Patna High Court
Chandra Kishore Jha Etc. vs The State Of Bihar on 22 January, 1975
Equivalent citations: 1975CRILJ1939
Author: Nagendra Prasad Singh
Bench: Nagendra Prasad Singh
JUDGMENT Nagendra Prasad Singh, J.
1. Criminal Revision No. 1980 of 1970 has been filed by the accused-petitioner under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code'). Criminal Misc. No. 141 of 1975 had been originally filed as Criminal Revision No. 2170 of 1970 under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code; but it has since been converted into a criminal miscellaneous application under Section 561-A of the Code. As common questions of law are involved in the two applications, they have been heard together and this judgment will govern them both. The five petitioners in the two cases are accused in Q. R. Case No. 1021 of 1963/ Trial No. 759 of 1970, pending in the court of a Munsif-Magistrate at Monghyr for inquiry under Chapter XVIII of the Code in the following circumstances.
2. On the 3rd July, 1963, one Shree S. P. Sinha, Deputy Collector Incharge Land Reforms and Development (hereinafter referred to as the "D. C. L. R.") lodged a first information report before the Officer-in-charge, Town Police-Station, Monghyr stating, inter alia, that one Nathun Sah of village Abhaipur, within Surajgarha Police Station, in the district of Monghyr, had filed a petition on the 18th April, 1960 in Compensation Case No. 537 of 1955-56 in which the said Nathun Sah falsely claimed and later obtained compensation from Government in respect of Tauzi Nos. 4498/2 and 4169 under Tarapur and Sheikhpura Ariari Anchals. The said Nathun Sah had obtained ad interim compensation from the State Government to the tune of Rs. 25,272.76 paise between the 19th April, I960 and 1st May, 1961 in collusion with several persons named in the first information report. The name of Chandra Kishore Jha (petitioner in Criminal Revision No. 1980 of 1970) has been mentioned against serial No. 7. So far as the petitioners in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 141 of 1975 are concerned they have been mentioned, respectively, against serial Nos. 6, 10, 5 and 8.
3. From the said first information report it appears that the allegation against petitioner Chandra Kishore Jha was that he, as the Head Clerk of the office of the D. C. L. R., passed the calculation chart prepared by the compensation clerk, although he had full knowledge that Nathun San and others were entitled to compensation only in respect of tauzi No. 4498/2, and not in respect of tauzi No. 4169. The allegation against petitioner Sheolal Prasad was that, as compensation clerk of Tarapur Anchal, he submitted a false and collusive verification report, under letter No. 1262, dated the 23rd September, 1959, letter No. 1338, dated the 5th October, 1959 and letter No. 964, dated the 12th April, 1960, in respect of tauzi No. 4498/2 in order to help the aforesaid Nathun Sah in haying the maximum amount of compensation. Against petitioner Ambika Prasad Sinha it was alleged that as Karamchari of Halka No. 12 of Surajgarha Anchal, he submitted a collusive report, dated the 24th June, 1960, without any order from the Anchal Adhikari, and in the said report he supported Nathun Sah's claim to compensation although he had no connection with Surajgarha Anchal. Against petitioner Mohammad Alam it was alleged that, as compensation clerk, Sheikh-pura Ariari Anchal, he submitted false and collusive report of verification, vide letter No. 1831. dated the 25th July, 1960, so that the said Nathun Sah might get the maximum amount of compensation.
Against him it was further alleged that he intentionally and in pursuance of a conspiracy showed collectible demand of the share of Shree Nandkishore Goenka in Tauzi No. 4069 "after interpolating Tauzi No. 4069 to 4169 for facilitating false payment to Nathun Sah in respect of Tauzi No. 4169." Against petitioner Shyam Charan Prasad it was mentioned that he, as compensation clerk in the office of the D. C. L. R., Sadar, deliberately suppressed the fact that the Additional Collector had ordered in Misc. Case No. 57 of 1959-60 that Nathun Sah be paid compensation only in respect of Tauzi No. 4498/2, which order was within his knowledge, and he prepared the calculation chart in spite of the said order. In the first information report certain other persons have also been named as accused but they are not petitioners before this Court, It has been stated that these accused persons, in conspiracy with one another, committed offences punishable under Sections 209, 420, 464, 466, 468 and 471, read with Sections 120-B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
4. On the basis of the said first information report a case was registered and investigation proceeded. After investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the accused-petitioners before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, who, by his order, dated the 5th June, 1968, took cognizance and summoned the accused other than accused Chandra Kishore Jha to appear before Shree S. K. P. Verma, Munsif-Magistrate, First Class. So far as petitioner Chandra Kishore Jha is concerned, he had been shown in the charge-sheet in column No. 2 as an accused "not sent up" and by that very order the Sub-Divisional Magistrate discharged him,
5. In due course the transferee Munsif-Magistrate started the inquiry under Chapter XVIII of the Code and examined five witnesses who supported the case of the prosecution and proved certain documents. On the 29th July, 1970, a petition was filed on behalf of the prosecution to summon petitioner Chandra Kishore Jha on the ground that evidence had come against him also. The learned Magistrate heard the parties on the question as to whether Chandra Kishore Jha should also be summoned and by his order, dated the 20th August, 1970, on a consideration of the materials on record, came to the conclusion that there was a prima facie case even against Chandra Kishore Jha, and he summoned him to face the inquiry. Against this order Criminal Revision No. 1980 of 1970 has been filed on behalf of Chandra Kishore Jha challenging the legality of the order, on the grounds, inter alia,
(i) that there was no material against him when the Munsif-Magistrate passed the impugned order; and
(ii) that, in view of Section 195(1)(b) of the Code, the cognizance taken by the Magistrate in absence of a complaint in writing by the Compensation Officer, or some other Court to which the Court of the Compensation Officer was subordinate, was illegal and without jurisdiction.
6. So far as the other petitioners in the criminal miscellaneous case are concerned, they also have challenged the inquiry under Chapter XVIII of the Code pending against them on several grounds. But, during the course of arguments they have mainly pressed the ground regarding the illegality of the proceeding pending against them in view of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 195(1)(b) of the Code.
7. I propose to deal with the criminal revision filed by Chandra Kishore Jha first. On behalf of the petitioner Chandra Kishore Jha it was submitted by his learned Counsel that the inquiring Magistrate was not justified in summoning the petitioner when, after proper investigation, his name was shown in column No. 2 of the final form submitted by the investigating officer as the accused not sent up for trial, and the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, while taking cognizance on the basis of the charge-sheet, specifically passed an order discharging petitioner Chandra Kishore Jha from his bail bond. That order, according to learned Counsel for the petitioner, became final and, unless some fresh materials were brought on the records of the case, the learned Magistrate had no authority, in law, to summon him to face the inquiry.
8. From the records of the inquiring Magistrate it appears that, before the 29th July, 1970, when the petition was filed on behalf of the prosecution for summoning petitioner Chandra Kishore Jha, five witnesses had been examined on behalf of the prosecution and they had proved certain documents in support of the prosecution case. P. W. 2 had proved that the calculation chart in the handwriting of petitioner Shyam Charan Prasad bears the signature of Shree S. K. Singh. He further stated that over the above signature of Shree S. K. Singh accused Chandra Kishore Jha had written "checked". He also proved the initial of petitioner Chandra Kishore Jha. During the course of his evidence he stated that the revised calculation chart had been prepared by accused Shyam Charan Prasad and accused Chandra Kishore Jha had written with red ink "checked"; he had put tick marks against the different amounts and had put his initials. He proved several other initials, signatures and tick marks on several documents and all of them were taken in evidence and exhibited.
In paragraph 10 of his evidence he stated that the draft which was marked as Ext. 7/1 was in the pen of Chandra Kishore Jha. In my opinion, on the evidence of P. W. 2, there were materials to show the complicity of petitioner Chandra Kishore Jha in the offences alleged to have been committed by the other accused, and the learned Magistrate was justified in summoning petitioner Chandra Kishore Jha. It is well settled by several judgments of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court that the power of the transferee Magistrate or the Magistrate holding the commitment inquiry is in no way fettered by the initial order summoning the accused persons passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. If some material is produced during the course of the trial or inquiry under Chapter XVIII against the accused who has not been summoned, it is open to the trying Magistrate or the Magistrate holding the inquiry to summon such accused. In this connection a reference can be made to the case of Raghubans Dubey v. State of Bihar . In my opinion, there is no merit in the above contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner.
9. So far as the second point is concerned, it has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the Compensation Officer exercising powers under the Bihar Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Land Reforms Act") was a Court and any prosecution launched for the offences mentioned in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code, without there being a complaint in writing by such Court or some other Court to which the said Court was subordinate, was illegal and the cognizance taken in absence of such complaint is wholly without jurisdiction. According to the petitioner, the said Nathun Sah had filed an application for compensation before the Compensation Officer in the year 1956 and the proceeding for payment of compensation had not concluded, and, during the pendency of the proceeding aforesaid amount of ad interim compensation was paid to Nathun Sah; and, as such, offences under Sections 193, 196, 209 etc. of the Penal Code were committed in relation to a judicial proceeding pending before the Court of the Compensation Officer. Section 195(1) (b) reads as follows:
195(1). No Court shall take cognizance- * * * *
(b) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the same Code (Indian Penal Code), namely, Sections 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate; or * * * * Now the question is as to whether the compensation Officer while discharging the functions enjoined on him by Chapters V and VI of the Land Reforms Act is a 'Court' within the meaning of Section 195(1)(b) of the Code, and, as to whether the accused persons, who are petitioners before this Court, have fabricated false evidence for the purpose of being used at any stage of a judicial proceeding, and have voluntarily and dishonestly, with intention to injure another person, made a claim in court of justice, which they had reason to believe to be false.
10. Under the Land Reforms Act, the interest of the intermediaries vested in the State of Bihar after issuance of different notifications in exercise of the powers conferred thereunder, and the ex-intermediaries, on and after the date of vesting in the State of Bihar, became entitled to compensation Chapter V of the Land Reforms Act deals with provisions regarding assessment of compensation. Chapter VI provides provisions for payment of compensation. Under Section 19, which occurs in Chapter V, Compensation Officers are appointed who have to take steps for preparation, in the prescribed form and in the prescribed manner, a compensation assessment-roll. Under Section 26, after the amount of compensation in respect of the interest of the intermediary concerned has been assessed and has been determined, the compensation-roll is to be published, and any person aggrieved can file objection which has to be considered by the Compensation Officer who has to pass suitable orders according to law.
Section 27 prescribes a right of appeal to this Court against every order passed under Section 26. Section 32, which occurs in Chapter VI, prescribes the manner of payment of compensation. Section 33 lays down the procedure for payment of ad interim compensation to the ex-intermediary. This ad interim payment is to be made pending the finalisation of the compensation which is to be finally paid to the ex-intermediary under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act. Section 35 bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of any entry in, or omission from, the compensation assessment-roll, or in respect of any order passed under Chapters II to VI of the Act, or concerning any matter which is or has already been the subject of any application made or proceeding taken under the said Chapters. Section 38 of the Land Reforms Act, which is relevant for the present case, reads thus:
38. (1) The Collector, for the purposes of inquiries under Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7, a Claims Officer for the purposes of inquiries under Section 16, a Compensation Officer, for the purposes of inquiries under Chapters V and VI, a Tribunal for the purposes of inquiries under Sections 12, 25 and 31 and the Commissioner for the purposes of inquiries under Section 34, shall have power to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses or of any person having an interest in the subject-matter of such inquiry and to compel the production of documents by the same means, and, so far as may be, in the same manner as is provided in the case of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).
(2) Every such inquiry conducted by the Collector or a Claims Officer or a Compensation Officer or a Tribunal or the Commissioner shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding' within the meanings of Sections 193 and 228, and for the purposes of Section 196, of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), and every statement made by any person examined by, or before, him with reference to such inquiry, whether upon oath or otherwise, shall be taken to be evidence within the meaning of the same Code.
11. From a bare reference to Sub-section (1) of Section 38 it is obvious that the Compensation Officer, for purposes of inquiries under Chapters V and VI, shall have power to summon, and enforce the attendance of witnesses, or of any person having an interest in the subject-matter of such inquiry and to compel the production of documents, so far as may be, in the same manner as is provided in the case of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Sub-section (2) specifically mentions that such inquiry conducted by the Compensation Officer under Chapters V and VI shall be deemed to be "a Judicial proceeding within the meanings of Sections 193 and 228, and for the purposes of Section 196, of the Indian Penal Code." Sub-section (2) further says that every statement made by any person examined by or before him with reference to such inquiry, whether upon oath or otherwise, shall be taken to be evidence within the meaning of the said Code (Indian Penal Code).
12. Now, the question is as to whether, in view of Section 38 of the Land Reforms Act, the Compensation Officer is a 'Court' so that the provisions of Section 195 (1) (b) of the Code may be attracted. Whenever a question arises as to whether an authority exercising certain judicial or quasi-judicial powers under a particular enactment is a 'Court' or not, several tests have been laid down in different judicial pronouncements from time to time. In this connection a reference may be made to the case of Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain in which several cases on the point were considered and it was pointed out that many administrative tribunals or authorities constituted under different Acts, on the facts and in the circumstances of a particular case, may be termed as 'Court', if they fulfil certain requirements. One of the tests prescribed is as to whether the pronouncement of such body is binding in nature. In that connection, a reference was made to the following passage in the judgment of Cooper v. Wilson (1937) 2 KB 309:
A true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties and then involves four requisites:
(1) The presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute;
(2) If the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence;
(3) If the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal arguments by the parties; and (4) a decision which disposes of the whole matter, by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law.
Reference may also be made to a passage from Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Volume 8, page 526, which has been often referred to in many of the judgments. The passage reads thus:
Many bodies are not courts, although they have to decide questions and in so doing have to act judicially, in the sense that the proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartially, such as assessment committees, guardians committees, the Court of referees constituted under the Unemployment Insurance Acts to decide claims made on the insurance funds, the benchers of the Inns of Court when considering the conduct of one of their members, the General Medical Council, when considering questions affecting the position of a medical man.
13. In Virindar Kumar Satytwadi v. The State of Punjab , while considering the applicability of Section 195 (1) (b) of the Code, a question arose as to whether the Returning Officer under the Representation of the People Act is a Court or not, and it was held that he was not a Court, because there was no lis in which persons with opposite claims are entitled to have their rights adjudicated in a judicial manner and he was holding simply an inquiry under the provisions of that particular Act exercising quasi judicial powers.
14. In Lalji Haridas v. State of Maharashtra a question arose as to whether, in view of Section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, an Income-tax Officer would be deemed to be a 'Court' and any false statement made before him could be punished under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. In that connection the applicability of Section 195 (1) (b) of the Code was also considered, and it was held that he was a 'court' within the meaning of Section 195 (1) (b) and the cognizance taken in absence of a complaint in accordance with the requirements of Section 195 (1) (b) was illegal and without jurisdiction. In the said judgment, much importance was attached to Section 37 (4) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 which made the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed great reliance on this judgment as Sub-section (2) of Section 38 of the Land Reforms Act is, more or less, in the same terms.
15. In the Sitamarhi Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha , a question arose as to whether the Assistant Registrar exercising the power of Registrar under Section 48 of the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act is a 'Court', and a Bench of this Court laid down three tests to be applied whenever a question arises as to whether an authority constituted under a particular Act exercising judicial or quasi judicial power is a 'Court' and it was pointed out that, before such authority is said to be a 'Court' (i) the dispute which is to he decided by him must be in the nature of a civil suit; (ii) the procedure for determination of such dispute must be a judicial procedure, and (iii) the decision must be of a binding nature. It was held that the Assistant Registrar was a 'Court', because he fulfilled all the aforesaid three tests. The said judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. The Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. where different sections of the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act were examined, and it was pointed out as follows:
....A Registrar exercising powers under Section 48 must, therefore, be held to discharge the duties which would otherwise have fallen on the ordinary Civil and Revenue Courts of the land. The Registrar has not merely the trappings of a Court but in many respects he is given the same powers as are given to ordinary Civil Courts of the land by the Code of Civil Procedure including the power to summon and examine witnesses on oath, the power to order inspection of documents, to hear the parties after framing issues, to review his own order and even exercise the inherent jurisdiction of Courts mentioned in Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In such a case there is no difficulty in holding that, in adjudicating upon a dispute referred under Section 48 of the Act, the Registrar is, to all intents and purposes, a Court discharging the same functions and duties in the same manner as a Court of law is expected to do.
In that connection it was further pointed out that by Section 57 of the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Court and Revenue Court of the land has been ousted in disputes which fall for consideration under Section 48 of the Act. This Section 57 is more or less, like Section 35 of the Land Reforms Act, which also ousts the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of orders passed under Chapters II to VI. Section 38 (1) of the Land Reforms Act, as I have pointed; out above, specifically says that, for the! purposes of inquiries under Chapters V and VI, the Compensation Officer shall have power to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel the production! of documents by the same means and, so far as may be, in the same manner as is provided "in the case of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908". Section 38 (2) makes the said inquiry a "judicial proceeding within the meanings of Sections 193 and 228 and for the purposes of Section 196 of the Indian Penal Code." Orders passed by the Compensation Officer under Chapters V and VI have binding effect subject to appeal to this Court under Section 27. Even the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Court has been ousted in relation to matters decided.
16. From a bare reference to the aforesaid provisions of the Land Reforms Act, it appears that, while exercising his power, the Compensation Officer is exercising judicial power, deciding a civil dispute and passing an order which is final in nature, and, us such, it has to be held that the Compensation Officer is a 'Court' within the meaning of Section 195 (1) (b) of the Code.
17. Now it has to be determined as to whether, on the allegations made against the accused persons in the instant case, an offence punishable under any of the following Sections of the Indian Penal Code, namely, 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 228, has been committed In, or in relation to, any proceeding in the Court of the Compensation Officer. The relevant portion of Section 193 is in these words:
193. Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine;
Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code makes intentionally giving false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, punishable. Giving false evidence has been defined in Section 191 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 192 of the Indian Penal Code, which is relevant for the purposes of the present case, describes as to what amounts to fabricating of false evidence, in these words:
192. Whoever causes any circumstance to exist or makes any false entry in any book or record, or makes any document containing a false statement, intending that such circumstance, false entry or false statement may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding, or in a proceeding taken by law before a public servant as such, or before an arbitrator, and that such circumstance, false entry or false statement, so appearing in evidence, may cause any person who in such proceeding is to form an opinion upon the evidence, to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point material to the; result of such proceeding, is said 'to fabricate false evidence.
18. It has been submitted that the accused persons, when they submitted false and collusive reports and made interpolations in collectible demands and altered Tauzi No. 4069 into 4169 for facilitating false payment to Nathun Sah, that will amount to fabricating false evidence within the meaning of (Section 192 of the Indian Penal Code, because under Section 192 whoever makes "any document containing a false statement, intending that such ...false statement may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding" and that the "statement, so appearing in evidence, may cause any person who in such proceeding is to form an opinion upon the evidence, to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point material to the result of such proceeding," is said "to fabricate false evidence". Ad interim payment has been made on the basis of the false statements made in those reports, which, according to the case of the prosecution were known to the accused; persons to be false. In my opinion there is substance in this contention and, on the case of the prosecution, an offence under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code is disclosed, and it can be said that an offence under Section 193 is alleged to have been committed in relation to a judicial proceeding pending in the Court of the Compensation Officer.
19. Section 209 of the Indian Penal Code reads as follows:
Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly, or with intent to injure or annoy any person, makes in a Court of Justice any claim which he knows to be false, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine.
On the allegations made by the prosecution, an offence even under this section is disclosed as a fraudulent and dishonest claim for compensation in respect of Tauzi No. 4169 was made knowing it to be false. In the first information report itself Section 209, along with other sections of the Indian Penal Code, was mentioned. The proceeding initiated on the application for compensation filed by the said Nathun Sah had not concluded and during the pendency of the said proceeding for assessment of compensation the aforesaid application for ad interim payment of compensation was made and excess amount was paid to said Nathun Sah in respect of Tauzi No. 4169, to which he was not entitled. As such, in my opinion it has to be held that offences punishable under Sections 193 and 209 of the Indian Penal Code are alleged to have been committed in relation to a proceeding pending in the Court of the Compensation Officer and the provisions of Section 195 (1) (b) of the Code are attracted.
20. Offences under Sections 420, 464, 466, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code are, on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, so intermingled with offences under Sections 193 and 209 of the Penal Code and they are alleged to have been committed in the same transaction that it is not possible to separate the trial in respect of some of the offences which do not attract the provisions of Section 195 (1) (b) of the Code.
21. It is well settled that it is not open to a Court to proceed with the trial by dropping the charges for offences which attract the provisions of Section 195 of the Code, Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Basirul Huq v. The State of West Bengal and that of Dr. S. Dutt v. State of Uttar Pradesh . That is permissible only if the offences are distinct and separate, some of them requiring complaint to be filed by the Court concerned in accordance with Section 195 of the Code and others not requiring the compliance of the provisions of Section 195.
In my view, on the aforesaid finding that the proceeding before the Compensation Officer under Chapters V and VI of the Land Reforms Act was a judicial proceeding before a Court, and. that in relation to the said proceeding offences under Sections 193 and 209 of the Indian Penal Code are alleged to have been committed, as a necessary corollary it has to be held that no Court [could have taken cognizance of the offences alleged to have been committed by the accused persons, in absence of a complaint in writing filed by that Court or by some other Court to which the said Court is subordinate, as required by Section 195 (1) (b) of the Code. Further proceedings taken in pursuance of the order taking cognizance, in contravention of Section 195 of the Code, are illegal and without jurisdiction. In this connection reference may be made to the cases of Lalji Haridas v. The State of Maharashtra and S. Dutt v. State of Uttar Pradesh . The result is that it has to be held that the order, dated the 20th August, 1970, passed by the learned Magistrate taking cognizance and summoning petitioner Chandra Kishore Jha is without jurisdiction and is liable to be set aside by this Court. Accordingly, Criminal Revision No. 1980 of 1970 is allowed and the order, dated the 20th August, 1970, is set aside.
22. So far as Criminal Miscellaneous No. 141 of 1975 filed by the other four petitioners is concerned, this also has to be allowed in view of the findings arrived at in Criminal Revision No. 1980 of 1970. Once it is held that the order taking cognizance passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was without jurisdiction, then the proceedings de die in diem are without any authority in law and the petitioners can legitimately make a prayer for quashing the same. Accordingly, Criminal Miscellaneous No. 141 of 1975 is also allowed and the proceedings taken in pursuance of the order taking cognizance passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on the 5th June, 1968 are also quashed in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court.
23. It is unfortunate that the prosecution which was launched against the petitioners in 1963 could not be concluded for one reason or the other. It will, however, be open to the prosecution to make steps for filing of a complaint in accordance with the provisions of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
S. Ali Ahmad, J.
24. I agree.