Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Sh. Prem Chand vs Union Of India & Ors. Through on 22 September, 2014
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench, New Delhi.
OA-2877/2012
Reserved on : 11.09.2011.
Pronounced on : 22.09.2014.
Honble Mr. G. George Paracken, Member (J)
Honble Mr. Shekhar Agarwal, Member (A)
Sh. Prem Chand,
S/o Sh. Parma Nand,
R/o Type V/1, Telecom Officers Colony,
Shastri Nagar, Telephone Exchange
Compound, Tejgarhi Chouraha,
Meerut (UP). . Applicant
(through Ms. Ritika Chawla for Mr. M.K. Bhardwaj, Advocate)
Versus
Union of India & Ors. through
1. The Secretary,
Ministry of Communication & Information
Technology,
Department of Telecommunications,
Sanchar Bhawan, 20, Ashoka Road,
New Delhi-1.
2. The Director (VA),
Department of Telecommunications,
Sanchar Bhawan, 20, Ashoka Road,
New Delhi-1.
3. The Chief Managing Director,
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited,
4th Floor, BSNL,
Janpath, New Delhi-1. . Respondents
(through Sh. Rajeev Kumar and Sh. M.M. Sudan, Advocate)
O R D E R
Mr. Shekhar Agarwal, Member (A) The applicant was working as Deputy General Manager (DGM) with the respondents when he was served with a charge sheet on 30.05.2003 containing the following charge:-
That the said Shri Prem Chand while functioning as DE (Internal), Brahampuri, E-10B Exchange, Meerut during the period from 16.6.1999 to 10.2.2000 committed grave misconduct by showing negligence and irresponsibility in the discharge of official duties, causing disclosure of confidential password for Translation Management due to which two unauthorized routes, viz. 85800 and 8590 were created from Brahampuri E-10B Exchange towards DTAX, Karol Bagh, New Delhi with Rank of Digit-4 Charging Parameter- No. metering and with open numbering scheme. These unauthorized routes were in operation up to 4.2.2000. With the help of these unauthorized any subscribers of Brahampuri E-1oB Exchange could make STD/ISD calls without any charge recording in the Exchange Meter causing huge loss of revenue to the Government. The loss of revenue for Rs.45 lakhs units (approx) of call was observed during an observation period of 16 days.
Thus by his above acts the said Shri Prem Chand Committed grave misconduct, showed lack of devotion to duty and acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a Government servant thereby contravening Rule 3(1)(ii) and (iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
2. The applicant denied the charge and an enquiry was conducted. The Enquiry Officer (EO) submitted his report on 26.06.2008 in which he held that the charge was not proved. The Disciplinary Authority (DA) tentatively agreeing with the EO sought advice of CVC vide their ID No. 8-236/2002-Vig-II dated 09.04.2010. The C.V.C., however, disagreeing with the DA advised imposition of a suitable minor penalty on the charged officer. After considering the advice of CVC, the DA decided to issue a disagreement note on 28.05.2010, which was served on the applicant vide letter dated 28.06.2010of General Manager, U.P. West Circle. Along with the disagreement note, a copy of the enquiry report as well as a copy of CVCs advice was made available to the charged officer and he was asked to submit a representation within 15 days. Accordingly, the applicant submitted his representation dated 14.07.2010. The DA after considering the same arrived at a view that a suitable minor penalty needs to be imposed on the charged officer. The case was then submitted to UPSC along with all the relevant documents for their advice in the matter. The UPSC tendered their advice on 23.02.2011 in which they opined that the charge established against the applicant constituted grave misconduct on his part and that ends of justice would be met if a penalty of reduction of pay by two stages in the time scale of pay for a period of two years without cumulative effect is imposed on the applicant. The DA considered the advice of UPSC, CVC and also consulted DoP&T. Thereafter, an order imposing a punishment of reduction of pay by one stage in the time scale of pay for a period of three years without cumulative effect and not adversely affecting the pension was passed on 29.06.2012. Since the DA in this case was the President, remedy of filing an appeal was not available to the applicant. Hence, he has challenged this order through this O.A. seeking the following reliefs:-
(i) To quash and set-aside the impugned order dated 29.06.201 (A-1) and direct the respondents to give all consequential benefits including due promotion and NFSG (PB3 to PB4) up-gradation etc from the date of juniors with all consequential benefits, without loss of seniority.
(ii) To direct the respondents to release the arrears of pay on account of promotion and NFSG up-gradation with 12% interest.
(iii) To declare the proceedings as initiated vide charge memo dated 30.05.2003 as illegal and unjustified and direct the respondents to grant NFSG-PB-4 as well as JAG Regular to the applicant from due date with all consequential benefits.
(iv)To pass such other and further orders which their lordships of this Honble Tribunal deem fit and proper in the existing facts and circumstances of the case. 2.1 The applicant has challenged the impugned order mainly on the following grounds:-
(i) There has been considerable delay in conclusion of the proceedings and on that ground alone the impugned order deserves to be quashed.
(ii) The DA has acted mechanically on the advice of CVC without application of his mind.
(iii) At best charge proved against the applicant was that of negligence, which does not constitute misconduct.
2.1 In support of his arguments regarding delay in conclusions of the proceedings, the applicant has relied on several judgments of Honble Supreme Court as well as other Courts. The judgment relied upon by the applicant is in the case of Rahul Gupta Vs. UOI (OA-2756/2008) decided on 03.02.2009 in which the following has been held:-
14. Yet another contention urged on behalf of the Applicant is that the inordinate delay in issuing the Memorandum of Charge would cause serious prejudice to the Applicant. It is pointed out that the documents given to the Applicant along with the Memorandum of Charge are doctored in as much as some of them are not true copies of the original documents.. xxxx
27. The matter came up before Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Bani Singh & Anr., (1991) 16 ATC 514 in which the Apex Court has held as follows:-
.There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunals order and accordingly we dismiss this appeal. xxxxx
29. Another case of undue delay in initiating of disciplinary proceedings which the Apex Court dealt with was Food Corporation of India Vs. V.P. Bhatia, 1998(9)SCC 131 in which the Honble Supreme Court has held as follows:-
4. It is no doubt true that undue delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings may cause prejudice to the employee concerned in defending himself and, therefore, the courts insist that disciplinary proceedings should be initiated with promptitude and should be completed expeditiously.
30. Yet another case of delay in serving the memorandum of charge is the case of State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. N. Radhakrishnan. In this context while considering the delay in serving the memorandum of charge the Apex Court observed thus in Para-19 of its judgment:-
It is not possible to lay down any pre-determined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. the essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weight them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he s not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. if the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer enterusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations. xxxxx
31. In the above judgment, Honble Supreme Court had also considered the case of State of Punjab & Ors. Vs. Chaman Lal Goyal, JT 1995(2) 18 where Apex Court held thus:-
10. Now remains the question of delay. There is undoubtedly a delay of five and a half years in serving the charges. The question is whether the said delay warranted the quashing of charges in this case. It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, malafides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the fact-, of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing..
32. The same issue came up for the consideration of Apex Court in P.V. Mahadevan Vs. M.D., T.N. Housing Board, (2005) 6 SCC 636: -
38..The delay has been unconscionable and it has greatly jeopardized the Applicants defence. CVC guidelines and the directions of DOP&T in conducting the disciplinary proceedings within time limit have been flouted. 2.1 The applicant contended that this judgment has been upheld by Honble High Court of Delhi in WP(C) No. 8094/2009. The applicant has further stated that in the case of B.A. Dhayalan Vs. UOI (OA-471/2010) the Tribunal on 13.07.2010 has held that no explanation as to why the respondents therein had taken more than four years in charge sheeting the applicant. On that basis, the Tribunal went on to conclude that the proceedings were vitiated.
2.2 Regarding the second ground, namely, that the DA has acted mechanically on the advice of CVC, the applicant has relied in the case of Dai-Ichi Karkaria Ltd. Vs. UOI & Ors., 2000(4) SCC 57 in which the Apex Court has held that the embargo of arbitrariness is embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. The authority which has been given their wide powers must consider all relevant aspects governing the questions and issues before it. In this context, he has also cited the case of Consumers Action Group & Anr. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., 2000(7) SCC 425. According to him, the same view has been taken by Apex Court in the following cases as well:-
(a) Navaneaswara Reddy Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 939.
(b) Commissioner of Police, Delhi & Anr. Vs. Dhaval Singh, 1991 (1) SCC 246.
(c) State of Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. Ku. Tanuja, AIR 1999 SC 791.
(d) Rajat Baran Roy Vs. State of West Bencal,AIR 1999 SC 1661.
2.3 On the third ground, namely, that no misconduct has been committed by the applicant, learned counsel for the applicant has stated that the charges levelled against the applicant related only to procedural lapses and not for committing any deliberate wrong for personal gain. No ill motive has been proved and as such this cannot be constituted as misconduct. Applicant has stated that in the case of UOI Vs. J. Ahmed, AIR 1979 SC 1022 the Apex Court has observed that misconduct means mistake arising from ill motive; acts of negligence, error of judgment and innocent mistake do not constitute misconduct. Same view has been reiterated in the case of Inspector Prem Chand Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, JT 2007(5) SC 294.
3. The respondents in their reply have disputed the averments made by the applicant and have stated that this O.A. is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed. According to them, the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant under Rule-14 of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 have been conducted as per the prescribed procedure. The applicant has been found guilty of serious irregularities committed by him. The respondents have questioned the jurisdiction of this Tribunal by saying that Honble Supreme Court has held that the High Courts and Tribunals while exercising the power of judicial review cannot act as an Appellate Authority (AA). In the case of State Bank of India Vs. Samarendra Kishore Endlow, (1994) 2 SCC 537 the Honble Supreme Court has held that imposition of proper punishment is within the discretion and judgment of the DA. While the AA can interfere with it, the High Courts and the Administrative Tribunals cannot do so as they exercised powers under Article 226. Further, they have stated that in the case of Chief of Army Staff Vs. Major Dharam Pal Kukrety, (1985) 2 SCC 412 Honble Supreme Court has held that this Tribunal was not entitled to go into the merits of the charge/allegations levelled against the delinquent.
3.1 The respondents have submitted that imposition of penalty on the applicant was neither arbitrary nor unjustified as contended by the applicant. Disciplinary action against him was taken as per Rules in view of the misconduct committed by him. After the enquiry the DA consulted the CVC and UPSC as required under the provisions of the Statutory Rules. It can be seen from the records that when the case was referred to UPSC all relevant documents were made available to them. After receiving the advice of the Commission, the DA considered the records of the case, submission of the applicant advice of CVC and UPSC and took a conscious decision to impose the penalty. The advice of CVC and UPSC are only guiding factor for the DA who applied his mind and arrived at his own conclusion regarding the quantum of penalty to be imposed on the delinquent officer. The DA has exercised his own wisdom and arrived at his own conclusion. The respondents have emphasized that CVC is a Statutory Body whose primary role is to advice the Ministries and Department on vigilance matters. It is mandatory for the Ministries to seek the advice of CVC in such matters and their advice is considered as unbiased, free and fair.
3.2 Denying the averment of the applicant that the charge proved against him was of negligence which did not amount to misconduct, the respondents have relied on the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoi Vs. District Collector Raigarh & Ors., 2012 (4) SCC 407 in which it was held that while misconduct is not capable of precise definition and in certain situation even negligence can constitute misconduct after it is detrimental to public interest. In the instant case the officer had committed grave misconduct by showing negligence and responsibility in the discharge of his official duties. This led to opening of unauthorized groups whereby some subscribers could make STD/ISD calls without being charged. This led to huge revenue loss to the department.
4. We have heard both sides and have perused the material on record. Each of the grounds taken by the applicant in support of his case is dealt with as hereunder:-
The first ground taken by the applicant is of delay in issuance of charge sheet and concluding the enquiry proceedings. His plea is that this delay has caused grave prejudice to him inasmuch as he has been deprived from his promotion as well as financial up-gradation due to pendency of these proceedings. He has prayed that on this ground alone the proceedings deserve to be quashed. In support of his contention he has relied on the judgment of this Tribunal in the case of Rahul Gupta (supra). In the aforesaid judgment several pronouncements of the Apex Court on the point of delay in issuance of charge memorandum and conclusion of disciplinary proceedings have been mentioned.
We have also seen pronouncements of Honble Supreme Court in certain other cases. Thus, in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. Vs. V. Appala Swamy, (2007) 14 SCC 49 Honble Supreme Court has held that as far as delay is concerned no hard and fast rule can be laid down for quashing the proceedings and each case must be considered on its own facts. The principles upon which proceeding can be quashed on the ground of delay are:-
(a) Where by reason of delay the employer condoned the lapse on the part of the employee.
(b) Where the delay caused prejudice to the employee. Such a case of prejudice, however, is to be made out by the employee for the EO.
In the case of Chairman, LIC of India & Ors. Vs. A.Masilamani, JT 2012(11) SC 533 the Honble Supreme Court has held as follows:-
The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is de hors the limitation of judicial review. In the event that, the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by court. The same principle is applicable, in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question, have to be examined, taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of charges involved therein. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration, all relevant facts and to balance and weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is infact in the interest of clean and honest administration, that the judicial proceedings are allowed to be terminated, only on the ground of delay in their conclusion. (Vide: State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma & Anr., AIR 1987 SC 943; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh & Anr., AIR 1990 SC 1308; Union of India & Anr. v. Ashok Kacker, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 180; Secretary to Government, Prohibition & Excise Department v. L. Srinivasan, (1996) 3 SCC 157; State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan, AIR 1998 SC 1833; M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 3475; Union of India & Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, AIR 2007 SC 906; and The Secretary, Ministry of Defence & Ors. v. Prabash Chandra Mirdha, AIR 2012 SC 2250). Here the direction has been given not to quash the proceedings on the ground of delay, as such, power is de hors the limitation of judicial review. We also notice that while giving this judgment Honble Supreme Court has taken note of various pronouncements made by the Apex Court in different cases such as State of U.P. Vs. Brahm Datt Sharma & Anr., AIR 1987 SC 943, State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. N. Radhakishan, AIR 1998 SC 1833, M.V. Bijlani Vs. UOI & amp; Ors., AIR 2006 SC 3475 and other judgments many of which have been relied upon by the applicant in the judgment Rahul Gupta (supra) by this Tribunal. Again in the case of Sh. Anant R. Kulkarni Vs. Y.P. Education Society & Ors., (Civil Appeal No. 3935 of 2013) on the point of delay Honble Supreme Court has observed as follows:-
8. The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is de hors the limitation of judicial review. In the event that the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by court. The same principle is applicable in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question, must be carefully examined, taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of charges involved therein.
The Court has to consider the seriousness and magnitude of the charges and while doing so the Court must weigh all the facts, both for and against the delinquent officers and come to the conclusion, which is just and proper considering the circumstances involved. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration all relevant facts, and balance and weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is in fact in the interest of clean and honest administration, that the said proceedings are allowed to be terminated, only on the ground of a delay in their conclusion. (Vide: State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma & Anr., AIR 1987 SC 943; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh & Anr., AIR 1990 SC 1308; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570; State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan, AIR 1998 SC 1833; M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 3475; Union of India & Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, AIR 2007 SC 906; The Secretary, Ministry of Defence & Ors. v. Prabash Chandra Mirdha, AIR 2012 SC 2250; and Chairman, LIC of India & Ors. v. A. Masilamani, JT (2012) 11 SC 533).
On the basis of the above citations, the position that emerges is that generally the enquiry proceedings should not be quashed on the ground of delay in initiation or conclusion of the departmental proceedings, as such action of the Courts would be de hours the limitation of judicial review. Facts and circumstances of each case should be seen to determine whether it would be in the interest of honest and clean administration to terminate such proceedings.
In the instant case, we find that the lapse committed by the applicant pertained to the period from 16.06.1999 to 10.02.2000. The charge sheet was issued to the applicant on 30.05.2003 and the EO submitted his report on 26.06.2008. The order of the DA was passed on 29.06.2008. Thus, while there has been some delay in initiation of the proceedings, there has been considerable delay in conclusion of the same. However, the applicant has not taken the plea of delay before the EO as has been laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of V. Appalaswamy (supra). Nor has he mentioned at any stage the prejudice which such delay has caused to his defence. In the written submissions given by the applicants counsel, it is only mentioned that the delay has deprived the applicant of promotions and financial up-gradations. However, it is not averred at any stage that this delay has in any way affected his defence. Moreover, we notice that the charge against the applicant is of causing huge loss of revenue to the Government by his conduct. In our opinion, it would not be in the interest of honest and clean administration if proceedings are terminated on the ground of delay, such a grave charge is condoned and the delinquent officer is allowed to go unpunished. We are, therefore, not inclined to quash these proceedings on the ground of delay.
4.2 The second ground taken by the applicant is that the DA has acted mechanically on the advice of CVC and has issued the disagreement note without application of mind. In support of his contention he has cited the disagreement note issued by the respondents, available on pages 93-94 of the paper-book, which according to him is reproduction of the CVC advice. The applicants counsel contended that EO had exonerated him. The DA also agreed with him initially but thereafter on receipt of CVC advice changed his mind and issued this disagreement note, which was nothing but verbatim reproduction of CVC advice. This according to learned counsel clearly demonstrated that the DA had failed to apply his mind. In this regard, he relied on the judgment of this Tribunal in OA-4279/2012 pronounced on 11.11.2013 in which the OA was allowed and the penalty order was set aside on the ground that DA had simply copied the advice given by UPSC while imposing the punishment.
In the instant case, however, we notice that the facts are different. It is true that initially the DA had agreed with EO and held the charge to be not proved against the applicant, on receipt of CVC advice, he issued the disagreement note. It is also true that in the disagreement note the reasons for disagreement given are the same as have been given by CVC in their advice. However, we notice that the DA did not make up his mind at that stage to punish the officer and only tentatively disagreed with EO. This is clear from the disagreement note itself wherein after giving the reasons for disagreement, it is mentioned that the President proposed to disagree with the EOs findings. Thereafter, an opportunity was given to the applicant to make a representation against the disagreement note. Along with the disagreement note, a copy of enquiry report as well as CVCs advice was also made available to the applicant. Thus, the action of the DA reveals that the DA had only tentatively accepted the advice of the CVC but still had open mind to consider the case in the light of representation received from the applicant.
Subsequent, conduct of the DA also reveals that reliance was not placed totally on the advice of CVC as advice of UPSC was also taken and even DoP&T was consulted. While CVC had advised imposition of a minor penalty, UPSC had advised penalty of reduction of pay by two stages in the time scale of pay for a period of two years without cumulative effect. The DA applied its own mind and imposed punishment of reduction of pay by one stage in the time scale of pay for a period of three years without cumulative effect and not adversely affecting the pension. Thus, the punishment imposed was quite different from what had been advised by UPSC or CVC. This is an indication of application of mind by the DA.
In this regard, the respondents had argued that UPSC is a Constitutional Body and consultation with UPSC is provided for in Article 320 (3) of the Constitution read with Regulation-5(1) of the UPSC (Exemption from Consultation) Regulations 1958. Similarly, CVC is a Statutory Body and consultation with them is also mandatory. Acting on their advice also not mean acting mechanically without application of mind. We are inclined to agree with the respondents in this regard. Bodies like CVC have been created to ensure that disciplinary action wherever necessary is taken freely without any bias. Similarly, UPSCs advice is taken to ensure that the punishment being meted out to the delinquent officer is just and commensurate with the lapse committed. Course correction based on the advice of these Bodies is inevitable and very much part of the prescribed procedure. If advice given by these bodies is not taken cognisance of and acted upon, it would make the whole process of consultation worth less. Acting on the advice given by these bodies cannot be construed as acting mechanically without application of mind. We, therefore, reject this ground of the applicant as well.
4.3 The third ground taken by the applicant is that the charge proved against him did not constitute misconduct as it was only negligence and supervisory lapse. In this regard, he had relied on the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the case of UOI Vs. J. Ahmed (supra) wherein it has been held that negligence, error of judgment and innocent misconduct do not constitute misconduct.
The respondents, on the other hand, had relied on the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoi (supra) in which it has been held that even negligence can constitute misconduct if it is found to be detrimental to public interest.
We have considered the rival submissions on this issue. In our opinion, the lapse committed by the applicant is of more serious nature and cannot be condoned as an inadvertent mistake. The applicant has been found to be guilty of causing disclosure of his confidential password. Thus, he failed to maintain secrecy of the same. Thereafter, he was found guilty of not giving commands from a terminal placed in a room where the general staff had no access as he had failed to install such a terminal in his room. He also failed to check the unauthorized routes from time to time by taking route analysis print out as well as YJDB log file print out. Thus, it is clear that it was not one but a series of lapses that was committed by the applicant, which shows irresponsible behaviour and lack of devotion to duty. Moreover, it is also clear that several unauthorized STD/ISD calls were made, because of this lapse and this resulted in a huge loss of revenue to the department. We are, therefore, in agreement with the respondents that such a conduct of the applicant cannot be termed as mere negligence and condoned in terms of the judgment of Apex Court relied upon by the applicant.
Applicants counsel had argued that the DA had found the applicant guilty of supervisory lapses which went beyond the main charge. We are not inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the applicant on this point. In our opinion, all the lapses referred to above were part of his duty as a supervising officer. Had he performed these tasks diligently he could have maintained better supervision on his staff and prevented revenue loss to his Department.
5. On the basis of the above analysis, we are of the opinion that none of the grounds taken by the applicant is sustainable. We find no merit in this O.A. and the same is dismissed. No costs.
(Shekhar Agarwal) (G. George Paracken)
Member (A) Member (J)
/Vinita/