact that the said property has been sold in the year 1983 would not scuttle the right of the petitioner(s) to claim eviction of the tenant under section 14(1)(h) of the Act. Reference in this connection can be had to the decision Brij Nath Vs. Bhagat Singh, 1991 RLR 300 in which it was observed that "if once acquired the residential premises then he is liable to eviction, even if the property acquired by him has been sold or is unsuitable or the same has been demolished by the MCD.
I, therefore, find that the petitioner(s) have been able to prove the ground of eviction under section 14(1)(h) of the Act, I, therefore, pass an eviction order in favour of the petitioner(s) and against the respondent(s) in respect of the premises Number 8, Hailey Road comprises of two garages on the ground floor, three rooms, two bathrooms, one small room and one kitchen an open space and terrace above the first floor as shown in yellow in the site plan."
14. To assail the Judgment besides arguing the matter orally, appellant also filed written submissions. In the written submissions the impugned Judgment has been assailed on the following grounds :-
i) Late Shri Satjit Singh the tenant was not the owner of the property bearing no. 64, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi in as much as, the said property was owned by Shri Satjit Singh and Sons HUF.
In this regard reliance is placed upon the judgment dated 08.1.1969 also been relied upon by the respondent which is Ex. AW3/1. This Judgment has been delivered in a suit filed by Shri Satjit Singh agaisnt his brother Sardar Surjit Singh for seeking the declaration that the property no. 64, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi was though purchased by him from his own fund in the name of Shri Surjit Singh his brother, but it was an HUF property.
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ii) Appellant also relied upon the judgments delivered by the Hon'ble High Court in a writ petition bearing No.316 or 1974 which was filed by the tenant against Shri Surjit Singh and the L&DO against refusal of the L&DO in mutating the property in the name of Shri Satjit Singh HUF which was allowed in favour of Satjit Singh and Sons HUF and a directions were given to L&DO to mutate the property in the name of Satjit Singh & Sons. This order has been annexed with an application u/o 6 Rule 17 CPC as also their application u/o 41 rule 27 filed by the appellant during the course of the proceedings. The respondent/landlord were not a party to this proceeding.
iii) It is also submitted that since the property belongs to Satjit Singh and Sons (HUF) it cannot be said, that the said property was acquired/built up by late Shri Satjit Singh which might furnish a ground to the respondent u/s 14(1)h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, as the tenant had no independent right to occupy or reside in the property of HUF as the HUF is a separate/distinct entity. All the members of the HUF were co-parceners. There is a distinction between the property belonging to an individual and one belong belong to HUF which is significant but this fact has been ignored by the trial court.
iv) It is also submitted, that statement of Shri B.L. Nirman PW5 was false in as much as, the property never stood in the name of Shri Satjit Singh as has been deposed Shri B.L. Nirman as the Lease Deed was executed in the name of Shri Satjit Singh. The document Ex. AW3/2 and Ex. AW3/1 supports this. As such, reliance placed by the trial court on the statement of PW5 is misplaced to held, that Shri Satjit Sing the tenant had acquired the property bearing no. 64, Sunder Nagar. It is submitted, that if the application u/o 41 rule 27 CPC moved by the appellant with their application u/o 6 rule 17 CPC are allowed it will prove the case of the respondents, that the property bearing no. 64 Sunder Nagar, New Delhi was not the individually property of Shri Satjit Singh but was the property of Satjit Singh and Sons (HUF)
v) The appellants have also taken the ground of limitation by submitting, that the property bearing no. 64, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi was purchased sometimes in the year 1956 i.e. as before the suit property was let out to the tenants and therefore it cannot be said, that the said property was acquired by the tenants subsequent to letting out of the suit property and therefore, the respondents/landlords were not entitled to invoke the ground u/s 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
vi) Regarding the interrogatories and the reply given in the affidavit Ex. PW6/21 dated 29.5.1979, it is stated that the information given about the last letting out of the property expired in 1972 would not help the respondent, because in para 10 of the affidavit it has been stated by Shri Satjit Singh that he had not acquired the property bearing no. 64, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi and further, that it was let out by him in the year 1972 as karta of the family.
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15. The respondent in their oral arguments in the written submissions contradicted the arguments of the appellant by stating that the pleas taken by the appellant in her written submissions is not born out of her pleadings. There is also no evidence led by her, that the suit property was let out for residential cum commercial purposes, more so when the Lease Deed Ex. PW 5/7 not only proves the ownership of the property in favour of the respondent but also shows, that the property in question is a residential property and can only be used for residential purposes. Moreover, from the readings of Ex. AW2/1, AW2/3 and AW6/10 wrote by Shri Satjit Singh to NDMC it is apparent, that the property in question is a residential property.
16. To support their contention, that 64, Sunder Nagar was acquired by Shri Satjit Singh and became available for occupation at least in 1972 they have relied upon the averments made by Satjit Singh Ex. PW3/1 in a certified copy of the plaint in the suit no. 118 of 1968 filed by Satjit Singh agaisnt Shri Surjeet Singh (his brother) claiming that 64, Sundar Nagar, New Delhi was benami in the name of his brothers and that it was purchased and constructed by him of his own costs. Further, they also relied upon the judgment Ex. AW3/2 dated 08.1.1969 holding that Shri Satjit Singh was the owner of the property.
17. It is also contended, that even if, it is to be believed that the property belong to Satjit Singh (HUF) the fact would remains, that it was Shri Satjit Singh, who paid for the acquisition of the property as also for construction thereof as is apparent from the reading of the certified copy of the plaint Ex. AW3/1 and therefore being a co-parcener and karta in of the said HUF he was also the co-owner of the property in 9 question, if not absolute owner and as such he could not have escaped eviction u/s 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act .
18. They have also referred to the portions of the affidavit filed by Satjit Singh Ex. PW6/21 wherein he admitted having let out the property bearing no. 64, Sundar Nagar, Delhi lastly in the year 1972. By relying upon the said affidavit is stated, that even if the said property had been acquired earlier it became available for occupation to the tenant in 1972 which furnished the cause of action to the respondent to file eviction petition u/s 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
19. They have also referred to the statement of Mrs. Satjit Singh recorded on 16.5.2000 wherein, she admitted that her husband had property bearing no. 64, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi though it was in the name of his brother Sardar Surjit Singh. This admission seen in the light of Ex. AW3/1 and AW3/2 proves the case of the appellant that Satjit Singh was the owner of the property.
20. It is a matter of record that no evidence has been led by the appellant about the acquisition/construction of the property and as to when it was let or relet. However, time of the last letting has been admitted to be in the year 1972 as per Ex. AW6/2. With these submissions it is submitted, that the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
21. The appellants also filed additional written submissions wherein they have laid much emphasis upon the word "acquired" by submitting that acquisition means that it has to be in the name of the individual and reiterated that the acquisition of the property by HUF cannot become the property of the individual. They have also relied 10 upon the various judgments:
i) B.R. Mehta Vs. Smt. Atma Devi, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 2220
ii) State Bank of India Vs. Ghamandi Ram, AIR 1969 Supreme Court 1330
iii) Krishna Prasad VS. CIT Bangalore, (1975) 1 Supreme Court 160
iv) M.L. Subbaraya Setty Vs. M.L. Nagappa Setty, (2002) 4 Supreme Court 743
v) Ganpat Ram Sharma and Ors. Vs. Smt. Gyatri Devi AIR 1987 Supreme Court 2016
22. I have gone through the meaning of the word 'Acquisition' in Blanck's Law Dictionary filed by the appellant. I have also examined the judgment relied upon by the parties.
23. In the case of B.R. Mehta Vs. Smt. Atma Devi [supra (i)] it was held as under:-
"The tenant, husband, cannot be made to lose his tenancy in respect of demised premises because of his wife acquiring possession of a flat or allotment of a flat because of her official duties over which the husband has no right or domain or occupation. If a wife or a husband, acquired a property and the other spouse if he/she is the tenant, has a legal right by virtue of such acquisition and stay there, then only can such acquisition or allotment of premises would disentitle or attract the provisions of cl.(h) of S.14(1), otherwise the whose purpose would be defeated. In other words, if for all practical and real sense the tenant, acquired, built or was alloted another residence then his need for the old tenanted residence goes and the tenant loses his right to retain his tenanted premises."
24. In State Bank of India Vs. Ghamandi Ram [supra (ii)] it was held:-
"According to the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law all the property of a Hindu joint family is held in collective ownership by all the coparceners in a quasi-corporate capacity. The textual authority of the Mitakshara lays down in express terms that the joint family property is held in trust for the joint family members then living and thereafter to be born (See Mitakshara, Chapter I. 1-27). The incidents of co-parcenership under the 11 Mitakshara law are: first, the lineal male descendants of a person up to the third general, acquire on birth ownership in the ancestral properties of such person; secondly that such descendants can at any time work out their rights by asking for partition, thirdly, that till partition each member has got ownership extending over the entire property conjointly with the rest; fourthly, that as a result of such co-ownership the possession and enjoyment of the properties is common; fifthly that no alienation of the property is possible unless it be for necessity, without the concurrence of the coparceners, and sixthly, that the interest of of deceased member lapses on his death tot he survivors. A coparcenery under the Mitakshara School is a creature of law and cannot arise by act of parties except in so far that on adoption the adopted son become a co- parcener with his adoptive father as regards the ancestral properties of the latter."
25. In Krishna Prasad VS. CIT Bangalore [supra (iii)] as well as AIR 1969 Hon'ble Supreme Court 682 paged 634 it was held :-
"Under the Income Tax Act, 1961, a Hindu undivided family is a distinct taxable entity, apart from the individual members who constitute the family. The manager by virtue of his status is competent to represent the Hindu undivided family, but on that account he cannot for the purpose of Section 222 be deemed to be the assessee when the assessmente is made against the Hindu undivided family and certificate for recovery is issued against the family."
26. In the case of M.L. Subbaraya Setty Vs. M.L. Nagappa Setty [supra (iv)] it was held:-
"Hindu Law- Joint family property-Relationship between members of, held, is the same as that of tenant- in-common and is thus not dissipation of, or profits earned from, properties in their possession-But they are not liable to account for profits in their own business or acquisitions made therein-After severance such acquisition would be their individual property.12
27. However, none of these judgments help the appellant because in the present case from the averments made by the tenant himself in the suit filed against his brother, he has stated, that the property was acquired by him from his own fund and it was also so constructed. Merely, because he obtained an exparte decree against the brother which was not contested to say, that the property was a HUF property and it would not mean that the property had not been acquired by the tenant late Shri Satjit Singh which is the cause of action giving rise to the grounds of the eviction available to the respondent/landlord.
28. In Ganpat Ram Sharma and Ors. Vs. Smt. Gyatri Devi [supra (v)] is on the point of delay in filing the eviction petition. In that case it was held:-
"The other aspect apart from the question of limitation to which we shall briefly refer is that the landlord must be quick in taking his action after the accrual of the cause of action, and if by his inaction the tenant allows the premises to go out of his hands then it is the landlord who is to be blamed and not the tenant.''
29. In the present case, the suit for eviction has been filed in 1977 after, the property became available to the tenant at least in 1972 for occupation when he lastly let it out. Finally, the tenant even sold the same. Thus, he cannot take plea of the limitation in the facts of this case.
30. As regard the date of acquisition of the property it may also be observed, that the tenant has not disclosed when the property was purchased and when it was constructed. He has also not disclosed when it was firstly let/re-let but his answer to interrogatories shows that it was certainly available for occupation in the year 1972. 13 As such, even the judgment delivered in the case of Dr. Avinash Kaur Vs. Dr. Beli Rat is of no help to the petitioner.
31. It may also be appropriate to take note of the judgment cited by the respondent on the point of limitation in a case decided by Hon'ble Delhi High Court as reported in 1989(1) RCR 590 wherein it has been held that the Limitation Act does not apply to an application under Delhi Rent Control Act. A similar view was taken by a Devision Bench of the Hon'ble High Court as reported in 1974 RCR page 118 in the case of Shri Kedar Nath Vs. Smt. Mohini Devi.
32. In the fact of this case is apparent, that the property bearing no. 64 Sunder Nagar, New Delhi was acquired by Shri Satjit Singh. It is he who claims that it was a HUF property without even pleading the same in reply to the eviction petition. application filed by the appellant u/o 6 rule 17 and u/o 41 rule 27 CPC along with the appeal have been apparently filed so as to prolong the litigation which is pending since 1977. It would play havoc on the landlord if these applications are allowed at this stage which are self creation of the tenants. It is apparent, that the suit filed by the tenants against his brother which was decreed in his favour without any contest and the record of the Hon'ble High Court in respect of the writ petition was also filed by the tenant against the L&DO and his brother to which, the respondent were not a party. The judgment delivered by the Hon'ble High Court on the writ petition does not prove that the property in question was a HUF property because, the statement,that it is a HUF is from the tenant only who admittedly, acquired the property from his own funds himself and was in occupation of the property at least in 1972 for occupation of 14 himself and his family when it was lastly let out as per the information furnished in answer to the interrogatories.
33. It may be observed, that the prohibition in evicting a tenant under the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act is meant for the welfare of the tenant but at the same time, the provisions of section 14 of the Act provides for certain grounds available to the landlord for evicting the tenant, once the tenant makes himself liable for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in the said provision. Thus, in this case once the tenant made himself liable to be evicted on account of acquiring an alternate residential property, he cannot be allowed to continue to remain in possession on false pretext or a pretext which had been created by the tenant so as to protect his possession in the suit property by just proclaiming that the property in question was a HUF property. In the alternative, even if it is presumed, that the property was meant for the welfare of the HUF, it cannot be presumed that the Karta of the HUF would not be entitled to use the same or to occupy the same. More so, when the persons who are litigating are the family members of the tenant. Thus, I do not find any merit either in the application filed by the appellant u/o 6 rule 17 CPC and 41 rule 27 CPC as well as the appeal are dismissed or course with no orders as to costs. In the interest of justice , one month time is granted to the tenants to vacate the property. Copy of this order be sent to the trial court along with trial court record. Appeal file be consigned to the record room.
(M.C.GARG) ADDL.RENT CONTROL TRIBUNAL, DELHI Dated: 11.1.2007 15 11.1.2007 Present: Appellant in persons.
Representative of the respondent.
Vide separate order passed today, both applications u/o 6 rule 17 CPC and u/o 41 rule 27 CPC as well as the appeal have been dismissed or course with no orders as to cost. Copy of this order be sent to the trial court along with trial court record. Appeal file be consigned to the record room.
(M.C.GARG) ADDL.RENT CONTROL TRIBUNAL, DELHI Dated: 11.1.2007 16