Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal - Delhi
Collector Of Customs vs Warner Hindustan Ltd. on 16 June, 1986
Equivalent citations: 1986(9)ECC108, 1986(26)ELT367(TRI-DEL)
ORDER M. Gouri Shanker Murthy, Member (J)
1. The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal by the Collector of Customs, Bombay, is as to whether the goods imported (named Incoloy-800) conform to the specification, composition and description of "stainless steel", so as to be assessable to duty under Item No. 73.15(2) of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (the Schedule and the Act for short), or they are assessable to duty under Item 73.15(1) of the Schedule as goods "not elsewhere specified". While the Asstt. Collector had held them to be assessable to duty under Item 73.15(2) on the ground that the goods conform to the definition of "stainless steel", the Collector (Appeals) had held that they were alloy steel sheets and not "stainless steel" sheets and accordingly they are more appropriately assessable to duty under Heading 73.15(1) of the Schedule.
2. The identical question arises in regard to another import of the same goods in Appeal No. 1950/85-B2 (C.C., Bombay v. Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd., Bombay). Our decision herein governs that appeal also.
3. It was contended by Shri Gopinath for the appellant before us inter alia that -
(a) the relevant heading for the Entry 73.15 in the Schedule, in so far material, is "Alloy. Steel and high carbon steel". That was sub-divided into "stainless steel" (coils, rods, wire rods, strips, sheets and plates) and those "not elsewhere specified". It is obvious, therefore, that "stainless steel" is also an alloy steel and it cannot be concluded that jui because the goods were of alloy steel they cannot be "stainless steel". The corn,usion of the Collector (Appeals) to the effect that the goods are not "stainless steel" because they are made of alloy steel is neither correct nor conclusive on the issue. The goods have necessarily to be alloy steel before they can be classified as of "stainless steel" or otherwise. Accordingly, the order of the Collector (Appeals) suffers from an error apparent from the face of it and is not sustainable;
(b) the goods themselves had never been subjected to analysis. Nevertheless, it would appear from the Memorandum of the grounds of appeal before the Collector (Appeals) that the goods are admittedly of the following composition:
Nickel 32.5% AV. Copper 0.75% Wax. Carbon 0.05% to 0.10% Chromium 21.0% AV. Manganese 1.5% max. Aluminium 0.38% AV. Sulphur 0.015% max. Titanium 0.38% AV. Silicon 1.0% max. Iron Balance;
(c) significantly, while the chromium content was to the extent of 21%, that of iron was 42.425%;
(d) it is the extent of the chromium content that is decisive in the determination of the question as to whether the goods are "stainless steel" goods. Thus, -
i) "Stainless Steel" has been defined to be "a generic name for a broad group of ferrous alloys of iron with chromium or iron with chromium and nickel, usually with other minor alloying additions and having outstanding characteristics of heat resistance and resistance to the oxidizing type of corrosion. Specified broadly by their micro structures, these alloys are known as "Stainless Iron' if substantially ferritic, 'Stainless Steel' if substantially martensitic (Hardenable by heat treatment) and 'Austenitic Stainless Steel' if the structure remains austentic after commercial annealing and cooling"; [Metallurigical Dictionary by 3.G. Henderson];
ii) "steel" itself is primarily a refined alloy of iron and carbon. "Steels may contain alloy constituents other than carbon. They are generally classified as carbon steel, alloy steel, corrosion and heat resisting steels and tool steel"; [Ibid]
iii) steel containing alloying elements intentionally added to impart desired mechanical or chemical properties not otherwise obtainable with iron and carbon alone, is known as 'alloy steel' ;[Ibid]
iv) "Stainless and heat resisting steels" is a generic term. It does not designate any one steel but rather a whole family of steels, the common characteristic of which is their comparatively high chromium content... Hence their general corrosion and high temperture oxidation resistance increases with an increase in the chromium content; [Appendix 11 - Ibid]
v) while martensitic (Stainless Steels) contain from 11.5 to 18% chromium, ferritic stainless steels (Stainless iron) contain from 18 to 30% chromium. The inherent oxidation resistance in ferritic stainless steels is taken advantage of in their wide usage as high temperature cracking tubes in the petroleum industry as heat resisters furnace parts and heat treating fixutres; [Appendix II - Ibid]
vi) in the Mcgraw Hill Dictionary (1982) as well, "stainless steel" is a generic description applied to a wide range of iron alloys containing more than 10% chromium. These alloys can be divided into various groups, those containing chromium and those containing nickel and chromium.
(e) there is no definition of "Stainless Steel" in the Act or the Schedule. Nevertheless, by the Customs Tariff (Amendment) Bill, 1985, the Schedule is substituted and in Chapter 72 of the substituted Schedule "Stainless Steel" had been defined to mean "alloy steels containing, by weight, 1.2% or less of carbon and 10.5% or more of chromium, with or without other elements". The said definition is applicable in the absence of a definition in the earlier Act as a exposition by Parliament of its intent [Reliance on (1) AIR 1969 S.C. 1089- (Jogindernath Naskar v. CIT); (2) AIR 1976 S.C. 2520 - (Sone Valley Protland Cement Co. v. General Mining Syndicate); (3) 1982 ELT 378 (A.P.) - (Jay Engineering Works Ltd. v. Government of India)];
(f) the ASTM, A240-80b for Heat resisting chromium and chromium-nickel stainless steel also goes by the extent of chromium content only;
(g) looking to the chromium content of the imported goods, they cannot but be classified as "Stainless Steel" goods.
4. Shri Haksar, for the respondent, on the other hand, urged that-
(a) it is not the chromium content alone that is decisive of the character or description or classification of the goods in question. Iron and nickel contents as well have to be considered. If, admittedly, the iron content is not more-than 50%, the goods cannot be described as "Steel" at all [Reliance on the Handbook of Stainless Steels, by Donald Peckner and I.M. Bernstein, wherein it has been stated (at P.10-16, 17) that:
"Fe-Ni-Cr Alloys - The Fe-Ni-Cr group comprises alloys HN, HP, HT, HU, HW, and HX. These alloys contain 23 to 68 Ni-10 to 28 Cr-0.20 to 0.75C and are all fully austenitic in microstruc-ture. The alloys in this group are not stainless steels inasmuch as they contain less than 50% iron. In each alloy nickel is either the predominent element or the base metal. These alloys are suitable for application in most services at temperatures up to 1150C but, because of their high nickel contents, are not suitable for use in high sulfur bearing atmospheres. The Fe-Ni-Cr alloys are not hardenable by heat treatment and are normally applied in the as-cast condition.'" ];
(b) "Stainless steel" is a ferrous alloy containing iron, chromium and mainly nickel with minor alloys. It is also classified by its micro structure. It is primarily a refined alloy of iron and carbon (carbon content varying from 0.01% to 1.1%). All "stainless steel" varieties are classified as low alloy iron and steel, wrought stainless steel, cast stainless steel and other cast alloys. Incoloy 800, on the contrary, is actually classified as nickel alloy and not as' stainless steel [Reliance on the Chemical Engineer's Handbook 5th Edn. - Perry - Table 23-5];
(c) Incoloy 800 contains higher percentage of nickel as high as 32.5% whereas "stainless steel" contains maximum of 22% nickel [Reliance on page 23-15 - Chemical engineer's Handbook by Perry - 5th Edition];
(d) in terms of Note 3 of Section XV of the Schedule, an alloy of base metals is to be classified as an alloy of the metal which is predominant by weight over the sum total of all others. The goods were of ferrous alloy steel but not "stainless steel" because the iron content was less than 50%. Even the ASTM standards require that a nickel - iron - chromium alloy should be composed of 30 to 35% of nickel, 19 to 23% of chromium and 39.5% of iron. The goods under import corresponds with a nickel-chromium-iron alloy as described in ASTM rather than with "stainless steel";
(e) in the absence of a statutory definition in the Customs Tariff Act, 1972, one will have to go by a meaning given to "Stainless steel" in commercial parlance;
(f) the ISI specification relied upon by the appellant is altogether silent about the iron content;
(g) the definition of "stainless steel" in the new tariff is inapplicable since it had not been given a retrospective effect by the use of appropriate language;
(h) thus, while it may be that the imported goods were a form of ferrous alloy, they are not "stainless steel".
5. In reply, Shri Gopinath drew our attention to the requirement in note (3) of Section XV of predominance over each of the constituent metals rather than the sum total of all the other metals.
6. On the submissions made and on perusal of the papers and otherwise, it would appear to us that -
(a) at the material time, in terms of item 73.15 of the First Schedule, while "stainless steel" alloy steels were to be assessed to duty at 300% ad valorem, alloy steel "not elsewhere specified were chargeable to duty at 60% ad valorem only;
(b) the Collector (Appeals) was clearly in error in assuming the goods to be goods "not elsewhere specified" merely because they were, admittedly, alloy steel. Even "stainless steel" is an alloy steel. One cannot say, therefore, that just because the goods are of alloy steel, they cannot be "stainless steel" goods. There is no escape from a determination of the question as to whether the goods are, in character and composition, description or specifica-tion, "stainless steel" goods so as to attract the higher rate of duty;
(c) this involves an enquiry as to what exactly "stainless steel" is, in the absence of a definition in the statute itself. In construing the expression "stainless steel", inevitably, the question relating to the applicable rule of construction arises;
(d) in interpreting a fiscal statute, -
(i) one rule of construction is that "one has merely to look at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used" [per Justice Rowlatt in (1921) 1 KB 65 at 71 - Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC approved by Viscount Simon in (1946) A.C.I 19 (Candian Eagle Oil Co. v. R)]. "The Court cannot proceed to make good deficiencies, if there may be any. The Court must interpret the statute as it stands and in case of doubt, in a manner favourable to the tax-payer" [AIR 1961 S.C. 609 at 612 -C.A. Abraham v. ITO Kottayam]. "The subject is not taxable by inference or analogy, but only by the plain words of a statute applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case" [per Lord Kilowen in 1936 A.C.I at 24 - Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Duke of Westminister]. If there is any ambiguity of language in a fiscal statute, benefit of that ambiguity must be given to the assessee [AIR 1960 S.C. 1175 at 1182 : 1960 (3) S.C. 727 at 742 - Commissioner of Incometax v. Karam-chand Premchand Ltd., Ahmedabad];
(ii) a second rule of construction (relied upon for the Appellant herein) is what is known as the rule of Parliamentary exposition. In AIR 1969 S.C. 1089 (cited for the appellant) a question as to whether an 'individual' in S.30 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, took within its scope and ambit a Hindu deity, came up for consideration. It was held, after a review of the case law, including AIR 1957 S.C. 832 (=1958 SCR 1-Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sodra Devi) that a Hindu deity, in law, can symbolise a legal person to the extent it represents the particular purpose indicated by the donor of the property gifted or endowed, and, accordingly, a Hindu deity falls within the meaning of the word 'individual'. After having come to an affirmative conclusion on that issue, as it were, their Lordships [J.C. Shah, V. Ramaswamy and A.N. Grover 33=Judgement by V.Ramaswamy J]while repelling an argument of the appellant to the effect that a restricted meaning was to be given to the word 'individual' in the 1922 Act, seeing that unlike in that Act, the definition of the word 'persons' in the later Income Tax Act, 1961, included categorically within its scope, not only an 'individual' but 'every artificial juridical person', that their Lordships observed 'on the other hand, we are of the opinion that the language employed in 1961 Act may be relied upon as a Parliamentary exposition of the earlier act, even on the assumption that the language employed in S.3 of the earlier Act is ambiguous". Their Lordships adverted to the observations of Lord Sterndale M R in 1921-2 KB 403 [Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commissioners] to the effect that I think it is clearly established in Attorney General v. Clerkson, 1900-1 Q.B. 156 at pp 163, 164, that subsequent legislation may be looked at in order to see the proper construction to be put on an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous. I quite agree that subsequent legislation, if it proceeded on an erroneous construction of previous legislation, cannot alter the previous legislation; but if there be any ambiguity in the earlier legislation then the subsequent legislation may fix the proper interpretation which is to be put upon the earlier Act". In AIR 1976 S.C. 2520 [also cited for the appellant] it was not a fiscal enactment that came up for construction. It was some provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 and the Mining Leases (Modification of Terms) Rules, 1956 providing for the modification and alteration of terms and conditions in the mining leases granted prior to the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Acts of 1948 and 1957 that were required to be construed. The Bihar Land Reforms Act was amended in 1964. The amended provision was relied upon as a Parliamentary exposition of the statute as it existed prior to the amendment. It was observed, "sometimes light may be thrown upon the meaning of an act by taking into consideration 'Parliamentary expositions' as revealed by the later Act which amends the earlier one to clear up any doubt or ambiguity. This principle has to be followed, where, as in this case, a particular construction of the earlier Act will render the later incorporated Act ineffectual or otiose or inept. [See Kirkness v. John Hudson & Co. 1955 A.C. 696 (H.L.)]. This view also receives support from the decision of this Court in Jogendranath Naskar v. CIT, Calcutta [(1969) 1 SCC 555 : AIR 1969 S.C. 1089]" (adverted to supra). The limitations in applying the concept of 'Parliamentary exposition' were laid down in AIR 1969 S.C. 543 [The I.T.O., Kanpur v. Maniram and Ors.] by the identical Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that decided AIR 1969 S.C. 1089 - Supra - [Judgement again by Ramaswamy J.], while construing the word "assessed" in SS 18A(3) and 23 B of the Income Tax Act, 1922. Repelling an argument that Ss 210 and 212 of the Incometax Act, 1961 were a Parliamentary exposition of S.18A(3) of the 1922 Act, their Lordships observed -
"There is nothing in 1961 Act to suggest that Parliament intended to explain the meaning or clear up doubts about the meaning of the word "assessed" in s. 18A(3) of the earlier Act. Generally speaking, a subsequent Act of Parliament affords no useful guide to the meaning of another Act which came into existence before the later one was ever framed. Under special circumstances, the law does, however, admit of a subsequent Act to be resorted to for this purpose but the conditions under which the later Act may be resorted to for the interpretation of the earlier Act are strict; both must be laws on the same subject and the part of the earlier Act which it is sought to construe must be ambiguous and capable of different meanings. For example, in Kirkness (Inspector of Taxes) v. John Hudson ^ Co. Ltd., 1955 A.C. 696, it was held by the House of Lords that the ordinary meaning of the word 'sale' importing a consensual relation is to be attributed to the use of it in the context of s.17(1)(a) of the Act of 1945. Since there was no ambiguity in the section, it was not permissible to seek guidance in its construction from later Finance Acts, although it was directed by Parliament to be construed as one with them. At page 714 of the Report Viscount Simonds states:
'I have looked at the later Acts to which the Attorney General referred to in order to satisfy myself that they do not contain a retrospective declaration as to the meaning of the earlier Act. They clearly do not, and I do not think that it has been contended that they do. At the highest it can be said that they may proceed upon an erroneous assumption that the word 'sold' in Section 17 (1) (a) of the Income Tax Act, 1945, has a meaning which I hold it has not. This may be so and, if so, it is an excellent example of the proposition to which reference was made in the report of the Committee of the Privy Council. In re, Mac Manasway, 1951 AC 161 and again by my noble and learned friend Lord Radcliffe in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Dowdall, O'Mahoney and Co. Ltd., 1952 AC 401 that the beliefs or assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law.'
(iii) a third rule of construction is the rule of popular or commercial usage or common parlance. This rule was stated by Lord Tenter-den in Attorney General v. Winstanley, when he said 1/4" the words of an Act of Parliament which are not applied to any particular science or art" are to be construed "as they are understood in common language" [1831 2 D&CI 302 at 310]. As was observed by Pollock B in (1876) 1 Ex D 242 at 248, "statute is not to be construed according to the strict or technical meaning of the language contained in it, but is to be construed in its popular sense, meaning, of course by the words 'popular sense' that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealitng would atri-bute to it." This rule would appear to have been adopted in AIR 1961 S.C. 1325 [Ramavatar v. Asstt. Sales Tax Officer - issue was if 'betel leaves' were vegetables], 1972 (2) SCC 620 [MMTC v. Union of India - question was if Wolfram ore was a 'metallic ore' so as to come within the ambit of item 26 of the Import Tariff, 1934], AIR 1977 SC 597 [=1983 ELT 1566-Dunlop India Ltd. v. Union of India - the question was if 'V.P. Latex' was not 'rubber raw', classifiable under item 39 of the Import. Tariff, 1934], AIR 1977 S.C. 1638 [State of West Bengal v. Washi Ahmed - The issue was if 'vegetable' was included 'green ginger'], AIR 1980 S.C. 1552 [Delhi Cloth and General Mills v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. - the issue was if rayon tyre cord fabric was a rayon fabric], AIR 1981 S.C. 1079 [Indo International Industries v. CIT - the issue was if "clinical syringes" were glassware]; and
(iv) a fourth rule is the construction of a scientific or technical word. "If it is a word which is of a technical or scientific character, then it must be construed according to that which is its primary meaning, namely, its technical or scientific meaning" - [Per Fry J. in (1881) 16 Ch. D. 718 at 720.- Holt & Co. v. Collyer -] adverted to but not adopted in AIR 1967 S.C. 1454 [The Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Jaswant Singh - Construction of the word 'Charcoal'];
(e) notwithstanding the apparent adoption of the rule of commercial or popular usage or common parlance for such words as may be undefined in a statute, in preference to their technical and scientific meaning [AIR 1977 S.C. 597 - the Dunlop case - wherein it was observed "The meaning given to articles in a fiscal statute must be as people in the trade and commerce conversant with the subject generally treat and understand them in the usual course. But once an article is classified and put up in a distinct entry, the basis of classification is not open to question. Technical and scientific tests offer guidance only within limits"], the decisions in 1972 (2) S.C.C. 620 and AIR 1980 S.C. 1552 had proceeded to discuss and consider the "preponderating weight of authority both of experts and books and writings on the subject" [Para 8 of (1972) 2 S.C.C. 620];
(f) there is no evidence on record in this case to establish that the goods described as "Incoloy-800" and of the given composition is treated and understood to be "Stainless Steel" in popular and commercial usage or common parlance. The reliance on either side was entirely on scientific treatises and additionally for the appellant on the rule of Parliamentary exposition and we accordingly, proceed to consider first the preponderating weight of authority in such treatises and then the applicability and resultant effect of the concept of Parliamentary exposition;
(g) admittedly,
(i) the goods are Alloy steel;
(ii) steel itself is, primarily, an alloy of iron and carbon and "Stainless Steel" is a ferrous alloy of iron + chromium or iron + Chromium + nickel and other minor alloying additions; [Metallurgical Dictionary by J.G. Henderson]
(iii) if the chromium content is less than 18% they are classified as Martensitic Stainless Steels and if more than 18%, the goods may be either "Ferretic Stainless Steels" (or "Stainless irons" - containing 18 to 30% of Chromium) or Austenitic Stainless Steels (or the so called 18-8 grades - of which the Chromium content is 18 - 26%; (Annexure II ibid)
(iv) "Austenitic Stainless Steel" contains nickel to the extent of 6 - 20% - (Appendix II - ibid), or 22% P".(.23 - 15 of the Chemical Engineer's Handbook). However, there is no specification of the nickel content in "Ferretic Stainless Steels in either in the Appendix II or the Chemical Engineer's Handbook.
(v) it is reasonable, in the circumstances, to conclude that the goods, in question, containing Chromium to the extent of 21% and Nickel to the extent of 32.5% are neither "Martensitic Stainless Steels", nor "Austenitic Stainless Steels";
(vi) however, a survey of the composition of various stainless steels at P.23-39 to 23-43 in the Chemical Engineer's Handbook would reveal that in only two cases the nickel content ranges between 29% to 33-37%, thus approximating to the nickel content in the goods in question. They are "Carpenter Stainless Steel" - No. 20, (Nickel content 29%), and "Cast 15-35 Alloy H.T." (Nickel content 33-37%). But then both of them do not contain either Sulphur or Aluminium or Titanium (which are present in the goods in question) and the composition of other elements also vary from that of the imported goods; (vii) a reference to ASTM - A - 240 - 80b - dealing with Chromium Nickel Stainless Steels and relied upon by the appellant -would also reveal that there is no steel listed therein where the content of Nickel exceeds 22%. On the contrary the composition of Nickel-Iron-Chromium alloy in ASTM - B 409 - 80 approximates to the composition of the goods in question; (viii) nor does it appear possible to contend that the goods are not of "Stainless Steel" merely because they contain less than 50% iron (as observed in the passage from the Handbook of Stainless Steels extracted in para 4(a) Supra), seeing that, a few alloys classified as "Stainless Steel" in the Chemical Engineer's Handbook have less than 50% of steel composition-wise e.g. Cast 18-38 Alloy (H.U.), Cast 15-65 Alloy (H.X.), Cast 15-35 Alloy (H.T.) (at P.23-41 and 23-42 of the Chemical Engineer's Handbook);
(ix) Incoloy Alloy 800, it would be observed, is itself classified as a "Nickel" alloy and not as a "Stainless Steel" alloy at P.23-45 of the Chemical Engineer's Handbook;
(x) it is thus reasonable to conclude, in the premises, on the basis of the preponderating weight of authority, that - the goods of the composition specified do not answer to the description of "Stainless Steel"; it is not the content of either chromium or iron alone or together that is decisive of the classification of the goods; the goods in question are actually classified as nickel alloys and not "Stainless Steel alloys";
(i) the limitations upon resorting to the concept of Parliamentary exposition have been adverted to Supra. Our attention has not been drawn to anything in the Customs Tariff (Amendment) Bill of 1985 or in Chapter 72 of the substituted Schedule, where a definition of "Stainless Steel" occurs, to suggest that Parliament intended to explain the meaning or clear up doubts as to what exactly "Stainless Steel" is. Nor can the use of the expression "Stainless Steel" in item 73.15 (2) of the Schedule ambiguous, so that the definition thereof in the succeeding enactment could be resorted to. There is no ambiguity in it and if the expression was not defined, we have to ascertain what it means, rather than resort to the concept of Parliamentary exposition in a bid to discover its meaning from a definition furnished in the succeeding enactment. No construction adopted in this case in acordance with settled principles of statutory interpretation can render the later incorporated Act ineffectual or otiose. If Parliament thought fit to define "Stainless Steel" in a particular manner in the succeeding enactment, goods conforming to that definition or description are goods of "Stainless", notwithstanding that the expression could, but for the statutory definition be construed differently in accordance with the meaning given in scientific treatises or the understanding in popular or commercial usage or common parlance. The definition cannot therefore become otiose, there is, therefore, no question of construing the said expression in the light of the definition thereof given in the Customs Tariff (Amendment) Bill, 1985;
(ii) even assuming, however, that the definition of "Stainless Steel" occurring in the Customs Tariff (Amendment) Bill, 1985, can be applied to the import in question, the resort to it does not appear to advance the case of the Appellant; (iii) as already observed, "Alloy Steel" had been defined in Chapter 73 of the Schedule as it existed at the material time and "Stainless Steel" was left undefined - as a species of "Alloy Steel". The scheme was different altogether in the Customs Tariff (Amendment) Bill, 1985. "Stainless Steel" was defined as an alloy steel containing 1.2% or less of carbon and 10.5% or more of chromium with or without other elements. "Other alloy steel", ("steels" not complying with the definition of stainless steel and...) was separately defined;
(iv) going by the definition in the Customs Tariff (Amendment Bill, 1985, most of the Nickel-iron-chromium alloys are "stainless steel", for several of them contain chromium in excess of 10.5% and not merely 0.3% as in the case of "Other alloy steel" notwithstanding that the text books (notably the chemical Engineer's Hand Book) classify them as Nickel alloys and not as "stainless steel" (e.g. Incoloy - 800-801-804-825-901),Nimonic (75-80A-90),Inconel (wrought alloy) 600, Inconel (cast alloy) 610, etc. at 23-45 to 46 of the Chemical engineer's Handbook). The ASTM standard specification for Nickel-iron-chromium Alloy, would become otiose and inapplicable because the alloy contains more than 10.5% of chromium;
(v) further, a comparison of the two definitions of "Alloy steel" in the Schedule and "Other alloy steel" in the Amendment Bill would reveal that what was "Alloy steel" for the purposes of the Schedule at the relevant time is neither "Stainless Steel" nor "Other Alloy Steel" for the purposes of the Amendment Bill, 1985. The content of the various metals in their composition materially differs. While the nickel content cannot be lesser than 0.50% under the earlier definition, it should not be lesser than 0.30% under the later. The content of chromium should be not less than 0.50% under the earlier definition, while in terms of the later it should not be below 0.3%. In terms of the earlier definition, an "Alloy steel" can contain the elements of Phosphorous and sulphur to the extent of 0.12% and 0.10% respectively or 0.20% both together. Phosphorous and sulphur cannot be present in terms of' the later definition even as residuary or remainder after the contents of all others are accounted for. -An alloy containing Phosphorous and sulphur and chromium below 10.5% can be an "Alloy steel" under Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, while it can be neither "stainless steel" because the chromium content is less than 10.5% nor "Other alloy steel" because of the phosphorous and sulphur content) in terms of the definitions in the Amendment Bill, 1985;
(vi)one cannot, therefore, read the definition of "Stainless steel" in the Amendment Bill into the schedule as it existed prior to the amendment.
For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the goods in question are not of "stainless steel" falling within Item No. 73.15(2) of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The appeal does not sustain and is accordingly dismissed.