Kerala High Court
M. Salim vs State Of Kerala on 5 November, 1999
Equivalent citations: [2001]122STC305(KER)
Author: Arijit Pasayat
Bench: Arijit Pasayat, K.S. Radhakrishnan
JUDGMENT Arijit Pasayat, C.J.
1. In this revision application filed under Section 41 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (in short, "the Act"), question raised is the rate at which "seat cover for motor vehicle" is to be taxed. The relevant assessment year is 1993-94.
2. Factual position which is undisputed is as follows : Assessee is a manufacturer of seat covers for motor vehicles. Tax was levied by the assessing officer at the rate of 15 per cent on a sales turnover of seat covers amounting to Rs. 4,75,880. The period for which the rate was applied is from April 1, 1993 to December 31, 1993. According to the assessee, the rate is 6 per cent. Appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Kollam, and before the Kerala Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram (in short, "the Tribunal") did not yield any relief for the assessee.
3. In support of the revision application, it is submitted that entry No. 86 of the First Schedule originally provided rate of tax at the rate of 15 per cent. The said entry, inter alia, related to "spare parts and accessories". Therefore, both categories of goods were covered under a common head. Subsequently, by S.R.O. No. 487 of 1993, "spare parts" were made taxable at the rate of 6 per cent. Subsequently, with effect from January 1, 1994 vide S.R.O. No. 1728 of 1993 specific entry relating to "accessories" was introduced and articles became taxable at the rate of 6 per cent. Since the broad group and head was one, different rates could not have been either conceived or provided for. Motor seat covers are accessories and, therefore, there is no reason to adopt a different rate for the period in question from April 1, 1993 to December 31, 1993.
4. Learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that in different parts of the Schedule, different tax rates are provided for. Merely because of subsequent rate of 6 per cent has been prescribed for accessories, that cannot be any ground to hold that from April 1, 1993 also the said rate is applicable.
5. In order to appreciate the rival submissions, entries as prescribed at different times need to be noted. Original entry No. 86 reads as follows :
"SI. No. Description of goods Point of levy Rate of tax (per cent)
86. Motor vehicles, chassis of motor vehicles, motor cycles, motor cycle combinations, motor scooter, mopeds, motorettes, three wheelers, motor vessels, motor engines, trailers, motor bodies built on chassis of motor vehicles, bodies built on motor vessels or engines and spare parts and accessories thereof.
At the point of first sale in the State by a dealer who is liable to tax under section 5. 15"
6. By S.R.O. No. 487/93 rates were modified and entry No. 17 in S.R.O. reads as follows :
"SI. No. Description of goods _ Rate of tax_ Existing reduced (percent) 17 Motor spare parts including spare parts for tractor.
15 6"
Subsequently, S.R.O. No. 1728/93 was issued which superseded the aforesaid S.R.O. No. 487/93. Sl. No. 38 of the entry reads as follows :
"SI. No. Description of goods _ Rate of tax_ Existing reduced (per cent) 38 Motor vehicle spare parts and accessories excluding tyres, tubes, flaps and battery for petrol and diesel driven vehicles including tractor, bulldozer and power tiller.
15 6"
7. The stand of the assessee that there was bona fide omission to include the word "accessory" is clearly without any foundation. It is for the Government to specify the rates. No material whatsoever has been placed before us to show that a different intention existed.
8. The further question as raised is whether seat covers come within the meaning of "accessory". In Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary International, Vol. I, the word "accessory" has been defined as (1) a thing that aids subordinately ; an adjunct ; appurtenance ; accompaniment such items of appeal as complete an outfit, (2) aiding the principal design, or assisting subordinately the chief agent and (3) contributory ; supplemental ; additional. This definition was approved by the apex Court in Annapurna Carbon Industries Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1976] 37 STC 378 at page 381, while examining the question whether "arc carbon" is an "accessory" to cinema projectors or other cinematographic equipment under item 4 of Schedule I to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, and laid the rule thus :
"We find that the term 'accessories' is used in the schedule to describe goods which may have been manufactured for use as an aid or addition. A sense in which the word 'accessory' is used is given in Webster's Third New International Dictionary as follows : 'an object or device that is not essential in itself but that adds to the beauty, convenience, or effectiveness of something else'. Other meanings given there are : 'supplementary or secondary to something of greater or primary importance' ; 'additional' ; 'any of several mechanical devices that assist in operating or controlling the tone resources of an organ'. 'Accessories' are not necessarily confined to particular machines for which they may serve as aids. The same item may be an accessory of more than one kind of instrument."
The meaning of "accessories" as an object or device that is not essential in itself but that adds to the beauty or convenience or effectiveness of something else or is supplementary or secondary to something of greater or primary importance which assists in operating or controlling or any serve as aid or accessories. The "arc carbon" was held to be an accessory.
9. In Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, at page 13 "accessory" has been defined as "anything which is joined to another thing as an ornament, or to render it more perfect, or which accompanies it, or is connected with it as an incident, or as subordinate to it, or which belongs to or with it, adjunct or accompaniment. A thing of subordinate importance. Aiding or contributing in secondary way of assisting in or contributing to as a subordinate". Above position was elaborately dealt with by the apex Court in Mehra Bros, v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer [1991] 80 STC 233. The stand of the assessee that the word "accessory" is included or deemed to have been included automatically in the entry at Sl. No. 17 of S.R.O. No. 487 of 1993 is not acceptable in view of the fact that such an intention cannot be gathered from the mere fact that at some point of time two items were grouped together. It is an accepted canon of interpretation of statutes that a later statute is normally not used as an aid to construction of an earlier one. However, when an earlier Act is truly ambiguous a later Act may in certain circumstances serve as a parliamentary exposition of the former. (See Ram Krishna Ram Nath v. Janpad Sabha AIR 1962 SC 1073, U.P. Co-operative Cane Union Federation Ltd. v. Liladhar AIR 1981 SC 152, and Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India AIR 1984 SC 1004). The rule of construction applicable in such cases can be best stated in the words of Lord Sterndale : "I think it is clearly established that subsequent legislation on the same subject may be looked at in order to see what is the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous. I quite agree the subsequent legislation, if it proceeds upon an erroneous construction of previous legislation, cannot alter that previous legislation, but if there be any ambiguity in the earlier legislation, then the subsequent legislation may fix the proper interpretation which is to be put upon the earlier Act." (See Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1921] 2 KB 403. The position was reiterated by the apex Court in Jogendra Nath Naskar v. Commissioner of Income-tax AIR 1969 SC 1089 and State of Bihar v. S.K. Roy AIR 1966 SC 1995. In the case at hand, there is absolutely no ambiguity in the concerned entries. The inevitable conclusion is that from April 1, 1993 to December 31, 1993 tax has to be levied at the rate of 15 per cent and thereafter 6 per cent in view of the subsequent notification. That precisely is what the authorities have adopted. There is no infirmity in the conclusions which warrant interference.
The tax revision case is accordingly dismissed.