Allahabad High Court
Ramesh Chandra vs State Of U.P. on 15 May, 2026
Author: Santosh Rai
Bench: Santosh Rai
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Reserved on 15.04.2026
Delivered on 15.05.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 192 of 1986
Ramesh Chandra
..Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P.
..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s)
:
B.k. Srivastava, Rajneesh Pratap Singh
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
A.G.A.
Court No. - 91
HON'BLE SANTOSH RAI, J.
1. Heard Shri Rajneesh Pratap Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Shri Purshottam Maurya, learned AGA on behalf of the State.
2. The present appeal is preferred under Section 374 Cr.P.C. by the appellant Ramesh Chandra to set aside the judgment and order dated 08.01.1986 passed by Special Judge, Bulandshahr in Criminal Case No.6 of 1983 convicting and sentencing the appellant under Section 3/7(1)(a)(ii) of Essential Commodities Act to undergo R.I. for 6 months and to pay fine of Rs.2,000/- whereas co-accused Kishan Chandra is acquitted of the charge levelled against him under Section 3/7 of E.C. Act.
3. Tersely, as per the prosecution case, accused Ramesh Chandra and Kishan Chandra were prosecuted under Section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act on the allegation that on 24.12.1982 at about 8:00 PM, they were found transporting 68 quintals and 50 kilograms of gur (jaggery) in Truck No. USA 8937. The truck was checked by Sri Kishan Gopal Gupta, Marketing Inspector, along with Sudhakar Gupta, Prem Chand Jain and Sompal Singh, Marketing Inspectors. Accused Kishan Chand was driving the truck, while accused Ramesh Chandra was alleged to be the owner of the gur. Upon demand, accused Ramesh Chandra failed to produce any license or document relating to the gur. Consequently, the truck along with the gur was seized and the gur was weighed, for which recovery memo Ex. Ka-1 was prepared showing the total quantity as 68 quintals and 50 kilograms. Thereafter, Sri Kishan Gopal Gupta prepared written report Ex. Ka-2 and handed over the accused along with the truck to the concerned police station. It was alleged that the accused were found in possession of more than 10 quintals of gur without any valid license, thereby contravening the provisions of the U.P. Sugar and Gur Dealers Licensing Order, 1962. On the basis of the report, the case was registered on 04.12.1982 at 10:00 PM by Constable Clerk A.S. Bhati, who prepared check FIR Ex. Ka-4 and made the corresponding GD entry at Serial No. 61, copy of which is Ex. Ka-5. Investigation was conducted by Sri Babu Ram, S.I., who recorded the statements of witnesses, prepared site plan Ex. Ka-6, obtained prosecution sanction from the District Magistrate, Bulandshahr vide Ex. Ka-8, and thereafter submitted charge-sheet Ex. Ka-7 before the Court.
4. The prosecution examined K.C. Gupta, Marketing Inspector P.W.-1 (complainant) and Babu Ram S.I. P.W.-2. The defence examined Vijendra Pal Singh DW-1, Anand Swarup DW-2 and Banwarilal DW-3.
5. The accused-appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he stated that he has been falsely implicated in this case.
6. PW-1 has supported the case of prosecution and stated that accused were found carrying 68 quintals and 50 kgs of gur in the truck. DW-1 has deposed that he had sold 8 quintals of gur to Ramesh Chandra, 9 quintals to Jai Prakash, 9 quintals to Surendra Kumar, 8 quintals to Chhedi Lal, and 9 quintals to Prem. He further stated that he has 23 bighas of land and also operates a crusher. DW-2 stated that he too has a crusher and had sold 6 quintals of gur to Dinesh, 9 quintals to Banwari, and 9 quintals to Ramnivas. DW-3 deposed that he had purchased 9 quintals of gur and that Prem, Jai Prakash, Chhedi Lal, Ramnivas, Ramesh Chandra, and Suresh Singh had also purchased gur from him for domestic consumption. He further stated that he was travelling in the truck and had gone to take meals, and by the time he returned, the truck was no longer present there.
7. In brief, the grounds of appeal are that the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned court below are against the evidence available on record, arbitrary, illegal, and based on irrelevant and extraneous considerations. The findings recorded by the trial court are not founded upon a proper appraisal and consideration of the entire facts, circumstances, and evidence on record and are therefore vitiated in law. The prosecution has failed to establish the alleged offence under Section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, and no such offence is made out against the appellants. The prosecution evidence is contradictory, unreliable, and unworthy of credence, yet the learned court below acted illegally in placing reliance upon such evidence while disbelieving the independent and reliable defence witnesses. Further, the sentence awarded is illegal, excessive, unduly harsh, and wholly unwarranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
8. In this case, two accused persons, namely Ramesh Chandra and Krishan Chandra, are said to be involved in committing the offence under Section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act. As per the recovery memo and the first information report, the accused-applicant is said to be the owner of the gur. During the inspection conducted by the prosecution witness, K.C. Gupta, it was discovered that 137 sacks, each weighing 50 kg, totaling 68.5 quintals of jaggery, were loaded in the truck and the accused-applicant had no license. As per the relevant rules and regulations, only 10 quintals of jaggery is permissible and any quantity in excess thereof is in violation of the U.P. Sugar and Gur Dealers Licensing Order, 1962, punishable under Section 3/7 of the E.C. Act. The jaggery was measured at the spot.
9. The accused-appellant, who is said to be the owner of the gur, stated that the goods belonged to different purchasers, but he had no sale and purchase receipts or any valid license under the U.P. Sugar and Gur Dealers Licensing Order, 1962. During the course of trial, PW-1 and PW-2 were examined and they clearly and specifically supported the prosecution version in their statements. The defence examined three witnesses. The defence version is that different persons had purchased the goods for the purpose of personal consumption and the defence witnesses stated that the quantity of jaggery belonging to each purchaser was about nine and a half quintals, nine quintals, etc., meaning thereby it was slightly less than ten quintals each. The trial court rightly opined that such huge quantity does not appear to be meant for personal use. Admittedly, no other person, who was said to be the purchaser of the goods, was present in the truck.
10. Learned counsel for the accused-appellant submits that the aforesaid goods did not belong to the accused-appellant, though it is admitted that he was present in the truck at the time of the incident. The accused-applicant has neither been examined nor submitted any reliable documents relating to such a huge quantity of jaggery, which was in violation of the U.P. Sugar and Gur Licensing Order, 1962. Furthermore, he also submits that the aforesaid quantity of jaggery was not in the possession of the accused-applicant and that, at best, only constructive possession may be attributed to him.
11. He further submits that the alleged Gur weighing 68 quintals and 50 kilograms was found only in the constructive possession of the appellant. It is undisputed that the same was being carried to their village, whereas the actual possession and ownership belonged to seven other persons of the village, namely Dinesh Kumar, Banwari Lal, Ram Niwas, Prem, Chheda Lal, Jai Prakash, and Surendra Kumar. The said Gur had been purchased from DW-1, namely Vijendra Pal Singh, and DW-2, Anand Swaroop. However, the learned trial court, in paragraph 5 of the impugned judgment at page 4, line 9, observed that the accused Ramesh was also not known to him prior to that date. In fact, DW-1 stated that he knew the accused through village relations, although they had not met on previous occasions. Therefore, the learned trial court wrongly questioned the reliability of DW1, similar to DW2.
12. In light of the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant, it would be just and proper to discuss the concept of possession in criminal law. Possession is not merely physical custody of a thing, but conscious dominion over it. In criminal jurisprudence, especially in offences regarding contraband, essential commodities, or illegal transport of prohibited goods, the Apex Court has repeatedly emphasized the doctrine of conscious possession. The word possession is not capable of precise and exhaustive definition. It varies according to the context and the statute. Simply put, possession means control over a thing coupled with knowledge of such control. The principle is that where contraband or illegal articles are found in a vehicle under the control of the accused, the Court may presume conscious possession from the surrounding circumstances. Conscious possession means possession with awareness about the existence and nature of the article possessed. A person may physically carry something unknowingly, and such custody may not amount to conscious possession.
13. In the present case, recovery of 68.5 quintals of jaggery is a huge commercial quantity. In this case, the prosecution has established through cogent and reliable evidence that the truck was being driven by Kishan Chandra and the accused-appellant was the owner of the gur loaded in the truck. The accused-appellant had no transit permit, sale invoice, or any license issued by the competent authority, and despite being afforded reasonable opportunity, he failed to offer any satisfactory explanation. Thus, considering all the facts and circumstances, the recovery of 68.5 quintals of gur from the aforesaid truck, which was being driven by Kishan Chandra and the accused-appellant was present there in the truck, who is the owner of the gur, clearly establishes the offence and the trial court rightly held the accused-applicant guilty under Section 3/7 of the E.C. Act.
14. Learned counsel for the applicant further argued that, if the Court finds the accused-appellant guilty, he may be released on probation, as this criminal appeal pertains to the year 1986 and the age of the appellant is about 70 years. No useful purpose would be served by sending the accused-applicant to judicial custody, particularly when he has no previous criminal antecedents.
15. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgement in Tarak Nath Keshari vs. State of West Bengal, (2024) 13 SCC 384 in which the Apex Court has held as under:
10. Even if there is minimum sentence provided in Section 7 of the EC Act, in our opinion, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of probation, the EC Act, being of the year 1955 and the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 being later. Even if minimum sentence is provided in the EC Act, 1955 the same will not be a hurdle for invoking the applicability of provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Reference can be made to a judgment of this Court in Lakhvir Singh v. The State of Punjab & Ors (2021) 2 SCC 763.
11. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. The appellant is directed to be released on probation under section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958..
16. Sections 4 and 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 are reproduced below for ready reference:
4. Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct. (1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:
Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond.
(2) Before making any order under sub-section (1), the court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case.
(3) When an order under sub-section (1) is made, the court may, if it is of opinion that in the interests of the offender and of the public it is expedient so to do, in addition pass a supervision order directing that the offender shall remain under the supervision of a probation officer named in the order during such period, not being less than one year, as may be specified therein, and may in such supervision order impose such conditions as it deems necessary for the due supervision of the offender.
(4) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall require the offender, before he is released, to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, to observe the conditions specified in such order and such additional conditions with respect to residence, abstention from intoxicants or any other matter as the court may, having regard to the particular circumstances, consider fit to impose for preventing a repetition of the same offence or a commission of other offences by the offender.
(5) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall explain to the offender the terms and conditions of the order and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the supervision order to each of the offenders, the sureties, if any, and the probation officer concerned.
5. Power of court to require released offenders to pay compensation and costs.(1) The court directing the release of an offender under section 3 or section 4, may, if it thinks fit, make at the same time a further order directing him to pay
(a) such compensation as the court thinks reasonable for loss or injury caused to any person by the commission of the offence; and
(b) such costs of the proceedings as the court thinks reasonable.
(2) The amount ordered to be paid under sub-section (1) may be recovered as a fine in accordance with the provisions of sections 386 and 387 of the Code.
(3) A civil court trying any suit, arising out of the same matter for which the offender is prosecuted, shall take into account any amount paid or recovered as compensation under sub-section (1) in awarding damages.
17. In Sitaram Paswan and Another vs. State of Bihar, (2005) 13 SCC 110, the Apex Court has held as under:
For exercising the power which is discretionary, the court has to consider the circumstances of the case, the nature of the offence and the character of the offender. While considering the nature of the offence, the court must take a realistic view of the gravity of the offence, the impact which the offence had on the victim. The benefit available to the accused under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act is subject to the limitation embodied in the provisions and the word "may" clearly indicates that the discretion vests with the court whether to release the offender in exercise of the powers under Section 3 or 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, having regard to the nature of the offence and the character of the offender and overall circumstances of the case. The powers under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act vest with the court when any person is found guilty of the offence committed, not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. This power can be exercised by the courts while finding the person guilty and if the court thinks that having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, benefit should be extended to the accused, the power can be exercised by the court even at the appellate or revisional stage and also by this Court while hearing the appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.
18. In Lakhanlal alias Lakhan Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2021) 6 SCC 100, the Apex Court held as under:
10. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444, while examining the provisions of the 1958 Act held that in case the offenders are below 21 years, an injunction is issued to the Court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case, it is not desirable to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act but in respect of offenders who were above age of 21 years, the Court has absolute discretion to release such offenders either after admonition or on probation of good conduct. The Court held as under:
"4. The Act is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish him. Broadly stated, the Act distinguishes offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age, and offenders who are guilty of having committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence. While in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years, absolute discretion is given to the court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct, subject to the conditions laid down in the appropriate provisions of the Act, in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years an injunction is issued to the court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act."
11. This Court in Jugal Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1972) 2 SCC 633 explained the rationale of the provision as to prevent the conversion of youthful offenders into obdurate criminals as a result of their association with hardened criminals of mature age in case the youthful offenders are sentenced to undergo imprisonment in jail. The Court held as under:
"6. The Probation of Offenders Act was enacted in 1958 with a view to provide for the release of offenders of certain categories on probation or after due admonition and for matters connected therewith. The object of the Act is to prevent the conversion of youthful offenders into obdurate criminals as a result of their association with hardened criminals of mature age in case the youthful offenders are sentenced to undergo imprisonment in jail. The above object is in consonance with the present trend in the field of penology, according to which effort should be made to bring about correction and reformation of the individual offenders and not to resort to retributive justice. Modern criminal jurisprudence recognises that no one is a born criminal and that a good many crimes are the product of socio-economic milieu. Although not much can be done for hardened criminals, considerable stress has been laid on bringing about reform of young offenders not guilty of very serious offences and of preventing their association with hardened criminals. The Act gives statutory recognition to the above objective. It is, therefore, provided that youthful offenders should not be sent to jail, except in certain circumstances. Before, however, the benefit of the Act can be invoked, it has to be shown that the convicted person even though less than 21 years of age, is not guilty of an offenec punishable with imprisonment for life. This is clear from the language of Section 6 of the Act."
19. In Mohd. Hashim vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2017) 2 SCC 198, the Apex reiterated the exercise of discretionary power of the court under Probation of Offenders Act as under:
21. In this regard, it is also seemly to refer to other authorities to highlight how the discretion vested in a court under the PO Act is to be exercised. In Ram Parkash v. State of H.P., (1972) 4 SCC 46, while dealing with Section 4 of the PO Act in the context of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the Court opined that the word "may" used in Section 4 of the PO Act does not mean "must". On the contrary, as has been held in the said authority, it has been made clear in categorical terms that the provisions of the PO Act distinguish offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age and offenders who are guilty of committing an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence. Thereafter, the Court has proceeded to observe:
"7.... While in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years. absolute discretion is given to the court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years an injunction is issued to the Court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. (Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444 and Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1088.)"
Be it noted, in the said case, keeping in view the offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the Court declined to confer the benefit under Section 4 of the PO Act.
22. We have referred to the aforesaid authority to stress the point that the court before exercising the power under Section 4 of the PO Act has to keep in view the nature of offence and the conditions incorporated under Section 4 of the PO Act. Be it stated in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (2000) 5 SCC 82, it has been held that Parliament has made it clear that only if the Court forms the opinion that it is expedient to release the convict on probation for the good conduct regard being had to the circumstances of the case and one of the circumstances which cannot be sidelined in forming the said opinion is "the nature of the offence". The Court has further opined that though the discretion has been vested in the court to decide when and how the court should form such opinion, yet the provision itself provides sufficient indication that releasing the convicted person on probation of good conduct must appear to the Court to be expedient. Explaining the word "expedient", the Court held thus:
9. The word "expedient" had been thoughtfully employed by Parliament in the section so as to mean it as "apt and suitable to the end in view". In Black's Law Dictionary the word "expedient" is defined as "suitable and appropriate for accomplishment of a specified object" besides the other meaning referred to earlier. In State of Gujarat v. Jamnadas G. Pabril, (1975) 1 SCC 138, a two-Judge Bench of this Court has considered the word "expedient". The learned Judges have observed in para 21 thus:
21.... Again, the word "expedient" used in this provision, has several shades of meaning. In one dictionary sense, "expedient" (adj.) means "apt and suitable to the end in view", "practical and efficient": "politic"; "profitable"; "advisable", "fit, proper and suitable to the circumstances of the case". In another shade, it means a device "characterised by mere utility rather than principle, conducive to special advantage rather than to what is universally right" (see Webster's New International Dictionary)'.
10. It was then held that the court must construe the said word in keeping with the context and object of the provision in its widest amplitude. Here the word "expedient" is used in Section 4 of the PO Act in the context of casting a duty on the court to take into account "the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence...". This means Section 4 can be resorted to when the court considers the circumstances of the case, particularly the nature of the offence, and the court forms its opinion that it is suitable and appropriate for accomplishing a specified object that the offender can be released on probation of good conduct."
20. In Chellammal and Another vs. State represented by the Inspector of Police, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 461, where the Sessions Judge has acquitted the appellants (mother-in-law and husband) of the charge under Section 304-B IPC but convicted them under Section 498-A, the Apex Court has held as under:
Summing up the legal position, it can be said that while an offender cannot seek an order for grant of probation as a matter of right but having noticed the object that the statutory provisions seek to achieve by grant of probation and the several decisions of this Court on the point of applicability of Section 4 of the Probation Act, we hold that, unless applicability is excluded, in a case where the circumstances stated in subsection (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act are attracted, the court has no discretion to omit from its consideration release of the offender on probation; on the contrary, a mandatory duty is cast upon the court to consider whether the case before it warrants releasing the offender upon fulfilment of the stated circumstances. The question of grant of probation could be decided either way. In the event, the court in its discretion decides to extend the benefit of probation, it may upon considering the report of the probation officer impose such conditions as deemed just and proper. However, if the answer be in the negative, it would only be just and proper for the court to record ord the reasons therefor.
21. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that at present, the accused-appellant is an elderly person, aged about 64 years. The appeal has remained pending since the year 1986. The appellant has no criminal antecedents. It is also an admitted fact that no loss of life occurred in the incident and the matter is not related to organized crime. Furthermore, learned counsel for the appellant has not assailed the conviction on merits in detail but has confined his argument particularly to the question of sentence and prayed for extending the benefit of probation as provided under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act.
22. Having considered the submissions advanced by the parties and material evidence available on record, admittedly, the age of the accused-appellant Ramesh Chandra was only 22 years at the time of incident. No Reliable evidence is placed before this court which shows that the accused-appellant has any previous criminal antecedent. There is no evidence of habitual criminality. The possibility of reformation cannot be ruled out. Presently, the age of the accused-appellant is about 64 years and this criminal appeal is pending before this court for about last 40 years, this Court is of the opinion that the benefit of probation deserves to be extended to the accused-appellant under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
23. Thus, in view of the above specific facts and circumstances, it would be just and proper to release the accused-appellant on probation. The appeal is, thus, partly allowed with modification in sentence. The conviction of the appellant Ramesh Chandra under Section 3/7(1)(a)(ii) of the E.C. Act is hereby affirmed. However, the sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment is set aside.
24. In view of the modification of sentence and release of the appellant on probation, the bail bonds and sureties furnished earlier during trial/appeal shall stand discharged.
25. Let the accused-appellant Ramesh Chandra be released on probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, subject to the following conditions:
(i) The accused-appellant shall execute a fresh personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the court concerned for a period of one year with an undertaking that he shall maintain peace and good behaviour and will not involve in any criminal activity.
(ii) In exercise of powers under Section 5 of Probation of Offenders Act, 1965, the appellant is directed to deposit/pay a sum of Rs.10,000/- as compensation to the State within a period of one month from today before the court concerned.
(iii) In the event of breach of the aforesaid condition, the accused-appellant shall be liable to undergo the sentence as awarded by the trial court to serve the original sentence.
26. Trial court shall ensure compliance and seek report from the Probation Officer for supervision.
27. The appellant is directed to appear before the trial court within one month from today to furnish the requisite bonds. In case of default, the trial court shall be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law, including issuance of coercive process.
28. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted forthwith to the trial court concerned along with trial court record for compliance.
(Santosh Rai,J.) May 15, 2026 Ankit.