Karnataka High Court
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs Mrs. Lucy Banilda Rebellow on 10 August, 1998
Equivalent citations: ILR1998KAR4206
Author: R.V. Raveendran
Bench: R.V. Raveendran
JUDGMENT R.V. Raveendran, J.
1. This is a tenant's revision petition under Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure.
2. The respondent is the landlord and the petitioner is the tenant (Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited) in regard to the petition schedule premises in HRC No. 326/1984 filed by the landlord against the tenant under Clause (a) of the Proviso to Section 21(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 ('Act' for short) in the Court of the Learned Munsiff, Mangalore.
3. The case of the landlord is briefly as follows: There was a term lease of the premises upto the end of 30.9.1983 in favour of the tenant. The tenant continued as a statutory tenant from 1.10.1983. The rent for the premises is Rs. 468.75 per month. The tenant did not pay the rents from 1.10.1983. Therefore a registered notice dated 5.8.1984 was sent by the landlord to the tenant demanding payment of rent. The said notice was sent to the registered office (Bombay), regional office (Bangalore) and the Sale Office (Mangalor'e) of the tenant. The notice was served on the Bombay Office on 13.8.1984 and on the Bangalore Office on 10.8.1984. The tenant tendered the entire arrears of rent for the period 1.10.1983 to 31.10.1984 by cheque dated 13.10.1984, sent by post on 17.10.1984 and delivered to the landlord at Mangalore only on 20.10.1984. According to the landlord, the tenant ought to have tendered the refits on or before 10.10.1984 (that is two months from the date of service of notice on the Bangalore office of the tenant); and as it was not so tendered, the tenant is liable to be evicted under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. The eviction petition was filed on 20.11.1984.
4. The tenant contended that cheques were being regularly sent from its Head Office at Bombay. It has hundreds of lease-hold premises throughout the country and to facilitate payment of rents to all its landlords, it had computerised the processing and issue of cheques; that on account of computer failure, there was some delay in payment; and that as the landlord has failed to report the non-receipt of the rents cheques, there was also no occasion for manual verification as to whether the rents had been sent to the landlord every month. The tenant submitted that the failure to pay the rents for about a year was an account of a bonafide mistake and prayed that the delay may be condoned by the Court, as having been satisfactorily explained. The tenant further contended that when the cheque dated 13.10.1984 was accepted and encashed, the payment should be related back to the date of the cheque; and as the cheque was issued on 13.10.1984, within two months of the date of service on its Registered Office (13.8.1984) there is no default; and even if there is any slight delay, it is neither deliberate nor on account of any negligence and therefore the eviction petition should be rejected. The tenant also contended that the landlord had not made out any ground under Section 21(1) proviso (a) to seek eviction.
5. The landlord examined her son and Attorney as P.W. 1. One of the officials of the local office of the tenant at Mangalore was examined as R.W.1. The landlord exhibited the registered lease dated 14.10.1963 (Ex.P-1), letter of renewal of lease dated 11.7.1973 (Ex.P-2), copy of the registered notice dated 5.8,1984 (Ex.P-3), the postal acknowledgment for having served the said notices at tenant's Bombay office on 13.8.1984 (Ex.P.4) and the Tenants Remittance Advice attached to the rent cheque for Rs. 6,093.75 ps. (Ex.P-5). The landlord exhibited the copies of eviction petition filed against the tenant by some other landlord in HRC 86/1985 and the objections filed in that petition by the tenant as Ex.P-6 & Ex.P-7. The tenant did not produce any documents.
6. The only point formulated by the trial Court for consideration was whether the tenant proved that it had sufficient cause for nonpayment of the rents within two months from the date of receipt of the notice dated 5.8.1984. The said point was answered in the negative and consequently, the petition was allowed. Feeling aggrieved, the tenant filed a revision under Section 50(2) of the Act before the district Court, Dakshina Kannada. The District Court by its order dated 29.7.1997 dismissed the revision petition confirming the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court. Feeling aggrieved, the tenant has filed this second revision petition.
7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant urged the following three contention:
(a) There is no valid notice, demanding payment of arrears of rents as required under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act.
(b) When the cheque dated 13.10.1984, issued by the tenant towards payment of rent is accepted and encashed by the landlord, even if the cheque was received by post by the landlord only on 20.10.1984, the payment relates back to the date of cheque, that is 13.10.1984. Therefore the payment is within two months of the date of service (13.8.1984) and consequently there is no default under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act.
(c) Even if the date of payment is taken as 17.10.1984 (the date of posting) or 20.10.1984 (the date of receipt of cheque by the landlord), sufficient cause has been shown in regard to the delay of few days and therefore no order for eviction could be made, having regard Section 21(2).
8. The learned Counsel for the landlord contended that Ex.P3 dated 5.8.1984 complies with the requirements of a notice required under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. The date of payment of tender of arrears, is the date on which the cheque was actually received by the landlord, that is 20.10.1984 and not the date of dispatch of the cheque and therefore there is no payment within two months of service of notice. The tenant has not shown sufficient cause for the delay and both the Courts below have concurrently found that there is no sufficient cause and this Court should not disturb the said finding of fact. Lastly he contended that in the absence of jurisdictional error, there is no case for interference under Section 115 CPC.
9. The following points arise for consideration from the rival contentions:
1. Whether there is any jurisdictional error in the orders of the Courts below.
2. If the answer to point No.(1) is in the affirmative, whether there is default in payment of rent, furnishing a cause of action for eviction under Section 21(1)(a).
3. If the answer to point No. (2) is in the affirmative, whether tenant has shown sufficient cause for the default in paying or tendering the rent within the period specified in Clause (a) of the proviso to Section 21(1).
Re: Point (1):
10. Before considering the first question, it is necessary to notice the relevant portions of the Act.
10.1. The relevant portions of Section 21 is extracted below:
"21. PROTECTION OF TENANTS AGAINST EVICTION:
(1) Notwithstanding (anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or other authority in favour of the landlord against the tenant."
Provided that the Court may on an application made to it, make an order for the recovery of possession of a premises on or more of the following grounds only, namely:
"(a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him within two months of the date on which a notice of payment for the arrears of rent has been served on him by the landlord by tender or delivery either personally to the tenant or to a member or servant of his family at his residence ( or if such tender or delivery is not practicable) by affixture to a conspicuous part of the premises.
xxx(b) to (p) omitted as not relevant to this case xxx xxx (2) No order for recovery of possession of any premises shall be made on the ground specified in Clause (a) of the proviso to sub-tenant (1), if the tenant -
(i) complies with the provisions of Section 29;
(ii) satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for the default to pay or tender the rent within the period referred to in the said Clause (a); and
(iii) pays to the landlord or deposits in the Court such further amount, as may be determined by the Court to be due, along with a sum not exceeding ten percent of the rent thereof as may be fixed by the Court, Within one month from the date of the order of the court."
10.2) Section 29 requires a tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 21, to pay to the landlord or deposit with the Court, all arrears of rent due in respect of the premises upto the date of payment on deposit, and continue to pay or to deposit the rents which subsequently become due during the pendency of the petition
11. The object and scope of Clause (a) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act is often misunderstood and misapplied as has been done in this case. A mere default in payment of rent is not a ground of eviction under Section 21(1)(a). The ground of eviction arises only when the tenant has not paid the rents, and the landlord serves on the tenant a notice calling upon him to pay the arrears of rent, and the tenant fails to pay or tender the whole of the arrears of rent, within two months of the date of service. The "default" in the payment of rents to furnish a ground of eviction under Clause (a) is not a 'default simpliciter' that is non payment of the rent on the due date every month, but the default in paying the arrears inspite {af service of a notice by a landlord, for a period of two months from the date of service of such notice. What gives the jurisdiction to a Court under the Act, to pass an order of eviction, is the existence of one of the grounds of eviction mentioned in the Act. The Supreme Court in NAGINDAS RAMDAS v. DALPATRAM ICCHARAM, has held that the existence of one of the statutory grounds for eviction mentioned in the Rent Control Act is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court under the Act.
11.1) Therefore, when passing an order in an eviction petition filed by a landlord under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, the Court should determine whether there is a default, as contemplated under Clause (a). This necessarily involves consideration of three aspects: (1) whether there is nonpayment of rent leading to accumulation of arrears; (2) whether a notice has been served by the landlord calling upon the tenant to pay the arrears of rent; and (3) whether the tenant had failed to pay the said arrears of rent within to months from the date of service of such notice. Unless the said three conditions are satisfied, there will be no ground for eviction under Clause (a) and the Court does not get jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction.
11.2) In RAMAIAH v. NARASAIAH, this Court held that under Clause (a), the landlord has a duty to issue a written notice to the tenant demanding the arrears of rent and have the same served and only if there is failure to pay the arrears demanded, within the stipulated period of two months, the Court will get the jurisdiction to pass an order of eviction.
11.3) If a Court without examining whether the requirements of Clause (a) are fulfilled, merely examines the question whether there was a default in payment of rents, or the question whether sufficient cause for default is shown, as has been done in this case, such exercise of jurisdiction is improper and illegal. As stated above, it is not the mere nonpayment which furnishes the cause of action, but the failure to pay the arrears within two months from the date of service of a notice, which furnishes the cause of eviction. As both the Courts below have failed to examine whether the requirements of Clause (a) are fulfilled, they have committed a jurisdictional error which requires interference under Section 115 of C.P.C.
Re: Point (2)
12. The effect of Section 21(1)(a) and Section 21(2) was considered by this Court in RAMAIAH's case referred to above. This Court held that the language of Section 21(1)(a) and (2) made it clear that the Court is not required to enquire whether the tenant is a chronic defaulter or whether he had sufficient cause or not for accumulating and not-paying the arrears of rents. The Court is required to consider only whether there is a default in paying the arrears of rent within a period of two months of service of notice demanding the rents as contemplated in Section 21(1)(a). If the arrears are not paid within the stipulated period without justifiable cause, then the Court has no choice, but to pass an order of eviction. But the Court will however have discretion in recording a finding as to whether there was sufficient cause for the default to pay or tender the rent within two months of service of notice, for the purpose of passing an conditional order under Section 21(2)(iii).
13. Even if the tenant fails to pay the arrears of rent within 60 days of service of a notice under Section 21(1)(a) and thus commits a default in terms of Section 21(1)(a), an order of eviction does not, automatically follow. When the Court records a finding that there is a default to pay the arrears as contemplated under Section 21(1)(a), Clauses (i) and (ii) of Sub-section (2) of Section 21 come into play and it becomes necessary for the Court to examine whether the tenant has complied with the provisions of Section 29 and whether he had sufficient cause for the default to pay or tender the arrears of rent within the period of two months referred to in Clause (a) of the provisos to Section 21(1).
13.1) If the Court comes to the conclusion that there is no compliance with the provisions of Section 29, and that the tenant has not shown sufficient cause for the default to pay or tender the arrears of rent within the two months period (from the date of service of notice), then, it will have to proceed to pass an order of eviction under Section 21(1)(a).
13.2) If, on the other hand, the tenant complies with Section 29, and also satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not paying or tendering the arrears of rent within the period of two months from the date of service of notice, then, the Court cannot pass an order of eviction under Section 21(1)(a), but will have to pass a conditional order under Sub-clause (iii) of Sub-section 21(2).
13.3) The compliance with provisions of Section 29 referred to in Section 21(2)(i) is not compliance with an order if and when passed by the Court under Section 29(4) on an application by the landlord for stopping further proceedings. The compliance with provisions of Section 29, means compliance with the primary obligation of the tenant not to contest any eviction proceedings without regular payment of rents. Therefore to comply with Section 21(2)(i), the tenant has to pay to the Landlord or deposit in the Court, the arrears of rent upto date, (either as demanded by the landlord or as admitted by the tenant) or entering appearance in the eviction petition, or within a reasonable time of entering appearance, and continue to pay or deposit the rent (at the admitted rate) as and when they become due. For the purpose of Section 21(2)(i), what the Court will have to see is whether there is substantial compliance and not mathematical precision in paying the rents on the due dates.
13.4) If there is compliance with Section 21(2)(i) and (ii), instead of passing an order of eviction, the Court shall pass an condition order under Section 21(2)(iii) directing the tenant to pay such further amount, as may be determined by the Court to be due, along with a sum not exceeding 10% of the rent thereof as may be fixed by the Court. The words 'such further amount used in Section 21(2)(iii) has been explained in RAMAIAH's case (supra) as follows:
"Similarly Clause (iii) of Sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Act speaks of further amount. That further amount relate to cases where the admitted rent has been paid after notice of demand under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act, but a dispute has been raised in regard to the balance of the difference in the claim and a petition filed on that basis. In such cases an enquiry has to be held as to the quantum of rent payable and only on payment of such further amount as decided by the Court, the order of eviction made subject to the condition that payment of amounts so decided should be paid within one month."
Thus if there is any dispute in regard to the rate of rent and/or the period for which the rents are due, and the tenant pays only the admitted rent, the Court shall enquire and find out, the actual amount to be paid (that is rate of rent and the period for which it is due) and also direct the balance if any, due on such determination, to be paid. The words "Ten percent of the rent thereof" means ten percent of the amount in arrears which was belatedly paid, that is the amount which ought to have been paid within two months of service of notice, but which is belatedly paid, either after the expiry of two months or after determination by the Court in the event of dispute. The Court shall, on passing such an order under Section 21(2)(iii), give a month's time to the tenant to pay such amounts. The Court shall also fix a date of hearing beyond one month, from the date of its order under Section 21(2)(iii), for reporting compliance. If the amounts ordered to be paid under Sub-clause (iii) of Section 21(2) are paid within the said period of one month, then, the petition under Clause (a) of the Section 21(1) shall have to be dismissed. If the tenant fails to pay the amount within the said one month, then, an order of eviction shall follow under Section 21(1)(a).
14. Having regard to the scheme under Section 21(1)(a) and Section 21(2), if the Court comes to the conclusion that there is no default within the meaning of Section 21(1)(a), i.e., where there is no arrears at all or where there is no service of notice as required by Section 21(1)(a) or where the arrears are paid within two months from the date of service of notice, then there is no need to proceed further and consider the matter under Section 21(2). Only if the default is proved under Clause (a), it becomes necessary for the Court to examine the question as to whether an order of eviction should be made or not, with reference to Section 21(2) arises.
15. The Scheme under Section 21(1)(a) and Section 21(2) is some what similar to the Scheme under Section 21(1)(h) and Section 21(4). Clause (h) provides that the need should be proved to be bona fide and reasonable. If that is proved, then the Court is required to consider the question of comparative hardship and partial eviction under Section 21(4). If the need is not proved to be bona fide or reasonable, the Court will not examine the question of comparative hardship and partial eviction under Section 21(4). Similarly only if the ground of eviction is made out under Section 21(1)(a), the Court will have to proceed to examine as to whether there are circumstances in favour of the tenant, to deny relief to the landlord, as provided under Section 21(2).
16. Let me now examine the facts of this case, with reference to the scheme and principles relating to eviction on the ground of arrears of rent, contained in Section 21(1)(a) and 21(2) of the Act. The Courts below were required to find out (a) whether the petitioner herein was in arrears of rent, (b) whether there was a notice demanding payment of the arrears of rent, (c) whether the amount was not paid within two months from the date of such service. The fact that the rent was in arrears from 1.10.1983 is not in dispute. The next stage is to find out whether there was a notice, as required under Section 21(1)(a). What should be the requirement of a notice under Section 21(1)(a) has been the subject matter of some decisions.
16.1) In RAKESH KUMAR v. HINDUSTAN EVEREST TOOL LTD., the Supreme Court held that a notice of demand of arrears of rent preceding an eviction proceedings, must be read in a common-sense point of view bearing in mind how such notices are understood by ordinary people. In that case, the Supreme Court held that, the notice issued by the Landlord describing the property and stating the arrears of rent and terminating the tenancy and calling upon the tenant to hand over possession, and threatening to file a petition for eviction was sufficient compliance with the requirements relating to such notice and failure to make, a specific demand for payment of the rents will not invalidate the notice, as such a demand was implied on the reading the notice.
16.2) In CHIMANLAL v. MISRILAL, the Supreme Court was considering the sufficiency of notice under Section 12(1)(a) under M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (somewhat similar to Section 21(1)(a) of KRC Act). The Supreme Court held as follows:-
"It is apparent, therefore, that there is a substantial difference between the accommodation mentioned in the notice and the accommodation actually let to the Appellant. It must be taken that notice relates to accommodation which cannot be effectively identified with 1he accommodation constituting the tenancy. This is not a case of mere misdescription of the accommodation where both parties knew perfectly well that the notice referred to accommodation let to the tenant. Nor is it a case where the discrepancy between accommodation alleged by the landlord and that actually let to the tenant is marginal or insubstantial ... The notice referred to in Section 12(1)(a) must be a notice demanding the rental arrears in respect of accommodation actually let to the tenant. It must be a notice (a) demanding the arrears of rent in respect of accommodation let to the tenant and (b) the arrears of rent must be legally recoverable from the tenant. There can be no admission by a tenant that arrears of rent are due unless that relates to accommodation let to him. A valid notice demanding arrears of rent relatable to the accommodation let to the tenant from which he is sought to be evicted, is a vital ingredient of conditions which govern the maintainability of the suit, for unless a valid demand is made, no complaint can be laid for noncompliance with it. and consequently no suit for ejectment of the tenant in respect of the accommodation will lie on that ground."
(emphasis supplied) 16.3. This court had occasion to examine the requirements of notice under Section 21(1)(a) in RAMACHANDRA BHAT v. RAO THALITHAYA, . The landlord therein relied on a notice of demand which did not give the description of the property except giving the door number. Further, the door number that was given in the notice, was not correct. The Court held that the mistake in regard to the door number could have been overlooked if the description of the premises let out was contained in the notice. But, as the notice did not contain the description of the premises apart from the door number which was also erroneous and as it was not possible to identify the schedule premises from the notice it was held that the notice was no a sufficient notice under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act.
16.4. A learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court considered Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, which is pari materia with Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, in the case of HARI MOHAN vs AMESHWAR DAYAL, and held that the demand by notice must be a demand for a definite sum due on account of arrears of rent from the tenant to the landlord; that it should state the period for which the rent has fallen due; and that even though no particular from of a demand is prescribed, it must be proper and clear.
17. Having regard to the provisions of Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, and the principles laid down by the Courts, it is evidence that a notice of demand issued under Section 21(1)(a) should contain the following particulars:
(a) description of the property sufficient to identify the property;
(b) description of the landlord and tenant;
(c) rate of monthly rent;
(d) the period for which the amount is due; and
(e) a demand for payment of the arrears of rent.
Though these particulars need not be given specifically, it must be possible to discern these particulars from the notice. In the absence of such particulars it is not possible to hold that there is demand by the landlord for arrears of rents from the tenant in regard to the premises. Let me examine whether the notice in this case satisfies the aforesaid requirements relating to a demand notice under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act.
17.1. The notice dated 5.8.1984 (Ex.P3) is extract below for ready reference:
Miss Lucy Pais Tel. Res; 25348
Loo Pais Hanging Gardens
Pais Compound, Urwa
MANGALORE - 575006
5th August, 1984
To
The Regional Manager
Hindustan Petroleum
Corporation Ltd.,
3, Sankey Road
Post Box 123
Bangalore-560 052
Sir
Sub : Nonpayment of rent due.
Ref: Lease Deed dated 8.3.1974.
Please note that the rental payable at the rate of Rs. 375/-p.m. in respect of the Ladyhill Petrol Bank premises had not been paid inspite of repeated requests since about six months. The nonpayment is deliberate and without just or sufficient cause.
You are hereby called upon to pay the rental due as aforesaid within the time allowed by law, last I should seek your eviction on the ground of nonpayment of rent.
The lease period which itself was renewed period, expired on 30.9.1983. I require the premises for putting up flats.
Therefore please make alternative arrangements to vacate the petrol bunk within a month.
On your failure to comply with the demands made, I will sue you to recover possession which please take notice.
Yours faithfully Sd/-
(Lucy Pais) c.c: 1. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., 17, Jamshetji Tata Road Bombay.- 400 020
2. Sales Officer, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Bunder, Mangalore-1 to take steps that may be necessary comply with the demands made as above.
17.2. The first requirement is that the notice should disclose the premises in regard to which the notice is issued i.e., the description of the property and where the property is situated should be disclosed. The notice in this case, merely refers to the property as "Ladyhill Petrol Bunk premises", without giving description. The notice does not even say in which city the property is situated. Nor does it give the address (that is Municipal number & Road name) of the property.
17.3. The second requirement is disclosure of the owner/landlord of the premises; or if it is issued on behalf of some one else, then the name of the person on whose behalf it is issued. The notice shows to names on too "Mrs. Lucy pais, Mrs. Loo Pais". The notice is signed by "Lucy Pais". The notice nowhere states who is the owner of the property. It is significant to notice that the name of the landlord in all official records and correspondence with the tenant as also in the eviction petition is "Lucy Banilda Rebello (Nee Pais)". Thus, the name of the landlord is not clear from the notice.
17.4. The third requirement is in regard to rent. It is not in dispute that rent for the premise is Rs. 468-75 ps. per month. But, the notice refers to the rent as Rs. 375/- per month.
17.5. The fourth requirement is the period for which the amount is due. It is admitted that the rent was due from 1.10.1983 and as on 5.8.1984 when the notice was issued, the rent was due for 10 months. But the notice states that rent is due for about six months.
17.6. Thus, the notice does not refer to the premises in regard to which it is issued, it does not specify the monthly rent correctly, it states the period for which rent is due wrongly, and it does not even state who is the owner.
18. The above analysis will show that the notice does not meet with the requirements of a valid notice under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. It is no doubt true that the notice must be read from a common sense point of view bearing in mind how it is understood by ordinary people. Such a reading will not also help the petitioner in the absence of relevant particulars.
19. One more aspect requires to be noticed. If a particular landlord has only one premises and one tenant and the tenant has only one rented premises, it is possible that the tenant who receives the notice from the landlord, may easily identify the premises, even if it is not specified. But a tenant like the Hindustan Petroleum Ltd., holds on lease several hundreds or thousands of premises all over the country; and the number of premises are so high that the entire processing of rentals has been computerised. Further, the matters will be handed at different points of time by different personnel incharge of a particular Section. In these circumstances, unless the notice gives the description of the property, name of the owner, amount of rent and the period of arrears, the tenants-Corporation will not be in a position to ascertain the premises to which it relates. It may be possible that after a detailed search, the tenant Corporation might have identified the property and paid the rents. But the very purpose of giving two months time to pay the arrears will be defeated if the tenant is not able to identify the subject matter of the notice on receipt of the notice. Where even a single requirement of a valid notice is not present, I have no doubt in my mind that the notice does not comply with Section 21(1)(a). Hence, point (2) is answered in the negative and infavour of the tenant. Hence, point No. (3) does not survive for consideration.
20. It is necessary to deal with one more contention of the learned Counsel for the landlord in this behalf. He contended that the invalidity of the notice is not specifically raised in the Statement of objections and therefore the tenant should not be permitted to raise it at the stage of revision. This contention is not sound as the tenant, in its statement of objections, has clearly contended that "the respondent begs to submit that the petitioner has not at all made out any ground under provisions of Section 21(1)(a) of the Act so as to seek eviction of the respondent". Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where the requirement is statutory, the absence of pleading is totally irrelevant. Where as eviction order can be passed only on compliance with certain statutory requirements, the onus is on the landlord to plead and prove compliance with the requirements. For example, if an eviction is sought under 21(1)(h) of the Act, the Supreme Court has held that the question of partial eviction must be considered by the Court irrespective of the fact whether there is a pleading in that behalf or not. Similarly, even if the tenant does not specifically raise a plea, the Court is bound to examine whether requirement of Section 21(1)(a) are complied with or not before passing an order of eviction. In this case, as pointed out above, the tenant has clearly stated that there is no compliance with Section 21(1)(a) of the Act and therefore, there is sufficient pleading.
21. In the result, this revision petitioner is allowed and the order of eviction dated 27.7.1989 passed by the learned Munsiff, Mangalore in HRC No. 326/1984 as confirmed in RR No. 302/1989 by the District Court, Dakshina Kannada on 29.7.1997 are set aside. The eviction petition (HRC No. 326/1984) under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act is rejected.